Purpose Human genomic research demands very large pools of data to generate meaningful inference. Yet, the sharing of one’s genetic data for research is a voluntary act. The collection of data sufficient to fuel rapid advancement is contingent on individuals’ willingness to share. Privacy risks associated with sharing this unique and intensely personal data are significant. Genetic data are an unambiguous identifier. Public linkage of donor to their genetic data could reveal predisposition to diseases, behaviors, paternity, heredity, intelligence, etc. The (...) purpose of this paper is to understand individuals’ willingness to volunteer their private information in this high-risk/high-reward context. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect survey data from 273 respondents and use structural equation modeling techniques to analyze responses. Findings The authors find statistical support for our theorization. They find that while heightened awareness of the benefits and risks of sharing correlates with increased privacy concerns, the net impact is an increase in intention to share. Social implications The findings suggest that prescriptive awareness might be an effective tool with which policy-makers can gain the sufficient voluntary participation from individuals necessary to drive large-scale medical research. Originality/value This study contributes a theoretically and empirically informed model which demonstrates the impact of awareness and privacy concern on individuals’ willingness to share their genetic data for large-scale HGR. It helps inform a rising class of data sufficiency problems related to large-scale medical research. (shrink)

The soaring promises made by personalized genetic medicine advocates are probably loftier than those in any other medical or scientific realm today. Are they justified?

Direct-to-consumer personal genetic profiling services that claim to predict people’s individual disease risks may promise a new era of ‘personalised healthcare’, but a report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has found that the results are often inconclusive and more evidence should be provided by the companies who sell them. In September 2008, the Council established a Working Party, which I chaired, to consider the ethical issues raised by developments in medical profiling and online medicine. One of our primary tasks (...) was to investigate the burgeoning market for personal genetic profiling services. Two years on, the Council has published its findings. The resulting report2 raises a number of concerns about personal genetic profiling services and puts forward a series of policy recommendations to address these concerns. (shrink)

Should a growing market for genetic self-tests be welcomed or feared? From the point of view of personal autonomy the increasing availability of predictive health information seems promising. Yet it is frequently pointed out that genetic information about future health may cause anxiety, distress and even loss of “life-hopes.” In this article the argument that genetic self-tests undermine personal autonomy is assessed and criticized. I contend that opportunities for autonomous choice are not reduced by genetic information but by misperceptions and (...) misunderstandings of the results of genetic tests. Since the interpretation of genetic information is sometimes distorted by the information provided about the genetic products, more attention should be given to deceitful marketing that overblows the utility of genetic products. Yet personal autonomy is reduced neither by genetic tests nor by genetic information and there is consequently no compelling case for the conclusion that genetic self-tests should be prohibited. (shrink)

The theory of evolution: The rise and impact of evolutionary ideas, by R. Scoon. Evolution in its relation to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture, by F.S.C. Northrop. The genetic nature of differences among men, by T. Dobzhansky. Evolutionary thought in America: Evolution and American sociology by R.E.L. Faris. The impact of the idea of evolution on the American political and constitutional tradition, by E.S. Corwin. Evolutionism in American economics, 1800-1946, by J.J. Spengler. The influence of evolutionary (...) theory upon American psychological thought, by E.G. Boring. Naturalism in American literature, by M. Cowley. The idea of organic expression and American architecture, by D.D. Egbert. Evolution and moral theory in America, W.F. Quillian, Jr. Evolution and theology in America, by S. Persons. (shrink)

Online personalized genetic testing services offer accessible and convenient options for satisfying personal curiosity about health and obtaining answers about one’s genetic provenance. They are especially attractive to healthy people who wish to learn about their future risk of disease, as Paul Mason’s case study of “Jordan” illustrates. In this response, we consider how online genetic testing services are used by people diagnosed with a common neurodegenerative disease, Parkinson’s disease, to gain a sense of certainty regarding the future.

