Whewell and ShaftesburyIn contemporary moral philosophy ‘moral realism’ refers to a position in the metaphysics of morality that is analogous to realism about ordinary objects, and to scientific realism about theoretical entities. It is a realist doctrine in contrast to non-cognitivism, constructivism, fictionalism, and nihilism about moral judgments and moral properties. But while these particular contrasts are characteristic of contemporary philosophy, realism itself is much older. Ross, Prichard, and Sidgwick, for instance, hold realist views in the (...) metaphysics of morals, though they do not describe them in this way.As far as I know, the first person to use ‘moral realism’ as a description of a distinct tradition in modern moral philosophy is Whewell. He speaks of Shaftesbury as “the origin of a new school of real moralists” , who maintained some of the views of “the ancient school of Cudworth and Clarke”. Balguy is a member of this “old realist school” who defe .. (shrink)

In this landmark volume, Samuel Hollander presents a fresh and compelling history of moral philosophy from Locke to John Stuart Mill, showing that a ‘moral sense’ can actually be considered compatible with utilitarianism. The book also explores the link between utilitarianism and distributive justice. Hollander engages in close textual exegesis of the works relating to individual authors, while never losing sight of the intellectual relationships between them. Tying together the greatest of the British moral philosophers, this (...) volume reveals an unexpected unity of eighteenth and nineteenth century ethical doctrine at both the individual and social level. Essential reading for advanced students and researchers of the history of economic thought, political economy, history of ethics, history of political thought and intellectual history. -/- Samuel Hollander is University Professor Emeritus at the University of Toronto, Canada, and an Officer in the Order of Canada. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Morals is Kant's major work in applied moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles of rights and of virtues. It comprises two parts: the 'Doctrine of Right', which deals with the rights which people have or can acquire, and the 'Doctrine of Virtue', which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Mary Gregor's translation, revised for publication in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series, is the only complete translation (...) of the whole text, and includes extensive annotation on Kant's difficult and sometimes unfamiliar vocabulary. A new introduction by Roger Sullivan sets the work in its historical and philosophical context. This volume will be of wide interest to students of ethics and of legal and political philosophy. (shrink)

Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy (Motilal Banarsidass 2007). Regretfully, it is not an uncommon view in orthodox Indology that Indian philosophers were not interested in ethics. This claim belies the fact that Indian philosophical schools were generally interested in the practical consequences of beliefs and actions. The most popular symptom of this concern is the doctrine of karma, according to which the consequences of actions have an evaluative valence. Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy argues (...) that the orthodox view in Indology concerning Indian ethics is false. The first half the book deals with theoretical issues in studying ethics: defining moral terms, understanding the subject matter of ethics so as to transcend culturally specific substantive commitments and touches upon issues of cross-cultural hermeneutics and translation. The second half consists of a systematic explication of the moral philosophical aspects of nine major Indian philosophical schools. I argue that “dharma” in its various uses in Indian philosophy is always rationally treated as a moral term—even in so called “ontological” employments of the term as seen in Buddhism and Jainism. In understanding “dharma” in this manner, the Indian philosophical tradition is replete with different versions of moral realism that fit tidily with other philosophical commitments of Indian philosophers. Pains are taken to show the breath of moral philosophical disagreement in this tradition. On a comparative note, some Indian moral philosophy resembles realist approaches of the Western tradition (such as the Non-natural realism of Neo-Platonism, or the Naturalism of Utilitarianism). Out of the major Indian philosophical schools, a slim minority are shown to be committed to moral irrealism while some are shown to regard their entire philosophical orientation as firmly planted within moral philosophy (such as Jainism, Buddhism, Purva Mimamsa and Yoga). In response to those who would argue that what Indian philosophers meant by “dharma” is very different from what moral philosophers in the West have meant by “ethical” or “good,” I argue that this is as vacuous as noting that Utilitarians have a different conception of the good from Deontologists. If philosophy is concerned with theoretical debate, as I argue it is, philosophical terms function to articulate such disagreements. The various seemingly desperate uses of “dharma” in the Indian tradition are no longer confusing or disorderly when we understand the theoretico-philosophical function of this term in Indian philosophical disputes. -/- The second edition contains an additional chapter that addresses the colonial and political context of the study of Indian Ethics. (shrink)

The key statement made at the outset of Schneewind’s comprehensive investigation of early modern moral philosophy is that “Kant invented the conception of morality as autonomy”. Schneewind supports this strong historical claim by distinguishing sharply between the concept of autonomy and the various notions of moral self-governance found in seventeenth and eighteenth century ethics. Generally speaking, we are morally self-governing when we are equipped, cognitively and emotionally, so as to require neither external sanctioning authority nor external instruction for (...) the regulation of our actions. Yet to base one’s moral theory on this kind of account of selfgovernance does not necessarily make one an advocate of autonomous ethics. We are autonomous only when, in addition to satisfying the requirements of self-governance, we are self-lawgiving. For Kant, we are morally self-governing because we are autonomous. Schneewind argues persuasively that this conception of moral autonomy is simply not present in the history of ethics prior to Kant. The book examines the historical context out of which Kant’s account of morality as autonomy emerged. It thereby brings to light the novelty of the Kantian approach to the question of moral self-governance. Yet it also makes plain the essential continuity of Kant’s theory of virtue and doctrine of right with traditional ethico-theological concerns underlying the systems of seventeenth and eighteenth century moral philosophy. A crucial key to understanding early modern moral philosophy in view of the theory of autonomy is to know exactly Kant’s place in a theoretical terrain determined largely by debates about how God can be kept essential to morality. Thus, Schneewind makes the question of voluntarism versus intellectualism the central guiding theme of his highly detailed analyses of individual ethical theories. In particular, Schneewind’s treatment of the relation between voluntarism and intellectualism allows him to show how late seventeenth century and eighteenth century moralities of self-governance emerged from criticism of the motivational assumptions behind modern natural law theories, the common distinguishing characteristic of which is the endorsement of a morality of obedience requiring external sanctions for the establishment of obligation. (shrink)

