Results for 'pratyakṣa'

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  1.  16
    Interpretation of "Pratyakṣa" in the First Chapter of the First Part of "Nyāya Sūtras".Нanna Hnatovska - 2022 - Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Philosophy 2 (7):22-29.
    The Article is concerned with the investigation of interpretation of the concept "pratyakṣa" in the first chapter of the first part of "Nyāya Sūtras", which became the determining ground for the entire subsequent history of the development of this concept in the teachings of the adherents of this philosophical school and their polemics with opponents. The methods of etymological and contextual analysis are applied, the key meaningful connotations of "pratyakṣa" are outlined, and the main issues of its interpretation and translation (...)
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  2.  82
    Perception (pratyakṣa) in advaita vedānta.Purusottama Bilimoria - 1980 - Philosophy East and West 30 (1):35-44.
    The aim of the article is to examine the indian theory of perception given best expression, According to the author, In the school of advaita vedanta. The peculiarity of the indian view is that it is quite unlike the representative theories current in the west. It can best be described as a "presentative" theory, Wherein the mind ("antahkarana") is presented directly with the object, Without the necessary mediation of sense-Organs. The "antahkarana" ('inner-Vehicle'), Unlike the 'mind' of locke, Is not a (...)
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  3. Pratyaksa and its Two Dimensions: Advaita Vedanta Perspective.B. Biswas - 1999 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):37-58.
     
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  4.  77
    A note on pratyakṣa in advaita vedānta.David Appelbaum - 1982 - Philosophy East and West 32 (2):201-205.
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  5.  22
    The Mimamsakas on Yogaja Pratyaksa: A Critique.Bhupendra Chandra Das - 2002 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):419-434.
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  6.  16
    Examination on pratyakṣa of Nyāya school in Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. 박기열 - 2019 - The Journal of Indian Philosophy 55 (55):5-45.
    니야야는 지각을 ①‘감관과 대상과의 접촉으로부터 일어나는 지식, ②언어표현 불가능한 것, ③잘못이 없는 것, ④확정을 본성으로 하는 것’이라고 정의한다. 이에 대해서 디그나가는 전면적으로 부정한다. 본고는 지넨드라붓디의 해당 복주 중에서 ①과 관련된 감관도달설 검증 이전까지의 ①~④에 관한 내용을 번역 및 분석한다. 그에 따르면 우선 니야야가 ②와 ③를 각각 소유복합어와 격한정복합어로 해석하고, 전자는 대상과, 후자는 지식과 관련짓는 것은 모두 타당하지 않다. ④의 ‘확정’과 ‘본성’에 있어 확정은 ③에 대한 중복 표현이고, 명칭 등과의 결합에 의한 결정이기에 ②와 모순한다. 한편 ‘본성’은 자성과 결과라는 주장에 대해서 본성이 (...)
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  7. Alternative definitions of pratyaksa.P. K. Mukhopadhyay - 1981 - In Krishna Roy (ed.), Mind, language, and necessity. Delhi: Macmillan India.
     
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  8.  32
    Vidyānandin’s Discussion with the Buddhist on Svasaṃvedana, Pratyakṣa and Pramāṇa.Jayandra Soni - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (5):1003-1017.
    Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs aṃśa/aṃśin and (...)
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  9. The Concept of Pratyaksa In Jaina Epistemology.L. V. Joshi - 1997 - In Vashishtha Narayan Jha (ed.), Jaina logic and epistemology. Delhi, India: Sri Sadguru Publications. pp. 209--1.
     
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  10. There's nothing wrong with raw perception: A response to Chakrabarti's attack on nyāya's "nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa".Stephen H. Phillips - 2001 - Philosophy East and West 51 (1):104-113.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...)
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  11. There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa.Amit Chaturvedi - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (2):255-314.
    This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...)
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  12. Madhyamaka Philosophy of No-Mind: Taktsang Lotsāwa’s On Prāsaṅgika, Pramāṇa, Buddhahood and a Defense of No-Mind Thesis.Sonam Thakchoe & Julien Tempone Wiltshire - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (3):453-487.
    It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...)
