In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a (...) complete axiomatisation for this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory. (shrink)

This paper considers two competing views of the relationship between preference and desire. On what I call the “preference-first view,” preference is our most basic form of conative attitude, and desire reduces to preference. This view is widely assumed, and essentially treated as orthodoxy, among standard decision theorists, economists, and others. I argue, however, that the preference-first view has things the wrong way around. I first show that the standard motivation offered for (...) this view—motivation underlying foundational work in decision theory and economics—leaves the view with unacceptable psychological implications. I then introduce an alternative view—the “desire-first view”—on which desire is our most basic form of conative attitude, and preference reduces to desire. On the desire-first view I propose, preferences, as comparisons, are best understood as comparisons of the extents to which alternatives are desired. I show that this desire-first view is simple, ecumenical, and explanatorily powerful. (shrink)

Respect for patient autonomy is a central principle of medical ethics. However, there are important unresolved questions about the characteristics of an autonomous decision, and whether some autonomous preferences should be subject to more scrutiny than others. In this paper, we consider whether _inappropriately adaptive preferences_—preferences that are based on and that may perpetuate social injustice—should be categorised as autonomous in a way that gives them normative authority. Some philosophers have argued that inappropriately adaptive preferences do not have normative authority, (...) because they are only a reflection of a person’s social context and not of their true self. Under this view, medical professionals who refuse to carry out actions which are based on inappropriately adaptive preferences are not in fact violating their patient’s autonomy. However, we argue that it is very difficult to articulate a systematic and principled distinction between normal autonomous preferences and inappropriately adaptive preferences, especially if this distinction needs to be useful for clinicians in real-life situations. This makes it difficult to argue that inappropriately adaptive preferences are straightforwardly non-autonomous. Given this problem, we argue that there are significant theoretical issues with contemporary understandings of autonomy in bioethics. We discuss what this might mean for the practice of medicine and for medical ethics education. (shrink)

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view (...) that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration. (shrink)

Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics and ultimately the question of how to “make the world better” with (...) a formal basis. (shrink)

Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is restricted to (...) first-person preferences, and that people’s third-person preferences are time-neutral. Philosophers disagree vigorously about the normative status of these preferences—i.e., they disagree about whether first-person future-bias is rationally permissible. Time-neutralists, for example, have appealed to the predicted asymmetry between first- and third-person preferences to argue for the rational impermissibility of future-bias. We empirically tested these predictions, and found that while people do prefer more past pain to less future pain, they do not prefer less future pleasure to more past pleasure. This was so in both first and third-person conditions. This suggests that future-bias is typically non-absolute, and is more easily outweighed in the case of positive events. We connect this result to the normative debate over future-bias. (shrink)

In at least some of their forms, Cost-Benefit techniques for the evaluation of environmental projects and policies treat the preferences of citizens as the sole determinants of the value of outcomes. There are two salient ways in which this supposition might be defended. The first is metaethical and appeals to considerations about how we must understand talk of environmental and other values. The second is political and appeals to considerations about democratic legitimacy and the proper aims of public policy. (...) Metaethical considerations, I argue, are something of a red herring here. Roughly subjectivist understandings of our talk of values may be appealingly metaphysically unassuming, but in their most plausible formulations they do not support a view of preferences as the sole determinants of value. Political considerations, on the other hand, are to be taken very seriously. They offer, however, no straightforward rationale for any crudely preferentialist measure of social value. Findings obtained from the use of cost-benefit techniques might sometimes have a legitimate role as an input into, but not as a substitute for, political deliberation. Questions about the scope and limits of such legitimacy are properly addressed in political and not in metaethical terms. (shrink)

Introduction: This study, the first of its kind in Iran, was to assess Iranian patients’ preferences for receiving information and participating in decision-making and to evaluate their satisfaction with how medical information is given to them and with their participation in decision-making at present. Method and materials: 299 of 312 eligible patients admitted to general internal medicine or surgery wards from May to December 2006 were interviewed according to a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire contained questions about patients’ preferences regarding (...) four domains of information and their participation in decision-making. Patients’ responses were measured on a visual analogue scale graded from 1 to 10. Results: The mean (SD) score for desire to receive information was 8.88 out of 10 (1.5) and for participation in medical decision-making was 7.75 out of 10 (3). The desire to receive information was greater in women than men (9.0 (1.5) vs 7.8 (1.4), p = 0.025). It was also correlated with their education (r = 0.2, p = 0.001) and their estimation of the severity of their own disease (r = 0.13, p = 0.027). The score for preference to participate in decision-making was higher in women than in men (7.95 (2.8) and 7.0 (3.2), respectively; β = 0.8, p = 0.022) and was negatively correlated with education (r = −0.14, p = 0.015). Discussion: This study shows that Iranian patients are highly interested in receiving information about their condition and participating in clinical decision-making. No predictive variable for such attitudes was found; therefore, the only way for the physician to recognise patients’ desire is to ask them explicitly. (shrink)