In this response to Steven Jensen’s ACPQ review essay of Martin Rhonheimer’s The Perspective of Morality, its author argues that Jensen failed to understand the proper subject matter, the inner logic, and the methodology of the book. As a result, he misread key passages while passing over others, with the result that his criticisms miss the mark. Correcting these misreadings provides the occasion to explain some key features of the book, namely its idea of integrating in a single ethical theory (...) eudaimonistic ethics and its theory of happiness with action theory, anthropology of action, a theory of practical reason, an account of the moral virtues, a doctrine of natural law, of prudence, of conscience, and of moral norms, disproving thereby Jensen’s misleading claim that the book rejects nature as a standard of ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: THE CASE OF PIERRE CHARRON Affanities, influences, borrowings, innovations, traditions, consistency--these are some of the key concepts of the time-honored and probably still dominant approach to the history of ideas. Scholars who seek to understand and interpret the philosophy and literature of the past in these terms tend to pay little attention to the social and institutional factors (...) which constituted the working conditions under which the ideas were conceived, articulated and disseminated; and it is precisely on those grounds that the traditional school has been increasingly challenged, over the past several decades, by historians (myself among others) who are convinced that, apart from their social context, the ideas themselves are virtually incomprehensible. A recent article on Pierre Charron by Maryanne Cline Horowitz may serve to illustrate some of the questions raised by these differences in method. At the close of her article, Horowitz explains the assumptions upon which she has conducted her investigation. Citing Peter Gay's interpretation of Ernst Cassirer, she affirms that "the critic begins the process of understanding a philosopher's work by searching for a dynamic center of thought. He must regard doctrines not as a series of discrete positions but as facets of a single point of view. The critic's equipment must therefore include the gift of empathy: he must sympathetically enter--indeed, relive---the thinker's world of ideas.''1 Following her own insight into the spirit of De la sagesse, and supporting it, of course, with a display of textual evidence, Horowitz argues that Richard Popkin was wrong to lay exclusive stress upon Charron's rejection of Aristotelian epistemology from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "I think," she says, "that Charron's De la sagesse is based primarily on Stoic, rather than Sceptic principles." Although I agree in general with the main thrust of Popkin's thesis, I too have been critical of his failure to give sufficient weight to the neo-Stoic dements of Charron's thought. Hence it is not this conclusion to which I take exception.2 Charron has, from the very beginning, been found to have said a great many things and been subjected to a wide variety of interpretations. Horowitz emphasizes "the seeds of virtue and knowledge [as] the dynamic center of De la sagesse"--a view which may appear perfectly plausible to some readers. But it can never compel widespread conviction, for the simple reason that it is impossible for a twentieth-century critic to enter--unaided--into a world of ideas now part of a remote past. A book written nearly four centuries ago is not immediately perspicuous. Before trying on our neo-idealist wings and taking flight into the empyrean of late Renaissance moral treatises, we would do well to explore as many as possible of the following questions: Just who was our author? For whom did he write? Who x p. Gay, Introduction to E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 22, cited by M. C. Horowitz, "Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom," Journal o! the History of Philosophy, IX, 4 (October, 1971), 457. 2 A. Soman, "Pierre Charron: A Revaluation," BibliothOque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXII (January, 1970), 57 n. 3. [495] 496 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in fact did read him? and how did his readers react? And what did our author think of their reactions.'?s Horowitz does not, apparently, give high priority to such questions. For rhetorical purposes, she readily agrees with Eugene Rice that "Pierre Charron's De la sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." (Important to whom? and from what point of view? The criteria are not at all clear.) She assumes that Charron's epistemology was consistent, and that the second edition of 1604 represents a clarification of, or advance over, the first edition of 1601. (There is no historical evidence for making either assumption.) And she does not seem to entertain the possibility that Popkin could still be right about the impact of Charron's Pyrrhonian scepticism on the libertins Jrudits, although Charron may never in fact have been a Pyrrhonian sceptic.4 These are... (shrink)

Some humanist theologians within the French Reformed Church in the 17th century developed the notion that a disability of the intellect could exist in nature independently of any moral defect, freeing its possessors from any obligations of natural law. Sharpened by disputes with the church leadership, this notion began to suggest a species-type classification that threatened to override the importance of the boundary between elect and reprobate in the doctrine of predestination. This classification seems to look forward to the (...) natural history of mind that emerged later in the century. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Morals is Kant's major work in applied moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles of rights and of virtues. It comprises two parts: the 'Doctrine of Right', which deals with the rights which people have or can acquire, and the 'Doctrine of Virtue', which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Mary Gregor's translation, revised for publication in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series, is the only complete translation (...) of the whole text, and includes extensive annotation on Kant's difficult and sometimes unfamiliar vocabulary. A new introduction by Roger Sullivan sets the work in its historical and philosophical context. This volume will be of wide interest to students of ethics and of legal and political philosophy. (shrink)

Ralph R. Acampora - Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 480-481 Gary Steiner. Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 332. Cloth, $37.50. In this text Steiner surveys the history of doctrines, (...) attitudes, and beliefs about the ethical standing of animals. Unsurprisingly, he finds that the mainstream of thought in this area manifests "an underlying logic: that all and only human beings are worthy of moral consideration, because all and only human beings are rational and endowed with language" . This neatly expresses the anthropocentrism identified in the.. (shrink)

Is there an objective moral standard that applies to all our actions? To what extent should I sacrifice my own interests for the sake of others? How might philosophers of the past help us think about contemporary ethical problems? As the most recent addition to the Blackwell Readings in Philosophy series, History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary brings together rich and varied excerpts of canonical work and contemporary scholarship to span the history of Western moral (...) philosophy in one volume. Editors Star and Crisp, noted scholars in their fields, expertly introduce the readings to illuminate the main philosophical ideas and arguments in each selection, and connect them to broader themes. These detailed and incisive editorial commentaries make the primary source texts accessible to students while guiding them chronologically through the history of Western ethics. Structured around a thematic table of contents divided into three distinct sections, History of Ethics charts patterns in the development of ethical thought across time to highlight connections between intellectual movements. Selections range from the work of well-known figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Mill to the work of philosophers often overlooked by such anthologies, including Butler, Smith, Sidgwick, Anscombe, Foot, and Frankena. Star and Crisp skillfully arrange the collection to connect readings to contemporary issues and interests by featuring examples such as Aquinas on self-defense and the doctrine of double effect, Kant on virtue, and Mill’s The Subjection of Women. Written for students and scholars of ethics, History of Ethics is a comprehensive collection of readings with expert editorial commentary that curates the most important and influential work in the history of ethics in the Western world. (shrink)

This study presents a defense of Kant's doctrine of the Highest Good. Though generally greeted with skepticism, I propose an interpretation that makes it an integral part of Kant's moral philosophy, which adds to the latter in interesting ways. Kant introduces the Highest Good as the final end of moral conduct. I argue that it is best understood as an end to be realized in history through human agency: a state of affairs in which all individuals act (...) from the Moral Law, and in doing so achieve their intended ends. Part One is a discussion of the Moral Law oriented towards showing how it can generate a final end. I proceed by showing how Kant's conception of duty and moral conduct incorporates a concern for ends and consequences. Included is a discussion of the concept of the good as object of pure practical reason, which is the basis for the Highest Good in Kant's system. Part Two is a survey of the texts which shows that they in fact contain different versions of the Highest Good. The aim here is an interpretation that states the leading idea and yields a way of saying what is essential. Though the Highest Good is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness would exist in proportion to virtue, I argue that a complete account can be given, faithful to the texts, in which neither feature appears. Here lies the key to my defense. Standard objections do apply to the Highest Good so conceived. But since neither the theological aspect nor the proportionality of happiness and virtue are essential features of the doctrine, the problems they raise do not affect the doctrine as a whole. Moreover, a secular alternative is found that is more consistent wth Kant's overall conception of moral conduct. It would be characterized by two distinct ends: the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of their permissible ends. (shrink)

Russell Hardin’s theory of constitutions as conventions implies several conclusions that are striking, deep, important, counterintuitive, and very hard to deny. Nevertheless, they have had little influence on the field of political theory. This chapter seeks to explain that through two theses. The theory embarrasses the prevailing schools of political thought not just by denying their doctrines but by suggesting the irrelevance of many of their favorite questions. The theory seems, as Hardin presents it, more pessimistic and quietist than (...) it needs to be. This chapter suggests that the theory contains within it under-stressed resources that make room for constant institutional progress and political reform. (shrink)

