En este trabajo trato de abordar el concepto de marco mental como clave para entender la concepción que la neuropolítica tiene de la deliberación pública y la democracia. En un primer lugar expondré los puntos centrales de las teorías de Jonathan Haidt y George Lakoff sobre el marco mental y la deliberación pública. Después pondré en relación la idea del marco mental con el concepto de marco referencial de Taylor. Finalmente, analizaré críticamente el (...) modelo de deliberación pública y de democracia que cabe extraer del concepto de marco mental en la neuropolítica.In this article I address the concept of «mental frame» as the key to understand the conception neuropolithics has on moral deliberation. Firstly, I will expose the core points of Jonathan Haidt y George Lakoff’s theories on mental frame and public deliberation. Then, I will put in relation the idea of mental frame with Charles Taylor’s concept of «referential frame». This will allow us, finally, to critically analyze the model of public deliberation and democracy that can be drawn from the concept of moral frame in neuropolitics. (shrink)

We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterfill and Apperly's "minimal theory of mind" framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social situations in terms of states of an enduring (...) class='Hi'>mental substance animating agents, infant interpreters parse observed bouts of behavior and their contexts into goals, rational means to those goals, and available information. In other words, the social ontology of infant interpreters consists in goal-directed, informed bouts of behavior, by non-enduring agents, rather than agents animated by states of enduring, unobservable minds. We discuss a number of experiments that support this interpretation of infant socio-cognitive competence. (shrink)

In March 1808 at the Institut de France, the German physician Franz Joseph Gall, together with his assistant Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, unveiled his rather controversial doctr...

In recent years, the postulation that deception is necessary for placebos to have an effect on pain relief or increased well-being has come into question. Latest studies have shown that an openly administered mock drug works just as well as a deceptively administered placebo on certain complaints. This open-label placebo effect has primarily been used in the area of pain treatment so far. This study is the first to examine the effect of such placebos on healthy individuals with the use (...) of drinking water. In two experiments, participants were required to use certain specified water bottles for their daily drinking water consumption. At the beginning of Experiment 1, all participants received one bottle of water, which they were asked to refill themselves each day during a 2-week intervention period. In Experiment 2, participants received a new sealed water bottle every day. In both experiments, participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: no treatment, open-label placebo without rationale, open-label placebo with rationale, and open-label placebo with additional rationale in a suggested relaxed state. We conducted baseline and post-treatment measurements of the subjective perceived physical and mental well-being of the participants. In Experiment 1, only the OPR++ group reported enhanced vitality at the post-treatment level compared to the other groups. In Experiment 2, post-treatment measurements showed improvements for the OPR++ group in the Physical Performance Capability, Mental Performance Capability, Emotional Balance, Overall Recovery, Negative Emotional State, and Overall Stress categories compared to the other groups. Our results support the idea that placebos with an additional rationale in a suggestive relaxed state are more effective than with just a rationale in a normal state. Furthermore, our study shows the tendency that OLP++ in the form of water with health claims may be more effective when the water is given in several sealed bottles separately than in one sealed but refillable bottle. (shrink)

Most countries have been struggling with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic imposing social isolation on their citizens. However, this measure carried risks for people's mental health. This study evaluated the psychological repercussions of objective isolation in 1,006 Italians during the first, especially strict, lockdown in spring 2020. Although varying for the regional spread-rate of the contagion, results showed that the longer the isolation and the less adequate the physical space where people were isolated, the worse the mental (...) health. Offline social contacts buffered the association between social isolation and mental health. However, when offline contacts were limited, online contacts seemed crucial in protecting mental health. The findings inform about the potential downsides of the massive social isolation imposed by COVID-19 spread, highlighting possible risk factors and resources to account for implementing such isolation measures. Specifically, besides some known factors such as physical space availability, the local contagion rate is critical in moderating the link between social isolation and mental health issues, supporting national policies implementing regional tiers of restriction severity. (shrink)

The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are (...) supposed to be just different kinds of generalization from perceptual experience. Specifically, I will argue that the projection of inner experiences to others which is involved in early mind-reading does not imply a computational leap beyond associative generalization from perceptual experience. (shrink)

