This article is divided into five parts. After a brief example in the first part, the second explains what historical sense-generation is about. The third characterizes tradition as a pregiven condition of all historical thinking. With respect to this condition, the constructivist theory of history is criticized as one-sided. The fourth part presents tradition as one of the four basic sense criteria of historical narration. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of tradition (...) in the historical culture of modern societies.Historical sense-generation is a mental procedure by which the past is interpreted for the sake of understanding the present and anticipating the future. This mental procedure is an anthropological universal in the cultural orientation of human practical life and will lead to a concept of the course of time as a necessary factor in the cultural orientation of human life.Today the dominant opinion in metahistory conceives of historical sense-generation in a constructivist way. The sense of the past is understood as an ascription of meaning onto the past; the past itself has no impact on this meaning. But I hold that the past is already present in the circumstances and conditions under which historical thinking is performed and is obviously influenced by it. This presence can be called tradition. Before historians construct the past they themselves are already constructed by the present outcome of past developments in the world. Thus tradition is always at work in historical thinking before the past is thematized as history.Historical sense-generation needs basic principles of sense and meaning. Using these principles transforms the experience of the past into a meaningful history for the present. Despite cultural differences, four sense criteria can be identified as basic for making historical sense of the past. One of the four principles is tradition. It is the most fundamental one upon which all other modes of making sense of the past are grounded. It presents temporal change in the human world such that the world’s order is maintained despite all its changes. Since the emergence of the so-called advanced civilizations, other types of historical narration have overshadowed the constitutive role of tradition. Historical narration has been supplemented by exemplary, genetic, and critical approaches to the past. Yet the traditional one has remained the most frequently used and is the most basic and popular. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Nietzsche was an avid reader of Emerson's essays, and their influence is discernible from his earliest philosophical writings through to his final philosophical works. Nietzsche's copies of Emerson's books are covered with traces of his reading, from underlinings, exclamation marks, question marks, and dog-eared pages to numerous annotations and philosophical comments written in the margins. I use some of these to analyze the influence Emerson exerted on Nietzsche's conception of history and historiography. The two authors can be considered “twin (...) souls” in that they both praised the strengthening effects of past greatness and, at the same time, opposed psychological subjugation or fanaticism. Nevertheless, they were not twin minds: Nietzsche rejected Emerson's metaphysical concept of an Oversoul and turned it into the ideal of a Dionysian soul, which aims at reliving the history of humanity in order to increase its power. (shrink)

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is (...) a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem. (shrink)

Senses of place are strongly intertwined with senses of heritage and cultural identity. Heritage places are distinctive not only for their tangible dimensions, but also the intangible qualities which give them meaning. The conservation of heritage places, however, has often emphasised the materiality of place rather than its symbolic significance. This article explores issues surrounding sense of place and heritage management through a focus on the former site of the Paradise Hotel in Norfolk Island’s Kingston and Arthur’s Vale Historic (...) Area. Drawing on interviews and a zine co-created with Norfolk Island residents, the article unpacks various ways participants articulate connections to the Paradise via their memories and recollections of the past as well as their present interpretation of and engagement with the site. Through a localised case study, the article provides insight into transnational challenges for the relationship between sense of place, heritage value and heritage management and interpretation. (shrink)

Cet article entend montrer que Nietzsche conçoit l’histoire comme n’étant pas simplement une pure discipline théorique, mais comme une dimension spécifique de l’existence humaine, impliquant une manière singulière de se rapporter au réel. Pour cette raison, elle doit être repensée en tant que « sens historique », plutôt que seulement comme science historique. À condition d’être convenablement pensé et maîtrisé, le sens historique est aux yeux de Nietzsche tout à la fois une condition du possible retour à la santé de (...) l’homme moderne, et une vertu nécessaire du philosophe authentique, vertu qui apparaît pour finir comme un élément constitutif de la notion de « généalogie » que Nietzsche met en place en 1887. (shrink)

Can we know anything for certain? There are those who think we can (traditionally labeled the "dogmatists") and those who think we cannot (traditionally labeled the "skeptics"). The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is the great debate between the two. This book is an introductory and historically-based survey of the debate. It sides for the most part with the skeptics. It also develops out of skepticism a third view, fallibilism or critical rationalism, which incorporates an uncompromising realism about perception, science, (...) and the nature of truth. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s 1905 essay “Physics of a Believer” is generally read as proposing a neat separation between metaphysics and physics as two fields that have little to nothing in common: some things will be the subject of metaphysics and some of physics, but nothing will fall under the purview of both. In this article, I advance a more nuanced interpretation of Duhem’s understanding of the differences between physics and metaphysics by drawing on his notion of “common sense” and highlighting (...) the historical (particularly Aristotelian) influences at work in Duhem’s thought on this question. I argue that Duhem’s own distinction between physics and metaphysics is subtler than the received view, framing metaphysics and physics as two distinctive fields of inquiry that nonetheless both begin from sensed phenomena and common-sense principles that are eminently certain but characteristically imprecise. (shrink)

