As artefacts, the worlds of digital games are designed and developed to fulfil certain expressive, functional, and experiential objectives. During play, players infer these purposes and aspirations from various aspects of their engagement with the gameworld. Influenced by their sociocultural backgrounds, sensitivities, gameplay preferences, and familiarity with game conventions, players construct a subjective interpretation of the intentions with which they believe the digital game in question was created. By analogy with the narratological notion of the implied author, we call (...) the figure to which players ascribe these intentions ‘the implied designer’. In this article, we introduce the notion of the implied designer and present an initial account of how appreciators ascribe meaning to interactive, fictional gameworlds and act within them based on what they perceive to be the designer’s intentions. (shrink)

A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for (...) understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory. (shrink)

In the value sensitive design literature, there has been little attention for how values may change during the adoption and use of a sociotechnical system, and what that implies for design. A value change taxonomy is proposed, as well as a number of technical features that allow dealing with value change.

This paper examines the ethical issues of the inclusion of workers with disabilities in the workplace with a cross-fertilization approach between organization studies, the ethics of care, and a movement from the field of architecture and design that is called Universal Design (UD). It explores how organizations can use UD to develop more inclusive workplaces, first by applying UD principles to workspaces and second by showing how UD implies an integrative understanding of inclusion from the workspace to the workplace. Moreover, (...) this paper discusses the ethical challenges and complexities that this design practice faces in regard to its applicability to diverse organizations and industries. Finally, this paper demonstrates that inclusion requires abandoning any notion of a perfect, productive body and, therefore, recognizing our shared vulnerability and fundamental interdependence in the workplace. (shrink)

Drawing from narratology and design studies, this article makes use of the notions of the ‘implied designer’ and ‘ludic unreliability’ to understand deceptive game design as a specific sub-set of transgressive game design. More specifically, in this text we present deceptive game design as the deliberate attempt to misguide players’ inferences about the designers’ intentions. Furthermore, we argue that deceptive design should not merely be taken as a set of design choices aimed at misleading players in their efforts (...) to understand the game, but also as decisions devised to give rise to experiential and emotional effects that are in the interest of players. Finally, we propose to introduce a distinction between two varieties of deceptive design approaches based on whether they operate in an overt or a covert fashion in relation to player experience. Our analysis casts light on expressive possibilities that are not customarily part of the dominant paradigm of user-centered design, and can inform game designers in their pursuit of wider and more nuanced creative aspirations. (shrink)

Richard Dawkins has a dilemma when it comes to design arguments. On the one hand, he maintains that it was Darwin who killed off design and so implies that his rejection of design depends upon the findings of modern science. On the other hand, he follows Hume when he claims that appealing to a designer does not explain anything and so implies that rejection of design need not be based on the findings of modern science. These contrasting approaches lead (...) to the following dilemma: if he claims that Darwinism is necessary for rejecting design, he has no satisfactory response to design arguments based on the order in the laws of physics or the fine-tuning of the physical constants; alternatively, if Humean arguments are doing most of the work, this would undermine one of his main contentions, that atheism is justified by science and especially by evolution. In any case, his Humean arguments do not provide a more secure basis for his atheism because they are seriously flawed. A particular problem is that his argument for the improbability of theism rests on a highly questionable application of probability theory since, even if it were sound, it would only establish that the prior probability of God’s existence is low, a conclusion which is compatible with the posterior probability of God’s existence being high. (shrink)

This explores the role of intention in interpreting designed artefacts. The relationship between how designers intend products to be interpreted and how they are subsequently interpreted has often been represented as a process of communication. However, such representations are attacked for allegedly implying that designers' intended meanings are somehow ‘contained’ in products and that those meanings are passively received by consumers. Instead, critics argue that consumers actively construct their own meanings as they engage with products, and therefore that designers' intentions (...) are not relevant to this process. In contrast, this article asserts the validity and utility of relating intention to interpretation by exploring the nature of that relationship in design practice and consumer response. Communicative perspectives on design are thereby defended and new avenues of empirical enquiry are proposed. (shrink)

Inclusive design prescribes addressing the needs of the widest possible audience in order to consider human differences. Taking differences seriously, however, may imply severely restricting “the widest possible audience”. In confronting this paradox, we investigate to what extent Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness applies to design. By converting the paradox into the question of how design can be fair, we show that the demand for equitability shifts from the design output to the design process. We conclude that the two (...) main questions about justice find application in design: the question about the standards of justice and the question about its metrics. We endorse a Rawlsian approach to the former, while some revision may be due regarding the latter. (shrink)

Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, (...) obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be war- ranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all. (shrink)

Evolutionary ideas and modern biological knowledge have important roles to play in the understanding of human behaviour. Nevertheless, it is deeply misleading to regard humans as robots in the grip of their genes. A well designed brain should respond to the consequences of behaviour; if an understanding of the likely consequences can be achieved without actually performing the act, then a person who knows that they will be rewarded or punished for certain acts is bound to be influenced by that (...) knowledge. A brain designed in that way facilitates the evolution of societies with explicit social approval of certain activities and explicit disapproval of others. The evolutionary approach to psychology does not imply that individuals do not make free choices. Individuals clearly do make a big difference to what happens in their lives through their decisions. They may be surprised by the consequences of their own actions. A well designed brain should be able to anticipate the consequences of various courses of action and choose between them on the basis of their likely costs and benefits. Planning before doing is clearly of great advantage. People do make well considered decisions and they benefit from doing so. (shrink)

