A central problem within an influential strand of recent philosophy of mind has been to explain the “conformity of mind to thing” that characterizes knowledge. John Haldane has argued that this problem can be best addressed by a development of Thomas Aquinas’s account of the “formal identity” of the knowing subject with the object known. However, such a development is difficult to present in a manner perspicuous to a contemporary audience. This paper seeks to present a persuasive account (...) of formal identity, taking sensory cognition of the individual object as the primary case for examination. Formal identity is initially explored usingthe notion of encoding, or the systematic transfer of information reflecting efficient and formal causal processes. The mathematical notion of “isomorphism” is thenemployed to describe precisely the features of encoding needed for formal identity. Forms are defined as formally identical if and only if they are isomorphic. (shrink)

In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra-mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial featu...

In this paper, I will be arguing that the basic infrastructure of an ineffable formal identity between name and object which is presented in the Tractatus is still very much involved in Wittgenstein's early development of the concept of grammar. First, it will be necessary to clearly describe how the identity between name and object is initially formulated in the Tractatus. Hence, in section 1, I will show how the 'picture theory' is ontologically grounded on the (...) class='Hi'>identity of linguistics' and worldly atomic structural elements. I will discuss the ‘picture theory’ only briefly, since my main interest is to illuminate how that infrastructure remains a core aspect of Wittgenstein's “middle period” thinking: that is, in what way the identity of name and object is contained and presupposed within his concept of grammar and how it is still used as a condition for our symbolism to make sense. Another way to describe this paper's aim, this time from its end backwards, would be to say that it is to reveal that grammatical systems of rules are nothing other than the implementations of that special kind of identity, for the latter is always and already manifest within our symbolism. (shrink)

In the so-called modern age, a transition can be observed in Western thought regarding this issue of tolerance. A perceptible shift can be seen in the understanding of tolerance as mere endurance to attempts to conceive of tolerance as a kind of well-grounded acceptance. It is regrettable, however, that this change in thinking has often remained hypothetical rather than heuristic. This certainly has to do with the fact that most of the time only large-scale theological, philosophical, or political projects were (...) negotiated. In this case, as is often happens, the directly concerned individual, the concrete person in the course of the demonstration efforts, was lost. We want to counter this loss with our study. In our investigation, which is based on a phenomenological reflection, we want to examine tolerance and respect as an existential problem couched within an individual. We wish to consider a person who desires to be tolerant and respectful; a person who accepts tolerance and respect as an existential task. (shrink)

Steven French and Decio Krause examine the metaphysical foundations of quantum physics. They draw together historical, logical, and philosophical perspectives on the fundamental nature of quantum particles and offer new insights on a range of important issues. Focusing on the concepts of identity and individuality, the authors explore two alternative metaphysical views; according to one, quantum particles are no different from books, tables, and people in this respect; according to the other, they most certainly are. Each view comes with (...) certain costs attached and after describing their origins in the history of quantum theory, the authors carefully consider whether these costs are worth bearing. Recent contributions to these discussions are analyzed in detail and the authors present their own original perspective on the issues. The final chapter suggests how this perspective can be taken forward in the context of quantum field theory. (shrink)

Following the global financial crisis, banks have become more regulated to advance ethical sales cultures throughout the sector. Based on case studies of three retail banks, we find that they construct the ‘appropriate advisor’ in different ways. Inspired by Bakhtin’s work on ethics, we propose a vocabulary of relational ethics centered on the ‘answerable self.’ We argue that this vocabulary is apt for studying and discussing how organizations advance ethical sales cultures in ways that instead of encouraging value congruence and (...) alignment allow for ethical openness. In such cultures, employees—as moral agents—are morally questioning, critically self-reflexive, and answerable for their own actions toward others in their social relationships. Our paper makes three theoretical contributions, namely, problematizing the idea of cultural alignment and value congruence, demonstrating that identity regulation can both comprise and support the ‘answerable self,’ and advancing our understanding of the interdependence of ethical openness and ethical closure in fostering ethical sales cultures. (shrink)

