The following essay analyzes the arguments made by the principal academic proponent of income taxation, Columbia University economist E. R. A Seligman, after it was found to be unconstitutional in 1894. Seligman thought that the prevalent theory of just taxation, that it should be based on a natural right to one’s person and property, was wrong. The principal American philosophical proponent of this natural rights-based approach to taxation was the late Brown University philosopher and economist, Francis (...) Wayland. The essay analyzes the flaws in Seligman’s contention that there are no natural rights and, therefore, no natural property rights, so that taxation could not be justified by the benefits received for the protection of such rights. Instead, he claimed taxation should rest upon a person’s financial capacity. Since that capacity would be most accurately measured by net worth, we would have expected Seligman to endorse a proportionately assessed net worth tax (which was commonly used by the states in the nineteenth century). Alternatively, he argued for an income tax progressively assessed. This essay argues that since income is only a portion of financial capacity, his argument fails. (shrink)

Why was the South African state so much more successful than the Brazilian state in its attempts to collect income taxes during the twentieth century? Nationally distinctive tax policies and patterns of administration can be explained by examining the impact of contrasting definitions of National Political Community, specified in critical constitutions written around the turn of the century. The ways in which racial and spatial cleavages were addressed in the 1891 Brazilian constitution and the 1909 South Africa Act influenced (...) the development of interclass and intraclass relations, which in turn affected the willingness of upper-income groups to accept state demands for income tax payments. Varied patterns of state development were largely predicated on contested notions of “us” and “them.”. (shrink)

This paper is based on the assumption that the high incomes of some professional sports athletes, such as players in professional leagues in the United States and Europe, pose an ethical problem of social justice. I deal with the questions of what should follow from this evaluation and in which ways those incomes should be regulated. I discuss three different options: a) the idea that the incomes of professional athletes should be limited, b) the idea that they should be vastly (...) taxed by the state, and c) the idea that there is a moral obligation for the athletes to spend portions of their incomes on good causes. I will conclude that in today’s circumstances there are good reasons to advocate both option one (limitation) and option two (taxation), but that priority should be given to taxation. (shrink)

This article considers the question of why labor income may be permissibly redistributed to the poor even though non-essential body parts should generally be protected from redistribution to the infirm – the body-income puzzle. It argues that proposed solutions that affirm self-ownership but reject ownership of labor income are unsuccessful. And proposed solutions that grant individuals entitlements to resources based on the centrality of those resources to the individual’s personal identity are also unsuccessful. Instead, this article defends (...) a solution to the body-income puzzle based on a novel conception of respect for the separateness of persons. This conception holds that the sphere of moral authority protected from interference by respect for the separateness of persons includes both the body and labor income. And the strength of the negative rights constituting this sphere vary based on these rights' importance to the personal identity of the right-holder. It is shown that a commitment to helping the disadvantaged tempered by this conception of respect for the separateness of persons can solve the body-income puzzle. (shrink)

This chapter discusses what maximin egalitarians should think about two types of age-sensitive taxation. One is a form of cumulative income taxation, which taxes yearly incomes taking into account all earlier income years instead of only the last one. The second is age-differentiated taxation, which taxes yearly incomes adjusting the rate to the taxpayer’s age. The chapter first presents the main reasons supporting cumulative income taxation and then proceeds to look at how it (...) affects fiscal obligations across life. Then it argues that egalitarians should aim at a fiscal reform that benefits the young and the elderly but not the middle-aged. Finally, it questions whether cumulative income taxes can deliver this without resorting to age-differentiated taxes. The chapter shows that while cumulative income taxation can benefit the young, age-differentiated taxes are necessary to benefit the elderly. (shrink)

The current concerns with laggard growth and income inequality have led to a widespread set of demands for more regulation and higher taxation to reverse the trend. These two approaches move matters exactly in the wrong direction. The correct response is to find ways to reduce tax burdens and barriers to entry, and to reduce the political uncertainty associated with new government measures. It may well be too late, worldwide, for a substantial rollback in the welfare state. But (...) the current proposals will only prolong the dismal results on both fronts in any arena in which they are tried. (shrink)

The inherent conflict in the taxation of married couples versus single individuals is examined. With competing social and economic outcomes, the taxation of married couples is tied to societal values and the political environment. The authors illustrate the issue by describing three methods of personal income taxation currently used across the globe. Factors such as stakeholder interests, workforce participation, and the political environment are important in determining acceptable trade-offs. Analyzing this issue in terms of the issue (...) life cycle, the authors conclude that in the United States the marriage tax penalty will be an enduring issue because of competing values and interests. (shrink)