The case outlined below is the basis for the In That Case section of the “Ethics and Epistemology of Big Data” symposium. Jordan receives reports from two separate personal genomic tests that provide intriguing data about ancestry and worrying but ambiguous data about the potential risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease. What began as a personal curiosity about genetic inheritance turns into an alarming situation of medical uncertainty. Questions about Jordan’s family tree are overshadowed by even more questions about Alzheimer’s disease (...) and healthy ageing. As a parent, Jordan is unsure whether to share these results and what it would mean for their children to learn about their genetic inheritance and potential future health. Furthermore, Jordan is unsure how to make sense of these reports in light of current knowledge of the risk factors for Alzheimer’s disease and in the absence of effective treatments or robust preventative guidelines. (shrink)

It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity (...) of beings of our kind. This is so irrespective of whether, essentially, we are beings with minds or beings of a certain biological species, the human one. Second, it is contended that, even if genetic therapy were to affect our identity, there could be person‐regarding reasons for conducting it, for existence can be better than non‐existence for the individual. (shrink)

Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how should we understand their moral status in relation to ours? The answer depends in part on which of two general models (...) of moral status—one based on respect and one based on interests—is more adequate. Buchanan tentatively argues that a respect-based model is preferable. I challenge Buchanan's view, along these lines: If we embrace a respect-based model of moral status featuring a threshold that divides persons, who are thought to have full and equal moral status, from sentient nonpersons, thought to have less moral status, then we should acknowledge a second threshold and a level of moral status higher than ours. A better option, I tentatively suggest, is to drop the idea of levels of moral status, accept that all sentient beings have moral status, and allow that some differences in interests and capacities justify some significant differences in how we should treat beings of different kinds. (shrink)

I have outlined two ways of defending the claim that there are so‐called person‐regarding reasons for practising gene therapy on human conceptuses. One is metaphysical and concerns our nature and identity. The upshot of it is that, in cases of most interest, this therapy does not affect our identity, by bringing into existence anyone of our kind who would not otherwise have existed. The other defence is value theoretical and claims that even if genetic therapy were to affect the identity (...) of beings our kind, there could still be person‐regarding reasons for performing it, since we can be benefited and harmed by being caused to exist or not to exist. Robert Elliot has attacked both of these lines, and my present objective is to show how his criticisms can be deflected. (shrink)

Argument about the ethical possibility of the therapeutic use of embryonic stem cells depends critically on the evaluation of the moral status of the very early embryo. Some assert that at the blastocyst stage it is only potentially human, not yet possessing the full ethical status of personhood, while others assert that from its formation the embryo possesses all the moral rights of a human person. It is shown that a decision on this issue is closely related to how human (...) nature is to be understood. The idea of a person as a dual combination of body and spirit correlates naturally with the assertion of absolute personhood from conception, while an idea of human psychosomatic unity encourages a development picture in which the embryo only grows gradually into personhood. The latter view is seen to be encouraged by new advances in science which emphasise the importance of the concept of information in the discussion of complex systems. Other ethical issues related to human genetics are also briefly reviewed. (shrink)

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, since (...) the effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. (shrink)

A current trend in bioethics considers genetic information as family property. This paper uses a logical approach to critically examine Matthew Liao’s proposal on the familial nature of genetic information as grounds for the duty to share it with relatives and for breach of confidentiality by the geneticist. The authors expand on the topic by examining the relationship between the arguments of probability and the familial nature of genetic information, as well as the concept of harm in the context of (...) genetic risk. Lastly, they examine the concept of harm in relation to the type of situations w the potential recipient of the information is not the person directly affected by the risk. (shrink)

Vaccines represent preventative interventions amenable to immunogenetic prediction of how human variability will influence their safety and efficacy. The genetic polymorphism among individuals within any population can render possible that the immunity elicited by a vaccine is variable in length and strength. The same immune challenge (virus and/or vaccine) could provoke partial, complete or even failed protection for some individuals treated under the same conditions. We review genetic variants and mechanistic relationships among chemokines, chemokine receptors, interleukins, interferons, interferon receptors, toll‐like (...) receptors, histocompatibility antigens, various immunoglobulins and major histocompatibility complex antigens. These are the targets for variation among macrophages, dendritic cells, natural killer cells, T‐ and B‐lymphocytes, and complement. The technology platforms (mRNA, viral vectors, proteins) utilized to produce vaccines against SARS‐CoV‐2 infections may each trigger genetically distinct immune reactogenic profiles. With DNA biobanking and immunoprofiling of recipients, global COVID‐19 vaccinations could launch a new era of personalized healthcare. (shrink)