This contribution to design methodology reflects upon the barriers to effectiveness imposed by our tendency to gravitate towards the over-formal in human affairs. We see a correspondingly cleaned-up description of the process of design, a failure to consider its jagged elements and to take proper account of the non-formal in knowledge (e.g. tacit knowledge) and communication. Discipline in methodology is accordingly wrongly equated with formality. The failure of design to be effective is more likely for innovative design rather than routine (...) design.It is suggested by way of explanation that design methodology especially in the field of information technology is infused with the ghost of positivism, manifest in an unconditional belief in the value of rationality and an implied naive realist conviction about the fixed, singular and transparent nature of the environment for which design is undertaken.We need to be able to work with uncertainty rather than try for its entire elimination. A breadth of approach in carrying out the activity of design is threatened by lack of attention to the variety of forms which knowledge and corresponding forms of discourse can take.We undertake the disciplined reduction from the messy real work to metaphors tidy enough to work with, or models as they are usually misnamed.The notion of “language of struggle” is invoked as a suitable metaphor for the non-formal discourse particularly relevant to innovative design. A complementary exploration is offered of socio-linguistic space which is the common context for design.In view of the concern with social space necessary to effective design, it may be enlightening to consider the designer as applied anthropologist. (shrink)

During the past decade, the “script” concept, indicating how technologies prescribe human actions, has acquired a central place in STS. Until now, the concept has mainly functioned in descriptive settings. This article will deploy it in a normative setting. When technologies coshape human actions, they give material answers to the ethical question of how to act. This implies that engineers are doing “ethics by other means”: they materialize morality. The article will explore the implications of this insight for engineering ethics. (...) It first augments the script concept by developing the notion of technological mediation. After this, it investigates how the concept of mediation could be made fruitful for design ethics. It discusses how the ambition to design behaviorinfluencing technologies raises moral questions itself and elaborates two methods for anticipating technological mediation in the design process: performing mediation analyses and using an augmented version of constructive technology assessment. (shrink)

Religion and Laughter in a Digital Society.

Our world is changing in rapid and unanticipated ways. Given technology’s central role in those changes, engineers face difficult design decisions. In dominant consequentialist and deontological engineering ethics paradigms, making design choices implies having sufficient information on those choices and their trade-offs, which is often lacking. Some scholars have pointed to virtue ethics as an alternative approach to engineering ethics, but how can virtue ethics support engineers in situations of uncertainty? In this chapter, we explore how virtue ethics is conducive (...) to sound engineering in different conditions of uncertainty. (shrink)

The concept of privacy by design is becoming increasingly popular among regulators of information and communications technologies. This paper aims at analysing and discussing the ethical implications of this concept for personal health monitoring. I assume a privacy theory of restricted access and limited control. On the basis of this theory, I suggest a version of the concept of privacy by design that constitutes a middle road between what I call broad privacy by design and narrow privacy by design. The (...) key feature of this approach is that it attempts to balance automated privacy protection and autonomously chosen privacy protection in a way that is context-sensitive. In personal health monitoring, this approach implies that in some contexts like medication assistance and monitoring of specific health parameters one single automatic option is legitimate, while in some other contexts, for example monitoring in which relatives are receivers of health-relevant information rather than health care professionals, a multi-choice approach stressing autonomy is warranted. (shrink)

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of premises, (...) asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

Ilya Somin argues that in light of the public's rational political ignorance we should make government smaller. But his account of the phenomenon of rational ignorance does not justify his policy prescription of smaller government; on the contrary, it implies that we should revamp the current framework of democratic institutions. This is because, since Somin fails to set out a principled basis on which to value democracy even in the face of rational ignorance, he cannot explain why we should want (...) any democratic government, however small it may be. If rational ignorance is as grave a challenge to democracy as he takes it to be, it would seem to demand either radical institutional innovation or, alternatively, an abandonment of certain democratic principles. By not explaining why we should value citizens’ involvement in politics at all, and why we might therefore draw different policy conclusions than he does himself, Somin's book ultimately fails to do full justice to the important questions that it raises. (shrink)

It is a dominant dictum in ethics that ‘ought implies can’ (OIC): if an agent morally ought to do an action, the agent must be capable of performing that action. Yet, with current technological developments, such as in direct-to-consumer genomics, big data analytics and wearable technologies, there may be reasons to reorient this ethical principle. It is our modest aim in this article to explore how the current wave of allegedly disruptive innovation calls for a renewed interest for this dictum. (...) As an effect of prevention and prediction oriented technological innovation, an increased focus on assumedly controllable lifestyle risks may be anticipated. For lay people who might turn into patients, this may entail a reinforced behavior-based individual responsibilisation. Holding on to the OIC dictum, such responsibilisation seems to require that individuals can actually control what is framed as ‘lifestyle risks’ when there is not always a reliable consensus about what one should do. As such, reference to OIC may be mobilised in function of a political task of designing institutions so as to enable such choice and control. (shrink)