* one of the great philosophical works of the eighteenth century * the rare and valuable first edition, reprinted in its entirety 'Of the countless reprints of Scottish Enlightenment works that Thoemmes has given us, none is more welcome than this. The posthumous System was not only Hutcheson's own last word on the full range of topics that he included under the rubric "moral philosophy", but also a monumental event in the book history of the Scottish Enlightenment itself.' (...) - Newsletter of the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) was a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the eighteenth century's most influential philosophers. He taught Adam Smith and he greatly influenced Hume and Bentham. His theory that the only proper actions are those which will generally benefit society prepared the way for the English utilitarians. His views were extensively discussed throughout Britain and ranged as far as the American colonies, where his political theory was adopted by revolutionaries. He is best known for his contribution to moral theory, being the chief exponent of the 'moral sense' doctrine which, following Shaftesbury, emphasized feeling rather than reasoning as the source of judgements of virtue and vice.A System of Moral Philosophy was written as early as 1738, but added to and altered by Hutcheson throughout his life. Published posthumously in 1755 by Hutcheson's son, Francis the younger, the System is Hutcheson's longest work and the fullest explanation of his method. Giving a comprehensive account of morality, it includes discussions of human nature; our duties to God, to each other and ourselves; the supreme good; civil liberty; rights; contracts; marriage; the rights and duties of parents; and the laws of peace and war. The work also contains an argument against slavery that was reprinted in colonial Philadelphia and helped give academic weight to the anti-slavery movement. William Leechman, a friend of Hutcheson and Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, contributes a highly valuable biography. This edition also includes a new introduction by Daniel Carey. (shrink)

The international law regulating resort to armed force, still known by the Latin phrase, the jus ad bellum, forms a principal substantive subfield of international law, along with human rights law, international environmental law, and international economic law. Among theologians, philosophers, and political scientists, just war theory is a major topic of study. Nevertheless, only a minority of scholars and practitioners know both jus ad bellum and just war theory well. Lack of knowledge has led to the erroneous view that (...) the two areas are in conflict. This article responds to this misapprehension, explaining the deep compatibility of international law and just war theory. Today's jus ad bellum, especially the peremptory norm against aggression, is not only the law; it also forms the minimum threshold of a just war under just war theory. In other words, for a war to be morally just, it must at least be lawful. To go to war in violation of the jus ad bellum is both a legal and a moral wrong. Compliance not only fulfills the general moral good of obedience to law; it forms the first step toward fulfilling moral obligations in the grave area of war. This characterization of the relationship between law and morality is seen in the history of the legal prohibition on force and in the actual set of rules that make up the contemporary regime. Comprehensive and persuasive accounts of the jus ad bellum and just war theory consistently reflect this thesis. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālī and the Idea of Moral Beauty rethinks the relationship between the good and the beautiful by considering the work of eleventh-century Muslim theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. A giant of Islamic intellectual history, al-Ghazālī is celebrated for his achievements in a wide range of disciplines. One of his greatest intellectual contributions lies in the sphere of ethics, where he presided over an ambitious attempt to integrate philosophical and scriptural ideas into a seamless ethical vision. The connection between ethics (...) and aesthetics turns out to be a signature feature of this account. Virtue is one of the forms of beauty, and human beings are naturally disposed to respond to it with love. The universal human response to beauty in turn provides the central paradigm for thinking about the love commanded by God. While al-Ghazālī's account of divine love has received ample attention, his special way of drawing the good into relation with the beautiful has oddly escaped remark. In this book Sophia Vasalou addresses this gap by offering a philosophical and contextual study of this aspect of al-Ghazālī's ethics and of the conception of moral beauty that emerges from it. This book will be of interest to scholars and students in Islamic ethics, Islamic intellectual history, and the history of ethics. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to defend negligence as a legitimate basis for moral and criminal culpability. In so doing, I also hope to demonstrate how philosophical and jurisprudential perspectives on responsibility can mutually inform each other. While much of the paper focuses on criminal negligence, my aim is to show how attention to certain doctrines and concepts in criminal law can shed light on our understanding of moral culpability including culpability for negligence. It is often (...) taken to be a fundamental principle of criminal law that an act cannot be guilty unless it is accompanied by a culpable state of mind or mens rea. This has led to scepticism regarding negligence as a legitimate basis for desert-based criminal sanction because it is not clear that negligence picks out any mental state at all, much less a culpable one. In this paper I articulate and defend a unified account of moral and criminal culpability that rejects the standard view of mens rea that underlies negligence-skepticism. Specifically, I hold that the mens rea element of a crime does not function to inculpate, as is standardly held, but to partly determine the description under which an action counts as wrongful. While I agree that we should be especially cautious about criminalizing negligence, the relevant question, on my view, is not whether a given mens is sufficiently culpable but whether the mens-cum-actus is sufficiently wrongful to warrant the attention of criminal justice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Aristotle's Coneeplion of Moral Weakness. By James J. Walsh. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. viii ~- 199. $6.00.) The section of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle discusses at length the notion of akrasia or moral weakness (vii. 1-10) is one which as much as any other has evoked from philosophers a host of varying interpretations. One of the difficulties (...) posed by Aristotle's remarks is that of determining what exactly his assessment is of Socrates' denial that there is such a phenomenon as moral weakness. Aristotle, it may be recalled, asserts in one passage (1145b 27-28) that the Socratic view "plainly clashes with the facts" and in another (1147b 14-15) that "the view which Socrates sought to establish seems to hold." Walsh maintains that Aristotle supports the Socratic position and the purpose of his book is "to prove this case in a thorough way" (p. 2). Beginning his study naturally enough with a discussion of the Socratic denial of akrasia, Walsh stresses the elements of choice and decision in the Socratic moral philosophy in order to balance recent accounts, like that of John Gould (Plato's Ethics, pp. 3-46), which take the Socratic ~mar~}u~ to be practical, i.e., a knowing how, rather than a knowing that, and thus to make plain both that the Socratic denial of akrasia is something more than a tautology and that an intellectualist theory of motivation is possible within the Socratic framework. Such a theory is that presented in the Protagoras and in coniunction with his summary of it Walsh presents a clear account of Euripides' dramatization of moral weakness as a phenomenon in which reason is motivationally insufficient. It is this picture of akrasia which Aristotle seems to have had in mind when he charges that Socrates' view contradicts the facts; in any event, according to Walsh, the modifications made by Plato in the Socratic doctrine represent an attempt by him to do justice to the psychological realism inherent in the Euripidean image (p. 27). In Plato's eudeavor (never fully worked out) to resolve the problem of moral weakness, there are, in Walsh's judgment, three distinguishable stages, the gradation occurring in time as well as in philosophical adequacy (p. 28).The development revealed in these stages isaway from the view that reason and knowledge alone are motivationally sufficientfor good action towards the view that the cooperation of 0v~ and a certain habituation of the appetities are essential alliesif reason is to be efficaciousin moral action. Walsh's thesis, in terms of this historical background, is that Aristotle, with his "strong emphasis on choice and decision and hence...the indispensability of knowledge or beliefto action," is more closely aligned with Socrates and the early Plato than with the later Plato (p. 29). In a masterfully argued and substantially evidenced chapter, Walsh deals with questions pertinent to his interpretation of Aristotle's conception of akrasia. In order to deal more at length with this interpretation, I give here only the conclusions of that chapter. (1) The ostensible conflict between accounts of the morally weak man as one in whom an inner struggle occurs and the account of the morally weak man which implies that such a struggle is not in fact occurring, all to be found in the Aristotelian treatise, are not irreconciliable. (2) The discussion of akrasia in Book vii of the Nicomachean Ethics would fit equally well in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Nicornachean Ethics, though in different ways. In the former it would function as a contribution to the discussion of several ethical notions, especially that of the voluntary; in the latter it would function rather as an appendix to Aristotle's treatment of moral virtue. (3) The Eudemian Ethics was written by Aristotle and was written before the Nicomachean Ethics. The psychology of movement is not affected by the alleged (Nuyens) shift in Aristotle's concept of the soul-body relationship from an instrumentist phase (De Partibus Animalium and De Moto Animalium) to a hylemorphic phase (De Anima). (4) With regard to the analysis of akrasia, there is no basic difference between the moral psychology... (shrink)