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the origination theory, which (...) says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons. (shrink)

The debate over whether germ-line genetic engineering is justified on the basis of the consent or presumed consent of future generations is mired in philosophical confusion. Because of this, the principle of informed consent fails to provide a reason to restrict germ-line genetic engineering. Most recent bioethicists ground the consent requirement on individual autonomy. While conceptually coherent, the notion of individual autonomy also fails to provide a reason for prohibiting germ-line genetic engineering. Moreover, it offers little in the way of (...) useful guidance for regulating genetic engineering. I argue, however, that respect for autonomy in the sense of moral agency – the ability to reflect on moral considerations and conform one’s behavior to those reflections – provides a principle that can be used for a nuanced evaluation of proposals for genetic engineering. (shrink)

I argue that the use of heritable modifications for psychology, personality, and behavior should be limited to the reversal or prevention of relatively unambiguous instances of pathology or likely harm (e.g. sociopathy). Most of the likely modifications of psychological personality would not be of this nature, however, and parents therefore should not have the freedom to make such modifications to future children. I argue by examining the viewpoints of both the individual and society. For individuals, modifications would interfere (...) with their capacity for self-determination in a way that undermines the very concept of self-determination. I argue that modification of psychology and personality is unlike present parenting in morally significant ways. For society, modification offers a medium for power to manipulate the makeup of persons and populations, possibly causing biological harm to the species and altering our conceptions of social responsibility. (shrink)

Major depression is associated with a decrease of 1st person visual perspective in autobiographical memory, even after full remission. This study aimed to examine visual perspective in healthy never-depressed subjects presenting with either genetic or psychological vulnerability for depression. Sixty healthy participants performed the Autobiographical Memory Test with an assessment of visual perspective. Genetic vulnerability was defined by the presence of at least one S or LG allele of the polymorphism of the serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region . Psychological vulnerability was defined (...) by high scores of harm avoidance measured by the Temperament and Character Inventory. Life stress exposure, depressive mood, rumination, and familial history of depression were assessed through standardized procedures. Visual perspective for positive memories was independently predicted by both harm avoidance and a gene by environment interaction between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and life stress exposure. Visual perspective and vulnerability for depression may share some biological bases. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Introduction: Locke's Distinction between Personal and Animal Identity The Irrelevance of Cloning Personal Identity and Science Notes.

Contemporary debate suggests that the new genetics may be changing ideas about the body and what it is to be human. Specifically, there are notions that the new genetics seems to erode the ideas that underpin modernity, such as the figure of the integrated, discrete, conscious individual body-self. Holding these ideas against the practices of genetic medicine, however, this article suggests a quite different picture; one that does not erase, but helps to keep in play, some crucial tenets (...) of humanism. The article examines how the genetic clinic constructs clinical pictures as new forms of portraiture: assemblages in which multiple and heterogeneous images of bodies and their parts are juxtaposed. Rather than these portraits just making the distributed and hybrid nature of personhood explicit, shifts in ground mean that what is being portrayed is the possibility of a ‘syndrome–genotype’ relation. At first sight this appears as a straightforward geneticization of the body and the unravelling of the figure of the individual. But the article illustrates how, at the same time as the portraits of syndrome–genotypes are made up of many heterogeneous parts, the clinic still keeps in play an idea of persons that remains, unlike their bodies, much more than the sum of their parts. All the parts that make up the body of the person can still, at moments, be transcended, to refigure the human: the complex individual of humanist thought. (shrink)