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  13.  4
    Knowledge of universals.UKb Monash Centre for Consciousness Oxford & Australia Melbourne - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-21.
    The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's (...)
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  14.  32
    Classical Indian Philosophy: A Reader.Deepak Sarma - 2011 - Columbia University Press.
    Deepak Sarma completes the first outline in more than fifty years of India's key philosophical traditions, inventively sourcing seminal texts and clarifying language, positions, and issues. Organized by tradition, the volume covers six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy: Mimamsa (the study of the earlier Vedas, later incorporated into Vedanta), Vedanta (the study of the later Vedas, including the _Bhagavad Gita_ and the _Upanishads_), Sankhya (a form of self-nature dualism), Yoga (a practical outgrowth of Sankhya), and Nyaya and Vaisesika (two forms (...)
  15.  24
    ‘Surabhi Candanam’: the First Acquaintance of Fragrant Sandal: a Problem.Mainak Pal - 2024 - Sophia 63 (4):699-734.
    Sometimes seeing sandal from non-smellable distance we obtain cognition in the form ‘surabhi candanam’ (that sandal out there is fragrant). According to the Naiyāyikas, this cognition is a single qualified visual perception, where fragrance is grasped by visual sense-faculty. Normally visual sense cannot grasp fragrance. But here fragrance is grasped by visual sense through an extraordinary sense-connection. The Nyāya holds that the memory of fragrance, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), connects its object, fragrance, with visual sense. (...)
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  16.  98
    The study of indian epistemology: Questions of method—a reply to Matthew dasti and Stephen H. Phillips.Jonardon Ganeri - 2010 - Philosophy East and West 60 (4):541-550.
    I would like to thank the editors of Philosophy East and West for courteously asking me if I would like to respond to Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips' very thoughtful remarks about the review I wrote of Phillips' translation and commentary on the pratyakṣa chapter of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi, prepared in collaboration with N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya (Phillips and Tatacharya 2004). Let me begin by reaffirming what I said at the beginning of my review, that the book is "a monumental and (...)
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  17.  31
    Unsur-unsur Epistemologi ‘Proto-Nyaya’ dalam Bhagavad-Gita.Jeffrey W. Jacobson - 2022 - Diskursus - Jurnal Filsafat dan Teologi STF Driyarkara 18 (2):133-150.
    The Bhagavad-Gita, as a multivalent text, has been a source of inspiration for all areas of Indian thought. This paper identifies elements in the Bhagavad-Gita which may have influenced the formation of Nyaya philosophy in the centuries after it was written. Part one of the paper reviews Nyaya epistemology as a whole, focusing on aspects that play an important role in the Bhagavad-Gita: perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), ‘syllogism’, verbal utterance (sabda) and the practical orientation of knowledge. The second part shows (...)
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  18.  23
    Development of Jaina Pramāṇaśāstra in the Commentaries of Tattvārthasūtra.Dharm Chand Jain - 2023 - Studia Humana 12 (1-2):78-87.
    In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned (...)
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  19.  35
    Semantic Aspect of Buddhist Logic with Special Reference to Dinnaga and Dharmakirti.Pramod Kumar - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 6:167-183.
    Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational (...)
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  20. Against immaculate perception: Seven reasons for eliminating nirvikalpaka perception from nyāya.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2000 - Philosophy East and West 50 (1):1-8.
    Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, nonverbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) in Nyāya. Standard Nyāya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate (...)
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  21.  18
    On vedanā in Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam for understanding mānasapratyakṣa and svasaṃvedana in Buddhist epistemology. 박기열 - 2014 - The Journal of Indian Philosophy 40 (40):71-104.