We propose a novel, ontological approach to studying mathematical propositions and proofs. By “ontological approach” we refer to the study of the categories of beings or concepts that, in their practice, mathematicians isolate as fruitful for the advancement of their scientific activity (like discovering and proving theorems, formulating conjectures, and providing explanations). We do so by developing what we call a “formal ontology” of proofs using semantic modeling tools (like RDF and OWL) developed by the computer science community. In (...) this article, (i) we describe this new approach and, (ii) to provide an example, we apply it to the problem of the identity of proofs. We also describe open issues and further applications of this approach (for example, the study of purity of methods). We lay some foundations to investigate rigorously and at large scale intellectual moves and attitudes that underpin the advancement of mathematics through cognitive means (carving out investigationally valuable concepts and techniques) and social means (like communication, collaboration, revision, and criticism of specific categories, inferential patterns, and levels of analysis). Our approach complements other types of analysis of proofs such as reconstruction in a deductive system and examination through a proof-assistant. (shrink)

The first quodlibetal question by William of Alnwick is a reply to John Duns Scotus' Quaestio de Formalitatibus, where the latter clarified his understanding of the formal distinction: ‘formal non-identity’ of the personal properties in God (and of the divine attributes) does not preclude a formal distinction if the latter is conceived as a distinction weakened by the modifier ‘formal’. Whereas Scotus' Quaestio has been subjected to a detailed analysis by Stephen Dumont, “Duns Scotus’ Parisian (...) Question”, there is as yet no such analysis of Alnwick's response. In the present paper his position is explained in detail. Alnwick rejects Scotus' view of ‘formal’ as a weakening modifier; he argues that the formal distinction necessarily is unqualified and may still import too much of unwanted realism in the matter at hand. Both Scotus and Alnwick acknowledge that the formal non-identity reflects the nature of things without falling back to a real distinction. But for Alnwick the right kind of distinction is a qualified distinction that is not a formal distinction. (shrink)

The paper is an extended version of a talk given to the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic devoted to the work of Professor Roman Suszko . Its aim is to present Sentential Calculus with Identity in comparison with other formalizations of propositional identity.

Review of Steven French, Décio Krause: 'Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may (...) be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes. Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation. (shrink)

Multi-national corporations (MNCs) have been criticised for not behaving ethically in some situations, which could have a negative effect on their reputation. This study examines the ethics of a large MNC in its relationship with its suppliers. A brief literature review of corporate identity, business ethics and buyer–supplier relationships is undertaken. The views and perceptions of the buying staff and the suppliers to a large South African MNC are obtained and discussed. The results indicate that this MNC has a (...) good corporate reputation among both its suppliers (an important stakeholder) and its own buying department. The existence and implementation of formal codes of ethics was found to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for good ethical practice. Candid relationships with suppliers emerged as a second and important factor. Ethical perceptions of buyers by suppliers are driven by the management of corporate identity, through the elements of ethical standards and candid relationships. We present a model of corporate identity/reputation in Buyer–Supplier Relationships. (shrink)

This is a short review of Identity in Physics, by Steven French and Decio Krause. (Tip: if you’re only going to read one chapter, make it chapter 4, where the philosophical juice is especially concentrated.).

Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, even when x and z have different properties (thus, x = y and y = z, but x ≠ z). In the present experiments, participants read stories about an iceberg that breaks into two icebergs, one to the east and (...) the other to the west. Many participants (32–54%, in baseline conditions across experiments) decided that both successors were the original iceberg, despite the different spatial locations of the successors. Experiment 1 shows that this tendency is not due to participants failing to understand both to mean both are simultaneously the original. Similarly, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the tendency is not solely due to their interpreting the question to be about properties of the icebergs rather than about the icebergs themselves. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest, instead, that participants may understand Which is the original? to mean Which, in its own right, is entitled to be the original? Emphasizing entitlement increases the number of seemingly intransitive responses, whereas emphasizing the formal properties of identity decreases them. (shrink)