The aim of the talk was to present a brief account of the history of investigations about concepts in the last decades, thereby contributing to the diffusion of cognitive science. The central episode in that history is the turning point that resultedfrom the researches carried out by Eleanor Rosch and others from the beginning of the 70's. Those researches constitute a challenge to the CLASSICAL VIEW OF CONCEPTS . The fact that the rejection of the classical view is not a (...) viable alternative generates what we called the PROBLEM OF CONCILIATION - that is, the problem of conciliating the classical view with the modern empirical results. The exposition ends with some suggestions towards the solution of the problem of conciliation.O objetivo da palestra foi o de apresentar um apanhado sucinto da história das investigações sobre conceitos nas últimas décadas, com isso contribuindo para a divulgação da Ciência Cognitiva. O episódio central dessa história é a guinada resultante das pesquisas realizadas por Eleonor Rosch e outros a partir do inicio dos anos setenta. Estas pesquisas colocam em cheque a CONCEPÇÃO CLÁSSICA DE CONCEITOS . O fato de que o abandono da concepção clássica não é uma alternativa viável, dá origem ao que chamamos de PROBLEMA DA CONCILIAÇÃO, ou seja, o de compatibilizar a concepção clássica com as descobertas modernas. A apresentação se encerra com algumas sugestões para a solução do problema. (shrink)

Ugar and Malele 1 critique the use of ‘generic’ technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) for mental health diagnoses, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. They highlight how these AI medical tools often overlook traditional perspectives and local contexts. The article has the merit of working on ethical issues regarding the particularities and risks of using AI and ML for health diagnosis in the Global South, an urgent and neglected topic. According to the authors, the use of (...) these AI technologies leads to overgeneralisation in diagnosing mental disorders, which could be especially problematic in the mental health field because of value-laden judgements intrinsic to the definition of mental health disorders. This argument is theoretically grounded in the hybrid conceptualisation of mental disorders proposed by Wakefield. 2 This author’s perspective incorporates both factual and value components in defining mental disorders, framing them as context-dependent ‘harmful dysfunctions’... (shrink)

This study evaluates the relationship between mental health and academic motivation among third-year college TES grantees. Thus, correlational design was employed to determine if there is a significant relationship between mental health and academic motivation among 150 third-year TES grantees. Statistical findings reveal that the r coefficient of 0.52 indicates a moderate positive correlation between the variables. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, leads to rejecting the null hypothesis. Hence, a significant relationship exists between (...) class='Hi'>mental health and academic motivation of third-year college TES grantees. Implications were discussed in the study. (shrink)

In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes (desires, values, etc.) along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views (...) of responsibility, on which the agent’s past is relevant to whether she is responsible for a specific action. In a recent paper, Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman bring these theoretical discussions on moral responsibility to bear on practical issues regarding neurological modifications of individuals. After proposing and arguing for a historical view, Sharp and Wasserman offer some insight into how such a view may help us in determining the responsibility of subjects who have undergone Deep Brain Stimulation. This paper aims to join this discussion, by arguing that the correct historical view to be applied will also appeal to the agent’s control over her mental life and the fact that this was bypassed. I conclude with some brief comments on the practical implications of such a historical view. (shrink)

Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: the standard evolutionary psychology model, the individualist empiricist model, the (...) cultural empiricist model, and the radical socio-cultural constructivist model, which we favor. We motivate model by arguing that many forms of mental state ascription do not serve the function of simply describing inner states causally responsible for the behavior of a cognitive agent; rather, they relate the agent to her environment by characterizing her practical commitments. Making these practical commitments explicit has an important regulatory function in that it supports action coordination and alignment on joint goals. We propose a model of how the ascription of mental states may have evolved as a linguistic device to perform exactly this function of making agents’ practical commitments explicit. (shrink)

