Resumo: A Kehre (viragem) no pensamento de Heidegger foi amplamente discutida e debatida. A introdução da noção de metontologia (Metontologie), em 1927, informou proveitosamente esse debate, uma vez que implica uma preocupação com o domínio ôntico, por parte de Heidegger, que não está presente em trabalhos anteriores. O fato de essa noção desaparecer logo após ser introduzida, porém, desafia sua contribuição para esse debate. Neste artigo, mostra-se que o desaparecimento da metontologia não significa o desaparecimento da preocupação de Heidegger com (...) o ôntico, mas o contrário. Começa-se apresentando a visão de Freeman de uma tensão entre o ôntico e o ontológico, no pensamento de Heidegger, em meados da década de 1920, que resulta na introdução da metontologia, em 1927. Mais tarde, evidencia-se que a explicação de McNeill para o desaparecimento da metontologia, como consequência da visão de Heidegger, de meados dos anos 30, de que a projeção a priori do ser é uma retirada do ser (Entzug des Seins), permite dizer que esse desaparecimento não acarreta uma repentina falta de preocupação de Heidegger com o ôntico. Ao considerar a análise de Heidegger de “o matemático”, em Die Frage nach dem Ding, finalmente, argumenta-se que a metontologia desaparece do pensamento de Heidegger, porque sua dependência da ontologia a impede de explicar sua crescente preocupação com o ôntico, de maneira adequada. (shrink)

In 1928 Heidegger argued that the transcendental philosophy he had pursued in Being and Time needed to be completed by what he called “metontology.” This paper analyzes what this notion amounts to. Far from being merely a curiosity of Heidegger scholarship, the place occupied by “metontology” opens onto a general issue concerning the relation between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics, and also between both of these and naturalistic empiricism. I pursue these issues in terms of an ambiguity in the (...) notion of “grounding” in Being and Time and in the works of what I call Heidegger’s “metaphysical decade” , defending a phenomenological conception against what proves to be the illusory idea that metaphysical grounds are presupposed in such transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time , in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic . The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology . Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within (...) class='Hi'>metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s argument for metontology , and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

This article introduces Heidegger's notion of metontology as a way to address the body-problem in Being and Time.

Commented article reference: CRICHTON, Cristina. Metontology and Heidegger’s concern for the ontic after Being and Time: challenging the a priori. Trans/form/ação: revista de Filosofia da Unesp, v. 45, n. 3, p. 33-58, 2022.

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 265 - 285 This article examines the development of Heidegger’s thought directly following _Being and Time_, a period that is significant both in its own right and in its capacity to shed light on the problems driving Heidegger’s later works. I assess Crowell’s thesis that Heidegger’s aim was to develop a metontology along the lines of a pre-critical _metaphysica specialis_ based on a reassessment of Kant’s transcendental dialectic. I show that such a (...) reading misrepresents the nature of Heidegger’s project in this period and argue that Heidegger was instead attempting to develop a distinctively critical metaphysics in a post-Kantian vein. (shrink)

The complexities of Heidegger’s early accounts of nature provide a privileged perspective from which to understand the evolution of his thought into the 1930s and beyond. This movement seems largely driven by his response to what Karsten Harries has called “the antinomy of being”. In Heidegger’s early writings, Natur is associated with the “theoretical” and the “intraworldly.” However, less attested is an “unworlded” and thus intrinsically “incomprehensible” sense of nature, as the abyssal ground of worlding. This thread is traced through (...) key Marburg period texts, into Being and Time, and beyond it into the 1928 “metontology” appendix and its surprising transformation in the 1929 inaugural lecture. Finally, some cursory observations are made about how this trajectory unfolds in later Heideggerian thought, taking the 1936 Artwork essay as an example, showing how both sides of the antinomy of being come to be incorporated within a more comprehensive framing of the Seinsfrage. (shrink)

There have been two prominent ways of thinking about the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism: the first and more traditional way, in continuity with Husserl’s critique of psychologism, exhibits the incompatibility of phenomenology with all forms of naturalism and positivism; the second and more recent interpretive strategy attempts to naturalize phenomenology and make it consistent with current scientific accounts of consciousness and intentionality. In this paper I argue that despite the fact that Heidegger followed the first path and remained critical (...) of naturalism and positivism throughout his career, there are important moments in the late twenties where his project of a phenomenological ontology is challenged by problems pertaining to naturalism. I show how the question of determining the essence of life and animality as well as the overturning of ontology into metontology offer significant methodological hurdles for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. (shrink)