The physics and metaphysics of identity and individuality Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9463-7 Authors Don Howard, Department of Philosophy and Graduate Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Elena Castellani, Department of Philosophy, University of Florence, Via Bolognese 52, (...) 50139 Florence, Italy Laura Crosilla, Department of Pure Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK Steven French, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Décio Krause, Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, 88040-900 Campus Trindade, Florianópolis, SC Brazil Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. (...) I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God. (shrink)

Completed in 1983, this work culminates nearly half a century of the late Alfred Tarski's foundational studies in logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of science. Written in collaboration with Steven Givant, the book appeals to a very broad audience, and requires only a familiarity with first-order logic. It is of great interest to logicians and mathematicians interested in the foundations of mathematics, but also to philosophers interested in logic, semantics, algebraic logic, or the methodology of the deductive sciences, and to (...) computer scientists interested in developing very simple computer languages rich enough for mathematical and scientific applications. The authors show that set theory and number theory can be developed within the framework of a new, different, and simple equational formalism, closely related to the formalism of the theory of relation algebras. There are no variables, quantifiers, or sentential connectives. Predicates are constructed from two atomic binary predicates (which denote the relations of identity and set-theoretic membership) by repeated applications of four operators that are analogues of the well-known operations of relative product, conversion, Boolean addition, and complementation. All mathematical statements are expressed as equations between predicates. There are ten logical axiom schemata and just one rule of inference: the one of replacing equals by equals, familiar from high school algebra. Though such a simple formalism may appear limited in its powers of expression and proof, this book proves quite the opposite. The authors show that it provides a framework for the formalization of practically all known systems of set theory, and hence for the development of all classical mathematics. The book contains numerous applications of the main results to diverse areas of foundational research: propositional logic; semantics; first-order logics with finitely many variables; definability and axiomatizability questions in set theory, Peano arithmetic, and real number theory; representation and decision problems in the theory of relation algebras; and decision problems in equational logic. (shrink)

RESUMO Ainda que Tomás de Aquino não usasse o termo intencionalidade frequentemente, ele tem uma teoria que explica como nós, enquanto sujeitos, nos referimos intencionalmente aos objetos. Nossa referência funciona quando há uma "identidade formal" entre a forma no ato de percepção ou conhecimento do sujeito e a forma do objeto. Na literatura secundária, "identidade formal" é muitas vezes o nome usado para chamar essa teoria. Nosso artigo visa o fato de que, em Tomás, a tese da identidade (...) formal não é só epistemológica, mas ela exige uma base metafísico-ontológica. O resultado da nossa investigação é que, segundo a tese da identidade formal, a referência epistêmica aos objetos funciona de maneira direta, mas por meio disso ela não produz uma variedade de objetos imanentes ou intencionais na ontologia. ABSTRACT Even if Thomas Aquinas did not use the term intentionality often, He has a theory that explains how we, as subjects, intentionally refer to objects. Our reference works when there is a "formal identity" between the form in the act of perception or subject knowledge and the form of the object. In secondary literature, "formal identity" is the name used to refer to that theory. Our article aims at the fact that, in Thomas's writings, the formal identity thesis is not only epistemological, but requires a metaphysical-ontological basis. The result of our investigation is that, according to the formal identity thesis, the epistemic reference to objects works on a direct way, but by means of that it does not produce a variety of immanent or intentional objects within ontology. (shrink)