Based on architectural projects which interpret literature as program we discuss design reasoning when no routine models of problem solving apply. We address three aspects of formulation: defining the design charge so that it can be retrospectively stated independent of the actual proposal; defining a language of formal operations; and defining the intrinsic aims of design that are only intimated through the proposal itself. The coherence of the project is a function of the way in which formal properties interact, and (...) the way in which they sustain analogical or metaphorical relationships to text: how the patterns of subdivision, connection, differentiation, positioning, movement or perception associated with built space relate to textual figures, concepts, structure, or narrative. The possibility of constructing architectural meaning in this way implies an underlying model of space as a morphic language which works primarily through the constitution of generic and significant relationships rather than the combination of previously objectified elements. The gradual articulation of the design charge is mediated by a process of diagramming. Diagrams express as spatial constructions the conditions and concepts abstracted from text; also, they act as notations of constructive operations which are themselves spatial. Diagrams can be abstractive or pictorial, dense or discrete. They document two aspects of an integral process of reasoning: First, an exploration of how concepts, whether directly, analogically or metaphorically transferred from text to shape, may relate to produce a more complex idea; second, how formal properties co-vary and how an emergent design proposal engages and activates a field of formal possibility. (shrink)

What kinds of feasibility restrictions should be taken into account in practically relevant political philosophy? David Estlund argues that “ought” does not imply “can will,” and, hence, that we should be very cautious regarding the inclusion of motivational restrictions in political philosophy. As Nicholas Southwood and David Wiens point out, however, Estlund’s position clashes with the requirement that “ought” implies “feasible.” The present article argues that even though we must accept that “ought” implies “feasible,” this does not settle the question (...) regarding the adequate set of feasibility restrictions to be included in applied normative thinking. Instead, we need to distinguish different kinds of normative theory that require different sets of feasibility restrictions. For this, the article provides a taxonomy of feasibility restrictions and a preliminary discussion of the adequate set of feasibility restrictions for different kinds of normative theory. (shrink)

This research study postulates an argument aimed at disputing the conception that determinism intrinsically entails the inevitability or unchangability of events. It claims that within our world, there exist events that are, in fact, avoidable. To defend this claim, the paper draws upon the evolutionary foundation established by cognitive philosopher Daniel C. Dennett. According to Dennett, the phenomenon of natural selection has bestowed human beings with the capability to avoid specific events by reducing the pervasiveness of inevitable events over time. (...) Nevertheless, a crucial query arises while recognizing the existence of avoidance-capable entities within a Toy deterministic world, such as John Conway’s “Game of Life.” The existence of such entities puts forward the presence of a practical expression of free will, despite the allegedly deterministic nature of the world. Dennett, a staunch proponent of naturalism, endeavors to demonstrate that determinism is not inherently problematic and does not pose a significant threat to our free existence. Anchored in compatibilism, Dennett argues that determinism and freedom can coexist, with the emergence of evolution enabling human beings to possess the capacity for avoidance within a so-called deterministic world. Thus, the prime intention of this paper is to exhibit an extensive analysis exemplifying that determinism does not diminish our notion of free will. To achieve this objective, the paper seeks to debunk prevailing misconceptions about determinism by employing a toy model wherein simplistic entities can evolve and acquire the ability to avoid harm, which can also be reflected in human life. Moreover, the paper endeavors to establish that the conventional association between determinism and inevitability is flawed, as the notion of inevitability should be attributed to the design level rather than the physical level of any system. (shrink)

Gendlin's Philosophy of the Implicit offers root concepts, and a schema derived from them, for thinking about living and experiencing in very general terms, in ways that build bridges for thinking about human experience and animal experience together. He describes living as occurring into implying - what occurs is happening into implying something helpful - and when what occurs actually is helpful he describes this as living carrying forward. His term “the implicit” points towards the complexity involved in being helpful, (...) from the standpoint of a life appreciated as a whole. His concepts support disciplined thick description of animals’ lives. Looking, for example, at passages of kangaroo mothers' living, reveals their concurrent, crossed sensitivity to grass and other food, to their young's behavior, to predators, and to what other members of their group are doing. Standard methods for researching behavior hide this complexity. Looking at animal lives from the perspective of implying creates opportunities for describing animals’ lives holistically. This creates new research opportunities, and provides new tools for practical problems like designing conservation strategies so they work from animals' perspectives. (shrink)