This thesis investigates two main issues concerning the behavior of rational agents, preference dynamics and agent diversity. -/- We take up two questions left aside by von Wright, and later also the multitude of his successors, in his seminal book Logic of Preference in 1963: reasons for preference, and changes in preference. Various notions of preference are discussed, compared and further correlated in the thesis. In particular, we concentrate on extrinsic preference. Contrary to intrinsic (...) preference, extrinsic preference is reason-based, i.e. one's preference for one option over another has a reason. A logical model is proposed and its properties are determined. Dynamics come in naturally, since reasons for the preferences can change. Logical systems and formal results regarding dynamical preference change are then presented. -/- Preference arises from comparisons between alternatives. A first option is to compare situations. Abstractly speaking, preferences are in this case between propositions, viewed as sets of possible worlds. The reasons can then be based on a `betterness' relation over possible worlds. Propositional preference arises as a lift from this primitive relation. A standard modal logical approach is taken and we use a modality for the betterness relation in the language. We then model preference change by techniques from dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), where a typical action, e.g. a suggestion or a command can change the betterness ordering of the worlds, and thereby the propositional preference. Dynamic reduction axioms are obtained to encode exactly how such a change takes place. We obtain a complete dynamic preference logic. -/- A second option is to compare objects as such. Concretely, properties of the objects often determine the preference over the objects. Properties are now the reasons. Inspired by Optimality Theory (OT), we propose a priority sequence, an ordering of properties. Various ways of getting a preference from the priority sequence are investigated, though we mostly follow the OT approach. We use a fragment of first-order logic to describe the situation. Here, on the dynamic side, it is priority change that leads to preference change. Using the DEL methodology again we propose a complete set of reduction axioms concerning the possible dynamic operations on priority sequences. -/- Not surprisingly, the above two views are closely related. After all, possible worlds can be thought of as objects! On the basis of a systematic comparison of the two views, we develop a two level perspective, in which the models themselves are structured in layers. In particular, correspondence results between the changes at the level of the possible worlds and the changes at the level of the priority sequences are proved. We end up by sketching a two-level preferential predicate logic to describe more complex circumstances in which situations and objects are compared simultaneously. -/- But we do not see this as the whole story. Preference does not live by itself, it is often intermingled with epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. One can have different intuitions about how this entanglement operates. A few options are discussed, and proposals for logical models are presented. When moving to dynamics, we now see a picture of knowledge update, belief revision and preference change taking place symbiotically, often unconsciously as in real life. -/- The resulting picture in the thesis is one of agents that process information and adjust beliefs and preferences in many different ways. There is no logically prescribed unique norm for doing this. The second part of the thesis takes this general phenomenon of diversity of agents as its focus, since it raises many issues for logical systems and the idealized agents which they normally presuppose. In reality, agents can differ across a wide spectrum of cognitive abilities and habits: in their memory capacity, observation power, inferential power, introspective ability, and revision policies when facing new information. -/- Two kinds of agents, perfect recall agents, and memory-free agents are studied thoroughly, in the setting of playing games. We show how current dynamic logics can be `parametrized' to allow for this memory diversity, with new characterizations of agent types resulting in complete dynamic-epistemic logics. The other dimension of the reality of diverse agents is that, however different they are, they often do manage to coordinate with each other successfully. While this theme has been prominent in game theory and multi-agent systems, it has received hardly any attention in logic. We analyze this interaction between different agents by looking at concrete scenarios which model their types explicitly. -/- Finally, we analyze the issue of agent diversity in its generality, discussing what dynamic logics would have to look like to become a full-fledged account of agents of different capacities and tendencies that pursue and sometimes achieve their goals in irreducibly social settings. -/- . (shrink)