There is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of Hegelrsquo;s social and political theories, the flavour of old-style lsquo;apologyrsquo; for his liberal credentials, as though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, contemporary political worldview. Such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian (...) model of moral judgement. The main claim made in the following pages is that the critique of lsquo;subjectiversquo; moralities is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. This paper will look to Hegelrsquo;s mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegelrsquo;s own conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative in the rational state. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms by James T. Bretzke, SJJohn J. FitzgeraldHandbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms James T. Bretzke, SJ washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 260 pp. $24.95The Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms continues the recent sequence of concise dictionaries published by Georgetown University Press, including the Key Words volumes for various religions and A Handbook of Bioethics Terms. James Bretzke’s (...) contribution is especially welcome as it is the first such English-language reference work in Catholic moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. The author covers fundamental, social, medical, and sexual issues while providing frequent cross-references and further readings. Special attention is also given to scripture and ethics, the history of moral theology, the nature and authority of the Magisterium, canon law, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. The longest entries are those on dissent (67–70), Humanae vitae (111–16), infallibility (122–24), and the Pontifical Commission on Births (180–82), which in advance of Humanae vitae produced the well-known Majority Report favorable to the use of contraception. The sections on these vexed issues delve into some of the relevant arguments from different sides.Given its space constraints as a portable paperback, the Handbook covers an impressive amount of historical and contemporary ground. The eight-hundred-plus entries are generally clear and irenic, and often illuminating. Consider the page-long entry on just war theory (131–32), which succinctly summarizes its development from Augustine to the present-day Catechism, calls attention to the importance of ius post bellum alongside the traditional categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and outlines four possible critiques of the theory. Particularly helpful throughout are the various examples the author provides. For instance, in the course of explaining that moral norms and human laws may not bind at all times, he suggests that it is justifiable to forgo the duty to sustain life when this can only be done through extraordinary means (140), or to exceed the speed limit in case of a medical emergency (15, 81; see also 183 and 239–40 for other relevant examples).On the other hand, a few key topics are either overlooked or not fully dealt with. This book rightly highlights ecumenical ethics (77–78 and passim), but there is essentially no coverage of Eastern Orthodoxy and very little on pre-twentieth-century Protestant thought. In addition, considering the prevalence of a “morality-of-happiness” perspective in historical and modern-day Catholic thought, and given Bretzke’s own thorough attention to law, the book might have incorporated separate entries on happiness and grace, law’s complement. [End Page 221] (To his credit, he does mention grace several times—a fact that the preface points out—and includes the beatific vision, Gloria Dei vivens homo, and Summum Bonum among his definitions.) And speaking of law, the author’s treatment of the divine law is slightly confusing; he appears to alternately conflate it with and differentiate it from both the eternal law and the law of the Old and New Testaments (70–71, 136, 138).In the end, despite Bretzke’s best efforts to remain above the ideological frays of moral theology, one’s overall evaluation of his book may depend somewhat on one’s place within them. Some will chafe at his suggestions that contraception (116), certain forms of assisted reproduction (198–99), and artificial nutrition and hydration that sustain those in a persistent vegetative state (10, 224–25) remain open questions to an extent. Others will point out, as Bretzke does, that Church doctrine has previously undergone substantial development on other issues, such as religious freedom (65–66, 151, 193, 229) and the charging of interest (107, 241). What most should be able to agree upon is that in many respects the Handbook is a valuable resource, one that will help professionals and students alike come to a much better understanding of the key terms and debates within the field. [End Page 222]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John’s University (New York)Copyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates' Place in a Critical History of Philosophy Plato's Genetic Development Socrates Logico‐Philosophicus A Later, Self‐Critical Plato The Unity of the Platonic Socrates' Thought Socrates Oxoniensis Socrates' “Failure in Love” Socrates Politicus Redivivus.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, & the Moral Life ed. by Reinhold Hütter and Matthew LeveringMatthew ShadleRessourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, & the Moral Life Edited by Reinhold Hütter and Matthew Levering Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010. 409 pp. $64.95This edited volume is a festschrift in honor of Romanus Cessario, OP, but, as its title suggests, it also has the larger (...) goal of showing that “ressourcement does not dispense with, but in fact requires, Thomism” (3). The contributors’ efforts to bring to light the insights of Aquinas are organized into three sections: theological method, sacramental theology, and moral theology.Readers of this journal will be most interested in the latter section. Highlights include Craig Steven Titus’s response to Jean Porter’s criticism of Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of the virtues, in which Titus claims that Aquinas has a more developed awareness of moral struggle and development, even among the virtuous, than Porter allows, and that therefore Aquinas is not averse to the idea of a “flawed saint” (331). Steven A. Long distinguishes between acts that are necessary for the completion of a given end and those that are not, arguing that for the former the end defines the species of the act whereas the latter possess their own end and species independent of further intentions. Long’s purpose is to refute Martin Rhonheimer’s contention that condoms can be used by married couples to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS by showing that the use of condoms is not necessary for this purpose (since abstinence is also available), and therefore that such use must be considered an act of contraception regardless of any other good intentions involved. Joseph W. Koterski provides an excellent overview of the classical roots of the natural law theory and its modern exponents that could be useful in undergraduate and graduate courses, although the essay seems mismatched for the volume since the likely reader will probably find little new in it.An evaluation of the overall project of the volume requires a reading of the essays in the first section on theological method. Thomas Joseph White points to the Dominican theologians Marie-Dominique Chenu and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as two extremes in the debate over historicity in theology: “in one we find history without sufficient recourse to dogma, while in the other we have dogma without sufficient recourse to history” (96). White insists that [End Page 218] theologians must find the proper balance between the two. It is not entirely apparent that those loosely identified with ressourcement Thomism have found this balance, if “recourse to history” includes sensitivity to the questions and concerns of one’s own age. In many of the essays in this volume it is unclear whose questions the authors’ exegeses of Aquinas are meant to answer, although other essays are quite engaging. Of course historical exegesis is necessary, but those involved in the mid-twentieth-century patristic ressourcement understood that the recovery of the sources was necessary precisely as an answer to the burning questions of the contemporary world. This is not accommodation, since the Christian tradition proposes something new to the world, but it proposes it with the confidence that human questioning is rooted in the innate desire for the triune God. The advocates of the earlier ressourcement saw the Thomism of their day as an obstacle to this dialogue between the Christian tradition and the contemporary world. The project of ressourcement Thomism will succeed to the extent that it shows how the teachings of Thomas Aquinas can contribute to this dialogue. [End Page 219]Matthew ShadleLoras CollegeCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The possibility of cooperation and the stability of political order are long-standing problems. Polybius, well known for his Histories analysing the expansion of Rome and his description of the Roman constitution, also offers an intriguing social and political theory that covers ground from psycho-anthropological micro-foundations to institution-based political order, providing a genealogy of morals and political order that is best understood in game-theoretical terms. In this paper I try to give such an interpretation. Polybius’ naturalistic, proto-game theoretical views show similarities (...) with Hume, Smith and especially Hobbes’ doctrine of sovereignty by acquisition. However, Polybius is original in crucial regards, giving a motivationally plausible account of institutional and especially constitutional solutions to moral and political problems. Constitutional order, for Polybius, embodies and makes possible in the first place a kind of political reason that cannot be had individually. Polybian political theory thus offers interesting solutions to problems concerning moral motivation, collective action, and the conditions for political order, as well as the explanation and character of institutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 445-446 [Access article in PDF] G. Felicitas Munzel. Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Pp. xxii + 378. Cloth, $53.00. Paper, $24.00. Given the recent trend in Kant scholarship to seek a kinder, more caring philosopher behind the familiar rules and imperatives, a study focusing (...) on the place of "character" in Kant's thought is a timely contribution to a growing body of work. Indeed, G. Felicitas Munzel intends to go where no Kantian has gone before and show not only that Kant has a conception of character, but that it is "rich" (1) and "unique in the history of philosophy" (5). Considering his "corpus as a whole" (6), she sets out to demonstrate the "systematic importance" of the concept for Kant's thought (1) and reveal "a richer sense of familiar notions of his moral philosophy than is generally appreciated" (11).From the outset, however, high hopes prove hard to sustain. In Chapter 1, Munzel's exegetical efforts to link "character" with Denkungsart ("conduct of thought") and Gesinnung ("comportment of mind"), either delineate only familiar elements of Kant's thought or attribute to him views which philosopher and non-philosopher alike could hardly deny: in Kant's "rich" conception, character involves clear thinking and perfection, and is an "accomplished state" (67) presupposing sound reasoning and the capacity to think. In what becomes the dominant theme of the study, Munzel concludes that, for Kant, character is an activity in which the objective moral law is realized in subjects acting on maxims and from firm principles.In Chapter 2 the reader is subsequently led across a familiar terrain of causality, desire, and feeling, to learn that Kant is disinclined to inclination, but very much inclined to reason (71-2); and that character has a foot in both the empirical and intelligible orders of causality (74). The same goes for desire (95ff.) and aesthetic capacity (126ff.), where the "moral form" of character represents the union of reason and nature. A [End Page 445] similar story continues in Chapter 3 where Munzel considers Kant's view of religion and hopes to cast "new light" (142) upon and foster "fresh appreciation" (182) for "radical evil." Again, the reader spots comforting landmarks along the way and emerges into a world unchanged: for Kant, Munzel concludes, human conflict is a manifestation of evil with its roots in human nature; virtue involves progress or advance; and a well-established character brings inner and outer peace to human life (134-6).In the remainder of the book Munzel turns to the "structure and cultivation of character." Chapter 4 focuses on orientation, reflective principles, conscience, and discourse where, rambling through the Kantian landscape, one learns that common sense is a source of principles (198ff); maxims should be steadfastly adopted (208-9); and that morally upright persons should know their duty (210), tell the truth (246), and develop their capacities to the full (249). By this stage, that "character must be made subjectively rational" (252) has become a mantra, but lest the point remain unclear, Munzel expounds a metaphor (from Mendelssohn's Morgenstunden) of a traveler on life's journey, in order to emphasize that moral character involves being rational, competent, and accountable for one's actions (191ff.).In the final chapter, pedagogy becomes the main focus. It is a practice, Munzel contends, which determines the conditions under which character is formed (260). Mixed in the appropriate fashion, its elements combine to make "cultivation of moral judgment" the "essence of moral character" (259). Again, Munzel connects character to well-known Kantian doctrines, linking pedagogy to self-mastery (292) and a community of civic-minded citizens (258) in which the good of one promotes the well-being of all (288). In the world according to Kant, reason "grafts" virtue onto the stuff of nature to create an organic unity as—in Munzel's favorite metaphor (see 335-45... (shrink)