In a regressive tax system, lower-income taxpayers pay larger percentages of their incomes in taxes compared to higher-income taxpayers. Although most policymakers and citizens view regressive taxation as generally unfair and unethical, the U.S. tax system taxes wage, salary, and self-employment income in a manner that deliberately subjects lower-income taxpayers to marginal tax rates that are greater than those imposed on higher-income taxpayers. As a result, some lower-income taxpayers pay a larger percentage of (...) their income in taxes than higher-income taxpayers. In this essay, we argue that this regressiveness in the taxation of salaried income is unfair and unethical. We then evaluate President Obama’s social security plan, which would retain most of the current tax system’s regressive structure. Finally, we offer two simple alternative proposals that are non-regressive, and thus more fair and ethical approaches to the taxation of salaried income. (shrink)

Distributive justice concerns the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Opposition to higher rates of taxation, or even existing levels of taxation, are often made on grounds that such taxes are unfair burdens. This fairness argument can be given a number of further, more specific, formulations. Libertarians like Robert Nozick, for example, argue that taxation of income is unfair because it violates individual rights. Libertarians invoke an entitlement argument which presumes that the (...) appropriate baseline of property rights is pretax income. Others take issue with specific policies that are supported by taxation, such as welfare provisions, and argue that welfare reform is necessary as tax burdens are only legitimate when they satisfy some form of reciprocity thesis. In this review article I critically assess these arguments. The recent publication of The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, and The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship help shed some light on each of these different arguments that are often invoked in defence of tax cuts. These three books are a welcome addition to debates about distributive justice as they help bridge the gap between normative theory and public policy. In addition to raising doubts about the arguments that taxation is unfair, I examine themes that raise important questions about taxation and justice- private property, welfare reform and inheritance. An examination of these themes should make it clear that the real challenge facing justice-theorists is to take scarcity seriously and thus I emphasis the shortcomings of simply endorsing a ‘cost-blind’ rights-oriented conception of justice. Such a conception of justice currently dominates debates in normative political theory. (shrink)

The consequences of taxation matter for the optimal design of the tax system. Those consequences depend on behavioral responses to taxation, as summarized by the elasticity of taxable income. Although this elasticity depends on characteristics of preferences, such as the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure, it also depends on the avoidance technology, and on the response of government to avoidance behavior. It depends on the size of states, and the amount of tax coordination and harmonization. (...) To some degree the elasticity of response can be affected by government policies, and the government need not accept it passively, but rather should put in place policies that optimally determine it. (shrink)

Taxation is more than one thing. Taxes can be levied in various ways on various things, with varying effects on a culture and an economy, and raising different challenges of justification.

This article challenges the general thesis that an unconditional basic income, set at the highest sustainable level, is required for maximizing the income-leisure opportunities of the least advantaged, when income varies according to the responsible factor of labor input. In a linear optimal taxation model (of a type suggested by Vandenbroucke 2001) in which opportunities depend only on individual productivity, adding the instrument of a uniform wage subsidy generates an array of undominated policies besides the basic (...) income maximizing policy, including a “zero basic income” policy which equalizes the post-tax wage rate. The choice among such undominated policies may be guided by distinct normative criteria which supplement the maximin objective in various ways. It is shown that most of these criteria will be compatible with, or actually select, the zero basic income policy and reject the basic income maximizing one. In view of the model's limited realism, the force of this main conclusion is discussed both in relation to Van Parijs' argument for basic income in Real Freedom for All (1995) and to some key empirical conditions in the real world. Footnotes1 I am grateful for useful comments on various stages of this paper by Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, Mathias Hild, Dirk Van de gaer, Frank Vandenbroucke, Alex Voorhoeve, Roland van der Veen, Andrew Williams, Chris Woodard and an anonymous referee. Above all I thank Loek Groot for his contribution. The research has also been supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and the Social and Political Theory Program of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. (shrink)

The need to use green taxes to protect the environment is urgent, particularly because of climate change, and can be justified via sound deontological and consequence-based arguments. One very influential criticism of such taxes, however, claims that they disproportionately burden relatively poor individuals who tend to contribute to environmental problems far less than wealthier persons. Critics can also object that because of the link between economic inequality and environmental destruction it is preferable to adopt environmental measures that impede rather than (...) accelerate the growth of inequality. Defusing these criticisms, the article argues that various types of green fiscal reform can both avoid disproportionally burdening those who pollute least and reduce the economic inequalities that income taxes leave behind, and slow down the collectively self-defeating consumption arms race that currently besets so many affluent societies. Global progressive environmental taxation is also a possibility, and even easier to justify. (shrink)

In Germany, transfers of assets between generations are subject to inheritance and gift tax.1 However, there are different views on whether or not the present level of taxation is high enough. Our study looks at the potential for applying increases. We show that the constitutional framework does indeed allow for higher taxation in the case of intergenerational property transfers. We identify the essential points in current German inheritance and gift tax law, which make it possible to transfer large (...) assets with no or low inheritance tax burden. For these points as well as the determination of tax rates, we propose reform approaches and present options for the use of possible additional income. (shrink)