Axel Honneth draws a distinction between three types of recognition: (1) love, (2) respect and (3) social esteem. In his The Struggle for Recognition, the recognition of cultural particularity is situated in the third sphere. It will here be argued that the logic of recognition of cultural identity also demands a non-evaluative recognition, namely a respect for difference. Difference-respect is formal because it is a recognition of the value of a particular culture not "for society" or "as such", (...) but for the social group involved. Yet, although it is formal, difference-respect cannot be reduced to respect for personal autonomy and its preconditions, as Honneth wrongly suggests in Redistribution or Recognition? It is argued here that difference-respect is oriented towards another dimension of the person, namely social attachments. This kind of respect entails a separate register of formal recognition with a corresponding concept of personal identity and a parallel category of social disrespect. What morally justifies difference-respect from a recognition-theoretic approach is the practical relation-to-self that thus becomes possible, namely self-respect as a sense of belonging. The formal conception of the good life that Honneth articulates should include the insight that this sense of belonging is as much a necessary condition for the good life as is personal autonomy. (shrink)

We begin to fill a lacuna in the relevance logic enterprise by providing a foundational analysis of identity in relevance logic. We consider rival interpretations of identity in this context, settling on the relevant indiscernibility interpretation, an interpretation related to Dunn's relevant predication project. We propose a general test for the stability of an axiomatisation of identity, relative to this interpretation, and we put various axiomatisations to this test. We fill our discussion out with both formal (...) and philosophical remarks on identity in relevance logic. (shrink)

Scotus’ theory of identity and distinction is a unique and central aspect of his thought, as he applies it throughout his metaphysics. On Scotus’ account of identity, the indiscernibility of identicals fails – i.e. A and B can be identical but not share all the same properties. As Ockham objected, Scotus is now in the difficult position of needing to provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for being identical, rather than simply invoking indiscernibility. The secondary literature has argued (...) that the lack of actual or potential separation is both necessary and sufficient for identity. I argue that is incorrect and provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for identity and real distinction, along with an analysis of Scotus’ theory of identity and distinction more broadly. Scotus thinks instead that the lack of actual, potential, and proportional separation are necessary and sufficient conditions for identity. The deeper root of this view is that identity corresponds to a certain degree of unity, and is accompanied by a sharing of esse. (shrink)

Review: French, Steven& Krause, Décio. Identity in Physics: a Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis.

The author attacks the view that identity, Like largeness, Is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles principle, As a truth of logic, Forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative (...) identity, As explicated by geach, Is very probably incoherent. (shrink)

Absolute identity seems at first sight to be presupposed in the branch of formal logic called identity theory. Classical identity theory may be obtained by adjoining a single schema to ordinary quantification theory.

Steven French and Décio Krause have written what bids fair to be, for years to come, the definitive philosophical treatment of the problem of the individuality of elementary particles in quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. The book begins with a long and dense argument for the view that elementary particles are most helpfully regarded as non-individuals, and it concludes with an earnest attempt to develop a formal apparatus for describing such non-individual entities better suited to the task than (...) our customary set theory. Along the way one is treated to a compendious philosophical history of quantum statistics and a well-nigh exhaustive (I’m tempted to say, “exhausting”) analytical history of philosophical responses to the quantum theory’s prima facie challenge to classical notions of particle individuality. The book is also a salvo from the headquarters artillery company of the “pro” side in the contemporary structuralism wars, and an essay in metaphysical naturalism. Whew! There are too many places where the friendly critic wants to engage the argument, and few where the authors have not already anticipated such engagement. I take this as my excuse, then, for offering not any systematic response to the whole project, but just some questions and observations about several points that caught my attention. (shrink)

I identify a class of arguments against multiple realization (MR): BookofSand arguments. The arguments are in their general form successful under reasonably uncontroversial assumptions, but this, on the other hand, turns the table on identity theory: If arguments from MR can always be refuted by BookofSand arguments, is identity theory falsifiable? In the absence of operational demarcation criteria, it is not. I suggest a parameterized formal demarcation principle for brain state/process types and show how it can be (...) used to identify previously unconsidered contenders for evidence for MR, e.g., binary classification, division, and sorting. For these to be actual instances of MR, the corresponding psychological kinds must be verifiably, relevantly similar. I also briefly discuss possible linguistic, behavioral, and experimental demarcation criteria for psychological kinds. (shrink)