Kant’s attempts to formulate a conception of the harmony of nature and freedom have two logical presuppositions. The first presupposition is separation of ought and is, which provides a logical formulation of the separation of freedom and nature. Kant might well have settled on the view that the separation between nature and freedom cannot be bridged. Why did Kant attempt to overcome said separation? The second presupposition of Kant’s project to bridge nature and freedom involves an ought→can inference, stating that (...) moral obligation implies the possibility of its fulfillment. There are at least two ways this inference can be understood. There is a weak sense of the inference, stating that no one is obliged to do the impossible. There is also a very strong sense of the inference, stating that if a moral obligation is found to obtain, it must then be possible to fulfill it. Kant interprets the ought→can inference in this strong as well as in the weak sense. Nature, the law-governed totality of what exists, must be understood as able to provide a suitable field for moral realization. The isomorphism between the lawfulness of nature and that of moral freedom animate Kant’s account of moral judgment, and will provide the main focus of the current investigation. Kant conceives of nature and freedom as twin kingdoms, thus providing a theoretical model validating this ought→can inference. The weaker sense of this ought→can inference does justice to moral judgment without requiring the awesome task of bridging nature and freedom. Why, then, should we maintain the strong ought→can inference in our post-Kantian situation? I suggest that Kant’s insistence on the strong ought→can inference may yield an ethical approach to the ever more powerful ways in which human beings technologically transform nature, including human nature itself. (shrink)

Spontaneous orders are an essential concept in political theory and political economy. Such orders entail the impossibility of predicting outcomes in detail and hence controlling and directing social processes. Many phenomena characterizing contemporary societies can be depicted as spontaneous orders, from the housing and financial markets to the evolution of norms and trends. Yet, it is well known that not every spontaneous order is beneficial. Therefore, what form of political framework is compatible with recognizing such orders? In this article, I (...) address this problem through the example of the work of Friedrich Hayek, a prominent liberal theorist of spontaneous orders. His work shows the necessity to theorize a government of spontaneous orders based on maximizing reasonable expectations and individual freedom. I finally emphasize what such a theory implies for political power, which is not abolished but should handle complexity appropriately. (shrink)

Person‐centred care, with its central focus on the patient in partnership with healthcare practitioners, is considered to be the contemporary gold standard of care. This type of care implies effective communication from and by both the patient and the healthcare practitioner. This is often problematic in the case of the paediatric population, because of the many communicative challenges that may arise due to the child's developmental level, illness and distress, linguistic competency and disabilities. The principle of universal design put forth (...) in conventions and legislation means that the design of products and services should be usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible. Augmentative and alternative communication encompasses strategies, for example pictures and apps, that are typically used with people with communication disability. In this position paper, we argue for the universal use of augmentative and alternative communication to support person‐centred communication and care for children, regardless of age or potential disability. Clinical examples are shared from three different paediatric care settings where pictorial supports were applied universally. Interviews were conducted with children and adolescents (with and without disabilities), parents and healthcare practitioners, and the principles of universal design were used as a framework to demonstrate how person‐centred communication is supported in paediatric care. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of ethics in design. Traditionally, ethical questions have been seen as marginal issues in the design of technology. Part of the reason for this stems from the widely held notion of technology being “out of control.” This notion is a barrier to what I call “ethical design” because it implies that ethics has no role to play in the development of technology. This view, however, is challenged by recent work in the field of Science and (...) Technology Studies (STS). Looking into the dynamics of technological change, STS scholars argue that human choices are present at every stage of a technology’s development and, furthermore, that human values are reflected in the very design of artifacts. This alternative view suggests that ethics can and should be included in the design process. Drawing on examples from the privacy arena. I point to some of the potential advantages of addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology. I conclude with some general strategies for bringing ethics back into design. (shrink)

The U.S. Constitution provides a framework for our laws, but what does it have to say about morality? Paul DeHart ferrets out that document’s implicit moral assumptions as he revisits the notion that constitutions are more than merely practical institutional arrangements. In _Uncovering the Constitution’s Moral Design_, he seeks to reveal, elaborate, and then evaluate the Constitution’s normative framework to determine whether it is philosophically sound—and whether it makes moral assumptions that correspond to reality. Rejecting the standard approach of the (...) intellectual historian, DeHart for the first time in constitutional theory applies the method of inference to the best explanation to ascertaining our Constitution’s moral meaning. He distinguishes the Constitution’s intention from the subjective intentions of the framers, teasing out presuppositions that the document makes about the nature of sovereignty, the common good, natural law, and natural rights. He then argues that the Constitution constrains popular sovereignty in a way that entails a real common good, transcendent of human willing and promotive of human well-being, but he points out that while the Constitution presupposes a real common good, it also implies a natural law that prescribes the common good. In critiquing previous attempts at describing and evaluating the Constitution’s normative framework, DeHart demonstrates that the Constitution’s moral framework corresponds largely to classical moral theory. He challenges the logical coherency of modern moral philosophy, normative positivism, and other theories that the Constitution has been argued to embody and offers a groundbreaking methodology that can be applied to uncovering the normative framework of other constitutions as well. This cogently argued study shows that the Constitution presupposes a natural law to which human law must conform, and it takes a major step in resolving current debates over the Constitution’s normative framework while remaining detached from the social issues that divide today’s political arena. _Uncovering the Constitution’s Moral Design_ is an original approach to the Constitution that marks a significant contribution to understanding the moral underpinnings of our form of government. (shrink)