Identifying causal relations from correlational data is a fundamental challenge in personality psychology. In most cases, random assignment is not feasible, leaving observational studies as the primary methodological tool. Here, we document several techniques from behavior genetics that attempt to demonstrate causality. Although no one method is conclusive at ruling out all possible confounds, combining techniques can triangulate on causal relations. Behavior genetic tools leverage information gained by sampling pairs of individuals with assumed genetic and environmental relatedness or (...) by measuring genetic variants in unrelated individuals. These designs can find evidence consistent with causality, while simultaneously providing strong controls against common confounds. We conclude by discussing several potential problems that may limit the utility of these techniques when applied to personality. Ultimately, genetically informative designs can aid in drawing causal conclusions from correlational studies. (shrink)

Background It has been suggested that researchers are obliged to offer summary findings to research participants to demonstrate respect for persons, and that this may increase public trust in, and awareness of, the research enterprise. Yet little research explores researchers' attitudes and practices regarding the range of initiatives that might serve these ends. Methods Results of an international survey of 785 eligible authors of genetics research studies in autism or cystic fibrosis are reported. Results Of 343 researchers who completed (...) the survey (44% response rate), the majority agreed that their team should (i) inform participants of summary findings (90.7%) and (ii) ensure they gain an awareness of developments in the field (86.9%). Additionally, the majority reported that in practice, their team (i) informs participants of summary findings (69.4%) and (ii) provides other types of relevant non-results information (eg, state of science in the field, opportunities for research participation) (67.9%). Conclusion Researchers endorsed the obligation of communicating with research participants by providing summary findings and other research-related information in equal measure. In light of these findings, it is suggested that while the provision of summary results may contribute to efforts to discharge the obligation of respect for persons, it may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient means to this end. (shrink)

The stories in this volume shed light on the potential of narrative inquiry to fill gaps in knowledge, particularly given the mixed results of quantitative research on patient views of and experiences with genetic and genomic testing. Published studies investigate predictors of testing (particularly risk perceptions and worry); psychological and behavioral responses to testing; and potential impact on the health care system (e.g., when patients bring DTC genetic test results to their primary care provider). Interestingly, these themes did not dominate (...) the narratives published in this issue. Rather, these narratives included consistent themes of expectations and looking for answers; complex emotions; areas of contradiction and conflict; and family impact. More narrative research on patient experiences with genetic testing may fill gaps in knowledge regarding how patients define the benefits of testing, changes in psychological and emotional reactions to test results over time, and the impact of testing on families. (shrink)

Behaving presents an overview of the recent history and methodology of behavioral genetics and psychiatric genetics, informed by a philosophical perspective. Kenneth F. Schaffner addresses a wide range of issues, including genetic reductionism and determinism, "free will," and quantitative and molecular genetics. The latter covers newer genome-wide association studies that have produced a paradigm shift in the subject, and generated the problem of "missing heritability." Schaffner also presents cases involving pro and con arguments for genetic testing for (...) IQ and for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Schaffner examines the nature-nurture controversy and Developmental Systems Theory using C. elegans or "worm" studies as a test case, concluding that genes are special and provide powerful tools, including "deep homology," for investigating behavior. He offers a novel account of biological knowledge emphasizing the importance of models, mechanisms, pathways, and networks, which clarifies how partial reductions provide explanations of traits and disorders. The book also includes examinations of personality genetics and of schizophrenia and its etiology, alongside interviews with prominent researchers in the area, and discusses debates about psychosis that led to changes in the DSM-5 in 2013.Schaffner concludes by discussing additional philosophical implications of the genetic analyses in the book, some major worries about "free will," and arguments pro and con about why genes and DNA are so special. Though genes are special, newer perspectives presented in this book will be needed for progress in behavioral genetics- perspectives that situate genes in complex multilevel prototypic pathways and networks. With a mix of optimism and pessimism about the state of the field and the subject, Schaffner's book will be of interest to scholars in the history and philosophy of science, medicine, and psychiatry. (shrink)

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, since (...) the effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. (shrink)

