Karl R. Popper was a great admirer and friend of Hans Albert. What is it exactly that connected them? Answer to this question, barely a sketch, will also answer the question why and how I came to know Hans Albert. Within the normative methodological tradition set forth in Rene Descartes’ Regulae and Discourse on the Method, Karl R. Popper and Hans Albert converged on critical rationalism, the generalized version of Popper’s deductivist-falsificationist methodology of science.

A number of authors have drawn attention to the contributions to geology of Robert Hooke, and it has been pointed out that in several ways his ideas were more advanced than those of Steno, who is sometimes taken to be the founder of geology as a scientific discipline. Moreover, it has been argued that in a number of instances Hooke should receive the credit for ideas which are usually believed to have originated in the work of James Hutton. This recognition (...) of the significance of Hooke's work is regarded by the present writer as being well founded. But, by contrast, the relationship between Hooke's geological ideas and his views on the proper methods for conducting scientific enquiries has been largely overlooked, and his views on the methodology of science, as revealed in his Posthumous works, have received little discussion. Moreover, on one of the few occasions on which they were discussed, by William Whewell, they were belittled. Whewell regarded Hooke's methodological contribution as merely ‘an attempt to adapt the Novum organon to the age which succeeded its publication’, 5 and he implied that the ‘same imperfections’ were to be found in the writings of both Hooke and Bacon. The influence of Bacon is, to be sure, most obvious in Hooke's general philosophy. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Hooke had a much clearer idea than did Bacon of the importance of so-called ‘hypothetico-deductive’ methods in science, and that in many ways his methodological views represent a significant advance on those of Bacon. (shrink)

By now many formulations have been proposed to provide a definition of the realm of research topics in the methodology of science, which is sometimes also called, in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon terminology, the philosophy of science. There are various situations in which fundamental discrepancies exist among some of these formulations. Without resorting in this article to citation and detailed analysis of such definitions, let us emphasize from the outset that one of the principal sources of significant (...) differences among them lies in the following circumstance: the methodology of science may be treated either as a theoretical discipline or as a practical discipline . Inasmuch as closer examination of this question shows that practical interpretation of the methodology of science leads us to expect from it statements which — albeit in a different, nonindependent role — are also formulated in the framework of methodological investigations of a theoretical nature, to that degree, in this case one can speak of their being a single discipline, existing however, in two variants, the theoretical and the practical. Such a concept has the advantage that it creates the possibility of demonstrating the connections that exist within a very broad set of the most diverse intuitive versions of the tasks and character of methodological studies — versions that usually elevate to absolutes either the theoretical or the practical method whereby such researches are conducted. (shrink)

The paper is a study of the establishment of the theoretical, human and institutional presuppositions of the development of modern methodology of sciences in Slovakia 1946-1962. It focuses particularly on the examnination of V. Filkorn´s scientific and educational work, who was drawing on the previous and contemporary activity of S. Felber and I.Hrušovský. In that time V. Filkorn published his first essential works and developed an original conception of the methodology of sciences with its special view of the (...) method of science, scientific law, and the relationship between logic and dialectics. It is defined as logical analysis of the building of the system od science by means of modern logic and an articulated theory of categories. (shrink)

Abstract In The Rational and the Social James Brown argues against the use of the method of reflective equilibrium in attempting to justify methodological norms. For, according to Brown, this would involve a circularity for that method presupposes an account of good scientific practice. In this paper it is argued that the method can be sustained without such a presupposition using either conherentism, reliabilism or defeasible foundationalism. That being so there is no circularity in applying it within normative methodology (...) of science. (shrink)

Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science (...) is partially determined by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-adequate theoretical results. (shrink)

Originally published in 1983. This book concentrates on the impact of philosophy of science on sociology and other disciplines. It argues that the impact of the philosophy of science on sociology from the rise of the Vienna Circle until the mid-1980s resulted in a deep-reaching and, in the author’s view, undesirable methodological reorientation in sociology.

Novelty and Continuity in Philosophy and Methodology of Science Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Nowadays, philosophy and methodology of science appear as a ...

