The close ties between modes of governing, subjectivities and critique in contemporary societies challenge the role of critical social research. The classical normative ethos of the unmasking researcher unravelling various oppressive structures of dominant vs. dominated groups in society is inadequate when it comes to understand de-politicizing mechanisms and the struggles they bring about. This article argues that only a non-normative position can stay attentive to the constant and complex evolution of modes of governing and the critical (...) operations actors themselves engage in. The article outlines a non-normative but critical programme based on an ethos of re-politicizing contemporary pervasive modes of governing. The analytical advantages and limitations of such a programme are demonstrated by readings of both Foucauldian studies and the works of and debates regarding the French pragmatic sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot. (shrink)

This article examines the relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition within educational theory and practice in relation to the development of a non-affirmative theory of education. The article argues that Hegel’s theory of recognition can serve as a fruitful starting point for articulating an educational theory that can contribute to the subject’s open-ended formation in modern society. To start with, the article surveys the connection between Hegel’s educational thought and his concept of recognition. Against this backdrop, the article singles out (...) how Hegel’s theory of recognition provides a compelling theory of intersubjectivity that calls attention to the role of norms in personal development and the construction of the social world. In continuation of a non-affirmative principle, it is argued that Hegelian recognition underlines, first, that the subject’s formation can fruitfully be an open-ended and dynamic process and, second, that in order to underpin this process it is necessary to critically assess norms and norm-generating practices within an educational context. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg’s distinction between formal and substantive bias in the design of technology is interrogated. The two dimensions of his definition—inten­tion and the enhancement of specific social interests—are examined and eight logical possibilities arising from his argument are identified. These possibilities are explored through discussion of examples and it is argued that Feenberg has both: a) not broken sufficiently with substantivist philosophies of technology so that he retains ambivalence on technology’s ‘biased essence,’ and b) illegitimately rejected the idea of a (...) technology that is biased in itself. The latter category is important to critical theory of technology and the paper offers a conceptualization of it that draws on Habermas’s discourse ethics. (shrink)

It has been argued that our concepts can be disrupted or challenged by technology or normative concerns, which raises the question of whether we can create, design, engineer, or define more robust concepts that avoid counterexamples and conceptual challenges that can lead to conceptual disruption. In this paper, it is argued that we can. This argument is presented through a case study of a definition in the technological domain.

In what follows, I will argue that racist ideology should be understood in terms of racist social norms that constitute certain incentive structures. To this end, I will motivate my position by examining two existing accounts of ideology: those of Tommie Shelby and Sally Haslanger. First, I will begin by reconstructing Shelby’s account of racism as ideology. After analysing three dimensions of ideology (epistemic, genetic and functional), I will argue that his view is too cognitivist. In this regard, Shelby’s view (...) is doxastic in viewing that racist ideologies consist in misguided beliefs. Rather, what is essential in ideology is its functional dimension. Here, ideologies persist because they function to stabilize and reinforce the unjust status quo of subordination and oppression. Then, I will turn to Haslanger’s account of ideology as cultural technēs. Her view is more functional than Shelby’s since the former is based on the account of social practice and culture. While Haslanger is right about her critique of Shelby’s cognitivist view of ideology, I argue that what she calls nonideal moral epistemology weakens her overall insight. The problem is that without considering how to intervene in concrete social mechanisms, merely knowing certain moral truths may not practically motivate subjects under ideologies. Taken together, both Shelby and Haslanger narrowly understand ideology in terms of epistemic deficiency. Even though Shelby and Haslanger deal with the discursive superstructure of ideology, both underestimate the functional substructure of ideology such as social and psychological motives, desires and needs. Ultimately, I will argue that ideology is better understood in terms of a racist social norm. This account is explanatorily superior to Shelby and Haslanger’s views in its stress on the nonepistemic, nonmoral and functional aspects of ideology. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish between two main critical questions: ‘how possible’ questions, which look for enabling conditions and raise issues of epistemic normativity; and ‘whether permissible’ questions, which relate to conditions of legitimacy and ethical normativity. I examine the interplay of both types of questions in Foucault’s work and argue that this helps us to understand both the function of the historical a priori in the archeological period and the subsequent accusations of crypto-normativity levelled against Foucault by commentators such (...) as Taylor and Habermas. I chart the complex conceptual space available for a defense. After examining several possible replies, I conclude that the most effective option, and the one that fits Foucault’s approach best, is to refuse the demand for normative justification as self-defeating, and to opt for the cultivation of an appropriate ethical sensibility through an emphasis on critique as a performative practice of the self. I offer in conclusion some thoughts on what such practice may look like for Foucault. (shrink)