Since the 1970s and more rigorously since the 1990s, many countries have regulated data protection and privacy laws in order to ensure the safety and privacy of personal data. First, a comparison is made of different acts regarding genetic information that are in force in the EU, the USA, and China. In Turkey, changes were adopted only recently following intense debates. This study aims to explore the experts’ opinions on the regulations of the health information systems, data security, privacy, and (...) confidentiality in Turkey, with a particular focus on genetic data, which is more sensitive than other health data as it is a permanent identifier that is inherited to next of kin and shared with other family members. Two focus groups with 18 experts and stakeholders were conducted, discussing topics such as central data collection, legalized data sharing, and the management of genetic information in health information systems. The article concludes that the new Turkish personal data protection law is problematic as the frame of collectible data is wide-ranging, and the exceptions are extensive. Specific laws or articles dedicated to genetic data that also overlook the dimension of discrimination based on genetic differences in Turkey should be taken into consideration. In broader terms, it is intended to put up for discussion that in addition to ethical aspects, economic aspects and legal aspects of health should be included in the discussion to be carried out within the framework of socio-political analyses with culture-specific approaches and cross-culture boundaries simultaneously. (shrink)

For the average person, genetic testing has two very different faces. The rise of genetic testing is often promoted as the democratization of genetics by enabling individuals to gain insights into their unique makeup. At the same time, many have raised concerns that genetic testing and sequencing reveal intensely personal and private information. As these technologies become increasingly available as consumer products, the ethical, legal, and regulatory challenges presented by genomics are ever looming. Assembling multidisciplinary experts, this volume evaluates (...) the different models used to deliver consumer genetics and considers a number of key questions: How should we mediate privacy and other ethical concerns around genetic databases? Does aggregating data from genetic testing turn people into products by commercializing their data? How might this data reduce or exacerbate existing healthcare disparities? Contributing authors also provide guidance on protecting consumer privacy and safety while promoting innovation. (shrink)

In an article recently published in this journal, I raised a puzzle about the control of genetic information, suggesting a situation in which it might turn out that we have a duty to remain in ignorance about at least some aspects of our own genome. In this article, I propose a way that would make sense of how the puzzle arises, and offer a way to resolve it and similar puzzles in future: in essence, we would consider genetic information to (...) be something the distribution of which may be more or less just. We would not know in advance what a just distribution would be, though, and in some cases there might still be a justice-based reason to deny a person genetic information about himself. However, others might also have justice-based claims to be able to access that information. This suggests that there is a possible world in which one person is entitled to at least some genetic information about another, while that other person—to whom the information refers—is not, and that this world would be just. (shrink)

Genetic testing seems to hold out hope for the cure of a number of debilitating conditions. At the same time, many people fear the information that genetic testing can make available. In this commentary, I argue that as of now, the nature of the information revealed in such tests should lead to cautious views about the value of genetic testing. Moreover, I suggest that our overall views about such testing should account for the fact that individuals place different sorts of (...) value on the possession of their own genetic information. As a result, we should largely defer to personal preference in thinking about the propriety of genetic testing. (shrink)

This collection of essays investigates the obligations we have in respect of future persons, from our own future offspring to distant future generations.

Confidentiality in genetic testing posesimportant ethical challenges to the currentprimacy of respect for autonomy and patientchoice in health care. It also presents achallenge to approaches to decision-makingemphasising the ethical importance of theconsequences of health care decisions. In thispaper a case is described in which respect forconfidentiality calls both for disclosure andnon-disclosure, and in which respect forpatient autonomy and the demand to avoidcausing harm each appear to call both fortesting without consent, and testing only withconsent. This creates problems not only forclinicians, (...) families and patients, but also forthose who propose clinical bioethics as a toolfor the resolution of such dilemmas.In this paper I propose some practical waysin which ethical issues in clinical geneticsand elsewhere, might be addressed. Inparticular I call for a closer relationshipbetween ethics and communication in health caredecision-making and describe an approach to theethics consultation that places particularemphasis on the value of interpersonaldeliberation in the search for moralunderstanding. I reach these conclusionsthrough an analysis of the concept of `moraldevelopment'' in which I argue that theachievement of moral understanding is anecessarily intersubjective project elaboratedby moral persons. (shrink)

Issues in genetics and genomics have been centre stage in Bioethics for much of its history, and have given rise to both negative and positive imagined futures. Ten years after the completion of the Human Genome Project, it is a good time to assess developments. The promise of whole genome sequencing of individuals requires reflection on personalization, genetic determinism, and privacy.