SummarySon preference has been considered as a determinant of women's risk of intimate partner violence experience in India, although quantitative evidence from large nationally representative studies testing this relationship is limited. This study examines the association between husband's son preference, sex composition of children and risk of physical and sexual IPV victimization among wives. Information was collected for 26,284 couples in the nationally representative 2005–2006 National Family Health Survey of India. The exposures were husband's son preference measured (...) as husband's desire for one or more sons greater than the number of daughters and sex composition of the household: only sons, only daughters and mixed. Outcome included past year physical and/or sexual IPV. The results showed that husband's reported son preference and sex composition of children were not associated with risk for IPV victimization in the models adjusted for socio-demographic factors. The findings from this first population-based study of socio-cultural norms around son preference and married Indian women's risk for IPV victimization indicate that cultural preference for sons does not influence women's risk for IPV victimization. (shrink)

Introduction: Cognitive behavioral therapy for children and adolescents has shown efficacy in treating different psychiatric disorders. It has been added to multiple clinical guidelines as the first-line treatment. However, despite more studies of its efficacy, CBT is underutilized in clinical settings due to a lack of rigorous training programs and qualified CBT therapists. The limited knowledge of parents in this intervention and their negative attitudes toward it have been considered as possible reasons.Methods: This is a cross-sectional survey-based study among (...) 464 Saudi parents living in Riyadh city. We aimed to evaluate the preference, knowledge, and attitudes of Saudi parents toward CBT for their children. We compared the difference in the level of knowledge and attitudes toward CBT in relation to the characteristics of parents. An online questionnaire that included 39 questions was carefully reconstructed from four validated scales, approved by an expert panel, and piloted. Participants were recruited to participate through online social media.Results: Saudi parents had average knowledge about CBT; however, they had positive attitudes toward the therapy itself and its role in treating the behavioral issues of children. Male participants showed better knowledge than female participants. Participants with higher education and those with high income had more favorable attitudes toward CBT than others.Conclusion: The knowledge of parents is considered inadequate and indicated the need for more awareness and perhaps mass education. In contrast, they maintained positive attitudes and were interested in evidence-based treatment, with more preference toward non-psychopharmacological interventions. (shrink)

The language comprehension system preferentially assumes that agents come first during incremental processing. While this might reflect a biologically fixed bias, shared with other domains and other species, the evidence is limited to languages that place agents first, and so the bias could also be learned from usage frequency. Here, we probe the bias with electroencephalography (EEG) in Äiwoo, a language that by default places patients first, but where sentence-initial nouns are still locally ambiguous between patient or (...) agent roles. Comprehenders transiently interpreted nonhuman nouns as patients, eliciting a negativity when disambiguation was toward the less common agent-initial order. By contrast and against frequencies, human nouns were transiently interpreted as agents, eliciting an N400-like negativity when the disambiguation was toward patient-initial order. Consistent with the notion of a fixed property, the agent bias is robust against usage frequency for human referents. However, this bias can be reversed by frequency experience for nonhuman referents. (shrink)

I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for (...) conditions that we regard as bad, they are typically better off having their acquired preferences satisfied. If they are badly off it is because they cannot get what we and they, would regard as more desirable alternatives. Preference utilitarianism explains why individuals in such circumstances are badly off whether they have adapted to their deprived circumstances or not. Even if they prefer the conditions of their lives to all other available alternatives, most would prefer alternatives that are not available to them which would, on the preferentist account, make them better off. And that, on the preferentist account, is the basis for a radical critique of unjust institutions that limit people's options and prevent them from getting what they want. (shrink)

In her Choosing Well, Chrisoula Andreou puts forth an account of instrumental rationality that is revisionary in two respects. First, it changes the goalpost or standard of instrumental rationality to include “categorial” appraisal responses, alongside preferences, which are relational. Second, her account is explicitly diachronic, applying to series of choices as well as isolated ones. Andreou takes both revisions to be necessary for dealing with problematic choice scenarios agents with disorderly preferences might find themselves in. Focusing on problem cases (...) involving cyclical preferences, I will first argue that her first revision is undermotivated once we accept the second. If we are willing to grant that there are diachronic rationality constraints, the preference-based picture can get us further than Andreou acknowledges. I will then turn to present additional grounds for rejecting the preference-based picture. However, these grounds also seem to undermine Andreou’s own appeal to categorial appraisal responses. (shrink)

We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.