How does everyday, inauthentic Dasein dominated by das Man become authentic? The aim of this article is to answer this and other questions about Dasein's authenticity by carrying out an analysis of the 'call of conscience'. This analysis, in turn, provides insights about Dasein's possibility for ethical existence. We will see that even though there are some puzzling issues in Heidegger's explanation of Dasein in its everydayness and its authenticity, the Heideggerian Existential Analytic is not 'anti-ethical' as some have claimed. (...) We will also see that the Existential Analytic's commitment to the ontic raises doubts about Heidegger's claim that the Analytic is prior to any ethics and examine how reading Being and Time as a project of 'metontology' may dissolve these doubts. Finally, the paper offers a suggestion about the importance of 'authentic historicality' in a factical account of the moral life. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify Heidegger’s concept of metaphysics as it is developed in the period immediately after the publication of Being and Time. According to Heidegger, the concept of metaphysics contains two different tasks: the question of Being as such (Sein als solches) and the question of being asa whole (Seiende im Ganzen). These two tasks correspond to Fundamental Ontology and Metontology. Based on this distinction, I argue that the concept of metaphysics introduces a fundamental change in the (...) philosophical project of Being and Time. Firstly, I show in what sense Fundamental Ontology can be understood as an immanent critique of Phenomenology, which attempts to overcome an omission in its account of the transcendental field. Secondly, I argue that Metontology should not be taken as an attempt to develop regional ontologies lacking in Being and Time, but as a new philosophical task concerning the world as being as a whole. However, this task cannot be considered on the basis of the concept of world presented in Being and Time. Metontology is concerned with a new account of the phenomenon of nature and of Heidegger’s concept of facticity, which goes beyond the boundaries of the Analytic of Dasein. (shrink)

This dissertation aims to develop Martin Heidegger's famous analysis of equipment into an ontology of objects. Although numerous commentators have discussed the role of the tool in Heidegger's work, all have interpreted it too narrowly as a question of human practical activity, in connection with a limited range of familiar utensils such as chisels, jackhammers, and saws. Chapter One argues that Heidegger's analysis actually holds good of all possible entities, whether they be "useful" or not. The term 'tool-being' holds good (...) for grains of sand as much as saws, for angels as much as windmills. In truth, all entities are caught up in Heidegger's famous reversal between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, a crippling global dualism from which nothing in the cosmos is immune. My related claim is that all of Heidegger's various attempts to discuss any sort of concrete subject matter quickly implode into a sheer repetition of the duel between tool and broken tool. His supposed discussions of "space," "truth," and "time" are nothing more than distracting code words for a repetitive duality that Heidegger tries to escape by means of his abortive project for a 'metontology.' His monotonous appeal to the drama of tool and broken tool is complicated by only one further dualism, one found in his work as early as the 1919 Freiburg course Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. The interplay of these two principles is what leads Heidegger to his infamous notion of the fourfold , a concept too hastily ridiculed even by many of his admirers. Chapter Two offers a critical engagement with the secondary literature, focusing in particular on the concepts of Dasein, being, time, truth, Ereignis, language, and technology. Chapter Three attempts to develop the implications of this reading of Heidegger for a theory of the structure of objects in general. I argue in conclusion that Heidegger's holistic theory of the world, expressed in even clearer form in the works of Whitehead, leads to just as many perplexities as the substance-based theories of Aristotle and Leibniz. The concept of 'tool-being' requires some sort of compromise position between context and substance. (shrink)

In my paper, I reconstruct the basic features of the metaphysical conception of the world in László Tengelyi. I outline that he understands the world and its existence as a fact. In opposition to traditional ontology, Tengelyi believes that the fact of the world is of necessary. However, its necessity is not of logical a priori nature but conditioned by the concordance of experience. One ought to point out that the Tengelyi’s phenomenological metaphysics of the world is limited by the (...) realm of experience. Following Husserl, he treats the world as the universal horizon of the experience. This is the horizon in which a thing can appear as limitless system of gradations. I analyze also the Tengelyi’s concept ‘project of world’ and explore two ‘projects’ of such a kind pointed in his metaphysics, namely (1) metontological transcendentalism and (2) naturalistic autarchism. I pay a special attention to the Tengelyi’s concept of the infinitude as a basic characteristic of the world. He considers it as the openness to the generation of the absolute new qualities of the things in the world. (shrink)

In my review, I survey the main content of L. Tengeli's book World and Infinity, reconstruct its structure and discuss the author’s research results in the field of phenomenology of the world, presented in it. In particular, I note here that Tengelyi conducts a detailed criticism of onto-theology, starting from the problem of the katholo-protological structure of metaphysics in Aristotle. He outlines Husserl’s doctrine of primordial facts and Heidegger’s idea of metontology. In addition, here I give a relatively detailed (...) description of Tengeliy’s understanding of a thing and the world, as well as his interpretation of infinity as a basic characteristic of the world. (shrink)

The Truth of Being and the Historicity of the Earth This essay reads Graeme Nicholson’s Heidegger on Truth in conjunction with Frank Schalow’s Heidegger’s Ecological Turn. It calls for the appropriation of Heidegger’s understanding of Da-sein to elaborate a radically other, earth-based political order. Nicholson and Schalow independently draw the conclusion that the technocratic world order, founded in the metaphysics of presence, is incapable of adequate response to a hermeneutic situation defined by instrumental reason and ecological collapse. Schalow’s carefully elaborated (...) contribution to eco-philosophy offers a creative adaption of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and specifies how it is integrated into the project of the history of being. (shrink)