This paper analyses the impact of labour taxation on the labour market (its indicators), measures the relationship between labour taxes and the rate of unemployment in Lithuania, and seeks to establish whether the tax wedge has an impact on employment. The obtained results suggest that the unemployment rate in Lithuania tends to vary mainly due to cyclical economic fluctuations. However, to some extent, the level of unemployment, especially of unskilled labour, depends on its taxation. In Lithuania, the tax (...) wedge on low-wage earners, i.e. those paid a little more than the minimum wage, is relatively high in the context of other EU countries. However, the overall labour taxation (describing all labour force) is low because of a relatively low taxation of high-income individuals. The article examined the scientific literature which confirms the existence of a link between the taxation of low-skilled and low-paid workers and the unemployment rate for this group. In addition, labour taxation and benefit levels can influence people’s motivation to take up a job. The conducted estimates support a direct link between the economically inactive population (aged 20–64) and the unemployment trap indicator. A greater unemployment trap leads to a bigger percentage of the economically inactive population in the country. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to meet their (...) aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

"Providing a thorough examination of distributive justice, Distributive Justice and Taxation presents and discusses different theories of what constitutes a just society, and how goods should be distributed in such a society. The distribution of goods in society has direct and serious consequences on the lives of the people. There are therefore important questions to be asked regarding the justice of that distribution: Is it just that some people inherit large fortunes while others inherit nothing? Do rich people have (...) additional access to political power because of their wealth? If so, is that just? And should the ambition for economic policies be to combat poverty, or to reduce inequality? This book explores these questions and a number of others through the analysis of related theories, spanning from strong egalitarian theories on the left to right-wing libertarianism. The chapters also explicitly examine the case of taxation - one of the most important and controversial measures of distribution of goods in society. Placing emphasis on the case of Norway and using data from both the UK and USA as a point of comparison, the work details and explores the key features of the tax system. It concludes by presenting and evaluating arguments for and against taxes such as income tax, wealth tax, and inheritance tax. This book is essential reading for those interested in distributive justice, as well as students and scholars of philosophy, law, political science and economics. J2rgen Pedersen is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Department of Business Administration, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norway"--. (shrink)

Taxation policy is driven by many factors, including public opinion, but little research has examined the strength and stability of the public’s taxation preferences. This paper demonstrates one way in which preferences for progressiveness depend on the framing of the question asked. Participants indicated how they would share a fixed tax burden between two individuals who earned different amounts of money, either by adjusting the amount of tax paid by the two individuals, or by adjusting the amount of (...) post-tax income retained. The units in which tax was described — amount of money or percentage tax rate — were manipulated orthogonally. There was a strong metric effect: Participants favored progressiveness more when tax was described as a percentage rather than amount. However, there was also a clear interaction: for amounts, participants favored progressiveness significantly more when considering post-tax money retained rather than tax paid; for percentages, no such effect was found. (shrink)

Progressive taxation has historically been discussed primarily in the context of developed, Western nations. This Article considers its application in two developing, nonwestern economies, emphasizing the differences in political, economic, and cultural contexts and their effect on the progressivity equation. In India these differences include long-standing attitudes, such as the Hindu tradition’s historic ambivalence towards utilitarian arguments, and shorter-term institutional arrangements, such as the division of power within India’s federal system and the tax exemption for agricultural income. In (...) China they include the legacy of Marxism as well as a more long-standing tendency to resolve legal and policy issues based on notions of communal rather than individual welfare. Both countries have limited administrative resources and a relatively small middle class, so that the income tax remains a relatively small albeit growing source of national revenues. In this Article I consider the impact of these factors, and conclude by asking whether a similar "tax life cycle" will apply to both countries or political and cultural differences will result in divergent tax patterns. Furthermore I also evaluate the progressivity problem as a case study in comparative taxation and assess the need to develop a more sophisticated methodology for dealing with institutional, attitudinal, and other cultural differences. (shrink)

In this book Kristi A. Olson addresses the question of fair labor income distribution by proposing the solidarity solution, a new test she defines and defends. She takes as her starting point the envy test, discussed by the philosophers Ronald Dworkin and Philippe Van Parijs and by the economists Jan Tinbergen, Hal Varian, Marc Fleurbaey, Duncan Foley, and Serge-Christophe Kolm. According to the envy test, a distribution is fair when no one prefers someone else's circumstances to their own. After (...) rejecting the envy test, Olson distinguishes two types of envy: personal and impersonal. Impersonal envy makes a demand on others; personal envy, in contrast, does not. Using this distinction, Olson argues that fair labor-income bundles must be impersonal envy-free, but need not be personal envy-free. The book concludes by relating the solidarity solution to concrete problems such as the gender wage gap and taxation. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, (...) and the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism. (shrink)

I present Lockean considerations that count in favor of a global basic income program. This paper articulates a conception of equal-share left-libertarianism that is supported by the moral rights of full self-ownership and world-ownership. It is argued that, according to this view, an appropriately constructed global basic income program would be a key institution for promoting the rights of full self-ownership and world-ownership.