    디그나가는 집량론 k.6ab와 자주(vṛtti)에서 욕망 등의 자기인식(svasaṃvitti)도 의지각(mānaspratyakṣa)으로 직접지각(pratyakṣa)이라고 한다. 본고는 구사론에서의 감수작용(受 vedanā)에 관하여 바수반두의 입장을 중심으로 고찰하여 디그나가의 심작용과 자기인식 그리고 의지각의 상관 관계를 미시적으로 모색해 보고자 한다. 구사론의 「세간품」에서의 증어촉(增語觸 adhivacana-saṁsparśa)의 순수(順受 vedanīya)와 심수(心受 caitasikī vedanā)의 의근행(意近行 manopavicāra)은 디그나가의 인식의 2상성(二相性 dvirūpatā)으로 분석되어 삼수(三受)는 인식 결과(pramāṇaphala)에 해당한다. 따라서 구사론의 감수작용은 디그나가의 심작용의 자기인식이 진행되는 과정을 구체적으로 보여 준다. 즉 욕망, 분노, 어리석음, 즐거움, 고통 등은 직접경험의 결과로 자기인식(svasaṃvedana)이라 할 수 있다. 또한 심작용의 자기인식은 ‘의에 의해서(mānasa)’만 일어나는 직접경험으로 (...)
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  22.  25
    Relational Realism and Practical Reason in Utpaladeva’s Sambandhasiddhi.Jesse A. Berger - 2024 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 52 (4):329-355.
    One debate that occupied Pratyabhijñā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors was the question of the reality of _sambandha_, or relation. A central treatise on the topic is Utpaladeva’s (∼10th c.) _Sambandhasiddhi_ [SS] (‘_Proof of Relation_’), a response to Dharmakīrti’s (∼7th c.) _Sambandhaparīkṣā_ [SP] (‘_Analysis of Relation_’). As the contrasting titles suggest, Dharmakīrti held that relations are merely conceptual constructions (_kalpanā_), inferred _post hoc_ from discrete perceptual cognitions (_pratyakṣa_)—and thus ultimately _unreal_. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, attempted to ‘prove’ (_siddhi_) the (...)
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  23. Pramāṇa.Malcolm Keating - 2021 - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
    In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a veridical cognition (in an event of knowing). For just about all Indian thinkers, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the foundational pramāṇas, although they debated energetically over how to characterize the content of the resultant cognitions and how to explain the basis for the authority of these pramāṇas. Debate also includes the relationship of knowledge to religious liberation, the role of scripture in knowing, and (...)
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  24.  62
    Bhartṛhari's view of the pramāṇas in the Vākyapadiya.Alberto Todeschini - 2010 - Asian Philosophy 20 (1):97-109.
    This paper is a study of Bhartṛhari's understanding of the pramāṇas, i.e. the means whereby knowledge is acquired, as can be evinced from his Vākyapadīya and the corresponding commentary (Vākyapadīya Vṛtti). Both Bhartṛhari's general attitude towards pramāṇas as well as his specific understanding of the individual means of knowledge are analyzed. In particular, it is established that Bhartṛhari accepts exactly three pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inferential reasoning (anumāna) and tradition (āgama). However, the status of the three is unequal: perception and inferential (...)
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  25.  25
    A Critical Analysis of Dignāga’s Refutation of Non-Buddhist Schools Theory of Perception.Bhima Kumar Kukkamalla - 2024 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 41 (1):1-16.
    Among the means of valid cognition, the one which appears first in every enumeration, which was considered as being the basis of all other means of knowledge and which was considered as a legitimate method of knowledge by all schools of Indian thought is perception (pratyakṣa). With regard to perception, we can naturally expect such questions as ‘what is it to perceive’ or ‘what do we mean when we say that something is perceived’. It is generally believed that the philosophical (...)
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  26.  15
    Knowledge of universals.Monima Chadha - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-21.
    The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's (...)
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  27.  54
    A note on nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception.Johannes Bronkhorst - 2011 - Philosophy East and West 61 (2):373-379.
    Some ten years ago an interesting discussion took place in the pages of this journal. It began with an article by Arindam Chakrabarti (2000) whose title betrays its intention: "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya." There followed a response by Stephen H. Phillips (2001), "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa," which in turn was commented upon in Chakrabarti's "Reply to Stephen Phillips" (2001).This discussion, as is clear (...)
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  28.  43
    Is Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) a Separate pramāṇa?: Analysis of the Vaiśeṣika View.Soma Chakraborty - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):321-345.
    In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa and anumāna, (...)
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