The concept of observability is of key importance for a consistent defense of Constructive Empiricism. This anti-realist position, originally presented in 1980 by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image, crucially depends on the observable/unobservable dichotomy. Nevertheless, the question of what it means to observe has been faced in an unsatisfactory and inadequate manner by van Fraassen and this represents an important lacuna in his philosophical position. The aim of this work is to propose a characterization of the (...) act of observation able to give the necessary support to the ‘rough guide’ of ‘observable’ that can be found in the aforementioned book. Countering van Fraassen’s own statements, that observability is not a matter for philosophy, but for scientific inquiry only, we maintain that any attempt to deal with this subject by the philosophers is legitimate. We will show that van Fraassen ended up doing a philosophical analysis of observation himself, albeit in a fragmentary way. We believe that this question should be dealt with methodically, though, ‘following the rules’ of a ‘proper’ philosophical analysis, as we attempted to do in this work. We will propose a way of conceiving the act of observation, different from van Fraassen’s one, that can help not only to ground the distinction between observable and unobservable, upon which Constructive Empiricism rests, but to get this anti-realist position closer to scientific practice as well, which is one of its desiderata. Without neglecting the philosophical dimension of the issue, though. However, this proposal does not represent an ad hoc ‘solution’ for Constructive Empiricism, but a characterization aspiring to have a universal reach. (shrink)

The emphasis on the role of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, is reaffirmed by the primacy of the distinction between observable and unobservable in Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. In this paper it will be showed that, despite being one the main topics of discussion in contemporary philosophy of science, particularly thanks to van Fraassen, the question of observation and observability is actually so old as philosophy itself and has to do with the willingness, that defines empiricism, to (...) keep ‘within the limits’. (shrink)

Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant’s defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This article argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical (unobservable) objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck’s constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the observables of quantum mechanics (...) as empirically real even though they are transcendentally (i.e., preobservationally) ideal.El indeterminismo cuántico parece incompatible con la defensa de la causalidad que hace Kant en su Segunda Analogía. La interpretación de Copenhague de la mecánica cuántica también considera a esta teoría como evidencia a favor del antirrealismo. Este artículo defiende que la ley (trascendental) de la causalidadse aplica solamente al mundo en tanto que observable, y no a objetos hipotéticos (inobservables) como los quarks, detectables solo mediante aceleradores de altas energías. Tomar la constante de Planck y la velocidad de la luz como límites inferior y superior de la observabilidad nos ofrece un modo de interpretar losobservables de la mecánica cuántica como empíricamente reales, incluso aunque estos sean trascendentalmente, es decir, preobservacionalmente, ideales. (shrink)

El concepto clásico de observación en la astrofísica contemporánea ha sufrido cambios considerables debido, en gran parte, a ciertas observaciones llevadas a cabo a través de simulaciones computacionales. Al considerarse la evolución que ha tenido esta noción en las últimas décadas, se analizarán diferentes reflexiones filosóficas acerca de la observabilidad. Se mencionará la dicotomía teórico-observacional, el debate realismo-antirrealismo y aquellos tratamientos actuales más afines a las prácticas científicas, aludiendo a la distinción entre entidades observables e inobservables. En este trabajo se (...) abordará, mediante un estudio de caso, la problemática en torno al rol de la validación externa en este ámbito disciplinar. Teniendo en cuenta los datos adquiridos tanto por la vía tradicional u observacional, como por aquélla lograda mediante modelos de simulación, se analizarán los diferentes mecanismos de producción de datos y su eventual reducción en astroinformática. A propósito, se desarrollará la propuesta ofrecida por Reiss (2019), examinando los argumentos a favor y en contra de la validación externa. Así, se identificarán aquellas estrategias vigentes de validación en modelos de datos diferentes, estableciendo los vínculos necesarios para una valoración cuantitativa y cualitativa de observaciones y de simulaciones. A partir del inter-juego entre estas últimas se mostrará el estatus y la conformación de la evidencia disponible y su dependencia con el diseño de las observaciones actuales. Se concluirá que la interacción entre modelos de observación y de simulación no sólo contribuyen al desarrollo de guías heurísticas, sino que permiten una retroalimentación favorable en los procesos de validación externa de ambos modelos. (shrink)

The act of observing is crucial for constructive empiricism, Bas van Fraassen's celebrated position on the aim of science. As Buekens and Muller noted in 2012, the Dutch philosopher should have characterized observation as an intentional act, because observation in science has a purpose. In the present article, which will also address the distinction between observing and observing that, introduced by Hanson and Dretske, it will be shown that considerations about the intentionality of the act of observing are, on the (...) contrary, unnecessary for drawing the distinction between observable and unobservable entities on which constructive empiricism depends. (shrink)

The primacy of the act of observation, one of the hallmarks of empiricism, found new life in the centrality of the distinction, made in Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, between observable and unobservable. As Elliott Sober have pointed out, however, it is not clear what van Fraassen understands by observing an object. Worse, the Dutch philosopher does not seem to consider that a clarification of this point is necessary. This, of course, represents an important lacuna in a position generally considered (...) as the main reference for modern empiricism. My goal is to take up again the counterfactual conditionals characterizing perception that Otávio Bueno presented in 2011 in this journal, and also to consider the observability and the existence criteria proposed by Filip Buekens and Michel Ghins, in order to get to a definition of observation that should give van Fraassen's observability concept the support it actually lacks, but without presenting itself as an ad hoc solution. (shrink)