This study investigated whether some Japanese intransitive verbs, called agent-implying intransitive verbs, are processed differently from other ordinary intransitive verbs. These verbs are special in that they denote agentive events, but they are intransitive verbs, which only allow the patient/theme to be the only nominatively marked argument. The priming experiment was designed based on the situation model theory, assuming that verbs with an agentive semantic structure (e.g., ordinary transitive verbs) has a shorter causal inferential distance than those with a non-agentive (...) semantic structure (e.g., ordinary intransitive verb). In the experiment, participants were instructed to read two sentences that formed a story, of which the second sentence was either a transitive or intransitive sentence. The participants then answered a related question about general knowledge, and their response times were measured. The results show that, whereas the mean response time in the ordinary intransitive condition was significantly longer than that in the ordinary transitive condition, the mean response time in the agent-implying intransitive condition was not significantly different from that of the corresponding transitive condition, suggesting that agent-implying intransitive verbs are interpreted as agentive. The findings suggest that agent-implying intransitive verbs instantly evoke agentivity, whereas ordinary intransitive verbs do not. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

In the real-world complex product design process, task allocating is an ongoing reactive process where the presence of unexpected design change is usually inevitable. Therefore, reallocating is necessary to respond to design change positively as a procedure to repair the affected task plan. General reallocating literature addressed the reallocating versions with fixed executing time. In this paper, a multi-objective reallocation model is developed with a feasible assumption that the task executing time is controllable. To illustrate this idea, a compressing executing (...) time strategy is proposed in CPD process, where the executing time can be controlled with a non-linear compression cost. When design change occurs during the executing, task-resource reallocating is required to absorb the interference effects. Reallocating implies an increase in design cost and system instability; the proposed method CETS can address this issue effectively. CETS considers three objectives: completing time, stability, and change-adaptation cost. An adaptive multi-objective hybrid genetic algorithm and tabu search is developed to solve this mathematical method. The computational results of specific simulation examples verify the superiority. It shows that CETS is sensitive to design change, and the proposed algorithm AMOGATS can be effective to achieve the allocating by coordinating the objective consistency. (shrink)

This paper aims to connect Stiegler’s reflections on theoretical computer science with his practical propositions for the design of digital technologies. Indeed, Stiegler’s theory of exosomatization implies a new conception of artificial intelligence, which is not based on an analogical paradigm (which compares organisms and machines, as in cybernetics, or which compares thought and computing, as in cognitivism) but on an organological paradigm, which studies the co-evolution of living organisms (individuals), artificial organs (tools), and social organizations (institutions). Such a perspective (...) does not compare human capacities to machine performances but studies the way in which the evolution of material and technical supports affects and transforms psychological, cognitive or noetic faculties (intuition, memory, understanding, imagination, sensibility, reason, etc.), as well as the constitution of different kinds of knowledge. This new theoretical paradigm implies a new ‘design’ for digital technologies, which considers their social role and their impact on psychological, cognitive or noetic faculties. (shrink)

In this panel, we explore the future of value sensitive design (VSD). The stakes are high. Many in public and private sectors and in civil society are gradually realizing that taking our values seriously implies that we have to ensure that values effectively inform the design of technology which, in turn, shapes people’s lives. Value sensitive design offers a highly developed set of theory, tools, and methods to systematically do so.

There is a long tradition of arguing that design and science are importantly different. One such argument is that the separation of science and design is an implication that can be drawn from the Simon–Kroes model of the nature of technical artifacts. This paper argues that the Simon–Kroes model does not imply a radical separation between science and design: if we accept the Simon–Kroes model of the nature of technical artifacts and their production, then we must also accept that all (...) the sciences also produce technical artifacts, and in importantly similar ways. Moreover, the placing of both science and design in a naturalist framework reinforces this conclusion and opens up new vistas for synergetic cross-disciplinary discussion of design and methodology. (shrink)

Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand (rather than place judgment on) the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents’ preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound (...) model for the PPIMT using a combined sample of college students from a southeastern university in U.S. and MTurk respondents. The PPIMT model fit was acceptable (χ2 = 84.125, df = 40, p = 0.001; RMSEA = 0.052, 90%CI = 0.037 to 0.068; CFI = 0.980; SRMR = 0.035) with four items for Virtue, four items for Deontology, and three items for Consequentialism. (shrink)

Technological imagination and actual technological achievements have always been two very different things. Sudden and unpredictable events always seem to intervene between our visions regarding possible futures and the subsequent concrete realizations. Thus, our ideas and projects are continually being redirected. In the field of naturoids—that is, artificial systems designed to simulate certain features of natural ones—the above-mentioned tendency is particularly frequent and illuminating, giving all prophecies a flavor of fiction rather than of reliable technological forecast. The dream of reproducing (...) complete natural systems—man included—by means of technological strategies clashes with the “nature” of artificial objects and also with that of natural exemplars. The only certainty is that the future will exhibit growing rates of variety and heterogeneity, and we cannot know, from our present standpoint, what this will imply for our species, or, at least, for our cultures. (shrink)