At the core of anthropomorphism lies a false-positive cognitive bias to over-attribute the pattern of the human body and/or mind. Anthropomorphism is independently discussed in various disciplines, is presumed to have deep biological roots, but its cognitive bases are rarely explored in an integrative way. I present an inclusive, multifaceted interdisciplinary approach to refine the psychological bases of mental anthropomorphism. I have integrated 13 conceptual dissections of folk finalistic reasoning into four psychological inference systems (physical, design, basic-goal and belief (...) stances); the latter three are truly teleological and thus prone to anthropomorphisms. I then have empirically integrated the cross-disciplinary genetic, neural, cognitive, psychiatric, developmental, comparative and evolutionary/adaptive evidence that converge supporting the nature of the distinct stances. The over-reactive calibration of the three teleological systems is framed as an evolved design feature to avoid harmful ancestral contexts. Nowadays, these stances easily engage with scientific reasoning about bio-evolutionary matters with negative and positive consequences. Design, basic-goal, and belief stances benefit biology by providing cognitive foundations, expressing a high-powered explanatory system, promoting functional generalization, fostering new research questions and discoveries, enabling metaphorical/analogical thinking and explaining didactically with brevity. Hence, it is neither feasible nor advantageous to completely eliminate teleology from biology. Instead, we should engage with the eight classes of problems in bio-philosophy and bio-education that relate to the three stances: types of anthropomorphism, variety of misunderstandings, misleading appeal, legitimacy controversy, gateway to mysticism, total prohibition and its backfire effect. Recognizing the distinction among design, basic-goal, and belief stances helps to elucidate much of the logic underlying these issues, so that it enables a much more detailed taxonomy of anthropomorphisms, and organizes the various misunderstandings about evolution by natural selection. It also offers a solid psychological grounding for anchoring definitions and terminology. This tripartite framework also shed some light on how to better deal with the over-reactive stances in bio-education, by organizing previous pedagogical strategies and by suggesting new possibilities to be tested. Therefore, this framework constitutes a promising approach to advance the debate regarding the psychological underpinnings of anthropomorphisms and to further support regulating and clarifying teleology and anthropomorphism in biology. (shrink)

The lockdown imposed in Italy to reduce the spread of COVID-19 posited unusual challenges to people practicing sports and physical activities. The rebooting of activities highlighted the need to cope with new behaviors and routines, such as wearing a face mask while exercising. We conducted a web-based survey in Italy at the start of physical activities’ rebooting, to investigate how people reacted to the new norms. Participants completed the questionnaires assessing insomnia, regulatory self-efficacy, optimism, mood states, and mental toughness. (...) Age, gender, and environment were assumed as design variables. Results showed that in outdoor activities, the younger females as compared to the older manifest less regulatory self-efficacy, while the younger males manifest more regulatory self-efficacy than the older. In indoor activities, a reversed pattern of regulatory-self-efficacy was observed. Regarding life orientation, younger participants showed less optimism and positive expectation for the future and seem to be more exposed to the unexpected effects of the restrictions: they showed more sleep disturbances, confusion, depression, anger, and fatigue and less vigor and mental toughness than older participants. An understanding of the psychological implications of the rebooting phase can support the enactment of more appropriate behaviors to practice sports and physical activities when living at the time of the coronavirus. (shrink)

Radical enactivists claim that cognition is split in two distinct kinds, which can be differentiated by how they relate to mental content. In their view, basic cognitive activities involve no mental content whatsoever, whereas linguistically scaffolded, non-basic, cognitive activities constitutively involve the manipulation of mental contents. Here, I evaluate how this dichotomy applies to imagination, arguing that the sensory images involved in basic acts of imaginations qualify as vehicles of content, contrary to what radical enactivists claim. To (...) argue so, I leverage what has appropriately been dubbed a “compare to prototype” argument. Hence, I will first identify, within the enactivist literature, the general functional profile of a vehicle of content complying with the austere standard of contentfulness radical enactivists adhere to. Provided such a profile, I will show, relying on a mixture of reasoning and empirical evidence, that basic sensory images satisfy it, and thus that they can rightfully be identified as vehicles of content. This, I claim, provides a sufficient reason to identify the sensory images involved in basic acts of imagination as vehicles of content, thereby denying that basic imagination does not involve mental content. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo interpretar como Foucault concebe a possibilidade da cura nos discursos e práticas psicológicas, durante sua fase protoarqueológica. Para atingir tal fim, discorre sobre os dois textos mais importantes dessa fase ? Maladie!Mentale!et!Personnalité e a introdução à Le Rêve et l'?Existence ? evidenciando como nesses textos se desenha uma concepção psicopatológica que deve subsidiar uma prática psicoterápica. Constata-se, no entanto, que reina uma contradição inerente aos dois textos, em que ora se completam, ora conflitam no modo (...) de conceber a doença mental. Terminamos assim por demarcar toda a intensidade dessa contradição, sublinhando a indecisão teórica de Foucault sobre o estatuto da psicologia. (shrink)