The article deals with the problematic aspects of the concept of identity, the analysis of which helps to point out and to overcome the paradoxes of the “diachronic identity”, the identity of the human person (as identity of its inner cell) and “plural, flexible identity”, and also to clarify the conditions of the legitimate use of these concepts in contemporary philosophy and social science. The article examines two paradigms of identity: the substantive, when the (...) identity of a thing is sought in an invariable property, which provides its synchronous identity, and the formal, when the identity is sought in a form, a structure of the language, which provides its duration in time and helps to understand the diachronic identity. The article shows the importance of the use of “criteria of identity”, introduced by analytical philosophers to find out the way of duration in time of beings which they try to identify, from the material objects to the collective beings, including the identity of the human person. The problem of subjective identity is pointed out as a separate problem. Two main approaches to it are differentiated: mentalist and expressivist. The first is focused on the inner world of the human being, its memories and feelings, creating paradoxes of the «identity for itself» which is not the «identity for the others», whereas the second lets include the social world in the definition of the subjective identity and facilitates the reconsideration of the boundaries of the internal and the external in determining the human self. The article analyses contemporary use of the concept of identity in social science and public discourses and demonstrates the contradiction of the concept of “plural, heterogeneous identity”, which formulates but doesn’t solve the problem of the subjective identity as the identification of an individual with different social groups. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a modern American today? These slides summarize the discussion from five lectures delivered in winter 2019 at the University of Oregon's Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. The lectures themselves are available on YouTube -/- Just how different is American from other cultural identities? We have thought of ourselves as the specially modern nation, spreading the revolutionary gospel of freedom from traditional restrictions. Some condemn this American exceptionalism, while others celebrate it. Don't take sides too quickly, (...) there are deep issues here. -/- -- The first lecture poses the question whether American identity is a rigid given set of traditional substantive values, or a free floating modern identity with at most a set of formal procedural values. -/- -- The second and third lectures dismantle these options, arguing that any substantive identity must include areas of inner freedom and mobility, and any formal procedural identity needs substantive style and content in order to exist at all. Personal and social identities are two leveled, with given values and projects plus inner self-reflection and space for revision. -/- -- The fourth lecture argues that what makes American identity special is neither its substantive values nor its modern formalism, which are shared with other modern nations, but rather the particular slant of its second level attitudes and practices towards first level substance. -/- -- The fifth lecture asks what America can learn and teach in an increasingly multicultural world. (shrink)

Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new (...) and surprising facts are proved; for instance, that weak dis- cernibility corresponds to discernibility in a language with constants for every object, and that weak discernibility is the most discerning nontrivial discernibility relation. (shrink)