Both the so-called high priests of atheism and the proponents of Intelligent Design argue that the Darwinian theory of evolution is more problematic for theism than any other scientific theory. Against the grain of most contemporary philosophers and theologians, I contend that their arguments are largely correct. Moreover, neo-Darwinism is especially threatening the soft theism or deism, defended by Darwin and several of the most prominent Darwinian theorists . For the proponents of ID, this implies that a more theistic science (...) is needed, whereas Dennett and Dawkins hold that the triumph of Darwinism as a science goes hand in hand with the death of theism. However, I contend that a reconciliation of today’s evolutionary theory with theism is possible. In order to substantiate this claim, I sketch out different intellectually legitimate ways to immunize theism against the many ‘Darwinian dangers’. (shrink)

This book addresses the morality of engaging in weapons research, a topic that has been neglected but which is extremely important. It is argued that this activity is both morally wrong and morally unjustifiable, and this implies that moral persons should not engage in it. The argument is not based on any pacifist assumptions: it is not assumed that neither individuals nor states should not defend themselves. What is wrong with weapons research is that it is the first step in (...) the production of weapons, weapons are the means to harm, and harming without justification is always wrong. Those who study science, for instance those who are interested in the responsibilities of the scientist, are given a new perspective, while those who are practicing scientists will realize that they should not consider working to design new or improved weapons systems. This book is of interest to students and researchers working in ethics and technology, philosophy of technology, military ethics, and history of technology. (shrink)

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether the resistance to extinction obtained in evaluative conditioning (EC) studies implies that EC is a qualitatively distinct form of classical conditioning (Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995 Baeyens, F, Eelen, P, and Crombez, G, (1995a). Pavlovian associations are forever: On classical conditioning and extinction, Journal of Psychophysiology 9 ((1995a)), pp. 127–141.[Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]a) or whether it is the result of an nonassociative artefact (Field & Davey, 1997 Field, AP, and Davey, GCL, (...) (1997). Conceptual conditioning: Evidence for an artifactual account of evaluative learning, Learning and Motivation 25 ((1997)), pp. 446–464.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], 1998 Field, AP, and Davey, GCL, (1998). Evaluative conditioning: Arti‐fact or ‐fiction?‐ A reply to Baeyens, De Houwer, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1998), Learning and Motivation 29 ((1998)), pp. 475–491.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], 1999 Field, AP, and Davey, GCL, (1999). Reevaluating evaluative conditioning: A nonassociative explanation of conditioning effects in the visual evaluative conditioning paradigm, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 25 ((1999)), pp. 211–224.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Both experiments included between‐subjects control groups in addition to standard within‐subjects control conditions. In Experiment 1, only verbal ratings were measured in order to evaluate the effect of postacquisition CS‐only exposures on EC whereas in Experiment 2, verbal ratings and postextinction priming effects were measured. The results showed that the EC effects are demonstrable in a between‐subjects design and that the extinction procedure did not have any influence on the acquired evaluative value of CSs regardless of whether the verbal ratings or the priming effects were used as dependent variables. The present results provide evidence that EC is resistant to extinction and suggest an interpretation of EC as a qualitatively distinct form of associative learning. (shrink)

Many bioliberals endorse broadly consequentialist frameworks in normative ethics, implying that a progressive stance on matters of bioethical controversy could stem from outcome-based reasoning. This raises an intriguing empirical prediction: encouraging outcome-based reflection could yield a shift toward bioliberal views among nonexperts as well. To evaluate this hypothesis, we identified empirical premises that underlie moral disagreements on seven divisive issues (e.g., vaccines, abortion, or genetically modified organisms). In exploratory and confirmatory experiments, we assessed whether people spontaneously engage in outcome-based reasoning (...) by asking how their moral views change after momentarily reflecting on the underlying empirical questions. Our findings indicate that momentary reflection had no overall treatment effect on the central tendency or the dispersion in moral attitudes when compared to prereflection measures collected 1 week prior. Autoregressive models provided evidence that participants engaged in consequentialist moral reasoning, but this self-guided reflection produced neither moral “progress” (shifts in the distributions’ central tendency) nor moral “consensus” (reductions in their dispersion). These results imply that flexibility in people's search for empirical answers may limit the potential for outcome-based reflection to foster moral consensus. (shrink)

A look at history showed that theology always has to face contemporary demands in terms of its scientific character. At present, processes of pluralisation and secularisation challenge the existence of theology at universities not only against the background of religious studies, which are independent of the churches, but also, for example, in relation to innovative life sciences or cognitive sciences. In this context, an essential point to consider was that theology – like social systems in general and science in particular (...) – is characterised by an increasing differentiation. This differentiation of science implied an increasing specialisation of research, which could also be observed in the field of theology and its sub-disciplines. This article accordingly addressed the question of how, in the face of increasingly specialised research studies, the unity of theology can be justified beyond abstract and sweeping determinations. The present contribution suggested that in this respect a model of research designs developed in religious didactics might prove useful. This model of research design could essentially be understood as consisting of three research dimensions that define a research space, in which the research study on the didactics of religion can be located in the three-dimensional space by the research goal as a formatting factor. The three dimensions of this model, including the research goal, seemed to be broad enough to be tested in other sub-disciplines of theology as well to see whether their research can be more closely defined with them.Contribution: Accordingly, the contribution of this article was to raise the question, in view of an increasing specialisation of theological research, to what extent a model of research designs developed in the didactics of religion could be transferred to other sub-disciplines of theology. Should this succeed a new approach to justifying the unity of theology could become available, which is able to take into account the current differentiation of theology. (shrink)