In the discussion of global ethics, philosophical ethics risks losing its distinct theoretical horizons. This predicament arises primarily from philosophy's failure to anchor its own object and to provide a rational basis for global justice from within its current confined theoretical paradigm. Against this background, this paper will first prioritize global co-existence as the primary concern of global ethics, then propose ontological co-existence justice as its foundational principle, and finally argue that the normative validity of co-existence justice is predicated on (...) the nations fulfilling the critical requirements of modern civilization, namely, the advancement of individual freedom. (shrink)

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for further research.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY with Diderot, in 1773, did not generate any excitement on either side: Diderot found the philosopher far less interesting than the patroness; Hemsterhuis, for his part, thought Diderot in person a disappointment, after reading his works. I wish I could say that I found Hemsterhuis an exciting thinker, as he is presented in Moenkemeyer 's useful and informed study. I cannot. On the other (...) hand, this quiet philosopher from Holland stood at one of the great crossroads in the history of European thought. In his struggle against the Atheism he saw emerging from the French Enlightenment, in his stress on essences, known and unknown, as opposed to the atheistic concept of matter, in his doctrine of total personality rather than faculty psychology, in his idea of perfectibilityand the Golden Age that he likened to the afterlife--in these he had found a way out of the sterile impass confronting the disciples of Diderot and d'Holbach. In short, this is a figure of undeniable consequence historically, and he has been too long ignored by American students of philosophy. We should be grateful both to the author and to the publisher for making him known to us in this monograph, the first comprehensive study of Hemsterhuis ever published in English. WALTER E. REX University of California, Berkeley The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals." By Robert Paul Wolff. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Pp. x + 228. $12.50) The Autonomy of Reason reflects Wolff's determination to get out of Kant's system what is good and to get out of Kant's system for good. It thus burns with the conflicting passions of a devoted student who has learned much from a reserved teacher but who now finds it imperative to break with him for precisely the reasons that attracted him initially. This explains why much of the book reads like a declaration of independence yet is based on a sympathetic, even immanent, critique of Kant addressed to Wolff himself. Although he is addressing himself, others may share and will certainly benefit from Wolff's two decades of intense study of Kant. Without question Wolff has written a provocative and important book. Contrary to its title, however, it is not really about the autonomy of reason; and contrary to its subtitle, it is only partly a commentary on Kant's Groundwork. It serves, rather, as a propaedeutic to Wolff's own moral and political views. I believe this at least accounts for some of the puzzling features of the book: its highly personal nature, its style of philosophical commentary, and its devastating introduction. Wolff does not see his task as one of either historical exegesis or philosophical criticism. In the place of both Whiff proposes a "philosophical reconstruction" of the text. This is both desirable and necessary, he says, because "of all the great philosophers, there is none so rich in insights and so plagued by inconsistency as Kant" (p. 4). The resulting reconstruction will be worthwhile provided that affirmative answers can be given to two questions: "Does the interpretation developed here illuminate the text, so that at least some of what Kant says is clearer and more plausible in the light of it; and, more important still, does the interpretation result in an argument whose independent philosophical merit justifies the effort spent grappling with Kant?" (p. 5). A third question suggests itself: would Kant recognize himself as the author of the reconstructed text? This question one must answer in the negative, for the Groundwork that emerges, although certainly Kantian, does not accurately reflect Kantianism. To the extent that this is a criticism, it is so only because the book advertises itself as a commentary. In short, Wolff's book is similar to Strawson's Bounds of Sense in that the value of both lies in salvaging something of worth from the sunken hulk of Kantianism. Wolff's Introduction is particularly revealing, for it consists of a sustained attack on several BOOK REVIEWS 483 of Kant's central metaphysical claims, an attack which, if successful, undermines much of his ethics. As an introduction to a commentary, it prejudices the... (shrink)