According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children's acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to early childhood. Against the facilitation—and also the maturation—hypothesis, I report empirical data attesting that children and even adults never come to understand false beliefs when deprived of proper social and linguistic interaction. In contrast to the attunement hypothesis, I argue that alleged mindreading (...) abilities in infancy differ significantly from those required to pass the false belief test at age four. I conclude that children's success in the false belief test reflects the acquisition of a novel psychological competence, and argue that social experience in the form of conversation about mental states teaches children to exploit belief reports to predict intelligent behaviour, and induces their acquisition of a capacity to recognize and track others' beliefs across contexts. (shrink)

As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some jurisdictions. By focusing on a prominent (...) type of view of free action, which I call bypassing views, this paper evaluates how such interventions may negatively impact the freedom of their subjects. The paper concludes that there will be a tension between the goals of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism, on the one hand, and the negative impact such interventions may have on free action, on the other. Other things equal, the better that a particular intervention is at achieving the former, the more likely it is to result in the latter. (shrink)

Celano’s notion of a “pre-convention” is grounded in the opposition between two allegedly different kinds of normative behaviour: observing a “rule” and conforming to a “norm”. This opposition plays a central role in Celano’s paper, and marks a crucial point in his intellectual trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains largely implicit. In this paper, I try to make it fully explicit, giving a more precise characterisation of both kinds of normative behaviour. I also focus on the importance of distinguishing between them, express (...) some conjectures regarding Celano’s future research, and propose a criticism. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease imposes an unusual risk to the physical and mental health of healthcare workers and thereby to the functioning of healthcare systems during the crisis. This study investigates the clinical knowledge of healthcare workers about COVID-19, their ways of acquiring information, their emotional distress and risk perception, their adherence to preventive guidelines, their changed work situation due to the pandemic, and their perception of how the healthcare system has coped with the pandemic. It is based on a (...) quantitative cross-sectional survey of 185 Swiss healthcare workers directly attending to patients during the pandemic, with 22% of them being assigned to COVID-19-infected patients. The participants answered between 16th June and 15th July 2020, shortly after the first wave of COVID-19 had been overcome and the national government had relaxed its preventive regulations to a great extent. The questionnaire incorporated parts of the “Standard questionnaire on risk perception of an infectious disease outbreak”, which were adapted to the case of COVID-19. Clinical knowledge was lowest regarding the effectiveness of standard hygiene. Knowledge of infectiousness, incubation time, and life-threatening disease progression was higher, however still significantly lower than regarding asymptomatic cases and transmission without physical contact. 70% of the healthcare workers reported considerable emotional distress on at least one of the measured dimensions. They worried significantly more strongly about patients, elderly people, and family members, than about their own health. Adherence to preventive guidelines by the government displayed patterns such that not all guidelines were followed equally. Most of the participants were faced with a lack of protective materials, personnel, structures, processes, and contingency plans. An increase in stress level was the most prevalent among the diverse effects the pandemic had on their work situation. Better medical equipment, better protection for their own mental and physical health, more personnel, more comprehensive information about the symptoms of the disease, and a system of earlier warning were the primary lessons to be learned in view of upcoming waves of the pandemic. (shrink)

Cognitive Robotics can be defined as the study of cognitive phenomena by their modeling in physical artifacts such as robots. This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly very basic, low­level cognitive phenomena like sensory­motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high­level human cognition. In this paper we argue that (...) a promising way to do that is to merge current ideas and methods of 'embodied cognition' with the Russian tradition of theoretical psychology which views language not only as a communication system but also as a cognitive tool, that is by developing a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics. We substantiate this idea by discussing several domains in which language can improve basic cognitive abilities and permit the development of high­level cognition: learning, categorization, abstraction, memory, voluntary control, and mental life. (shrink)