Stephen Read presented harmonious inference rules for identity in classical predicate logic. I demonstrate here how this approach can be generalised to a setting where predicate logic has been extended with epistemic modals. In such a setting, identity has two uses. A rigid one, where the identity of two referents is preserved under epistemic possibility, and a non-rigid one where two identical referents may differ under epistemic modality. I give rules for both uses. Formally, I extend Quantified (...) Epistemic Multilateral Logic with two identity signs. I argue that a uniform meaning for identity tout court can be given by adopting Maria Aloni’s account of reference using conceptual covers. We obtain a harmonious set of rules for identity that is sound and complete for Aloni’s model theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:206 Feminist Studies 46, no. 1. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Pang Laikwan Identity Politics and Democracy in Hong Kong’s Social Unrest Hong Kong’s anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (anti-ELAB) movement began with legislation proposed in February 2019 to allow the transfer of fugitives to jurisdictions with which the city lacks formal extradition treaties. The law quickly attracted a tremendous amount of criticism and generated enormous anxiety (...) because mainland China was one of those jurisdictions.1 In fact, many believe that this bill was proposed to allow the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to transfer wanted persons of any nationality from Hong Kong to China, subject to a legal process that many view as highly dubious. A large-scale anti-government movement exploded in June 2019 when pro-establishment legislators in Hong Kong insisted on passing it, and millions of people took to the streets. The government waited three months to withdraw the bill, only doing so after some of the most violent confrontations between civilians and the police in Hong Kong’s history. With Beijing’s 1. The law was originally proposed after a Hong Kong man, who killed his pregnant girlfriend in Taiwan, could not be extradited back to Taiwan to stand trial for the murder due to the lack of formal extradition laws. The proposed law, which would be applied to Hong Kong citizens, foreign residents, and even people passing through on business or as tourists, is being opposed due to the fear that it would be used to extradite Hong Kong political/civil rights activists and dissidents to China, where they would be harshly punished. Pang Laikwan 207 support, the Hong Kong government has doggedly resisted negotiating with the protestors over other demands, such as setting up an independent inquiry into police misconduct. As people have become completely disillusioned with the government and their own futures, tensions have increased. Collapsing many of the city’s socioeconomic problems into one cause, the anti-ELAB movement is primarily an anti-authoritarian impulse motivated by the unifying power of the term “Hongkongers.” As the movement unfolds, one of the most popular slogans, “Add Oil, Hongkongers!” (meaning “Keep going, Hongkongers!”) gradually transformed into “Rebel, Hongkongers!” and “Revenge, Hongkongers!” showing the protestors ’ anger about unrestrained police violence and the Beijing regime behind it. The militarization associated with these protests is both worrisome and symptomatic. This short essay analyzes this movement and uses it as a vehicle to disentangle social and political identity. My concern is about how a large-scale political movement can realign identities to generate power from the bottom. I use an Arendtian approach to ground my theoretical orientation, asking: How can political actions be understood as the pursuit of freedom to transcend one’s biological and social identity? From an intersectional feminist angle, if we are aware that social discrimination operates within a complex network of simultaneous discriminations, real social change can only be envisioned using a broad political canvas. Hong Kong’s anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill movement provides such a setting. Division and Inclusion “The people” might be the emptiest, but also the most powerful, phrase in the modern political lexicon. It can be used by politicians to justify groundless proposals or criticisms, but it is also the foundation and source of legitimacy for all modern political institutions. Indeed, the most basic meaning of democracy is “rule of the people,” which is impossible to avoid in any democratic imagination. As has been widely seen throughout the world, however, “the people” is often attached to various degrees of xenophobia—hatred of outsiders in the name of in-group solidarity. While the Hong Kong protestors’ courageous demands for the PRC to honor its promise to grant the city a high degree of autonomy have gained widespread international sympathy, thorny social divisions persist within the movement. 208 Pang Laikwan While Hong Kong has never been a united society, the anti-ELAB protests—like most social movements—have been highly divisive, splitting Hong Kong people apart. Most obviously, “the people” are divided by their political identifications, forming a primary antagonism between those who support the protests and those who do not, usually described... (shrink)

SummaryThe traditional account of micro‐reductive explanations, in terms of bridge‐law derivations and attribute‐identities, is subjected to critical analysis. Formal expositions of this approach especially those of R. L. Causey, are shown to have oversimplified certain relations between micro‐parts and wholes, and between identities and explanations, and to have neglected a key difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous micro‐explanatory contexts. An alternative treatment of part‐explanation adequacy is outlined and illustrated.

Identity criteria are used to confer ontological respectability: Only entities with clearly determined identity criteria are ontologically acceptable. From a logical point of view, identity criteria should mirror the identity relation in being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. However, this logical constraint is only rarely met. More precisely, in some cases, the relation representing the identity condition fails to be transitive. We consider the proposals given so far to give logical adequacy to inadequate identity conditions. (...) We focus on the most refined proposal and expand its formal framework by taking into account two further aspects that we consider essential in the application of identity criteria to obtain logical adequacy: contexts and granular levels. (shrink)