In this paper, I set out two ethical complications for Rid and Wendler’s proposal that a “Patient Preference Predictor” (PPP) should be used to aid decision making about incapacitated patients’ care. Both of these worries concern how a PPP might categorize patients. In the first section of the paper, I set out some general considerations about the “ethics of apt categorization” within stratified medicine and show how these challenge certain PPPs. In the second section, I argue for a (...) more specific—but more contentious—claim that proper respect for the autonomy of incapacitated patients might require us to act on reasons which they could endorse and show how this claim places important limits on the categories employed by an ethically acceptable PPP. The conclusion shows how these concerns about apt categorization relate to more familiar worries about Rid and Wendler’s proposals. (shrink)

An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to (...) regular tastes where regularity means that tastes can be derived from a pure qualitative relation between the different commodities. Besides, a preference family based on preference relations corresponding to each particular commodity is said to be rationalizable if there exists a metapreference over commodity bundles which consistently summarizes the preference family and then allows to decide. As a second result, it is shown that if a preference family is rationalizable, then the tastes are organized thanks to a reflexive and transitive qualitative relation between the different commodities. (shrink)

This study surveyed investors to determine the extent to which they preferred ethical behavior to profits and their interest in having information about corporate ethical behavior reported in the corporate annual report. First, investors were asked to determine what penalties should be assessed against employees who engage in profitable, but unethical, behavior. Second, investors were asked about their interest in using the annual report to disclose the ethical performance of the corporation and company officials. Finally, investors were asked if (...) they felt that ethics reports should be audited.The survey results indicate that many shareholders (42%) do not expect a high level of ethical behavior from corporate employees or officers. There is a significant amount of interest in disclosure of ethical issues (72%) and unwillingness to trust management to provide unbiased reports of ethical behavior. If such reports are included with the financial statements, 32 percent of the investors surveyed would prefer to have them audited to provide independent verification. (shrink)

A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ' choice' is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Económica 26: 121-127,1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled (...) by such choice functions. Arrow's standard model of rationality has been criticized in economics and gave rise to approaches of bounded rationality. Two standard assumptions of rationality will be given up in this paper. First, the idea that agents are utility optimizers (Simon). Second, the idea that the relation of ' indifference' gives rise to an equivalence relation. To account for the latter, Luce (Econometrica 24: 178-191, 1956) introduced semi-orders. Extending some ideas of Van Benthem (Pac Philos Q 63: 193-203, 1982), we will show how to derive semi-orders (and so-called interval orders) based on the idea that agents are utility satisficers rather than utility optimizers. (shrink)

Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. (...) Second, I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw. (shrink)

This is the first book to examine behavioral theories on social preference from institutional and philosophical perspectives using economic experiments. The experimental method in economics has challenged central behavioral assumptions based on rationality and selfishness, proposing empirical evidence that not only profit seeking but also social preferences matter in individuals' decision making. By performing distribution experiments in institutional contexts, the author extends assumptions about human behavior to understand actual social economy. The book also aims to enrich behavioral theories (...) of economics directed toward institutional evolution. The author scrutinizes how specific institutional conditions enhance or mute individuals' selfish incentives or their fairness ideals such as egalitarian, performance-based, labor-value radicalism or libertarianism. From experimental results and their analysis, implications for actual problems in social economy and institutional change are derived: why performance-based pay often fails to promote workers' productivity; why labor wages decline whereas shareholder's values increase after financialization; and whether socially responsible investment can be a social institution for corporate governance. The book is also addressed to philosophers of social sciences interested in how experimental methods can contribute to developing cognition of human behaviors and be extended to social theories. Referring to behavioral theorists in the history of economic thought, the author discusses the meanings of experiments in the methodology of social sciences. She also proposes new ways of interpreting experimental results by reviving historic social theories and applying them to actual social problems. (shrink)

This paper offers a general approach to ethics before considering its implications for the question of how to respond to religious preferences in healthcare, especially those of patients and healthcare workers. The first section outlines the two main components of the approach: (1) demoralizing, that is, seeking to avoid moral terminology in the discussion of reasons for action; (2) welfarism, the view that our ultimate reasons are grounded solely in the well-being of individuals. Section 2 elucidates the notion of (...) religious preferences and describes the history and importance of their protection by human rights legislation. The following section defends the ‘Preference Principle’, according to which there is a reason to satisfy any preference (in so far as that satisfaction advances well-being). Section 4 discusses the implications of this principle for religious preferences in healthcare, again seeking to bring out the special social and political importance of respect, and respect for such preferences in particular. The paper ends with a brief description of how to approach such problems from the perspective of a demoralized welfarism. (shrink)