Tax law is a technical area of law which does not seem to be culturally specific. It is thus seen as easily transferable between different societies and cultures. However, tax law is also based on definitions and notions which are not universal. So, is tax law universal or particular? Is it indeed easily transferable between different societies? And in what ways does tax law reflect ethnic or cultural rather than economic differences? This Article seeks to answer these questions by analyzing (...) one specific example — the history of income tax legislation in Mandatory Palestine. This history reveals the dual nature of income taxation. On the one hand, the Income Tax Ordinance which was enacted by the British in Palestine in 1941 was based on a one-size-fits-all colonial model, and the lawyers involved in its enactment, in Palestine and in the Colonial Office in London, made relatively little effort to adapt it to local conditions. On the other hand, other actors — the officials, politicians and businessmen involved in the initial debate about the imposition of income taxation in Palestine in the 1930s, and the administrators involved in the application of the specific rules of the Ordinance after it was enacted in the 1940s — were aware of the need to adapt the law to the specific conditions of Palestine. Thus, while on a formal level the Ordinance seems to represent a process in which the tax law of Palestine converged with that of other British colonies, once we expand our framework and examine not just law in the books, but also law in action, and actors such as politicians and administrators, we discover that particular local conditions were an important factor in the enactment and application of the Palestine Income Tax Ordinance. The study of the process of transplantation, the Article concludes, should therefore focus not only on the formal norms being transplanted, but also on the role of the different non-legal actors involved in the process. (shrink)

The distributive justice literature has recently formulated several tax proposals, with limitarians or property-owning democrats proposing new or higher taxes on wealth or capital income intended to decrease the growing wealth gap. This essay joins this debate on inequality and redistributive taxation through the lens of the “benefit principle for public policy.” This principle says that specific rules and institutions are acceptable to the extent that they create benefits for all individuals in society, or at least don’t make (...) anyone worse off. This benefit principle opposes wealth accumulation to the extent that wealth was generated through rent-seeking—that is, income unrelated to economic productivity, which is not embedded in mutually beneficial exchanges. I maintain, however, that ruling out rent-seeking requires not ex post taxation, but primarily a more “predistributive corrective policy,” that is, reconfiguration of market institutions to prevent wealth accumulation through rent-seeking in the first place. The alternative response is, thus, not to tackle inequality as such but to reform the market to promote the occurrence of mutually beneficial exchange. (shrink)

This Article examines ability taxation, which is a tax on a person’s earning ability or potential earnings, rather than earned income. Despite this regime’s longstanding favor as a theoretical ideal for fair and efficient taxation among public finance economists, certain political philosophers, and tax law scholars, insufficient effort has been made to provide an analysis of what ‘potential earnings’ means. This Article explores competing understandings of this notion, and situates them within a multipart taxonomy. In so doing, (...) it unearths a tension at the core of the ability tax program involving a fundamental misalignment between the metaphysics (or correct conceptual analysis) of potential earnings and the economics of its taxation. It concludes that once we correctly understand its requirements, we should reject ability taxation as the first-best normative ideal it has been held out to be on the grounds that it is overly burdensome and unfair to certain individuals. (shrink)

This paper contains a summary of public support for the idea of unconditional basic income in the Czech Republic in the first part. Interest in unconditional income can be found both in the Czech political sphere and in the social sciences community. In the second part, the article theoretically analyzes the possible sources of unconditional basic income funding. The aim of this paper is to support argumentation in favor of the implementation of BI by a systematic analysis (...) of the real possibilities of its funding through the state tax revenues. The feasibility of funding a BI scheme using taxes on labor, property, consumption, environmental taxes, financial transaction tax, and tax on the transfer of information is considered. Consideration is also given to administrative savings that the basic income system could bring. Due to political enforceability of BI, it is important to contemplate and discuss the distortions and other problems of proposed changes in taxation, which would not be negligible as can be expected. (shrink)

The paper undertakes macroeconomic analysis of Universal Basic Income (UBI). It focuses on issues of paying for and the funding of universal basic income. A number of proposals are examined and the limitations of borrowing and money creation for the funding of UBI are indicated. It is generally argued that funding of UBI should be examined in terms of funding through taxation. The effects of UBI on employment and national output and the macroeconomic limits on the scale (...) on UBI in terms of work force participation and tax rates are investigated. (shrink)