This article attempts to determine Adorno’s stance concerning two opposing positions in the relationship between critique and normativity. Although he rejects the demand to account for the normative foundations of critique, his negative dialectics does not fall back on the alternative of skepticism about normativity, of which it is often accused. I illustrate this problem by recovering the skeptical objections advanced by Justin Evans. Next, I turn to the young Hegel’s interpretation of the positive relationship between his (...) speculative dialectics and skepticism to pose the question of what relationship now exists between negative dialectics and skepticism. The answer is outlined based on a reading of Minima Moralia under the interpretative key of the idea of real normative antinomies. (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg presents fourteen essays which establish Kant's Critique of Judgment as a central contribution to the understanding of human cognition. The papers bring out the significance of Kant's philosophical notion of judgment, and use it to address interpretive issues in Kant's aesthetics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of biology.

The normative status of Michel Foucault’s critical method of genealogy has been the topic of much debate in secondary scholarship. Against the criticisms forwarded by Nancy Fraser and Jürgen Haberm...

1. In this article, I will use a case study to explore the broader question of how to assess socioeconomic development from a normative perspective, especially in relation to indigenous peoples.1 T...

This article aims to confront the principal arguments of the concept of critique in sociology and to demonstrate the emergence in recent years of a re-dimensioned conception of critique, on the one hand, of a pragmatic, pluralistic and contingent nature, and, on the other, show how the need for a strong and transcendental concept of critique that does not renounce the possibility of individual and collective emancipation is still present. This article argues that the analytic and empirical (...) space in which we can better observe the meeting between the contingent and normative aspects of critique is that of the social movements, that unsurprisingly have been important reference points for many of the different sociological traditions of critique. (shrink)

Displaying an impressive command of complex materials, Seyla Benhabib reconstructs the history of theories from a systematic point of view and examines the origins and transformations of the concept of critique from the works of Hegel to Habermas. Through investigating the model of the philosophy of the subject, she pursues the question of how Hegel´s critiques might be useful for reforumulating the foundations of critical social theory.

Following a critical reconstruction of the shift from norms of communication to norms of identity formation, and thus from conditions of argumentation to conditions of recognition, the paper argues that a non-foundationalist critique of ideology must be based on a theory of motivation and social mobilization.

The distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality does not allow for sufficient attention to be given to the question of non-normative heterosexualities. This paper develops a feminist critique of normative sexuality, focusing on alternative readings of sex and/or gender offered by Beauvoir and Irigaray. Despite their differences, both accounts contribute significantly to dismantling the lure of normative sexuality in heterosexual relations-a dismantling necessary to the construction of a feminist social and political order.

The unity of Paul Ricœur’s philosophy can be restated using the question of the imagination as a guideline. Ricœur’s goal was to envisage the imagination not as a psychological faculty but as a semantic power. Metaphor and narrative allow us to see the real in a different way, hence to imagine it. The image has less to do with perception and concepts. It is the instrument that allows them to be articulated. This shift of the imaginary to the practical dimension (...) is confirmed in Ricœur’s theory of ideology and utopia. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” The (...) basic insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

Michaël Foessel | : L’unité de la philosophie ricoeurienne peut être reconstituée au fil conducteur de la question de l’imaginaire. Le propre de Ricoeur est d’envisager l’imagination non comme une faculté psychologique, mais comme un pouvoir sémantique : la métaphore et le récit permettent de percevoir le réel autrement qu’il n’est, donc de l’imaginer. L’image n’est pas moins que la perception et moins que le concept, elle est l’instrument qui permet leur articulation. Cette promotion de l’imaginaire au rang de dimension (...) pratique se vérifie dans la théorie ricoeurienne de l’idéologie et de l’utopie. | : The unity of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy can be restated using the question of the imagination as a guideline. Ricoeur’s goal was to envisage the imagination not as a psychological faculty but as a semantic power. Metaphor and narrative allow us to see the real in a different way, hence to imagine it. The image has less to do with perception and concepts. It is the instrument that allows them to be articulated. This shift of the imaginary to the practical dimension is confirmed in Ricoeur’s theory of ideology and utopia. (shrink)

Some theorists are suspicious of normative political theology because they believe it undermines critical rationality. In my view, these theorists neglect theological traditions that resist dogmatism through intensified critique. Because authoritarian dogma is not unique to religion, theology offers sophisticated techniques that may be useful for those who are not themselves religious. A normative theology that intensifies critique represents a valuable resource for political reflection, and not only for the faithful.