How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good (...) marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness. (shrink)

Language does not have to be held as a problem for radical enactivists. The scope objection usually presented to criticize enactivist explanations is a problem only if we have a referentialist and representationalist view of the nature of language. Here we present a normative hypothesis for the great question concerning the hard problem of content, namely, on how linguistic practices develop from minds without content. We carry representational content when we master inferential relations and we master inferential relations when we (...) master normative relations, especially when we are introduced into frameworks of authorizations and prohibitions. Inspired by the anti-intellectualism of the later Wittgenstein and Brandom’s inferentialism, we present the hypothesis that language emerges from inferentially articulated action from normative elements and not from manipulation in internal mental states of contents fixed by reference to external things. (shrink)

Psychotic-like experiences are a phenomenon that occurs in the general population experiencing delusional thoughts and hallucinations without being in a clinical condition. PLEs involve erroneous attributions of inner cognitive events to the external environment and the presence of intrusive thoughts influenced by dysfunctional beliefs; for these reasons, the role played by metacognition has been largely studied. This study investigates PLEs in a non-clinical population and discriminating factors involved in this kind of experience, among which metacognition, as well as psychopathological features, (...) seems to have a crucial role. The aim of this study was to extend the knowledge about the relationship between metacognition, psychopathology, and PLEs, orienting the focus on metacognitive functioning. The sample consisted of 207 Italian participants voluntarily recruited online, who gave consent to participate in the study. The average age of the sample was 32.69 years. Subjects affected by psychosis, neurological disease, and drug addiction were excluded from the analyses. The following scales were used to investigate PLEs: Peters et al. Delusions Inventory, Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale-Extended Revised, Prodromal Questionnaire-Brief, and Revised Hallucination Scale. To assess general psychopathological features, the Behavior and Symptom Identification Scale was administrated. The Metacognition Self-Assessment Scale was chosen to evaluate metacognitive functioning. From hierarchical regression analyses, it emerged that the presence of anxiety, depression, and impulsive/addictive symptoms constitute a remarkable vulnerability factor for PLEs, in line with previous evidence regarding the relationship between general psychopathology and PLEs. Metacognition negatively predicts PLEs, and its presence does not affect the significance of psychopathological variables, suggesting that metacognitive abilities seem to play a protective role for the occurrence of PLEs among non-clinical individuals, and such ability operates as an independent predictor along with other variables. These results are explained by the role of metacognitive functions, which allow individuals to operate many mental processes such as interpreting sensorial events as real or illusory, understanding behaviors, thoughts, and drives of others, and questioning the subjective interpretation of facts. (shrink)

Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at (...) age four, depend on children’s ability to explain people’s reasons to act in conversation with adults. Accordingly, rather than embodied, late theory-of-mind abilities are embedded in an external linguistic practice. (shrink)

Celano’s notion of a “pre-convention” is grounded in the opposition between two types of normative behaviour: following a rule and conforming to a norm. The opposition plays a central role in Celano’s paper, and marks a crucial point in his intellectual trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains largely implicit. In this paper I try to make it fully explicit, giving a more precise, albeit sketchy, characterization of both kinds of normative behaviour. I also focus on the importance of distinguishing between them, express (...) some conjectures regarding Celano’s future research, and propose a critique. (shrink)

This essay argues for the applicability and importance of the notion of the unconscious in Fichte’s Jena period, with a focus on the,second’ Wissenschaftslehre. The essay begins by arguing for the existence of a fundamental tension in Fichte’s philosophy: namely, between a,transcendence’ principle – that the conditions for consciousness cannot themselves be present within experience, since they ground that experience – and an,immanence’ principle that there is no genuine reality outside of consciousness. It is shown that this tension is particularly (...) evident if one observes some of the conflicting ways in which Fichte employs the notions of,intellektuelle Anschauung’ and,unmittelbares Bewusstsein.’ Fichte seems to violate the immanence principle especially insofar as he characterizes the conditions of the possibility of consciousness as a series of,actions,’ which, qua actions, must be,real’ in some sense: insofar as they are both real and not present to consciousness, it is argued, they must be unconscious. Although Fichte does not wholly embrace the notion of unconscious mental activity due to his adherence to the immanence principle, his conception of the,two series’ of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as some of his uses of the notion of,unmittelbares Bewusstsein’ in particular allow the recognition that Fichte has a rich but inchoate conception of the unconscious. (shrink)