Neutralists have argued that there is something illiberal about linking access to gift-like resources to work requirements. The central liberal motivation for basic income is to provide greater freedom to choose between different ways of life, including options attaching great importance to non-market activities and disposable time. As argued by Philippe Van Parijs, even those spending their days surfing should be fed. This article examines Van Parijs' dual commitment to a ‘real libertarian’ justification of basic income and the (...) public enforcement of a strong work ethos, which serves to boost the volume of work at a given rate of taxation. It is argued (contra Van Parijs) that this alliance faces the neutrality objection: the work ethos will largely offset the liberal gains of unconditionality by radically restricting the set of permissible options available. A relaxed, non-obligatory ethos might avoid this implication. This view, however, is vulnerable to the structural exploitation objection: feasibility is achieved only because some choose to do necessary tasks to which most people have the same aversion. In light of these objections, the article examines whether there is a morally untainted feasibility path consistent with liberal objectives. (shrink)

Tobacco is a significant product providing considerable economic benefits to countries worldwide, while its increased consumption causes health and socio-economic losses for smokers and non-smokers. This paper constructs a decomposition system of tobacco taxation: the population aging factor is included in the influencing factors of personal tax, and personal tax revenue is regarded as the product of tax structure, macro tax burden, regional economy, reciprocal aging, and the elderly population. This article conducts an empirical study on the relationship between (...) taxation and economic growth. The estimated coefficients of business tax and corporate income tax are significant at the significance level of 0.1, with a consumption tax and time-variable coefficients reporting a 0.02 level of significance. The T statistic value and the explanatory degree of the variables involved in the model to the explained variables are also very high, reaching more than 95%. We find that increasing the macro tax burden negatively impacts economic growth. Therefore, the study suggests that for fostering the industry’s economic growth, the country needs to ensure the optimal macro tax burden of 17.5%, with different types of taxes influencing economic growth. Personal tax reform should pay attention to the phenomenon of aging, adjust the tax structure to increase personal tax income, provide policy support and guarantee for the elderly labor force, and encourage the re-employment of silver-haired people to alleviate the adverse impact of aging on taxation. (shrink)

This book focuses on the impact of technology on taxation and deals with the broad effect of technology on diverse taxation systems. It addresses the highly relevant eTax issue and argues that while VAT may not be the ultimate solution with regard to taxing electronic commerce, it can be demonstrated to be the most effective solution to date. The book analyzes the application and the effectiveness of traditional income tax principles in contradistinction to VAT principles. Taking into (...) account rapidly ameliorating technology, the book next assesses the compatibility between electronic commerce and diverse systems of taxation. Using case studies of Amazon.com and Second Life, as well as additional practical examples, the book demonstrates the effectiveness of VAT in respect of electronic commerce and ameliorating technology in the incalculable and borderless realm of cyberspace. (shrink)

This volume presents philosophical contributions examining questions of the grounding and justification of taxation and different types of taxes such as inheritance, wealth, consumption or income tax in relation to justice and the concept of a just society. The chapters cover the different levels at which the discussion on taxation and justice takes place: On the principal level, chapters investigate the justification and grounding of taxation as such and the role taxation plays and should play (...) in the design of justice, be it for a just society or a just world order. On a more concrete level, chapters present discussions of these general reflections in more depth and examine different types of taxation, tax systems and their design and implementation. On an applied level, chapters discuss certain specific taxes, such as wealth and inheritance taxes, and examine whether or not a certain tax should be favored and for what reasons as well as why it is just to target certain kinds of assets or income. Finally, this volume contains chapters that discuss the central issue of international and global taxation and their relation to global justice. (shrink)

The United States, unlike most developed countries, continues to use the marital couple as the taxable unit for its income tax. This continued use of the marital unit— like its original establishment —rests on cultural preferences. This Article suggests that the roles of marriage, religion and taxation in America are essential factors in America’s retention of the marital unit. Part I examines the distinctive contribution marriage — especially the traditional single-earner breadwinner marriage — makes to the political life (...) of the country. Part II explores the similar role of religion. Part III describes some congressional efforts over the past two decades to aid, ostensibly, married couples through the income tax. Part IV concludes that although these actions have not been the most effective or efficient means of helping married couples, they nevertheless serve an important expressive purpose. Tax has been the arena for many political issues since the founding of the nation. Consequently, congressional actions and rhetoric regarding the income tax’s "marriage penalty" reinforce the marital unit/joint return and reaffirm — even if only symbolically — a national commitment to marriage as instrumental to American democracy. (shrink)