The achievement of the person of intellectual, moral, spiritual freedom throughout the history of mankind was at the center of philosophical, theological, moral, ethical and political doctrines. The problem of freedom and necessity philosophy for a long time was regarded as antinomy: or everything is subordinated to necessity - then there can be no freedom, or there is freedom that denies necessity. An attempt to find out the dialectical connection between freedom and necessity was made by (...) B. Spinoza, who recognized freedom as a conscious necessity. The concept of the stages of this awareness, which at the same time are the stages of socialization of a person, was developed by G.Gegal. Unconditional instruction of the moral consciousness to follow in the behavior of the law I. Kant considered as a categorical imperative, the condition of which is freedom of will. (shrink)

Catholic moral philosophy requires an absolute prohibition against the direct killing of innocents. In this paper I consider some examples of justified actionswhich involve the killing of innocent persons and will present them as cases about which I am confident many others will share the same intuitions. I willthen try to show what conditions apply in such cases that justify those intuitions. I will argue that their justification is in accordance with a modified version of theFinnis, Grisez, Boyle interpretation (...) of the doctrine of double effect; it defends their interpretation of what is direct versus indirect in cases of double effect, and meets the proportionality condition in a way suggested by Philippa Foot regarding the virtues of justice and charity. (shrink)

One can sympathize with [Leo] Strauss' ultimate aim—to protect the validity of moral judgment against that form of relativism which would assess the value of great philosophic works simply in terms of how they satisfied the needs of the times for which they were written. But in believing that "historicism " meant "relativism," and that all attention to the temporal relevance of great doctrines in the history of ideas was somehow perverse, Strauss was profoundly mistaken. Hermeneutics is (...) not axiology. Questions of truth and validity are fundamental, but they are dependent upon a prior solution of the problem of meaning. And for the establishment of meaning, contextual analysis is crucial. For it is not as if ideas were the ghostly inhabitants of another world, logically cut off from human purposes and intentions. All three things exist: ideas, agents, and social contexts, and the best history of ideas is, I believe, constituted by the careful consideration of the multiple interrelationships between them. It is false to believe that texts exhaust their own meaning. For there is always an historical grounding and a web of person and social events that give them wider and deeper significance. And this is precisely why we must ask such questions as: What sort of society was the author writing for and trying to persuade? What were the conventions of communication and the literary forms of discourse current at the time? What was the author's class affiliation, his place in the social hierarchy of his age? And perhaps above all: What were his moral commitments, the structure of his ideals? Albert William Levi, David May Distinguished University Professor of the Humanities at Washington University, Saint Louis, is the author of Philosophy and the Modern World; Literature, Philosophy and the Imagination; Humanism and Politics; and Philosophy as Social Expression, and The Idea of Culture. His "Culture: A Guess at the Riddle" appeared in Critical Inquiry, Winter 1977. (shrink)

This chapter shows how a cumulative case for theistic belief is already moving from considerations of natural theology to considerations of revealed theology, as one attempts to do justice to a wide range of historical data on the history of religions. Sense has to made of the widespread phenomenon of religious experience. Morality, too, is found to be more intelligible in a theistic context than within a purely naturalistic worldview. Further arguments for theism from value include appeals to the (...) objectivity of beauty and truth. But the diversity of world religions presents a problem for the rationality of any one doctrinal system. Christianity, like any other faith, has to provide a theology of religion and the religions if its particular and unique claims are to be rationally justified. (shrink)

The paper discusses the philosophical and historical doctrine of the Russian philosopher and historian George Petrovich Fedotov. The author focuses on the analysis of imperial issues in the works of G.P. Fedotov, especially of his views on the cultural history of the Russian empire and the essence of imperial project in Russia. Fedotov reconsiders the historical experience and revolutionary catastrophe of Russia and searches for the foundations of the social and cultural processes determining the events of Russian history. (...) Fedotov’s works offer a variety of interpretations of the political and cultural phenomenon of empire. This reflects his evolution as a philosopher of history: the focus of his vision shifts from the Medieval Rus to the Empire of Peter the Great, then to the collapsed empire of Nicholas II and finally to the USSR. Fedotov’s concept of Empire evolves into a timeless cultural-philosophical phenomenon but originates from the historical description of the centralization of power in the feudal monarchy of Ivan the Terrible. The evolution of the philosophical and historical views of Fedotov is influenced by the changes of his attitude to the historical conception of Klyuchevsky. In the 1940s Fedotov considers the empire as a universal idea. The concept of empire proposed by Fedotov gives an understanding of the Russian historical development, especially the causes of the decline and fall of the Russian Empire. Fedotov associates the cause of the salvation of Russia with the study of ancient Russian culture, in which he founds a moral and political ideal of the “Republic of Saint Sophia.” The paper shows heuristic potential of Fedotov’s cultural and philosophical ideas on the vocation of spiritual elite and the creative role of personality in the process of nation-building. (shrink)

This essay explores doctrinal issues in the philosophical and theological debates on human nature and self-love in the early 18th century. It focuses on the arguments between the Scottish philosopher and theologian Archibald Campbell and the Committee for Purity of Doctrine concerning Campbell’s Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue (1733). These centre in particular on Campbell’s supposedly unorthodox account of self-love as a virtuous principle and the connected more general view of human nature as tending towards virtue. A (...) comparison with the situation in Geneva shows that similar views were held by influential theologians such as Jean-Alphonse Turrettini and Jacob Vernet. (shrink)

Using recontructive ideas available in classical Indian original works, this book makes a departure in the style of modern writings on Indian moral philosophy.

An Essay on Kant’s Theory of Evil shows the centrality of the doctrine of radical evil within Kant's critical philosophy. Combining textual accuracy with systematic ethical theory, it fills the gaps Kant left open in his own doctrine, and provides a non-mystifying account of human immorality, which shows the pertinence of the Kantian view to our moral concerns.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality by Edward Y.J. ChingMaria Hasfeldt Long (bio)The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality. By Edward Y.J. Ching. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Pp. vii + 204. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-3-030-77923-8.In recent years, the study of Korean Neo-Confucianism as an international (...) field has been growing exponentially. Compared to former decades, the number of international publications has grown significantly over the last ten years, with Edward Y.J. Chung as one of the most active scholars. The Moral and Religious Thought of Yi Hwang (Toegye): A Study of Korean Neo-Confucian Ethics and Spirituality is the culmination of an almost decade-long study of the Korean Neo-Confucian scholar, Yi Hwang Toegye (1501–1570). With a focus on the moral and spiritual aspects of the theories of Toegye, Chung maps out a brilliant overview of the philosopher's worldview and literary works. Chung's primary objective is to provide "thought-provoking" and fresh insights into one of the most important Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers in history, as well as shed light on Neo-Confucian thought in general and how Toegye's philosophy in particular can be relevant in modern interreligious dialogues (p. 149).Consisting of ten chapters, where each chapter could serve as an individual article, Chung takes the reader through the core concepts of Toegye and his development of a form of self-cultivation different from the Chinese Neo-Confucian idea of self-cultivation. This together created a holistic religious worldview with a strong spiritual dimension, which manifests through selfcultivation practices. The first two chapters introduce Toegye and the historical context of 16th-century Joseon-dynasty Korea (1392–1910); his understanding of the Neo-Confucian tradition as the true learning; and his rejection of Daoism and Buddhism. With the reader introduced to the immediate historical context and Neo-Confucian discourse of the time, the following three chapters cover Toegye's religious and moral understanding of the relationship between the Heavenly Principle (C. tianli, K. cheolli) and human nature (C. renxing, K. inseong). Furthermore, Chung covers the moral-spiritual implications that the Four-Seven Debate had on Toegye's later practical self-cultivation for becoming a sage. In short, the debate concerns the relation between the "four sprouts" of human characteristics as first described by Mengzi (ca. 371–289 BCE) and the seven human emotions mentioned in various classical texts. Toegye believed in the doctrine that the "experience of Heaven was within oneself" (p. 47). Therefore, [End Page 1] to become a sage, one would have to commit to the active practice of an inner feeling of reverence (C. jing, K. gyeong) daily.Chapter six dives into the spiritual practice of self-reflection and mind cultivation (C. xinxue, K. simhak), which was an ongoing process that would lead the practitioner closer to sagehood. The seventh chapter focuses on how this spiritual dimension of Toegye's doctrine is relevant to broader discussions of ecology today. With a strong love for nature, Toegye incorporated the idea of nature within his spiritual self-cultivation, which Chung elaborates on. It was important for the human being to be in harmony with Heaven, earth, and all myriad things. This meant respecting and spending time in nature also played a part in the daily practice of spiritual self-cultivation. Moving on, in chapters eight and nine, Chung presents a comparative study on the philosophical and theological question of how to transcend evil, as well as the matter of interreligious dialogue. By way of a textual-interpretive approach, Chung compares Toegye's thought with Christian contra Buddhist theological ideas and how these findings can help develop an interreligious approach. In chapter nine, Chung suggests that the idea of self-transcendence through self-cultivation can be the ultimate reality. In this chapter, Chung wants to break with the tendency in interreligious dialogue where many scholars rely heavily on Christian theological terms. Chung introduces Neo-Confucian concepts and terms, especially the terms used by Toegye. The last and concluding chapter... (shrink)