A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is (...) not compatible with the truth of determinism. In response, some theorists have argued that there is a relevant difference, and have developed two sorts of accounts of that difference: bypassing views, and manipulator-focused views. Manipulator-focused views suggest that the difference concerns the presence of a manipulator, whereas bypassing views suggest that the relevant difference concerns the fact that the action issues from attitudes that the manipulated agent acquired in a way that bypassed her capacities for control over her mental life. One sort of case used to decide between these sorts of accounts is a case of machine induction, which is just like a manipulation case, yet the change in the agent is the result of some natural force. Against the received view, Xiaofei Liu argues that such cases pose problems for bypassing views, and favor manipulator-focused views instead. This paper addresses Liu’s arguments, as well as a variety of cases, concluding that cases of machine induction do not provide motivation for a bypassing theorist to adopt a manipulator-focused view. (shrink)

Lorenz advanced in chapter The Mind-Body Problem of the «Russian Manuscript» some theses concerning the mind-body relations that are very impressive for the contemporary philosophers of mind. The way Lorenz deals with the origins, the role of consciousness and of qualitative mental states is up to date. He gives us also a way to deal with the knowledge argument, quite forty years the argument were worked out. Notwithstanding Lorenz was not a reductionist, it is possible for a reductionist using (...) his perspective to take away from the knowledge argument its antireductionist value, so that to defend the identity theory. (shrink)

In this paper the author aims at showing that Kant’s awakening from the dogmatic slumber, often related to the reading of Hume, finds its full achievement only by means of the assimilation of the Aristotelian doctrines. If Hume provided a critique of the concept of “causality” conceiving it as a mere mental representation, in Kant’s opinion Aristotle provided a “new way” to conceive all the concepts of intellect, even though in a non-systematic way. Kant found the solution of his (...) epistemological problem in the peculiar Aristotelian tradition of Königsberg, according to which the categories are mental constructions or concepts of a mental order. Kant’s debt to Aristotelianism in the matter of the awakening is clear in his “terminological turn” of the years 1771-1772. In those years some important Aristotelian terms such as “category”, “schema”, “dialectic” and “analytic” appear for the first time. At that time, Kant’s awakening, influenced by Aristotelianism, was possible because the philosopher has been working as a librarian at the Schlossbibliothek, where he had at his disposal vast book holdings relating to the Aristotelian tradition. (shrink)

Neurointerventions—interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states—are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation. One objection to the nonconsensual implementation of such interventions holds that this expresses a disrespectful message, and is thus impermissible. In this paper, we respond to this objection, focusing on the most developed version of it—that presented by Elizabeth Shaw. We consider a variety of messages that might be expressed (...) by nonconsensual neurointerventions. Depending on the message, we argue either that such interventions do not invariably express this message, that expressing this message is not invariably disrespectful, or that the appeal to disrespect is redundant. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows (...) us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple robotic “brain”. I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases. A quick conclusion follows. (shrink)

"... an excellent collection... " —Journal of Language & Social Psychology An important collection of original essays by well-known scholars debating the questions of logical versus psychologically-based interpretations of language.

En el presente artículo se analizan los tres ejes del debate en la polémica que hace unos años han mantenido Antonio Diéguez Lucena y Francisco José Soler Gil: i) la causación mental y su posible explicación en clave naturalista, ii) los méritos y límites explicativos de una posible alternativa teísta y iii) la conveniencia o no de una metodología naturalista en filosofía.