Midcentury America was governed from the center, a bipartisan consensus of politicians and public opinion that supported government spending on education, the construction of a vast network of interstate highways, healthcare for senior citizens, and environmental protection. These projects were paid for by a steeply progressive tax code, with a top tax rate at one point during the Republican Eisenhower administration of 91 percent. Today, a similar agenda of government action would be portrayed as dangerously left wing. At the same (...) time, radically anti-government and anti-tax opinions are considered part of the mainstream. In _Take Back the Center_, Peter Wenz makes the case for a sane, reality-based politics that reclaims the center for progressive policies. The key, he argues, is taxing the wealthy at higher rates. The tax rate for the wealthiest Americans has declined from the mid-twentieth-century high of 91 percent to a twenty-first-century low of 36 percent--even as social programs are gutted and the gap betweeen rich and poor widens dramatically. Ever since Ronald Reagan famously declared that government was the problem and not the solution, conservatives have had an all-purpose answer to any question: smaller government and lower taxes. Wenz offers an impassioned counterargument. He explains the justice of raising the top tax rates significantly, making a case for less income inequality, and he offers suggestions for how to spend the increased tax revenues: K-12 education, tuition relief, transportation and energy infrastructure, and universal health care. Armed with Wenz's evidence-driven arguments, progressives can position themselves where they belong: in the mainstream of American politics and at the center of American political conversations, helping their country address a precipitous decline in equality and quality of life. (shrink)

Resumen. A la Sociedad Cooperativa, se le distingue por ser una sociedad mercantil con ciertas particularidades a diferencia de los demás tipos de sociedades, tan es así que se rige por su legislación especial. En los últimos años en México, se ha detectado un incremento de sociedades cooperativas dedicadas al suministro de personal, toda vez que el esquema fue considerado por algunos especialistas fiscales como una alternativa para las empresas que buscan disminuir sus cargas impositivas derivadas de las relaciones laborales. (...) Dicho esquema básicamente consiste en transferir a los trabajadores de las empresas a la sociedad cooperativa, los cuales al ser registrados como socios, las remuneraciones que estos perciben son bajo el concepto de previsión social; en lugar de salarios evitando así la retención y pago del Impuesto Sobre la Renta correspondiente. Con motivo de lo anterior, en la presente investigación se analizan y califican los aspectos más relevantes del asunto.Palabras claves. Sociedad cooperativa, evasión fiscal, outsourcing, previsión social.. A cooperative society is distinguished as a corporation with certain features unlike other types of companies, so much so that is governed by a special legislation. In recent years Mexico has seen an increase of cooperative societies dedicated to supply services, since the scheme was considered by some experts as an alternative tax for companies seeking to lower their tax burdens resulting from relations. This scheme basically consists of transferring workers from companies to the cooperative, which when registered as members the remuneration that they perceive are under the concept of social welfare, instead of avoiding wage withholding and payment of VAT Income for. On the occasion of the above, this research analyzes and scored the most relevant aspects of the case. (shrink)

The traditional view of tax holds that consumption taxes fail tax the yield to capital, whereas income taxes do, leading to John Stuart Mill's criticism of the income tax as a "double tax" on wealth that is saved. A better analytic understanding illustrates that there are two types of consumption taxes. A prepaid consumption or (equivalently) wage tax indeed ignores the yield to capital. But a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax gets at such yield, at the individual level, (...) when but only when the returns to capital are used to elevate lifestyles in material terms. Such a tax allows "ordinary" savings that move around labor earnings, in constant dollar terms, to different periods of an individual's life, such as times of retirement or heightened medical or educational needs. Because a progressive postpaid consumption tax falls on the yield to capital at the right time-when its use at the individual level becomes manifest-all other taxes on capital, such as capital gains, gift and estate, and corporate income taxes, can and should be repealed, in the name of fairness. Footnotesa I thank the editors, my research assistants Alex Baskin and Nina Kang, and the other contributors to this volume for their helpful comments. (shrink)

Inequality, as well as the scope of the duty of justice to reduce it, has always been a central concern of political justice. Income taxation has been seen as a key tool for redistribution and the state was the arena for discussions of justice. Globalization and the tax competition it fosters among states change the context for the discussion of distributive justice. Given the state’s fading coercive power in taxation and the decreasing power of its citizenry to (...) co-author its collective will due to global competition, we can no longer assume that justice can be realized within the parameters of the state. International tax policy in an effort to retain justice often opts for cooperation as a vehicle to support distributive justice. But cooperation among states is more than a way for them to promote their aims through bargaining. Rather, it is a way for states to regain legitimacy by sustaining their very ability to ensure the collective action of their citizens and to treat them with equal respect and concern. The traditional discussion in international taxation seems to endorse a statist position — implicitly assuming that when states bargain for a multilateral deal, justice is completely mediated by the agreement of the states. In contrast, this Article argues that such a multilateral regime intended to provide the state with fundamental legitimacy requires independent justification. Contrary to the conventional statist position, I maintain that cooperating states have a duty to ensure that the constituents of all cooperating states are not treated unjustly because of the agreement. I argue that not only cosmopolitanism but political justice too requires that a justifiable cooperative regime must improve the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all cooperating states. I explain that cooperation alone is no guarantee of improved welfare and that certain transfer payments between rich and poor countries might be required to ensure this. (shrink)