The phenomenon of the New Genetics raises complex social problems, particularly those of privacy. This book offers ethical and legal perspectives on the questions of a right to know and not to know genetic information from the standpoint of individuals, their relatives, employers, insurers and the state. Graeme Laurie provides a unique definition of privacy, including a concept of property rights in the person, and argues for stronger legal protection of privacy in the shadow of developments in human (...) class='Hi'>genetics. He challenges the role and the limits of established principles in medical law and ethics, including respect for patient autonomy and confidentiality. This book will interest lawyers, philosophers and doctors concerned both with genetic information and issues of privacy; it will also interest genetic counsellors, researchers, and policy makers worldwide for its practical stance on dilemmas in modern genetic medicine. (shrink)

Genetic epistemology analyzes the growth of knowledge both in the individual person (genetic psychology) and in the socio-historical realm (the history of science). But what the relationship is between the history of science and genetic psychology remains unclear. The biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is inadequate as a characterization of the relation. A critical examination of Piaget's Introduction à l'Épistémologie Généntique indicates these are several examples of what I call stage laws common to both areas. Furthermore, there is at (...) least one example of a paradoxical inverse relation between the two — geometry. Both similarities and differences between the two domains require an explanation, a developmental explanation. Although such an explanation seems to be psychological in nature, it is not merely empirical but also normative (since psychology is both factual and normative according to Piaget). Hence genetic epistemology need not be reduced to psychology (narrowly conceived), but rather should be seen as being both empirical and normative and thus similar to certain types of contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

The mutation-selection hypothesis may extend to understanding normal personality variation. Traits such as emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness figure strongly in mate selection and show evidence of non-additive genetic variance. They are linked with reproductively relevant outcomes, including longevity, resource acquisition, and mating success. Evolved difference-detection adaptations may function to spurn individuals whose high mutation load signals a burdensome relationship load. (Published Online November 9 2006).

According to what McMahan and Savulescu (2024) call the “popular position”, embryo selection is less ethically problematic than gene editing (other things being equal). The Two-Tier View, defended by McMahan and Savulescu, implies that the popular position is mistaken. The authors treat gene editing of embryos similarly to standard cases of medical treatments that promise expected benefits for the (subsequent) person even though gene editing also may create risks of harmful side effects for her. McMahan and Savulescu assume that if (...) gene editing is (successfully) done, it is better for the person who developed from the beneficently edited embryo. And, if the editing had not been done, although it was possible, that would have been worse for the same person in question. Thus, the comparator must always be a possible, even if unlikely, world in which she would have existed. That is why gene editing, in their view, resembles medical treatments. Therefore, assuming that standard medical treatments are not more ethically problematic than embryo selection, they conclude that (in general) gene editing should also be treated as not more problematic than embryo selection. In this paper, I am taking one step further than McMahan and Savulescu in questioning the central assumptions in the bioethical debates about new reproductive technologies. In the previous work, we argued that the very distinction between person-affecting and identity-affecting interventions is based on a questionable form of material-origin essentialism (Żuradzki and Dranseika 2022). Here, I argue that the bipartite distinction between person-affecting and impersonal reasons, as used by McMahan and Savulescu, insufficiently represents different possible counterfactual comparisons between real and merely possible outcomes. In particular, I argue that the evaluation of gene editing requires counterfactual comparisons to situations in which the benefited person might or might not exist. Such evaluation requires an additional class of reasons, let me call them “semi-person-affecting,” that cannot be reduced to either person-affecting or impersonal ones. This aspect of gene editing makes it dissimilar to standard cases of medical treatments. (shrink)