This book examines the various norms for the logic and methodology of science, placing them in the context of the cognitive interests and explanatory ideals that motivate science. Various themes in the philosophy of science are examined, including the views of K. Popper, T. Kuhn, and L. Laudan. Characteristic cases of scientific theories are examined in order to illustrate and justify the proposed norms. These include, on the one hand, the emergence of the science of (...) Galileo, Kepler, and Newton from the older metaphysical style of explanation to be found in Aristotle and, on the other hand, Darwin's theory of natural selection. Also included are characteristic cases of pseudoscience, including creation science, Lysenkoism, Velikovsky, UFOs and ancient astronauts, astrology, parapsychology, and various kinds of alternative medicine. From these examples and the more theoretical discussion, there emerges a series of norms for demarcating science and pseudoscience. Various aspects of the scientific method are examined in detail, including the role of hypotheses, the logical structure of theories, and how these relate to the experimental methods of John Stuart Mill. collection; for example, what do we say about observational reports of the existence of UFOs? In this context there is a discussion of some of the issues raised in the so-called science wars. It is concluded that the sociology of science can at times be helpful to the scientific community in improving their methods of investigation. (shrink)

The article provides an overview of activity of the department of logic and methodology of science of the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Science of Ukraine. This activity includes scientific research, translation of philosophical literature, organization of seminars on urgent problems of modern philosophy. Research projects, on the one hand, are based on scientific traditions formed over the years in the Institute, and on the other hand, they focus on the transformations in scientific cognition (...) and science, and build the projections for the future. It presents methodological backgrounds of the project «Semiotic analysis of cultural phenomena» (2018–2020), and outlines research tasks of the projects «Communicative transformations in modern science» (2020–2021) and «Logical, ontological and axiological dimensions of modern scientific knowledge» (2022–2024). Involvement of young scholars in research in logic, methodology and philosophy of science is the major challenge for the department. (shrink)

(1) In the first part of this paper, I review Chomsky's meandering journey from the formalism/mentalism of Syntactic Structures, through several methodological positions, to the minimalist theory of his latest work. Infected with mentalism from first to last, each and every position vitiates Chomsky's repeated claims that his theories will provide useful guidance to later theories in such fields as cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. With the guidance of his insights, he claims, psychologists and neuroscientists will be able to avoid (...) costly dead-end lines of research. -/- (2) This never happened. As I have shown, this never could have happened. (See Johnston, 2018). What has happened, instead, is that current neurolinguistic research (with the arguable exception of the now-dated Lemma Model of Willem Levelt) proceeds without reference to Chomsky. It also wholeheartedly rejects the mentalism of the associated Language of Thought theory of Jerry Fodor. (See Johnston, 2018). -/- (3) I make this argument in the first part of this paper. I would also like to point out that most of my argument was developed in 1972, when I was a graduate student. I know of no other sustained criticisms of Chomsky at that time, and certainly none along the lines I had developed back then. -/- (4) In the second part of this paper, I present my own account of the methodology of science. When I was a graduate student, philosophy of science was dominated by an attempt to describe a methodology common to all the specific sciences, i.e. Hempel’s deductive-nomological model. These days, Hempel’s emphasis on the methodological unity of science has been rejected by such “dis-unity” philosophers of science as Ian Hacking, Patrick Suppes and Nancy Cartwright (see Cat, 2021). -/- (5) I view this change as the swing of a pendulum or, to change the metaphor, a journey from one end point of a continuum to another. As the level of abstraction at which one tries to describe scientific method is raised, the descriptions become increasingly general. Whether or not unity-of-science theories become so general as to be vacuous, is ultimately a subjective judgment. And so I expect that philosophers will eventually become tired of increasingly specific “close to the workbench” descriptions of how scientists work, and begin to turn back to methodological “big pictures”, finding in them powerful abstractions rather than empty irrelevancies. -/- (6) In the second part of this paper, I present my own account of the methodology of science, which I would situate somewhere between the “unity” and “dis-unity” accounts. However, I am not a scientist. My own views about scientific method have three origins: -/- (6a) my work as a graduate student from 1966 until I passed my comprehensive exams in 1973 (at a different university); -/- (6b) reading every issue of Scientific American from 1972 until nearly 2000, (at which point I continued to read it only sporadically, since I concluded that, around that time, it had evolved from a serious science magazine to a popular science magazine); and -/- (6c) my three-year immersion in the cognitive neuroscience of language after I retired, based on repeated study of and note-taking for (Banesh & Compton, 2018), (Kemmerer, 2015), several other books and, finally, numerous articles not hidden behind a paywall. -/- So, as always with my writings: caveat emptor. (shrink)