The rapid development of complex income taxation and welfare systems in the 20th century may give the impression that progressive wealth redistribution systems are uniquely modern. However, religious systems provided similar mechanisms for addressing economic injustice and poverty alleviation centuries earlier. Zakat is the obligation of almsgiving and is the third pillar of Islam--a requirement for all believers. In the early development of the Islamic community, zakat was collected as a tax by the state and the funds were (...) distributed to a defined set of needy groups. As a theoretical matter, there are three insights that make zakat an especially relevant subject for modern legal scholars. First, zakat is an example of a modest wealth tax combined with an income tax that may be illustrative in the discourse regarding wealth taxes. Second, the jurisprudence of zakat supports the ethical conclusions of scholars who contend that property rights are attached to post rather than pre-tax income. Third, to the extent that zakat is considered a principal source of revenue for public programs, it might imply a limited role for government, focusing on equitable distribution of goods. This paper begins with a thorough evaluation and synthesis of the traditional Islamic jurisprudence related to zakat. The next section identifies three broad approaches to zakat adopted by modern Muslim states, with particular emphasis on ways that zakat is institutionalized legally. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the correlation of the approaches to zakat with individual income and wealth stratification. The article concludes with observations and policy recommendations related to zakat and broader legal theory based on the earlier qualitative analysis and empirical findings. (shrink)

In this book, the French economist and philosopher Serge-Christophe Kolm discusses the problem of what he calls “macrojustice”, which “concerns the most general rules of society and their application to the distribution of the benefits from the main resources”. He reminds his readers that the first and most important challenge for any policy analysis is the spelling out of its ethical foundations. On that basis, he argues in favour of what is nothing less than a paradigm shift in the theory (...) of optimal income taxation, rejecting the whole traditional approach in public economics as being welfarist and too strongly focused on the problem of labour market distortions. As an alternative, he proposes an approach based on the ideal of equal freedom, and works out a specific tax proposal: equal-labour income equalization. He claims that ELIE is a general and operational solution for the organization of the distribution branch of taxation and public expenditure policy that does not create labour market distortions. (shrink)

I argue that taxation for redistributive purposes is a property rights violation, responding to arguments (due to Nagel, Murphy, Sunstein, and Holmes) claiming that individuals lack ownership of their pretax incomes.

In this review, I say a few words about the analysis portion of Piketty’s book, but I will focus mostly on its solution portion. In the first section, I go over Piketty’s main argument and make two critical points: there is a lack of consideration for, first, human capital and, second, absolute levels of income and capital per capita. The second section of this essay focuses on the solution portion of the book. I also go over Piketty’s argument and (...) make five more substantial points: I wonder what Piketty means by social justice; I emphasize that raising taxes is desirable; I ask why it is capital that should be taxed, and how feasible a global tax on capital would be; and finally, I claim that the book could provide more guidance in terms of the policies that could be put in place right now. If the global taxation of capital is not politically feasible in the short to medium term, what should be done in the meantime? (shrink)

Global income inequalities are met with increasing calls for direct supranational redistribution. This article argues that from the perspective of political feasibility, this approach should not be prioritised. We use the example of tax competition to show that supranational regulation that stops short of direct redistribution has better chances of being implemented. Moreover, as the case of tax competition illustrates, such regulation can help to shore up the capacity of nation states to redistribute internally, which indirectly tends to reduce (...) global inequalities, too. Against this background, we formulate the conditional subsidiarity principle of redistribution. It states that when the case for direct supranational redistribution is built on the alleged incapacity of the state to redistribute due to the pressures of globalisation, our first instinct should be regulatory reform in order to restore this capacity. Finally, the article asks whether two prominent proposals for global taxation – the global resource dividend and the financial transaction tax – pass the test of the conditional subsidiarity principle. (shrink)

To the extent that antibiotic resistance (ABR) is accelerated by antibiotic consumption and that it represents a serious public health emergency, it is imperative to drastically reduce antibiotic consumption, particularly in high‐income countries. I present the problem of ABR as an instance of the collective action problem known as ‘tragedy of the commons’. I propose that there is a strong ethical justification for taxing certain uses of antibiotics, namely when antibiotics are required to treat minor and self‐limiting infections, such (...) as respiratory tract infections, in otherwise healthy individuals. Taxation would allow a reduction in consumption (given certain behavioural economics assumptions) and/or ensure that individuals internalize or compensate for their contribution to the erosion of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness. I suggest that revenue from the tax could be used to fund conservation and innovation strategies. Taxation might be a coercive policy, especially for certain individuals, but the ethical case for coercive policies is very strong when the good to be preserved is important enough and when they force individuals to do something they have a moral obligation to do anyway. I argue that, in the case of mild and self‐limiting infections, individuals have a moral duty of easy rescue and a moral duty of fairness to make their contribution to the preservation of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness by foregoing antibiotics. I also suggest that taxing antibiotics in such cases is an all things considered ethically justified policy even if it would introduce inequalities in access to healthcare. (shrink)