The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent interpretation, I argue that this does not amount to a disappearance of the Principle of Autonomy, but to an important development of the notion of autonomy. I first show that Kant still advocated the Principle of Autonomy in the 1790s along with the thought of lawgiving through one’s maxims. I (...) then argue that the role of autonomy in Kant’s later ethics has a different focus than in the previous works, which requires to connect autonomy with autocracy. Conversely, in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, autocracy, which Kant had employed before as an independent notion, is construed as a new layer of autonomy. What Kant there calls subjective autonomy is thereby considered as reason’s self-government in the maxims of each rational agent. -/- . (shrink)

The term_ freedom_ appears in many contexts in Kant's work, ranging from the cosmological to the moral to the theological. Can the diverse meanings Kant gave to the term be ordered systematically? To ask that question is to test the consistency and coherence of Kant's thought in its entirety. Widely praised when first published in France, The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom articulates and interrelates the disparate senses of freedom in Kant's work. Bernard Carnois organizes all Kant's usages (...) into a logical "grammar," isolating and defining the individual meanings and pointing out their implications and limits. In a first step, he shows how Kant's notion of _intelligible character _makes possible a synthesis of transcendental freedom, as a problematic concept of theoretical reason, and practical freedom, as a fact demonstrated by experience. He then develops the concept of freedom under the rubric of the will's autonomy in the context of the moral law. And finally, Carnois persistently explores the role of negativity in Kant's idea of freedom. For within the magisterial coherence of the system the imperfection of human finitude is inscribed. This introduces the "history" of our freedom—a freedom which posits itself, but then inevitably denies itself, even while preserving the possibility of its regeneration. The only work in English to consider in detail all of Kant's writings on freedom, this book also introduces French Kant scholars whose works have often been unavailable to English-speaking readers. As both an interpretation of Kant and a trenchant analysis of the relationship between ethical commitments and metaphysical assumptions, it will be a useful addition to moral, religious, and political philosophy as well as to Kant scholarship. (shrink)

SummaryThis article situates Ernest Renan's representation of the historical Jesus in the author's intellectual, personal and political trajectory. It traces the development of Renan's ideas about Jesus across a variety of texts, from his loss of faith at the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice in 1845 until the publication of Life of Jesus in 1863. It particularly argues that Renan's best-selling book should be rooted in the cultural aftermath of the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 to 1851. The violence of the June Days (...) and the election of Louis-Napoléon bred in Renan a deep disillusionment with democracy and socialism. Where French writers of the 1830s and 1840s had offered a proletarian Christ promising social revolution, Renan therefore depicted a liberal Jesus who offered a non-violent ‘revolution’ of personal morality. This Jesus was an individualist who spurned the temporal realm with ‘transcendent disdain’, preferring instead to pursue a state of inner liberty and perfection. Furthermore, this article argues that this representation of Jesus reflected the self-justification of Second Empire liberals such as Renan, who had retreated from frontline politics into the realm of culture and ideas. Indeed, Life of Jesus was itself a product of precisely this retreat. (shrink)

Throughout the history of moral philosophy, most of its best-known practitioners have occupied positions antithetical to moral relativism. With a number of significant exceptions and caveats, which need not be rehearsed here, one could go as far as saying that the history of moral philosophy is the history of an ongoing battle against such relativism in its various forms and guises, ranging from the man-is-the-measure-ofall- things doctrine of the Sophists, to earlytwentieth- century anthropologically inspired (...) cultural relativism, late-twentieth-century power-focused poststructuralist discourse, and the ever-present moral subjectivism of first-year undergraduate students. Nor is there an end in sight; this battle seems to be a neverto- be-completed Sisyphean task. (shrink)

No doctrine of Pufendorf's is better known than that of socialitas. The reason is that Pufendorf himself declared that socialitas was the foundation of natural law. No interpreter of Pufendorf can therefore avoid dealing with it. Moreover, Pufendorf linked the issue of socialitas to the question of the state of nature, thus raising important issues with both theological and philosophical implications. Given the prominence and importance of this theme in Pufendorf's work, a close analysis of what he meant by it (...) is central to the interpretation of his work, even though this means to pose again a new number of questions already discussed in the scholarly literature. In particular, this article examines the relationship between Pufendorf and Hobbes with regard to this central theme. In fact, a traditional historiographic topos is that Pufendorf and Hobbes fundamentally disagree on the doctrine of socialitas, while the former is closer to Grotius and to the Aristotelian-classic tradition that see man as a social animal. This article takes, instead, Pufendorf to be a follower of Hobbes, and tries to explain how the more traditional view of Pufendorf as a critic of Hobbes was in some way due to Pufendorf's own attempt to distance himself from the accusations of Hobbesism (and hence of atheism and moral indifference) that the critics made against him when his work first appeared. In order to do this, Pufendorf tried to rethink his own position within the history of ethics, and put himself on the side of the Stoics, of Grotius and of Cumberland, against Epicurus and Hobbes. This retrospective ‘illusion’ has greatly influenced later scholarship, giving us a distorted image of Pufendorf's own view of socialitas. A more precise account of the latter gives a better prospective from which to look at the relationship between Pufendorf and Hobbes. ☆ The publication of this text, in this form, may require some explanation. In what it now appears the very distant June 1989, the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen organised an International Workshop on ‘Unsocial Sociability: Modern natural Law and the 18th-Century Discourse of Politics, History and Society’. The proceedings of that Workshop were never published, even though individual contributions have piecemeal appeared since then. My own contribution consisted in a short extract from a chapter from my book Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes. Per una reinterpretazione del giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna, 1990), which appeared in print the following year. For this reason, I considered the separate publication of that intervention as superfluous. Rather naively I underestimated the fact that the publication of my book in Italian restricted its circulation in the Anglo-American academic circles, and even if occasionally quoted, the book would not be much read. Recently, following the solicitations of many friends to present in English part of the theses developed in that book, I had decided to have my intervention at the Göttingen Workshop finally published. After all, this had amply circulated as a manuscript and been cited by many in that form. But while I was planning to revise that manuscript, I was presented with the draft translation of the second chapter of my book done by Dr. Melissa Calaresu of Cambridge University, when she was still a graduate student. It is probably better to leave aside the story of why Melissa did that translation, but I am extremely grateful to her for having allowed me to use it as the basis for this piece, which is therefore a revised version of the second chapter of my Italian book on Hobbes. I have decided to publish it in English with some hesitation, at least for two reasons. First, because with the publication in English of only part of my book I may risk to reinforce a rather simplified interpretation of my work, and consequently of Pufendorf's thought, that his main contribution lies in his doctrine of socialitas and of the state of nature. I am instead firmly convinced that the most important parts of my own work are those that are still untranslated, that is those on the nature of moral obligation and that of moral entities, beside the comparison I make in the second part of the book between the first and the second edition of De iure. Secondly, because during the intervening years I have distanced myself from a conception of the history of philosophy understood as an internal analysis of the texts, and have become more attentive to the context in which to place philosophical texts. I have therefore developed a slight impatience towards the rather nick-picking analysis of texts, which with a certain virtuosism I performed in the book. Nonetheless, since even after so many years I do not believe that the theses I developed in that book have lost their force, I am happy for this partial translation, with some essential bibliographic updating, to appear, in the hope that such theses will be finally discussed for what they are and not on the basis of second-hand reports. I am grateful to Dario Castiglione for his precious help with the final revision of the text, and to Richard Whatmore and Brian Young for their willingness to publish this translation in their Journal. (shrink)