This paper discusses a study examining how mentors in nurse education make professional judgments about the clinical competence of their pre‐registration nursing students. Interviews were undertaken with nine UK students and 15 mentors, using critical incidents in practice settings as a focus. The study was undertaken for the English National Practice‐Based Professional Learning Centre for Excellence in Teaching and Learning. This paper reports on the conversation analytic thread of the work. The mentor role with pre‐registration nursing students is not only (...) supportive but involves formal assessment. Central to the relationship is communication. In professional education, communication is seen as a skill to be applied and assessed in practice settings but is also the medium mentors and mentees use to talk about the relationship. Analysis of excerpts of conversation in the interviews shows that episodes of communication are used as topics of conversation to establish professional identity. It also reveals that judgments about the extent of professional capacity of both students and mentors are grounded in everyday behaviours (for example, enthusiasm, indifference and confidence) as well as professional competence. In addition to focusing on clinical issues, mentors can and do use mundane communication as a resource for judgments about competence. (shrink)

This article is a continuation of our promenade along the winding roads of identity, equality, nameability and completeness. We continue looking for a place where all these concepts converge. We assume that identity is a binary relation between objects while equality is a symbolic relation between terms. Identity plays a central role in logic and we have looked at it from two different points of view. In one case, identity is a notion which has to be (...) defined and, in the other case, identity is a notion used to define other logical concepts. In our previous paper, [16], we investigated whether identity can be introduced by definition arriving to the conclusion that only in full higher-order logic with standard semantics a reliable definition of identity is possible. In the present study we have moved to modal logic and realized that here we can distinguish in the formal language between two different equality symbols, the first one shall be interpreted as extensional genuine identity and only applies for objects, the second one applies for non rigid terms and has the characteristic of synonymy. We have also analyzed the hybrid modal logic where we can introduce rigid terms by definition and can express that two worlds are identical by using the nominals and the @ operator. We finish our paper in the kingdom of identity where the only primitives are lambda and equality. Here we show how other logical concepts can be defined in terms of the identity relation. We have found at the end of our walk a possible point of convergence in the logic Equational Hybrid Propositional Type Theory, [14] and [15]. (shrink)

This dissertation constitutes an inquiry into the formal aspects of a particular form of conceptual intentional realism: Holistic Realist Ramified Conceptualism. Several axiomatic systems, which have this theory as their philosophical background are developed and/or studied from a syntactical and semantical point of view. ;Among systems studied are Cocchiarella's RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$. A set theoretical semantics for these systems is developed. Also, completeness theorems with respect to certain extensions of RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and certain notions of validity related to (...) that semantics are proved. A relative consistency proof of RRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$, HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ and other systems is given. ;An axiomatic system for identity free realist ramified conceptualism involving indiscernibility relative to constructive concepts is developed. A set theoretical semantics for this system is constructed. A completeness theorem with respect to certain extensions of the identity-free system and a notion of validity related to that semantics is proved. ;Epistemic considerations are brought into this inquiry by introducing an epistemic operator into the logical syntax. Such an operator corresponds intuitively to the idea of constructive knowability. A philosophical discussion of this idea is presented and on the basis of this discussion an epistemic logical theory is formulated. It is shown that this system has HRRC$\sbsp{\lambda}{\*}$ as a proper subsystem. On the basis of the epistemic logical theory, an axiomatic system is introduced from which Peano's arithmetic is deduced. In this way, it is shown that arithmetic can be developed axiomatically on conceptualist foundations. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse the connection between the contested ethno-cultural labelling of Gipsy-Travellers in Wales and their position of social marginalisation, with special reference to spatial issues, such as the provision of campsites and public housing. Our main aim is to show how the formal and informal (mis)labelling of minority groups leads to a number of morally and politically questionable outcomes in their treatment on the part of political authorities. Our approach combines a close reading of official policy (...) documents, government-commissioned and independent empirical research with a theoretical framework drawn mainly from contemporary political philosophy, and especially from the debate on redistribution and recognition. (shrink)