This volume contains the contributed papers of invitees to SEMS 2012 who have also given talks at the conference. The invitees are experts in philosophy of science and technology from Asia (besides China), Australia, Europe, Latin America, North America, as well as from within China. The papers in this volume represent the latest work of each researcher in his or her expertise; and as a result, they give a good representation of the cutting-edge researches in diverse areas in different (...) parts of the world. (shrink)

In spite of the many efforts made to clarify von Neumann’s methodology of science, one crucial point seems to have been disregarded in recent literature: his closeness to Hilbert’s spirit. In this paper I shall claim that the scientific methodology adopted by von Neumann in his later foundational reflections originates in the attempt to revaluate Hilbert’s axiomatics in the light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Indeed, axiomatics continues to be pursued by the Hungarian mathematician in the spirit of (...) Hilbert’s school. I shall argue this point by examining four basic ideas embraced by von Neumann in his foundational considerations: a) the conservative attitude to assume in mathematics; b) the role that mathematics and the axiomatic approach have to play in all that is science; c) the notion of success as an alternative methodological criterion to follow in scientific research; d) the empirical and, at the same time, abstract nature of mathematical thought. Once these four basic ideas have been accepted, Hilbert’s spirit in von Neumann’s methodology of science will become clear. (shrink)

For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck, Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change, which men of science and philosophy (...) have advocated in various forms in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that one's conception of science can be based on an identification of its theories with languages in which they may be, my own alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book (1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other, quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here, therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo, are not just problems concerning language change. (shrink)

The book discusses methodological issues relating to the philosophy of science and the natural and social sciences. It reconstructs the methods of measurement and scientific explanation, the relation of data, phenomena and mechanisms, the problem of theory-ladenness of explanation and the problem of historic explanation. From the sciences chosen for methodological analysis are those of early classical mechanics, early thermodynamics, Bohr's theory of atom, early quantum mechanics, research into great apes and political economy.

I. Mathematical logic has long since come into use in the solution of individual problems of interest in the methodology of science. In this connection the question arises as to how effective this use is, and what its prospects are. Before formulating any general and categorical judgments on that score, it would be useful to discuss special cases of the application of mathematical logic to the methodology of science. In the present article we shall deal with (...) one case of this order, to wit, the utilization of mathematical logic in investigating the problem of possibility and necessity. (shrink)

The methodology of the empirical sciences is treated from a set-theoretical point of view. Starting from Tarski's formulation of the methodology of the deductive sciences, a relation between terms, called degree of centrality, is introduced. Epistemic correlation, and therefore the notion of interpretative system, is defined using this relation.

Unter dem Begriff der „Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie der Wissenschaft“ verstehen wir den Einfluß wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise auf die Methodologie der Wissenschaft, insbesondere den Gebrauch von wissenschaftlichen Ideen und Methoden für die Formulierung und Lösung von methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaft und Problemen der Methodologie selbst. Es werden vier Haupttendenzen im Prozeß der Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie vorgestellt: (a) der Übergang vom „statement view“ zum mathematischen Holismus; (b) die Verwissenschaftlichung auf system-theoretischer Basis; (c) der Einzug soziologischer (...) Methoden in die methodologische Analyse der Wissenschaft und (d) die methodologischen Anwendungen von Forschungsresultaten im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Darüberhinaus werden einige besondere Formen der Implementierung wissenschaftlicher Konstruktionen in der Methodologie ins Auge gefaßt. (shrink)