Physical inactivity and coronavirus disease 2019 signify two pandemics with negative physical, mental, and economic consequences. Younger and older people have not reached the recommended physical activity level for years. Societal restrictions due to COVID-19 additionally reduce opportunities for physical activity, and they increase social isolation. Here, we outline how playing exergames with others at home could foster physical and mental health and promote communication and discussions on exergaming. Accordingly, we highlight the educational and social benefits of exergaming (...) at home and delineate the concept of Educational and Social Exergaming. We outline specific benefits and pitfalls of exergaming regarding its physical and nonphysical effects, including educational values of discussing exergaming experiences and related topics. Moreover, we discuss the relevance of practical guidelines for educational and social exergaming at home as well as prospects for future research. Overall, educational and social exergaming could alleviate several detrimental effects of both pandemics on the health and well-being of people of all ages. (shrink)

According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...) belief tasks without the need to assume the existence of a cognitive module specific for mental state attribution. My proposal suggests a plausible explanatory strategy for the problem of the representational format of the information processed in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. (shrink)

If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of psychology should depend on the unitarian description of the mind. However, the mind is anything but a unitarian concept. Its common sense definition is subject to temporal and geographical variation because the mental is also a cultural construct; and the variety of psychological disciplines nowadays existing proposes several definitions of the mental. The epistemology of psychology investigates the definition of (...) the mental by assuming the pluralism of the psychological disciplines as a fact, rather than as a problem, and it invites psychologists to reason about the epistemological bases of their empirical research. (shrink)

Within the field of neuroscience, it is assumed that the central nervous system is divided into two functionally distinct components: the brain, which does the cognizing, and the spinal cord, which is a conduit of information enabling the brain to do its job. We dub this the “Cinderella view” of the spinal cord. Here, we suggest it should be abandoned. Marshalling recent empirical findings, we claim that the spinal cord is best conceived as an intrabodily cognitive extension: a piece of (...) biological circuitry that, together with the brain, constitutes our cognitive engine. To do so, after a brief introduction to the anatomy of the spinal cord, we briefly present a number of empirical studies highlighting the role played by the spinal cord in cognitive processing. Having so done, we claim that the spinal cord satisfies two popular and often endorsed criteria used to adjudicate cases of cognitive extension; namely the parity principle and the so-called “trust and glue” criteria. This, we argue, is sufficient to vindicate the role of the spinal cord as an intrabodily mental extension. We then steel our case considering a sizable number of prominent anti-extension arguments, showing that none of them poses a serious threat to our main claim. We then conclude the essay, spelling out a number of far-from trivial implications of our view. (shrink)

This contribution explores the concept of the unconscious as articulated by Proust in his À la recherche du temps perdu (Proust ([1913–1927] 1998–1999) and in a series of documents and texts that preceded it. It aims at understanding whether and to what extent Proust can be placed in a line of French thought that begins with the work of Maine de Biran and culminates in the reception in the second half of the nineteenth century of Biranism by French alienists: doctors (...) specialized in the study of mental alienation. This type of interpretation of Biran’s doctrine is attuned to the increasing attention which, at the time of Proust’s education, was given to the unconscious and to the idea that, alongside the conscious self, there is an unconscious self, understood as a secondary personality that can manifest itself in the life of the individual in both normal and pathological ways. Following the interpretative path pursued in Piazza (1997, 2017), Bizub (2006), and Fraisse (2013), this article takes into account both Proust’s secondary and university education and his familiarity with experimental psychology, to which he was introduced by his father. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Dan Sperber and Peter Carruthers have addressed the issue of cognitive flexibility, giving us different but somehow complementary accounts of it. Here I intend to focus on another cognitive mechanism which plays some role in allowing flexibility, and has been given little emphasis in their accounts. This mechanism is sensory imagination. In so doing, I have to confront with the assumption, which is widespread in the philosophical domain, that perceptual representations cannot convey any thought process. In (...) the first place, I argue that this assumption rests more on the notion of accessibility than on that of systematicity. In the second place, I argue that – as an argument from the frame problem seems to show – accessibility of propositional representation has been largely overestimated; besides, there are reasons to think that systematicity and accessibility of perceptual representations have been largely underestimated. Those arguments are held to support the conclusion that people, and nonhuman animals too, can make use of sensory imagination as a cognitive strategy to confront with novel state of affairs. This conclusion fits well with a large amount of research in comparative psychology, and converges with current models of controlled thought processes which are based on the notion of a mental global workspace. The differences with the accounts of Carruthers and Sperber are briefly investigated. (shrink)