Accumulating research has identified the interactive effects of catechol-O-methyltransferase gene Val158Met polymorphism and environmental factors on aggression. However, available evidence was mainly based upon correlational design, which yields mixed findings concerning who are more affected by environmental conditions and has been challenged for the low power of analyses on gene–environment interaction. Drawing on a mixed design, we scrutinized how COMT Val158Met polymorphism impacts on aggression, assessed by hostility, aggressive motivation, and aggressive behavior, under different social conditions in a sample of (...) 70 Chinese male undergraduate students. We found that both Val/Val homozygote and Met alleles carriers showed differences in the feelings of hostility and aggressive motivation under conditions of exclusion versus inclusion, but these differences were more pronounced for Met allele carriers. These findings implied that COMT Val158Met polymorphism did not respond to environmental stimuli in an all-or-none way and shed light on the importance of examining the gene–environment interaction using a mixed design. (shrink)

Education is a field that evolves constantly in relation to the changes in the society and the needs of its beneficiaries, taking over and adapting functional models from other fields. The quality of education of today’s generations has a direct impact on the future, as tomorrow's adults need to have strong key competences, but also transversal competences needed in a dynamic and competitive labour market. Thus, the knowledge society implies opening up the education system to other social sectors, exploiting the (...) paradigm of student-centred education, harnessing technology and virtual environments to create authentic learning and training contexts. Within this framework, educational coaching can be a means through which the individual potential of the learner can be discovered and optimised, with multiple benefits in personal, academic and professional terms. In order to achieve academic success, students need to know themselves, set short-, medium- and long-term goals and objectives, develop skills and competences in autonomous learning, communication, self-motivation, creative and critical thinking, emotion management etc. Through coaching activities, students can benefit from academic support and help in the process of self-discovery and personal development, optimising personal potential, collaborating and creating educational communities that share common goals and values. Placing the teacher in the position of a coach, this can contribute to the development of a multifaceted perspective related to the role of the teacher in the contemporary school, as a student’s partner in the process of his or her education. The present paper aims to explore students’ perceptions concerning the need for coaching activities in their academic life and to identify the students’ main needs and directions for optimizing actions and interventions. (shrink)

Philosophical games are games designed to invite players to think philosophically within (and about) their gameworlds. They are interactive fictions allowing players to engage with philosophical themes in ways that often set them apart from non-interactive kinds of speculative fictions (such as philosophical novels or thought experiments). To better understand philosophical games, this entry proposes to distinguish two primary ways in which a philosophical game can approach its themes: dialectically or rhetorically.

The phrase ‘synthetic biology’ is used to describe a set of different scientific and technological disciplines, which share the objective to design and produce new life forms. This essay addresses the following questions: What conception of life stands behind this ambitious objective? In what relation does this conception of life stand to that of traditional biology and biotechnology? And, could such a conception of life raise ethical concerns? Three different observations that provide useful indications for the conception of life in (...) synthetic biology will be discussed in detail: 1. Synthetic biologists focus on different features of living organisms in order to design new life forms, 2. Synthetic biologists want to contribute to the understanding of life, and 3. Synthetic biologists want to modify life through a rational design, which implies the notions of utilising, minimising/optimising, varying and overcoming life. These observations indicate a tight connection between science and technology, a focus on selected aspects of life, a production-oriented approach to life, and a design-oriented understanding of life. It will be argued that through this conception of life synthetic biologists present life in a different light. This conception of life will be illustrated by the metaphor of a toolbox. According to the notion of life as a toolbox, the different features of living organisms are perceived as various rationally designed instruments that can be used for the production of the living organism itself or secondary products made by the organism. According to certain ethical positions this conception of life might raise ethical concerns related to the status of the organism, the motives of the scientists and the role of technology in our society. (shrink)

As COVID-19 continues to spread, a variety of COVID-19 tracking apps (CTAs) have been introduced to help contain the pandemic. Deployment of this technology poses serious challenges of effectiveness, technological problems and risks to privacy and equity. The ethical use of CTAs depends heavily on the protection of voluntariness. Voluntary use of CTAs implies not only the absence of a legal obligation to employ the app but also the absence of more subtle forms of coercion such as enforced exclusion from (...) certain social and work activities. The protection of individual rights to voluntary use can be enhanced through an ethics by design approach in the development of CTAs that treat the introduction of CTAs for what it is: a complete novelty that is being tested for the first time in democracies. (shrink)