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it (...) infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias. (shrink)

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief (...) revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals are prone to making systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to (...) situations in which the empirically reasonable assumption that individuals have different degrees of computational abilities is introduced. I first show that this objection can be raised in cases involving individuals who have incomplete information, but that it ultimately fails for such cases since we can appeal to higher order insurance markets in order to mitigate any initial concerns. I further claim, however, that the objection is much more powerful in cases involving individuals who have different reasoning skills, since the appeal to higher order insurance markets is no longer tenable. Consequently, the ideal principle of justice proposed by Dworkin is met with a new feasibility challenge. Finally, I claim that the problem of reasoning errors and various forms of cognitive biases also affect Dworkin’s non-ideal principle of justice, skewing the outputs of the hypothetical insurance mechanism in an unjustifiable manner. (shrink)

Satisficing is a central concept in both individual and social multiagent decision making. In this paper we first extend the notion of satisficing by formally modeling the tradeoff between costs and decision failure. Second, we extend this notion of “neo”-satisficing into the context of social or multiagent decision making and interaction, and model the social conditioning of preferences in a satisficing framework.

Fractal patterns offer one way to represent the rough complexity of the natural world. Whilst they dominate many of our visual experiences in nature, little large-scale perceptual research has been done to explore how we respond aesthetically to these patterns. Previous research (Taylor et al., 2011) suggests that the fractal patterns with mid-range fractal dimensions have universal aesthetic appeal. Perceptual and aesthetic responses to visual complexity have been more varied with findings suggesting both linear (Forsythe et al., 2011) and curvilinear (...) (Berlyne, 1970) relationships. Individual differences have been found to account for many of the differences we see in aesthetic responses but some, such as culture, have received little attention within the fractal and complexity research fields. This 2-study paper aims to test preference responses to fractal dimension and visual complexity, using a large cohort (N=443) of participants from around the world to allow universality claims to be tested. It explores the extent to which age, culture and gender can predict our preferences for fractally complex patterns. Following exploratory analysis that found strong correlations between fractal dimension and visual complexity, a series of linear mixed-effect models were implemented to explore if each of the individual variables could predict preference. The first tested a linear complexity model (likelihood of selecting the more complex image from the pair of images) and the second a mid-range fractal dimension model (likelihood of selecting an image within mid-range). Results show that individual differences can reliably predict preferences for complexity across culture, gender and age. However, in fitting with current findings the mid-range models show greater consistency in preference not mediated by gender, age or culture. This paper supports the established theory that the mid-range fractal patterns appear to be a universal construct underlying preference but also highlights the fragility of universal claims by demonstrating individual differences in preference for the interrelated concept of visual complexity. This highlights a current stalemate in the field of empirical aesthetics. (shrink)

A method is presented for collecting data which yield a scale on which the entities are ranked in preference and all combinations of value distances are ranked. The method is based on the concept of secondary preference, i.e. preference among preferences. This method is compared with a classical method based on 50–50 game comparison. Two empirical studies are presented. The first examines whether both methods yield the same ordering of value distances. The second involves empirical derivation (...) of a higher-ordered metric scale. (shrink)

To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the (...) class='Hi'>preference for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)

As Cuba achieves one of the lowest per capita ecological footprints in the world, the country’s overshoot day was on 1 December 2019, while some European countries already reach this limit in February (e.g., Luxembourg), monitoring the environmental preferences of the Cuban younger generation may offer valuable behavioral or pedagogical insights into such a society. As accepted standardized measures exist in the scales of 2-Major Environmental Values (2-MEV) and the General Ecological Behavior (GEB), both measures are following the necessary psychometric (...) requirement, as they have the unique advantage of repeated independent confirmation (and thus provide an external validity). These captured 40 items of reported behavior originating in six subscales that total in a single main cover score. The first one (2-MEV) monitors individual biocentric and anthropocentric preferences with a 20 item-set by relying upon these two higher-order factors of “Preservation” (PRE) and “Utilization” (UTL). Although many language versions already exist (33 in the case of the 2-MEV) for verifying validities and reliabilities of both scales, a country such as Cuba may affirm that this is due to expected cultural differences as well as their exceptionally low global footprint. Additionally, neither the individual connectedness with nature nor the diurnal preferences within the linear structural model showed a substantial relationship to PRE or UTL. Nevertheless, all the regression scores follow the expected positive or negative directions, albeit not all the fit scores turned out as satisfactorily. Apparently, the applied measures secure a good basis for measuring the attitudinal and behavioral framework, but will need further fine tuning to completely monitor the environmental preferences of Cuban adolescents. (shrink)

Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for (...) all actions of an agent, Lucky, who luckily has preferences that accord with P, and I extend the argument to all citizens of a land, Luckyland, who are like Lucky. I argue the citizens of Luckyland have free will but lack moral responsibility because of the connection between moral responsibility, reactive attitudes and future action. Furthermore, the presence of CI and his plan P may allow free will but is incompatible with freedom of preference. Preference concerns alternatives excluded by CI. I argue that a special higher order preference for the preference structure, a power preference, ends the regress of higher order preference and explains the first order preference. Causal determinism is compatible with freedom of preference explained by a power preference when a power preference would also explain an alternative preference. The remoteness argument for incompatibility fails because of a lack of transitivity causal explanation. The power preference is the self-explained source of freedom of preference. That basic freedom may be limited by government knowledge of our preferences, even if, like Lucky, our preferences do not provoke intervention and we conform of our own free will. (shrink)

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: “Would God’s existence be a good thing?” The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God’s existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very (...) good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being’s existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God’s existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God’s non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God’s existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God’s existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be. (shrink)

We explore aversion to the use of algorithms in moral decision-making. So far, this aversion has been explained mainly by the fear of opaque decisions that are potentially biased. Using incentivized experiments, we study which role the desire for human discretion in moral decision-making plays. This seems justified in light of evidence suggesting that people might not doubt the quality of algorithmic decisions, but still reject them. In our first study, we found that people prefer humans with decision-making discretion (...) to algorithms that rigidly apply exogenously given human-created fairness principles to specific cases. In the second study, we found that people do not prefer humans to algorithms because they appreciate flesh-and-blood decision-makers per se, but because they appreciate humans’ freedom to transcend fairness principles at will. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of algorithm aversion. They indicate that emphasizing the transparency of algorithms that clearly follow fairness principles might not be the only element for fostering societal algorithm acceptance and suggest reconsidering certain features of the decision-making process. (shrink)

In standard economic models, two basic assumptions are made: the first, that actors are rational, and the second, that actors’ preferences are a given and exogenously determined. Behavioral economics — followed by behavioral law and economics — has questioned the first assumption. This Article challenges the second one, arguing that in many instances, social welfare should be enhanced not by maximizing satisfaction of existing preferences but by changing the preferences themselves. The Article identifies seven categories of cases where (...) the traditional objections to intentional preference change by the state and the law lose force and argues that in these cases, such a change warrants serious consideration. It then proposes four different modes of intervention in people’s preferences, varying in intensity, on the one hand, and in the identity of their addressees, on the other, and explains the relative advantages and disadvantages of each form of intervention. (shrink)

Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or compulsory insurance. The first intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give preference (...) to the interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of other patients or clients of the system. These two intuitions are in potential conflict. One of the most obvious ways in which to ensure impartiality in a health care system is to require impartiality of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care professionals a duty to treat everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to give their patients preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of allowing individual health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is to create inequality in health care. This paper explores the conflict and proposes that it can be right to give preference to ‘your’ patients in certain circumstances. (shrink)

In recent years, a consensus has developed among both affirmative action's advocates and opponents that in relation to the typical white applicant, the effects of minority preferencing are minimal. In this essay, the aim is to clarify the mathematics of affirmative action's impact on majority applicants, and to flag the distinction between that question and affirmative action's opportunity cost. First, the essay establishes the level of agreement among judges and academics on the triviality of affirmative action's effect on the (...) regular white applicant's prospects of success. Second, it demonstrates how the prevailing position on the impact of minority preferencing on the white applicant is flawed - as regards both the calculation of relative admission likelihood and the application of the matriculant yield variable. Making use of a number of case studies reviewed in the literature, it shows how those studies, properly understood, convey a rather different picture of the arithmetic of minority preferencing. The essay concludes by challenging the tendency to take the effects of affirmative action (on both preferred and non-preferred applicants) as exclusively indicative of its costs. (shrink)