In this article I argue that there are grounds for considering agonistic democracy and participatory democracy complementarity in order to institutionalize agonism which has thus far lacked an elaborate articulation of its institutional dimension. The two democratic theories share a commitment toward widening the scope of the political as a way of inclusion of citizens and their subsequent political subjectivation and empowerment. Furthermore, there are authors on both sides who think democracy does not need foundations. Agonistic participation and contestation, on (...) the one hand, and the broadening and strengthening of various sectors of political participation, on the other, both open up new possibilities for critique and change, but also create new risks. Building on a redefinition of agonisitic participation, I aim to attenuate an objection that agonism is normatively weak in terms of lacking resources to motivate citizens and justify their critique of practices of domination and oppression. The article concludes that we need to embrace agonistic participation as a means towards the development of democratic political judgement, as there are no other guarantees, i.e. secure foundations, for our ability to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic agon. (shrink)

파핏은 최근 저서에서 도덕적 속성을 포함한 규범적 속성이 그 어떤 자연적 속성과 동일시될 수 없다는 비자연주의를 옹호한다. 논문은 자연주의에 반대하는 파핏의 두 논증을 비판적으로 검토하는데, 첫째 논증은 자연주의가 채택된다면 어떤 자연적 속성을 가진 행위가 옳거나 그르다는 규범적 명제들이 사소하게 참이 되어 실질적 의미를 상실한다고 주장하고, 둘째 논증에 의하면 자연주의적 환원은 규범성의 독특하고 고유한 특징을 포섭하지 못한다. 논문은 규범을 자연적 속성과 동일시하면서도 의미있는 규범적 명제들이 가능한 방식, 그리고 파핏의 규범성의 이념의 중심인 행위이유에 대한 자연주의적 환원의 모델을 제시한다. 그리고 규범윤리학과 메타윤리학을 포함한 (...) 파핏의 전반적 구도내에 존재하는 긴장들을 제시한다. (shrink)

Ben Saunders claims that actual consent is not necessary for organ donation due to ‘normative consent’, a concept he borrows from David Estlund. Combining normative consent with Peter Singer's ‘greater moral evil principle’, Saunders argues that it is immoral for an individual to refuse consent to donate his or her organs. If a presumed consent policy were thus adopted, it would be morally legitimate to remove organs from individuals whose wishes concerning donation are not known. This paper disputes (...) Saunders' arguments. First, if death caused by the absence of organ transplant is the operational premise, then, there is nothing of comparable moral precedence under which a person is not obligated to donate. Saunders' use of Singer's principle produces a duty to donate in almost all circumstances. However, this premise is based on a flawed interpretation of cause and effect between organ availability and death. Second, given growing moral and scientific agreement that the organ donors in heart-beating and non-heart-beating procurement protocols are not dead when their organs are surgically removed, it is not at all clear that people have a duty to consent to their lives being taken for their organs. Third, Saunders' claim that there can be good reasons for refusing consent clashes with his claim that there is a moral obligation for everyone to donate their organs. Saunders' argument is more consistent with a conclusion of ‘mandatory consent’. Finally, it is argued that Saunders' policy, if put into place, would be totalitarian in scope and would therefore be inconsistent with the freedom required for a democratic society. (shrink)

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his main work of theoretical philosophy, frequently uses metaphors from law. In this first book-length study in English of Kant's legal metaphors and their role in the first Critique, Sofie Møller shows that they are central to Kant's account of reason. Through an analysis of the legal metaphors in their entirety, she demonstrates that Kant conceives of reason as having a structure mirroring that of a legal system in a natural right framework. Her (...) study shows that Kant's aim is to make cognisers become similar to authorized judges within such a system, by proving the legitimacy of the laws and the conditions under which valid judgments can be pronounced. These elements consolidate her conclusion that reason's systematicity is legal systematicity. (shrink)