Although Hegel's philosophy of history is recognized as a great intellectual achievement, it is also widely regarded as a complete failure. Taking his cue from the third century Greek historian Polybius, who argued that the rapid domination of the Mediterranean world by Rome had instituted a new phase of world history, Hegel wondered what the rise of European modernity meant for the rest of the world. In his account of the contingent paths of world history, he argued that at work (...) behind it is an eternal human struggle over justice, and that it had led to a new conception of justice in which nobody by nature had authority to rule over anybody else. Moving away from the ancient conception of justice as ordered through a cosmic system, the modern conception is based instead on freedom. This is, so Hegel argues, not an accident of history but part of the necessary development of the institutions and practices through which humans establish and maintain their changing shapes of agency. Behind it is an infinite end, justice, which as infinite is neither something which can ever be finally achieved nor a goal to which we are getting closer but which requires an infinite effort at sustaining.--. (shrink)

The thesis is a philosophical and historical study of Plotinus' views on sense-perception. Chapter I contains an exposition of Plotinus' metaphysics. Chapter II deals with Plotinus' views on man and the soul in general. In Chapter III Plotinus' views on visual transmission are discussed. It is argued that his doctrine of visual transmission, which Plotinus describes in terms of sympatheia, is to be regarded as a synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic elements. Like other ancient philosophers Plotinus holds (...) that sense-perception involves an affection of the percipient. In Chapter IV his notion of affection in sense-perception is examined. It is argued that what Plotinus calls affections in this context are sensations, and differences between Plotinus' and certain modern views of sensations are pointed out. Plotinus has original views on the unity of the senses. In Chapter V these views, which Plotinus expresses in terms of the omnipresence of the soul as a whole in the body, are discussed and explained. It is also argued that though original Plotinus' position is to be seen as a development of views expressed by Plato and Aristotle, and in particular by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Plotinus' views on the objects of perception are a matter of debate. In Chapter VI it is argued that despite contrary appearances Plotinus consistently holds that the objects of sense-perception are external things. Chapter VI also contains an examination of Plotinus' notion of perceptions as judgements. Chapter VII deals with the notion of forms in Plotinus' theory of perception. Plotinus' view that the soul is active in perception is explained. It is suggested that in Plotinus' view the forms we are supposed to entertain when we perceive are developed from innate "unfolded forms", and that perceptual judgements are to be identified with the entertaining of forms. In the Appendix Plotinus' position on the mind-body relationship is discussed. It is argued that he rejects materialsm for interesting and original reasons. (shrink)

In the 1970s, particularly in his article “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text”, Paul Ricœur proposed a hypothesis concerning the homology between the text and social action. That hypothesis is not reducible to the narrative logic prevailing in late Ricœur’s writings, and we are searching to elucidate its further implications in social sciences. A new hermeneutics of social meanings can be founded upon it, enriched by the methodological experience of structural semiotics and taking into account (...) some special processes of sense-giving as “remote-model behavior” and “sense-suppressing action”. . (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 1, February 2019, Page 120-124.

Terry Pinkard has been a leading figure within the revival of Hegelian philosophy over the last quarter century, together with Robert Pippin articulating an innovative and influential interpretation of Hegel as the rightful successor to Kant’s distinctly modern critique of “dogmatic metaphysics.” In Does History Make Sense?, he attempts the challenging task of rescuing Hegel’s philosophy of history, drawing on his earlier account of Hegel as a kind of “modified Aristotelian naturalist,” here sketched in chapter 1. Given that the (...) picture of Hegel as an Aristotelian “conceptual realist” has been popular with critics of the post-Kantian... (shrink)

Jesus changed our world forever. But who was he and what do we know about him? David Wenham's accessible volume is a concise and wide-ranging engagement with that enduring and elusive subject. Exploring the sources for Jesus and his scholarly reception, he surveys information from Roman, Jewish, and Christian texts, and also examines the origins of the gospels, as well as the evidence of Paul, who had access to the earliest oral traditions about Jesus. Wenham demonstrates that the Jesus of (...) the New Testament makes sense within the first century CE context in which he lived and preached. He offers a contextualized portrait of Jesus and his teaching; his relationship with John the Baptist and the Qumran community ; his ethics and the Sermon on the Mount, his successes and disappointments. Wenham also brings insights into Jesus' vision of the future and his understanding of his own death and calling. (shrink)