High-hope and low-hope research participants (males and females), as preselected on the basis of a dispositional self-report scale, choose freely between brief audiotaped messages that varied in depressive content. In the first experiment, the messages were of either positive or negative content. Highhope as compared to low-hope persons preferred listening to the positive tapes (no differences related to Gender), and this Hope main effect remained after the shared variance related to depression and positive and negative affectivity were removed. In (...) a modified replication, the contents of the tapes were comprised of successful or unsuccessful goal-attainment statements related to hopeful thinking. High-hope as compared to low-hope persons again preferred to listen to the successful goal pursuit messages (no differences related to Gender), and this Hope main effect on listening choices remained after the shared variances related to depression, positive and negative affectivity, and self-esteem were removed. Implications are discussed. (shrink)

Preference formation and choice are dynamic cognitive processes arising from interactions between decision-makers and their immediate choice environment. This thesis examines how preferences and decisions are played out in visual attention, captured by eye-movements, as well as in group contexts. Papers I-II make use of the Choice Blindness paradigm. Paper I compares participants’ eye movements and pupil dilation over the course of a trial when participants detect and fail to detect the false feedback concerning their choices. Results indicate objective (...) markers of detection with important implications for questions concerning possible demand effect or cognitive dissonance explanations of choice blindness. Paper II examines another aspect of the choice environment, namely, the social context. Choice blindness is demonstrated in small groups for the first time. It is shown that preferential change can be induced in dyads by manipulating the group’s beliefs about their choices, thus extending the preference change through choice effects beyond individuals for the first time. Paper III examines how visual attention differentially supports both decision and memory processes depending on the amount of task-relevant information available to participants. Participants’ performance and visual attention dynamics was found to vary depending on the amount of information available to them, and the results indicate that decision outcomes are heavily influenced by encoding prior to traditional choice phases used in decision research. Papers IV-VII concern decision-making in the moral domain. Paper IV investigates visual attention when participants choose between difficult moral dilemmas, showing asymmetries in how participants distribute their attention depending on making utilitarian or deontological choices. Paper V introduces a novel paradigm for influencing decision based manipulating the timing of decision by measuring the direction of gaze while the participant deliberates. Using this method participants’ moral decisions were biased without their knowledge to a randomly chosen alternative. This shows that moral decision and visual attention are highly coupled and that by simply knowing where someone is looking it is possible to influence their decision process. Papers VI&VII build on the links between gaze direction and moral choice and present the first computational decision models based on eye gaze applicable to the moral domain. Paper VI for choices between abstract principles and Paper VII for donations to charitable organizations. Together the papers advance novel methodological solutions to understanding preferences and decisions across a number of domains, both highlighting the important contributions of social and sensorimotor interactions to the content of our decisions as they develop over time, as well as demonstrating how decisions can be influenced by leveraging those interactions. (shrink)

We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...) Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that extends the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is also maximally assertive. Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and both attribute to the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in terms of two conceptual arguments, i.e., the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference axioms, but for the sake of completeness, also considers a construal of objective uncertainty based on the assumption of an exogeneously given probability measure. JEL classification: D70; D81. (shrink)

For most of its history, decision theory has investigated the rational choices of humans under the assumption of static preferences. Human preferences, however, change. In recent years, decision theory has increasingly acknowledged the reality of preference change throughout life. This Element provides an accessible introduction and new contributions to the debates on preference change. It is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, the authors discuss what preference change is and whether we can integrate it (...) into decision theory. In the second chapter, they present models of preference change, including a novel proposal of their own. In the third and final chapter, they discuss how we can rationally choose a course of action when our preferences might change. Both the transformative experience literature and recent work on choosing for changing selves are discussed. (shrink)

This study of morphological overabundance focuses on the (non-)synonymy of parallel forms in Estonian illative case (‘into’) and the type of entrenchment behind it. We focus on the lexical level, testing whether the form preferred for a lexeme depends on semantic or morphophonological factors, or both. Using multifactorial regression analyses, we compare three corpus datasets: lexemes biased toward long forms, those biased toward short forms and lexemes with balanced form distribution. This is the first study to investigate realised overabundance (...) in this way, and to include inflection class membership in the model, enabling us to test whether declension class subsumes the morphophonological factors found to affect form preference in previous studies. The analysis shows that cell token frequency and inflection class are significant predictors of form preference, while the lexical-semantic features included in the study do not affect formative choice, highlighting the role of cell entrenchment instead of formative entrenchment in guiding form use. In conclusion, the study highlights the important role of inflection class (morphophonology) in the general shaping of form usage patterns in parallel forms and the weak role of semantic factors on the lexical level. (shrink)