Previous research has documented that type 2 diabetes mellitus is associated with cognitive impairment. Psychological variables were repeatedly investigated to understand why T2DM patients are poorly active, despite standards of medical care recommends performing aerobic and resistance exercise regularly and reducing the amount of time spent sitting. This exploratory study aims to investigate how affective variables as thoughts, feelings, and individuals’ stage of exercise adoption can modulate low cognitive performances during an experimental procedure based on exercise. The Exercise Thoughts Questionnaire, (...) Exercise-Induced Feeling Scale, and Physical Activity Stage of Change were administered to a sample of 12 T2DM patients. The Bivalent Shape Task alone, BST with exercise [control exercise recovery + BST], and BST with metaboreflex [post-exercise muscle ischemia + BST] were used as mental task, and response time to congruent, incongruent, and neutral stimuli was recorded. Concomitant cerebral oxygenation was evaluated by near-infrared spectroscopy. As expected, T2DM patients performed significantly better when the stimulus was presented in congruent trials. In the CER + BST session, T2DM patients showed longer reaction time to incongruent trials than in the PEMI + BST and BST alone sessions. Positive feelings toward exercise seem to modulate cognitive performances in high challenging task only if T2DM patients were conscious to play exercise. These results could provide some insights for health intervention targeting exercise for patients with T2DM in order to enhance cognitive performances. (shrink)

Sometimes, we act in concert with others, as when we go for a walk together, or when two mathematicians try to prove a difficult theorem with each other. An interesting question is what distinguishes the actions of individuals that together constitute some joint activity from those that amount to a mere aggregation of individual behaviours. It is common for philosophers to appeal to collective intentionality to explain such instances of shared agency. This framework generalizes the approach traditionally used to explain (...) individual action: a behaviour is an action just in case it causally follows from the relevant intention. Contemporary philosophers of action, as well as cognitive psychologists, however, have criticised this way of explaining individual actions, favouring instead an approach that puts “control” or “guidance” as the discerning factor: a behaviour is an action just in case the agent controls it, or just in case it is guided by the agent. In this paper, I argue that we should include talk of guidance even in cases of joint action. I first show that problems of deviant causation arise also in cases of joint action, and that therefore guidance is required to face this issue. Then, I show what a “capacity to guide” amounts to for a group and how joint guidance relates to individual guidance. Joint guidance is actually constituted by task co-representation and the sense of commitment. I argue that an approach that favours joint guidance over collective intentions eschews a lot of metaphysical problems about collective mentality and group subjects, and it is thus more explanatorily fruitful. (shrink)

It has been argued that numbers are spatially organized along a "mental number line" that facilitates left-hand responses to small numbers, and right-hand responses to large numbers. We hypothesized that whenever the representations of visual and numerical space are concurrently activated, interactions can occur between them, before response selection. A spatial prime is processed faster than a numerical target, and consistent with our hypothesis, we found that such a spatial prime affects non-spatial, verbal responses more when the prime follows (...) a numerical target (backward priming) then when it precedes it (forward priming). This finding emerged both in a number-comparison and a parity judgment task, and cannot be ascribed to a "Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes" (SNARC). Contrary to some earlier claims, we therefore conclude that visuospatial-numerical interactions do occur, even before response selection. (shrink)

This contribution consists of two parts. The first aims to clarify the structure of the nosology of psychopathologies that Kant proposes in the "Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes". Such nosology consists of two series, arranged in ascending order, one relating to the social manifestations of madness, the other to its individual manifestations, which specifically concern the faculties of the soul. We will try to demonstrate the existence of a connection between these two series, and to illustrate how this occurs. (...) The second part of the contribution, on the other hand, intends to question the thesis according to which Kant in his "Versuch" provided a social aetiology of psychopathologies. We will show, in spite of this thesis, how society creates conditions only for the manifestation of these pathologies, and not for their production, which must instead be sought in the body. (shrink)

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a ‘loss-of-function lesion premise,’ according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On (...) the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon. (shrink)