Moti Mizrahi provides experimental evidence according to which subjects judge that a person ought to ? even when she cannot ?. He takes his results to constitute a falsification of the alleged intuitiveness of the ‘Ought Implies Can’ principle. We point out that in the light of the fact that (a) ‘ought’ is multiply ambiguous, that (b) only a restricted set of readings of ‘ought’ will be relevant to the principle, and that (c) he did not instruct his subjects appropriately (...) – or otherwise ensure that in their ‘ought’ judgements they applied the relevant concept(s) – Mizrahi’s conclusions appear premature. We suggest two ways in which the experimental design could be adjusted or supplemented. First, Mizrahi could instruct (or prime) subjects to read the ‘ought’ question in a particular way. Second, he could complement his experiment by asking follow-up questions aimed at uncovering the implications for blame of subjects’ judgements. Once these adjustments are applied, an experiment with a similar outcome would be more significant. (shrink)

As a step towards comprehensive computer models of communication, and effective human machine dialogue, some of the relationships between communication and affect are explored. An outline theory is presented of the architecture that makes various kinds of affective states possible, or even inevitable, in intelligent agents, along with some of the implications of this theory for various communicative processes. The model implies that human beings typically have many different, hierarchically organized, dispositions capable of interacting with new information to produce affective (...) states, distract attention, interrupt ongoing actions, and so on. High "insistence" of motives is defined in relation to a tendency to penetrate an attention filter mechanism, which seems to account for the partial loss of control involved in emotions. One conclusion is that emulating human communicative abilities will not be achieved easily. Another is that it will be even more difficult to design and build computing systems that reliably achieve interesting communicative goals. (shrink)

That the present day society profits from research in many areas is evident. This has stimulated a keen desire to emulate similarly advantageous contributions in other areas. It appears to imply not only a need to know how to (better) support action in general or any action, but also how to support the act of making "better" itself (better businesses, better houses, better emotions, better objectives, etc.). Developing the latter type of knowledge has proved to pose a major challenge, however. (...) Although the challenge has been taken up in areas such as social policy, economics, therapy, management, architecture, design, and others, leading to a number of responses, a complete characterisation seems still to be lacking. Such a characterisation is attempted in this article. Typical characteristics are the inclusion of non-observational experiences and a simultaneous striving for individual and collective high quality. (shrink)

This article introduces confirmatory composite analysis (CCA) as a structural equation modeling technique that aims at testing composite models. In doing so, it overcomes a current weakness of structural equation modeling, i.e., the operationalization and assessment of design concepts, so-called artifacts. CCA entails the same steps as confirmatory factor analysis: model specification, model identification, model estimation, and model assessment. Composite models are specified such that they consist of a set of interrelated composites, all of which emerge as linear combinations of (...) observable variables. Researchers must ensure theoretical identification of their specified model. For the estimation of the model, several estimators are available; in particular Kettenring's extensions of canonical correlation analysis provide consistent estimates. Model assessment mainly relies on the Bollen-Stine bootstrap to assess the discrepancy between the empirical and the estimated model-implied indicator covariance matrix. A Monte Carlo simulation examines the efficacy of CCA, and demonstrates that CCA is able to detect various forms of model misspecification. (shrink)

This paper responds to the Radical Behavioral Challenge to normative business ethics. According to RBC, recent research on bounded ethicality shows that it is psychologically impossible for people to follow the prescriptions of normative business ethics. Thus, said prescriptions run afoul of the principle that nobody has an obligation to do something that they cannot do. I show that the only explicit response to this challenge in the business ethics literature is flawed because it limits normative business ethics to condemning (...) practitioners’ behavior without providing usable suggestions for how to do better. I argue that a more satisfying response is to, first, recognize that most obligations in business are wide-scope which, second, implies that there are multiple ways of fulfilling them. This provides a solid theoretical grounding for the increasingly popular view that we have obligations to erect institutional safeguards when bounded ethicality is likely to interfere with our ability to do what is right. I conclude with examples of such safeguards and some advice on how to use the research findings on bounded ethicality in designing ethical business organizations. (shrink)

The present study explored several dispositional factors associated with individual differences in lay adult’s interpretation of when an arguer is, or is not, committed to a statement. College students were presented with several two-person arguments in which the proponent of a thesis conceded a key point in the last turn. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which that concession implied a change in the proponent’s attitude toward any of the previous statements in the argument. Participants designated (...) as ‘liberal’ used the concession to infer substantial change in commitment to earlier statements in the argument. A group designated as ‘conservative’ were reluctant to make any such inferences. A discriminant analysis indicated that variables assessing participants’ attitudes toward argument as well as their cognitive and communication styles jointly predicted their liberal or conservative status. The discriminant function and follow-up group comparisons indicated that liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in argument. This included a greater tendency to use argument as a source of knowledge. Liberals also employed a more sophisticated message design logic than conservatives on a communication task. The groups did not clearly differ with respect to participants’ implicit theory of argument, though trends were present that merit attention in future research. Implications of these findings for future research on lay interpretations of commitment are discussed. (shrink)