argued that there are two options for what he called a realistic solution to the quantum measurement problem: (1) select a preferred set of observables for which definite values are assumed to exist, or (2) attempt to assign definite values to all observables simultaneously (1810–1). While conventional wisdom has it that the second option is ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem, Vink nevertheless advocated it. Making every physical quantity determinate in quantum mechanics carries with it significant conceptual costs, but it (...) also provides a way of addressing the preferred basis problem that arises if one chooses to pursue the first option. The potential costs and benefits of a formulation of quantum mechanics where every physical quantity is determinate are herein examined. The preferred-basis problem How to solve the preferred-basis problem Relativistic constraints Conclusion. (shrink)

Non-compensatory aggregation rules are applied in a variety of problems such as voting theory, multi-criteria analysis, composite indicators, web ranking algorithms and so on. A major open problem is the fact that non-compensability implies the analytical cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as measured on an ordinal scale. Here this problem has been tackled in its most general formulation, that (...) is when mixed measurement scales (interval, ratio and ordinal) are used and both stochastic and fuzzy uncertainties are present. Objectives of this article are first to present a comprehensive review of useful solutions already proposed in the literature and second to advance the state of the art mainly in the theoretical guarantee that weights have the meaning of importance coefficients and they can be summarized in a voting matrix. This is a key result for using non-compensatory Condorcet consistent rules. A proof on the probability of existence of ties in the voting matrix is also developed. (shrink)

Changing preferencesis a phenomenonoften invoked but rarely properlyaccounted for. Throughout the history of the social sciences, researchers have come against the possibility that their subjects’ preferenceswere affected by the phenomenato be explainedor by otherfactorsnot taken into accountin the explanation.Sporadically, attempts have been made to systematically investigate these in uences, but none of these seems to have had a lasting impact. Today we are still not much further with respect to preference change than we were at the middle of the (...) last century. This anthology hopes to provide a new impulse for research into this important subject. In particular, we have chosen two routes to amplify this impulse. First, we stress the use of modellingtechniquesfamiliar from economicsand decision theory. Instead of constructing complex, all-encompassing theories of preference change, the authors of this volume start with very simple, formal accounts of some possible and hopefully plausible mechanism of preference change. Eventually, these models may nd their way into larger, empirically adequate theories, but at this stage, we think that the most importantwork lies in building structure.Secondly,we stress the importance of interdisciplinary exchange. Only by drawing together experts from different elds can the complex empirical and theoretical issues in the modelling of preference change be adequately investigated. (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is (...) bad. The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

People tend to prefer fluently processed over harder to process information. In this study we examine two issues concerning fluency and preference. First, previous research has pre-selected fluent and non-fluent materials. We did not take this approach yet show that the fluency of individuals’ idiosyncratic on-line interactions with a given stimulus can influence preference formation. Second, while processing fluency influences preference, the opposite also may be true: preferred stimuli could be processed more fluently than non-preferred. Participants (...) performed a visual search task either before or after indicating their preferred images from an array of either paintings by Kandinsky or decorated coffee mugs. Preferred stimuli were associated with fluent processing, reflected in facilitated search times. Critically, this was only the case for participants who gave their preferences after completing the visual search task, not for those stating preferences prior to the visual search task. Our results suggest that the spontaneous and idiosyncratic experience of processing fluency plays a role in forming preference judgments and conversely that our first impressions of preference do not drive response fluency. (shrink)

Professor Gombrich's last book and first narrative work in over 20 years.

The Mohists may have been the first consequentialists on earth. Their most important principles are that right action is what benefits the world and that the underlying outlook for benefiting the world is inclusive care, whereby each person receives equal consideration. The early Mohists are clearly objective-list consequentialists, whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting the most basic goods. Stephens argues that the later Mohists shift to a preference-satisfaction consequentialism whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting what happens (...) to please individual people. Stephens argues that while the direct texts are ambiguous between an objective-list interpretation and a preference-satisfaction interpretation, the latter better explains later Mohist engagement with opponents. I argue that the direct texts actually preclude Stephens’ preference-satisfaction interpretation, which moreover has the later Mohists concede an implausible amount to their opponents. (shrink)