At least four different senses of 'meaning' need to be kept separate when describing the proper way to do the history of ideas. The first sense, communicative meaning, relies on the communicative intentions of the author and is very close to H. P. Grice's 'nonnatural meaning'. The second sense, meaning as significance or importance, is close to Grice's "natural meaning," but I focus on a type that depends on human interests; in this sense, meaning as significance is (...) always relative to a person or group and changes as the events or the interests of the person or group change. I show that Quentin Skinner in his classic article, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," confuses these senses. While historians of ideas often focus on identifying communicative meaning, what historians care most about is the significance or importance that something had for people in the past or in the present. (shrink)

Emotion, Sense, Experience calls on historians of emotions and the senses to come together in serious and sustained dialogue. The Element outlines the deep if largely unacknowledged genealogy of historical writing insisting on a braided history of emotions and the senses; explains why recent historical treatments have sometimes profitably but nonetheless unhelpfully segregated the emotions from the senses; and makes a compelling case for the heuristic and interpretive dividends of bringing emotions and sensory history into conversation. Ultimately, (...) we envisage a new way of understanding historical lived experience generally, as a mutable product of a situated world-brain-body dynamic. Such a project necessarily points us towards new interdisciplinary engagement and collaboration, especially with social neuroscience. Unpicking some commonly held assumptions about affective and sensory experience, we re-imagine the human being as both biocultural and historical, reclaiming the analysis of human experience from biology and psychology and seeking new collaborative efforts. (shrink)

Why should past occurrences matter to us as such? Are they in fact meaningful in a specifically historical way, or do they only become meaningful in being connected to other sorts of meaning—political or speculative, for example—as many notable theorists imply? Ranke and Oakeshott affirmed a purely historical meaningfulness but left its nature unclear. The purpose of this essay is to confirm historical meaningfulness by arguing that our commanding practical interest in how we share action with other (...) actors is distinctively engaged by presumed information about past occurrences. We recognize that past occurrences have determined the conditions of action sharing, constraining our practice with regard to which actors we share practical reality with and which compounding actions we may or must join in progress. (shrink)

Common Sense and Science from Aristotle to Reid reveals that thinkers have pondered the nature of common sense and its relationship to science and scientific thinking for a very long time. It demonstrates how a diverse array of neglected early modern thinkers turn out to have been on the right track for understanding how the mind makes sense of the world and how basic features of the human mind and cognition are related to scientific theory and practice. (...) Drawing on a wealth of primary sources and scholarship from the history of ideas, cognitive science, and the history and philosophy of science, this book helps readers understand the fundamental historical and philosophical relationship between common sense and science. (shrink)

Are scientific enquiries directly relevant to epistemological issues? That is the question which links together the four studies comprising this work. Professor Mandelbaum answers the question in the affirmative. On the basis of this answer he rejects all phenomenalist or subjectivist notions: that we know only our states of mind or ideas. He rejects likewise any epistemology of a naïvely realist kind, which asserts that things are just as they appear to be. In their room he defends the epistemological doctrine (...) which he calls ‘critical realism’. A critical realist acknowledges that physical objects exist independently of our perception of them but insists, on the strength of scientific testimony, that not all the qualities which physical objects appear to possess are really possessed by them. On this count, Locke was a pioneer critical realist when he denied, on what he supposed to be scientific evidence, that secondary qualities inhere in objects. Mandelbaum is not committed precisely to Locke’s form of critical realism, but he believes that Locke was following the right general lines. (shrink)

The enactive approach conceives of cognition as acts of sense-making. A requirement of sense-making is adaptivity, i.e., the agent’s capacity to actively monitor and regulate its own trajectories with respect to its viability constraints. However, there are examples of sense-making, known as ultrafast cognition, that occur faster than the time physiologically required for the organism to centrally monitor and regulate movements, for example, via long-range neural feedback mechanisms. These examples open a clarificatory challenge for the enactive approach (...) with respect to how to operationalize monitoring and regulation, and with respect to the temporal scale of sense-making, which has traditionally been limited to the here-and-now in accordance with the axiom of structural determinism. We explore possible responses to this challenge and suggest that this axiom should be explicitly rejected, in particular, we suggest that adaptivity is a property of organism–environment interactions over a time span that includes both present and past conditions. Ultrafast performances are thus no longer a challenge for the enactive approach, because the constitutive basis of their normativity is spatiotemporally extensive. This is in agreement with recent developments in different varieties of enactivism, which all converge toward assigning a constitutive role to an agent’s history of interactions. (shrink)

Common sense philosophy was one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most original intellectual products. The nine specially written essays in this volume explore the philosophical and historical significance of this school of thought, recovering the ways in which it developed during the long eighteenth century.