Imagine two friends. Anna inherits nothing and works for every penny she has, while Mary inherits millions. How should a world that respects individual autonomy and private property rights treat Anna’s earnings and Mary’s inheritance? Should it tax them the same, or tax one more heavily than the other? If the latter, which one? The conventional wisdom holds that although some “right” libertarian theories justify taxing income, none justify taxing inheritances. Such taxes are “expropriations” and “an especially cruel injury” (...) that “run[] roughshod over [a] deceased’s interest in the ends his property will serve.” This essay explores the standard libertarian objections to taxing gifts and bequests and argues that libertarians overstate their case when distinguishing the taxation of gratuitous transfers from other types of taxation. At minimum, the benefit theory of taxation embraced by many minimal statists and classical liberals mandates that the receipt of gifts and bequests should be taxed to the recipient. Moreover, the goals of curbing inherited political power and preventing wealthy families from insulating their members from market competition provide two additional explanations for why taxing inheritances to recipients is compatible with classical liberal values. (shrink)

Cohen endorses the coercive taxation of the talented at a progressive rate for the sake of realizing equality. By contrast, he denies that it is legitimate for the state to engage in the 'Stalinist forcing' of people into one or another line of work in order to bring about a more egalitarian society. He rejects such occupational conscription on grounds of the invasiveness of the gathering and acting upon information regarding people's preferences for different types of work that would (...) be required to implement such a policy. More precisely, Cohen maintains that the presence versus the absence of such intrusion explains why such Stalinist forcing of the talented is unacceptable whereas the progressive taxation of their income is legitimate. I argue that Cohen's appeal to invasiveness does not adequately capture the moral repugnance of the state's conscripting people into work at a given occupation. I propose that a right to self-ownership, and that which explains such a right, provides a better explanation than Cohen's of why Stalinist forcing is objectionable, whereas progressive taxation is not. 1. (shrink)

Unlike the traditional earnings tax which is based on the individual’s actual income, the endowment tax is based on the individual’s maximum potential income. The endowment tax raises a frightful prospect: an individual taxed according to her potential income as, say, a corporate lawyer might be forced to give up her preferred occupation as a philosophy professor and to work as a corporate lawyer in order to pay her taxes. Although this seems to be an impermissible intrusion (...) on freedom, the challenge is to specify why the endowment tax is impermissible in a way that does not rule out all forms of taxation. After showing why the solutions put forward by John Rawls and by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel fail, I provide my own solution. I claim that the endowment tax is impermissible not because it forecloses more options but because of which options it forecloses. Thus, in order to explain the impermissibility of the endowment tax, we first need to distinguish the options to which individuals have a legitimate moral claim. I suggest one way of drawing this distinction by appealing to two principles widely embraced in the philosophical literature. If my argument is right, then the income tax as it is currently implemented is also morally impermissible. (shrink)

I propose that liberal egalitarians and libertarians can find common ground in support of an unfamiliar means of forcing well off individuals to come to the assistance of the least well off. Such means would not, as is typically the case, involve the taxation of the income of all well off individuals. Rather, assistance would be provided by the taxation of only those well off individuals who have been properly convicted of performing justifiably criminalized acts that they (...) had no right to commit. In Section I, I argue that many liberal egalitarians will discover that a strong case can be made for the taxation of only the unjust, since such a scheme would mitigate the objectionable nature of the coercion that must be applied in order to provide for the least well off. In Section II, I argue that libertarians who reject standard schemes of redistributive taxation will not also be able to resist the case for taxation of the unjust. In Section III, I defend taxation of the unjust against the objection that it would call for punishment in excess of what justice permits. (shrink)

From the 1980s onward income inequality increased in many advanced countries. It is very difficult to account for the rise in income inequality using the standard labour supply/demand explanation. Fiscal redistribution has become less effective in compensating increasing inequalities since the 1990s. Some of the basic features of redistribution can be explained through the optimal tax framework developed by J.A. Mirrlees in 1971. This Element surveys some of the earlier results in linear and nonlinear taxation and produces (...) some new numerical results. Given the key role of capital income in the overall income inequality it also considers the optimal taxation of capital income. It examines empirically the relationship between the extent of redistribution and the components of the Mirrlees framework. The redistributive role of factors such as publicly provided private goods, public employment, endogenous wages in the overlapping generations model and income uncertainty are analysed. (shrink)