The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong”—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction (...) among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich’s argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world. (shrink)

Resumen: La psicología como saber constituido recibe una importante problematización a partir del texto ¿Qué es la psicología? del filósofo francés Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995). Su crítica se refuerza cuando consideramos el concepto de vida explorado por el autor, es decir, como algo precario y errante. Así, se revela un impasse epistémico de la psicología: la fragilidad en aprehender lo viviente como creador de normas, dada su precariedad esencial. La psicología, al ignorar la comprensión de la vida en estos términos sugeridos (...) por Canguilhem, convierte al psicólogo en un instrumento al servicio de la patologización de las formas singulares de la existencia. Abstract: Psychology as a field of knowledge receives an important problematization from the text What is Psychology? by the French philosopher Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995). His criticism is strengthened when we consider the concept of life explored by the author, that is, as something precarious and errant. Thus, an epistemic impasse in psychology is revealed: the fragility of apprehending the living as a creator of norms, given its essential precariousness. Psychology, by ignoring the understanding of life in these terms suggested by Canguilhem, turns the psychologist into an instrument at the service of the pathologization of the singular forms of existence. (shrink)

This article explores the normative assumptions about the self that are implicitly and explicitly embedded in critiques of organisational control. Two problematic aspects of control are examined – the capacity of some organisations to produce unquestioning commitment, and the elicitation of ‹false’ selves. Drawing on the work of Rom Harré, and some examples of organisational-self processes gone awry, I investigate the dynamics involved and how they violate the normative expectations that we hold regarding the self, particularly its moral (...) autonomy and authenticity. The article concludes by arguing that, despite post-structuralist challenges, some notion of a ‹core’ or ‹real’ self still holds salience for employees negotiating their identities within regimes of control. The assumptions and expectations surrounding this aspect of self are also a pivotal element in the western intellectual tradition that promotes and enables critique. (shrink)

Ce texte vise à proposer quelques arguments pour une critique empiriste de la hiérarchie des normes, c'est-à-dire pour les besoins d'une science du droit descriptive et explicative. La hiérarchie des normes est à la fois objet d’étude scientifique, et théorie construisant cet objet. Une approche empiriste nécessite la formalisation de quelques concepts et une justification minimale de la possibilité d'une science juridique empiriste : ce seront les objets des premiers points de ce texte. Il s'agira ensuite de proposer une (...) formulation de la conception de la hiérarchie des normes à laquelle l’empirisme peut conduire, permettant de réévaluer la théorie (normativiste) de la hiérarchie des normes proposée par Kelsen comme une théorie politique, qui ne décrit pas son objet mais le construit comme contrainte. (shrink)

The essay is a critical revision of various of Marx’s approaches in his analysis of capitalism in “Das Kapital”. One can distinguish immanent, normative critiques from transcendental and objectivistic ones. The review of the normative standards used in each case leads to the questions of how Marx determined and used the relationships of justice and law and the capitalist mode of production. Orthodox Marxist views (most recently C. Menke) claim that Marx did not criticise capital as unjust and (...) understood the law of capital only as private law that stabilised domination. Against this, it is shown that he certainly bases his “critical presentation” on an (almost Kantian) constitutional (“rechtsstaatliches”) concept of private law and public law. Thus the “popular prejudice” of “human equality”, defined by Marx as an epochal and systematic condition of the capitalist exchange of goods, becomes apparent as a covert reference to the historical (America, French Revolution),public-lawdeclarations of human rights. And in the chapter “Struggle for the length of the working day” Marx presents the decisions of this dispute between “equal rights” first and foremost in the systematic historical actions of the constitutional powers (legislature, executive and judiciary). At the same time, however, he attempts to ironise and defame this public-law and deliberative, democratic dispute and then to misinterpret it as a violent “civil war”. Because Marx in his further presentation ignores this legal-democratic dispute, including a potential human-rights critique and (possible!) future regulation of capitalism, focussing instead on objectivist concepts of history and development, he can only insufficiently grasp the still challenging relationship between democracy and capitalism. (shrink)

Constructing Marxist Ethics offers a series of compelling essays that reassess the role of ethics and moral values in Marxist theory and philosophy.