Numerical identity is standardly considered to be a relation between things. This means that two things are identical if they are only one thing. It is not only Wittgenstein who finds this claim rather odd. Another possibility is to understand identity as a relation between names which denote the same thing; or as a relation between the senses of those names which are modes of presentation of the same thing. Or identity statements can be considered as expressions (...) of the fact that there is exactly one thing that has certain characteristics. These conceptions are, in fact, closely interlinked. There are some rather straightforward proposals on how to give these approaches a formal pattern in relative harmony with classical logic. What is important to emphasize and keep in mind is the specific character of identity and essential dissimilarities between identity and relations of objects in logic. (shrink)

In this article I am concerned with reasoning about matters of justice. There is no doubt that justice-reasoning is a significant mode of ethical reasoning and its importance is therefore generally accepted. But there is a considerable debate concerning the role formal justice can play in reasoning about justice. In this paper, I first provide an analysis of formal justice. I then show that the concept of formal justice is identical to one notion of fairness and I (...) illustrate the function of formal justice in reasoning about issues of fairness. In the third section, I argue that formal justice is an essential component of justice tout court and I demonstrate its value for understanding and assessing reasoning about matters of justice. The overall result of this investigation is that formal justice is an important notion that has a special function in moral thinking, which has not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Christian Identity and Genuine Openness to the Religious Beliefs of OthersSchubert M. OgdenNot the least important thing I have learned from my participation in the International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter is that genuine interreligious dialogue is possible only under certain conditions. Specifically, I am now confirmed in the assumption I made in beginning my participation that one can enter into such dialogue only if one can somehow claim truth (...) for one's own religious beliefs without thereby denying, explicitly or implicitly, that others' religious beliefs also may possibly be true. But how is it possible to claim that one's own beliefs as a Christian are true while allowing for at least the possible truth of others' beliefs as well?This is how I, as a Christian, formulate the question—or, at any rate, one of the questions—that I took to be raised by the topic discussed at the most recent meeting of our group: "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World." One implication of this formulation, obviously, is that, in my view, a necessary aspect of Christian identity, as of religious identity generally, is the confession, or profession, of certain religious beliefs, together with the claim that these beliefs are true. Moreover, by "true" in this context I understand not merely "substantially true," in the sense of agreeing in substance with any other true religious or existential beliefs, but also "formally true," in the sense of providing the norm with which any other religious or existential beliefs must agree in order to be true beliefs. With this understanding, then, the question I propose to pursue really asks, "How is it possible to be a Christian and to claim formal truth for one's own religious beliefs while allowing that others' beliefs also can be formally true?"This explains, in turn, why the other operative term in the title of my paper is not simply "openness," but "genuine openness." One might possibly think—or be thought—to be open to the religious beliefs of others simply because one allowed that their beliefs could indeed be true provided only that they substantially agreed with Christian beliefs taken as the norm for judging their truth. But on my analysis of the claim that others themselves make for the truth of their beliefs, one would [End Page 21] not be genuinely open to their beliefs at all. For their claim is that their beliefs are formally true and therefore themselves the norm with which all other religious or existential beliefs, including Christian beliefs, must agree if their own claim to be true is a valid claim. My test of "genuine openness," then, is openness to at least the possibility that the religious beliefs of others are formally true in the same sense in which I as a Christian claim my own religious beliefs to be so.The other thing to note about my formulation of the question is what it does and does not ask. It does not ask whether it is possible to claim formal truth for my beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true; rather, simply assuming that it is possible, somehow, to do this, it asks how it is possible. In other words, what are the necessary conditions of the possibility of claiming formal truth for one's own religious beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true?With this clarification of our question, I now want to indicate how I, as a Christian and a theologian, answer it. This I propose to do by briefly developing my answer against another that is currently being given to it by what appears to be a growing number of other Christians and theologians.I refer to those who are commonly called—and call themselves—"religious (or Christian) pluralists," or simply "pluralists." According to these Christians and theologians, the monistic claim traditionally made for the truth of Christian beliefs, to the effect that they alone among religious or existential beliefs are formally true, can no longer be defended and should be given up. Far from being the only true religion, Christianity is in fact... (shrink)