The publication of volume 2 of Philip T. Grier’s translation of _The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity _completes the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher I. A.Il’in. Most of the contents of volume 2 will be unknown even to those who have read the 1946 German version prepared by Il’in, because in that version he omitted eight of the original ten chapters. These omitted chapters provide an (...) extended reflection on the central categories of Hegel’s moral, legal, and political philosophies, as well as of the philosophy of history. The topics examined are, in order: freedom, humanity, will, right, morality, ethical life, personhood and its virtue, and the state. Contained within these chapters are some notably insightful expositions of core doctrines in Hegel’s philosophy. Il’in’s colleague A. F. Losev accurately observed in the same year the text first appeared: “Neither the study of Hegel nor the study of contemporary Russian philosophical thought is any longer thinkable without this book of I. A. Il’in’s.”. (shrink)

Renowned Eastern European author Adam Michnik was jailed for more than six years by the communist regime in Poland for his dissident activities. He was an outspoken voice for democracy in the world divided by the Iron Curtain and has remained so to the present day. In this thoughtful and provocative work, the man the Financial Times named "one of the 20 most influential journalists in the world" strips fundamentalism of its religious component and examines it purely as a secular (...) political phenomenon. Comparing modern-day Poland with postrevolutionary France, Michnik offers a stinging critique of the ideological "virus of fundamentalism" often shared by emerging democracies: the belief that, by using techniques of intimidating public opinion, a state governed by "sinless individuals" armed with a doctrine of the only correct means of organizing human relations can build a world without sin. Michnik employs deep historical analysis and keen political observation in his insightful five-point philosophical meditation on morality in public life, ingeniously expounding on history, religion, moral thought, and the present political climate in his native country and throughout Europe. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's final publication in ethics was The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals. This text presents Kant's normative ethical theory. This guide is meant to be read alongside Kant's text, combining accessible explanations and novel interpretations of this difficult text. It is the first book in English devoted to The Doctrine of Virtue, one of Kant's most significant works. -/- Timmons divides the guide into five parts. Part I reviews Kant's life, the (...) class='Hi'>history and significance of The Doctrine of Virtue, and situates Kant's ethics within his general metaphysical and epistemological views. Part II is devoted to the General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, which is essential for understanding Kant's ethics. Part III and Part IV turn to The Doctrine of Virtue itself, exploring Kant's defense of a system of duties and corresponding virtues. Part V examines Kant's conception of moral education, the practice of virtue, and the conclusion to the book where Kant explains why the discipline of ethics does not include religion as a doctrine of duties to God. Timmons concludes the book highlighting key aspects of The Doctrine of Virtue, situating Kant's ethical theory in relation to other normative ethical theories. This guide is a vital resource for both students and scholars interested in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

One of the unsolved problems for the historical and philosophical thought of Ukraine is the lack of reflection on the phenomenon of Ukrainian neo-Thomism. Today, there has not been reconstructed the history of this trend, which had been actively developing in the interwar Western Ukraine since the time of socio-ethical letters by Andrei Sheptytsky in the early XX century, gained new connotations in the diaspora from 1940s to 1990s and acquired new forms in Roman Catholic thought in Ukraine at (...) the beginning of the XXI century. Moreover, a comprehensive historical and philosophical assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of Ukrainian neo-Thomism at different stages of its development has not been made. Meanwhile, Ukrainian neo-Thomism is experiencing a crisis, which it is trying to overcome by translating controversial works devoted mainly to the history of moral theology. The main feature of the proposed works is the oscillation between the need to recognize the presence of a person’s spiritual-intellectual and moral-volitional intuitions and the reluctance to recognize it openly, because it would be contrary to the very principles of Thomism. Modern Ukrainian neo-Thomism inherits this contradiction, and therefore the choice of classic books for translation reflects the dialectic of the struggle of different tendencies, which objectively cannot contribute to the legitimization of neo-Thomism in the Ukrainian philosophical discourse. Especially significant in this regard was the translation of the book by the classic of Polish neo-Thomism Mieczysław Krąmpiec “Why evil?”, because this monograph shows the contradiction of neo-Thomistic thought in the key issues about the possibility of person’s moral intuition, moral responsibility and dignity. The very refusal of Krąmpiec to recognize the existence of a person’s spiritual-intellectual and moral-volitional intuitions, despite all the prerequisites for such recognition, leads the monograph Why evil? to failure and to inability to answer the question stated in the title of the monograph. All this justifies that in the time of Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis moral theology and social doctrine moved to neo-Augustinianism, which unequivocally recognizes that the person has spiritual-intellectual and moral-volitional intuitions. (shrink)

The article deals with the main ideas of the political philosophy of Abu Abdallah Ibn al-Azraq al-Garnati (1427-1491), a well-known Muslim statesman, supreme judge of Granada, lawyer, diplomat, supporter of Arab Muslim peripatetism, a student of the outstanding thinker of the Muslim Middle Ages Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). In the history of the political philosophy of the Muslim East, a number of major transformations in the development of the Arab Caliphate from the Medina state of the prophet to the Sultanate (...) in the Abbasid period should be noted, which were reflected in the development of the theory of the Arab-Muslim state (caliphate). The main problem of the theory of the caliphate was connected with the question of the relationship between power and authority in the context of the moral foundations of the state. The creative heritage of Ibn al-Azraq is mainly known for his work in the genre of adab ("mirrors of princes") “Miracles on the way, or the Nature of dominion”. The treatise became a classic of the political philosophy of the Muslim Middle Ages, in which, under the influence of Aristotelian ideas, a special place was given to the moral foundations of power and the state, that is, ethics was considered as a political science. In the form of instructive parables, the rulers and heirs to the throne were explained the basics of state administration as part of their studies and education. His doctrine of the virtues can be viewed as ethical rationalism with a belief in the moral perfection of people in power and subjects of the state. Since morals are largely acquired and a person can control them, the task of purifying his own morals and curing them is entrusted to him. In addition, accordingly, it is possible and necessary to cultivate virtues in rulers, since the well-being of the state and the ummah depends on their morals. The moral foundations of power determine the strength of political authority. (shrink)