This article addresses some recent tendencies in economic methodology defined as a philosophy of science for economics. I review the problem of normative/positive distinction in methodology and argue that normativity in its past forms is intolerable today but is, at the same time, indispensable for methodological inquiry. Using recent texts by Mirowski and Nik-Khah and by Alexandrova and Northcott on the applications of auction theory as a case study, I compare in more detail various approaches to economic (...) methodology inspired by the science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy of science literatures, respectively. On the basis of this comparison, I show that the STS programme in economic methodology may prove fruitful in the future, but there is still a place for more aprioristic philosophical thinking. Methodology and history of economics also play a fundamental role that goes beyond the descriptive analysis of STS and offer conceptual clarification paired with normative concerns provided by philosophers of science. (shrink)

Among the extraordinary Polish philosophers of the past one hundred years, Zygmunt Zawirski deserves to be given particular attention for his fusion of analytic and historical scholarship. Strikingly versatile, and con tributing original work in all his fields of competence, Zawirski thought through issues in the philosophical aspects of relativity theory, on the claims of intuitionalistic foundations of mathematics, on the nature and usefulness of many-value Logics, and on the calculus of probability, on the axiomatic method in science and (...) in the philosophy of science, on the genesis and development of scientific and philosophical concepts, and in his crowning achievement, the conceptual history of notions of time. His work has been too little known in English despite the respect which has been so clearly shown by his Polish COlleagues and students. In this generous selection from his papers and from his great critical study L' Evolution de la Notion du Temps, Dr. Irena Szumilewicz-Lachman has provided a clear account of Zawirski's achievement; and she has written a fine comprehensive introductory essay which provides both the personal and historical context of his work and a systematic survey of his principal publications. (shrink)

Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI.

This book explores aspects of science from an economic point of view. The author begins with economic models of misconduct in science, moving on to discuss other important issues, including market failure and the market place of ideas.

In the growing Prussian university system of the early nineteenth century, "Wissenschaft" (science) was seen as an endeavor common to university faculties, characterized by a rigorous methodology. On this view, history and jurisprudence are sciences, as much as is physics. Nineteenth century trends challenged this view: the increasing influence of materialist and positivist philosophies, profound changes in the relationships between university faculties, and the defense of Kant's classification of the sciences by neo-Kantians. Wilhelm Dilthey's defense of the independence (...) of the methodology of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) from those of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) is as much a return to the ideal of Wissenschaft as a cooperative endeavor as it is a defense of the autonomy of interpretive or hermeneutic methods. The debate between Dilthey and the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband at the close of the century illuminates the development of this dialogue over the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel was one of the first philosophers of science who reflected systematically on the methodology of the social sciences. His cooperation with Paul F. Lazarsfeld at Columbia University proved to be instructive in this regard. Moreover, Nagel stood in close contact with representatives of sociological functionalism and published, in 1956, a contribution on the prospects of a formalization of functionalism. In his seminal The Structure of Science from 1961, Nagel devoted two long chapters to methodological and (...) explanatory problems of the social sciences. The aim of the present chapter is to rationally reconstruct this 1961 account. I will proceed in three steps: first, I shall shed some light on Nagel’s discussion of the problem of a clear-cut demarcation between the natural and the social sciences; then Nagel’s interpretation of the presumptive ‘immaturity’ of the social sciences will be taken into account; finally, two case studies will be provided in order to illustrate the implications of Nagel’s particular analysis. (shrink)

The article gives a short account of V.A. Smirnovs scientific biography, including his work in Tomsk University in Siberia and in the Department of Logic of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow.

The experimental approach in economics is a driving force behind some of the most exciting developments in the field. The 'experimental revolution' was based on a series of bold philosophical premises which have remained until now mostly unexplored. This book provides the first comprehensive analysis and critical discussion of the methodology of experimental economics, written by a philosopher of science with expertise in the field. It outlines the fundamental principles of experimental inference in order to investigate their power, (...) scope and limitations. The author demonstrates that experimental economists have a lot to gain by discussing openly the philosophical principles that guide their work, and that philosophers of science have a lot to learn from their ingenious techniques devised by experimenters in order to tackle difficult scientific problems. (shrink)