Over 80% of the genes in the E. coli chromosome express fewer than a hundred copies each of their protein products per cell. It is argued here that transcription of these genes is neither constitutive nor regulated by protein factors, but rather, induced by the act of replication. The utility of such replication‐induced (RI) transcription to the temporal regulation of synthesis of determinate quantities of low copy number (LCN) proteins is described. It is suggested that RI transcription may be necessitated, (...) as well as facilitated, by the folding of the bacterial chromosome into a compact nucleoid. Mechanistic aspects of the induction of transcription by replication are discussed with respect to the modulation of transcriptional initiation by negative supercoiling effects, promoter methylation status and derepression. It is shown that RI transcription offers plausible explanations for the constancy of the C period of the E. coli cell cycle and the remarkable conservation of gene order in the chromosomes of enteric bacteria. Some experimental tests of the hypothesis are proposed. (shrink)

Articles on Vedanta school of philosophy.

Transcription and DNA supercoiling are known to be linked by a cause‐effect relationship that operates in both directions. It is proposed here that this two‐way relationship may be exploited by the E. coli genome to facilitate constitutive transcription of supercoil‐sensitive genes by polymerase batteries made up of uniformly spaced RNA polymerase elongation complexes. Specifically, it is argued that (1) polymerases transcribing DNA in tandem cooperate to relax each other's transcription‐driven positive supercoils; and (2) negative supercoils driven upstream by elongation complexes (...) tend to be ‘harnessed’ and used to cooperatively (and periodically) initiate fresh transcription from promoters. Harnessing of transcription‐driven negative supercoils is thought to be achieved through the erection of protein barriers to the rotational upstream propagation of supercoils from transcription events. The possible relevance of such cooperation amongst polymerases to the activation of transcription by DNA‐binding protein factors is emphasized. Some testable predictions are made and implications are discussed. (shrink)

We propose that hyper‐inflammation (HYPi) is a ‘‘runaway’’ consequence of acute inflammation (ACUi) that arises more easily (and also abates less easily) in those who host a pre‐existing chronic inflammation (CHRi), because (i) most factors involved in generating an ACUi to limit viral proliferation are already present when there is an underlying CHRi, and also because (ii) anti‐inflammatory (AI) mechanisms for the abatement of ACUi (following containment of viral proliferation) are suppressed and desensitized where there is an underlying CHRi, with (...) this causing the ACUi to spiral into a HYPi. Stress, pollution, diet, and gut microbiomes (alterable in weeks through dietary changes) have an intimate and bidirectional cause‐effect relationship with CHRi. We propose that avoidance of CHRi‐promoting foods and adoption of CHRi‐suppressing foods could reduce susceptibility to HYPi, in Covid‐19 and in other viral diseases, such as influenza, which are characterized by episodic and unpredictable HYPi. (shrink)

RésuméOn examine ?on;abord les termes explicites et implicites du contrat de justice selon Rawls. Ensuite on rappelle ľinterprétation ‘procédurale’ que ce dernier donne de ľautonomie kantienne et ľon montre ľinanité de cette interprétation. Cependant la doctrine de Rawls exprime avec bon‐heur une conception sceptique de la justice.SummaryAfter a short examination of the explicit and implicit contract of justice according to Rawls, the reasons afforded by him to give a Kantian foundation to the contract are recalled and rebutted. However Rawls's doctrine (...) remarkably expresses the main argument of a sceptical conception of justice.ZusammenfassungNach einer kurzen Untersuchung des expliziten und impliziten Begriffs des Gesellschaftsver‐trages, wie Rawls ihn versteht, wird die besondere Interpretation erOrtert, die er vom Kantschen Autonomiebegriff gibt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese unzutreffend ist und dass Rawls Lehre eher auf eine skeptische Auffassung der Gerechtigkeit zutrifft. (shrink)

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...) to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the “error explanation” is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues. (shrink)

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper (...) scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. (shrink)

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

Contrary to philosophical tradition, modern theorists of the mind have often downplayed the importance of consciousness. Instead, they have accounted for the mind in terms of phenomena like mechanisms, dispositions, abilities and even environmental features. One of many inspirations for this trend is a series of passages of the later Wittgenstein. These passages discuss a variety of specific mental phenomena, like searching, comparing, understanding and reading. The passages have often been taken them to show that one may exemplify any of (...) the phenomena at issue without being in any particular type of conscious state. I claim that the passages do not support this conclusion, and that the conclusion is, arguably, false. My conclusion is that consciousness may be a more important aspect of the mind than is supposed by many contemporary theorists--both Wittgensteinians and others. (shrink)

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

RésuméCette étude voudrait attirer ľattention sur la théorie peircéenne de la signification et, plus particulièrement, sur une notion qui paraît jouer un rôle central dans cette dernière, à savoir la notion ?on;interprétant. Médiateur entre le signe et ľobjet, l'interpretant peircéen prend tout son sens dans le cadre ?on;une theorie de la genèse des systèmes sémiotiques et ľanalyse qu'en fait Peir‐ce tente ?on;apporter, bien avant Carnap, une solution originale au problème des rapports entre sens et référence.SummaryThe purpose of this study is (...) to call the reader's attention to Peirce's theory of meaning and particularly to one notion which appears to play a decisive part in it, the notion of interpretant. The Peircean interpretant, a mediator between the sign and the object, is fully revealed within the theory of the genesis of semiotic systems and its analysis by Peirce is an attempt, long before Carnap, to propound an original solution to the problem of the relationship between meaning and reference.ZusammenfassungAnliegen dieser Studie ist es, im Rahmen der Peirceschen Theorie den Begriff der Bedeutung hervorzuheben und insbesondere das Konzept des interpretant, das eine wesentliche Rolle in dieser Theorie zu spielen scheint. Als Vermittler zwischen Zeichen und Objekt gewinnt der Peirce‐sche interpretant seine ganze Bedeutung im Rahmen einer Theorie ttber die Entstehung der semiotischen Systeme, und die Peircesche Analyse versucht lange vor Carnap eine eigene LSsung zum Problem der Beziehungen zwischen Sinn und Referenz zu erbringen. (shrink)