This article discusses a case study that explored the potential of nonfiction graphic novels to develop pre-service teachers’ understanding of agency in a social studies methods course. White pre-service teachers were aske'd to read one graphic novel and then add frames, re-narrate frames, and reflect on their decisions. The positionalities of researchers, who are White males, and participants were part of our analysis. The researchers found that pre-service teachers made revisions to the graphic novels to change the historical actors’ (...) decisions: within the constraints of the historical situation's circumstances; to better fit their own ethical framework; and to critique the author's interpretation of the historical event and the amount of agency assigned to certain historical actors. We also reported findings related to shifts in understanding related to positionality. The pre-service teachers’ revisions demonstrated their understanding of historical actors’ ability to make choices; however, for most pre-service teachers those decisions were limited by, and insignificant in comparison to, the constraints of societal structures. Most pre-service teachers viewed these structures as operating outside of the realm of ethics that they used to articulate and identify agency, and thus, these structures were not responsive to changes in individual or collective agency. Implications are provided for social studies teacher educators. (shrink)

_Making Sense of Tantric Buddhism_ fundamentally rethinks the nature of the transgressive theories and practices of the Buddhist Tantric traditions, challenging the notion that the Tantras were "marginal" or primitive and situating them instead--both ideologically and institutionally--within larger trends in mainstream Buddhist and Indian culture. Critically surveying prior scholarship, Wedemeyer exposes the fallacies of attributing Tantric transgression to either the passions of lusty monks, primitive tribal rites, or slavish imitation of Saiva traditions. Through comparative analysis of modern historical (...) narratives--that depict Tantrism as a degenerate form of Buddhism, a primal religious undercurrent, or medieval ritualism--he likewise demonstrates these to be stock patterns in the European historical imagination. Through close analysis of primary sources, Wedemeyer reveals the lived world of Tantric Buddhism as largely continuous with the Indian religious mainstream and deploys contemporary methods of semiotic and structural analysis to make sense of its seemingly repellent and immoral injunctions. Innovative, semiological readings of the influential _Guhyasamaja Tantra_ underscore the text's overriding concern with purity, pollution, and transcendent insight--issues shared by all Indic religions--and a large-scale, quantitative study of Tantric literature shows its radical antinomianism to be a highly managed ritual observance restricted to a sacerdotal elite. These insights into Tantric scripture and ritual clarify the continuities between South Asian Tantrism and broader currents in Indian religion, illustrating how thoroughly these "radical" communities were integrated into the intellectual, institutional, and social structures of South Asian Buddhism. (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

What are genes? What do genes do? These seemingly simple questions are in fact challenging to answer accurately. As a result, there are widespread misunderstandings and over-simplistic answers, which lead to common conceptions widely portrayed in the media, such as the existence of a gene 'for' a particular characteristic or disease. In reality, the DNA we inherit interacts continuously with the environment and functions differently as we age. What our parents hand down to us is just the beginning of our (...) life story. This comprehensive book analyses and explains the gene concept, combining philosophical, historical, psychological and educational perspectives with current research in genetics and genomics. It summarises what we currently know and do not know about genes and the potential impact of genetics on all our lives. Making Sense of Genes is an accessible but rigorous introduction to contemporary genetics concepts for non-experts, undergraduate students, teachers and healthcare professionals. (shrink)

The traditional distinction between basic and applied science has been much criticized in recent decades. The criticism is based on a combination of historical and systematic epistemic argument. The present paper is mostly concerned with the historical aspect. I argue that the critics impose an understanding at odds with the way the distinction was understood by its supporters in debates on science education and science policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And I show how a distinction that (...) refers to difference on several epistemic and social dimensions makes good sense of representative historical cases. If this argument is tenable it suggests more continuity in the epistemology and politics of science than has been claimed by a new paradigm of science studies and politics during recent decades. (shrink)

The notion of a hypothesis being deployed essentially in the derivation of a novel prediction plays a key role in the deployment realist reply to Laudan’s and Lyon’s attacks to the No Miracle Argument. However Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, urging deployment realists to abandon this requirement altogether and accept as true all the assumptions actually deployed in novel predictions. But since many false assumptions were actually deployed in novel predictions, he concludes that the “no miracle argument” and deployment (...) realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor, and a “no miracle argument” deprived of that condition is a straw man. While Lyons’ criticisms of Psillos’ formalization of essentiality may be well taken, I suggest that there is a simpler formulation which escapes those criticisms and is enough to deal with the supposed counterexamples to the No Miracle Argument and deployment realism: a hypothesis is essential when it does not have a proper part (in Yablo’s sense) from which the prediction could also be derived. I then show how this condition rescues deployment realism from Lyons’ purported historical counterexamples. Essentiality in this sense cannot be detected prospectively, but this is just what we should expect, and far from causing problems for deployment realists, this frees them from unreasonable obligations. (shrink)

I begin with a kind of phenomenological reporting of the recent war between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, in order to explain the meaning of the thesis that "historicity is predication" - meaning by that to clarify the sense in which predication is a kind of political act (for good and sufficient philosophical reasons) and how the "objective" description of an evolving war illuminates such a philosophical reading of history.