La gobernanza contemporánea exige una revisión de las categorías jurídico-políticas de la modernidad. El complejo y mutable marco institucional de la contemporaneidad asiste a una intensificación y polarización de la confrontación, que se ejerce de formas y con instrumentos heterogéneos y en planos diferentes. Esto transforma el papel y la estructura de lo normativo, haciendo resurgir su carácter performativo y fluctuante como instrumento estratégico de aprehensión de lo real, entrelazado y atravesado por elementos de naturaleza extrajurídica que son todo menos (...) objetivos. Una imagen que bien resume el paradigma de la fictio legis, reconstruido por Yan Thomas a partir de la tradición ius-romanista. (shrink)

The article investigates how and why we treat works of art as persons. From rhetoric to jurisprudence, various disciplines have dealt with the practice of attributing human features and abilities to insensate objects. The agency of works of art acting as fictitious persons is not only rec­ognized at the level of aesthetic experience, but also outside it, because there have been cases in which they were subject to legal liability. Per­sonhood is not reducible to individual human beings. However, since works (...) of art lack senses and consciousness, there is ultimately a limit to the personifying metaphor. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between Roman school texts and the socialization of the student into an elite man. I argue that composition and declamation communicated social values; in fact, the rhetorical education of the late republic and the empire was a process of socialization that produced a definite subjectivity in its elite participants. I treat two genres of Roman school texts: the expansions on a set theme known as declamation and the bilingual, Greek and Latin, writing exercises known as (...) the colloquia amid the collections of hermeneumata. This article is more broadly concerned with the attitudes toward language use that are learned along with specific literacy skills. Habits of reading and writing and speaking are learned in scenes and contexts that contribute to concepts of the self and more widely of gender and social roles. The encounters and verbal interactions recurrently plot a deviation from violence or a return to civil and familial order through the proper verbal display of the elite speaker. The student speaker's assumption of roles, his training in fictio personae, is a strong training in memory and imagination-pretending to be someone else, pretending to talk like someone else, or pretending to talk on behalf of someone else. That someone else is most important as the schoolboy becomes the voice of or for prostitutes, the raped, slaves, freedmen, women. His was not a neutral ventriloquism in the styles of Latin but a training in the master's mode toward the ready conviction that the speaker can and must speak for others, his subordinates. Roman rhetorical education was a process of persona building, shaping the schoolboy in his future role while excluding others from the very right to become speaking subjects. (shrink)

This article analyzes the legal-philosophical situation of Artificial Intelligence and the intelligent robot on being a subject of Law to be considered a creative person or author. The contradiction involved in allowing an object to present the legal duality of being protected as an object that it is and at the same time being considered a subject by the resulting work is analyzed, an impairment or vulgarization for the subject of Law as a moral subject when proposing the fictio (...) legis de a moral object, which is not conceivable. Instead, an alternative to such an aporia is proposed, more fictitious than real. (shrink)

William de la Mare suggests in his Correctorium fratris Thomae that it is possible to read Aquinas as saying that the will is necessitated by the intellect. Early defenders of Aquinas thought that this was nonsense (a fictio). However, I analyze Aquinas’s corpus and show that he has a consistent view of the relationship between the will and the intellect according to which the will is indeed necessitated by the intellect, not absolutely but conditionally: it is necessary that, if (...) the intellect apprehends some object as good, then the will wills that object. However, I also argue that, although Aquinas is committed to the necessitation of the will by the intellect, it does not follow that the will lacks alternate possibilities. (shrink)

Ana Escoto (El Salvador, 1984) es economista y doctora en Estudios de Población, radicada en la ciudad de México, donde se dedica a la investigación y la docencia. No obstante, su alma se encamina a la narrativa breve y a la poesía. Perteneció en 2006-2007 al taller literario La Casa del Escritor, dirigido por Rafael Menjívar Ochoa. En narrativa ha publicado el libro de cuentos cortos “Menguantes y Otras Creaturas” (Dirección de Publicaciones e Impresos, 2008), así como ha contribuido con (...) la antología “Memorias de la Casa – Narrativa” (Índole Editores, 2012), y con el proyecto de narrativa erótica “Cuerpos” (FyG Editores, 2015). También formó parte del proyecto bilingüe “Vanishing Points/Puntos de fuga” (Kalina, 2017) y ha participado en la antología internacional seleccionada por María Farazdel [Palitachi], “Voces de América Latina – Fictio – III” (Media Isla, 2016). Algunos de sus poemas han sido publicados en antologías en El Salvador como “Nuevas Voces Femeninas en El Salvador” (Universidad de El Salvador, 2009), “Memorias de la Casa – Poesía” (Índole Editores, 2010) y “Voces del Extremo” (2006) en Huelva, España, también está indizada en el “Segundo índice antológico de la poesía salvadoreña” (Vladimir Amaya, Índole Editores, 2014). En esta ocasión, la Revista Ístmica comparte dos cuentos de la autoría de Ana Escoto con nuestro público lector. (shrink)

Le Tiers Livre que Rabelais publie en 1546 est sans doute le premier ouvrage à traiter strictement de la notion de perplexité. Serai-je cocu? Cette question cocasse fournit la matière de la première véritable mise en scène littéraire de la notion. Elle recueille les fruits d'un héritage savant, tant juridique que théologique. Pour les juristes, le terme de perplexitas désigne la situation particulièrement délicate où deux lois s'opposent l'une à l'autre, sans espoir de conciliation. Cette inacceptable antinomie réclame des méthodes (...) de résolution originales (renvoi sine die, recours au hasard, mise en place d'une fictio legis, etc.) qui trouvent un écho direct chez des auteurs comme Rabelais et Montaigne. Pour les théologiens, le terme désigne prioritairement le conflit de la loi de l'Église et de la loi de la conscience. A priori impensable dans un monde où Dieu dit la même chose à son Église et à la conscience de chacun, la situation ne survient que par la faute du fidèle qui s'est mis lui-même dans la situation terrible d'inevitabilitas peccandi. Ce double éclairage permet de réévaluer l'histoire de Panurge. De la perplexité initiale du héros à sa résolution - problématique - dans le Cinquième Livre s'ébauche l'esquisse d'un cheminement « thélémique ». L'aventure de Panurge devient alors la métaphore de cet autre chemin retracé par différents textes contemporains, qui mène de la perplexité terrestre à la Jérusalem céleste, autre abbaye de Thélème. (shrink)

Without extending the historical analysis, this article analyzes the relationship between the legal concept of person with regard to the notion of living independently. The concept is normatively established in Article 19 of the CRPD and is presented as a legal fiction. The legal technique of fictio iuris is the premise for analyzing contemporary problems, for example, the attribution of responsibilities to non-human personalities, such as robots. The article, however, develops the problem of attributing rights to persons with disabilities. (...) The contraposition of robots and disabled people, understood as opposing visions of anthropological and human models, is part of the philosophical dispute between humanism and post- or transhumanism. The conception of man appears different if created in the image and likeness of God, or as the fruit of evolution from primates, or as a transhumanist entity that can be replaced by the robot. The latter vision is rooted in the mechanization of the mind triggered by cybernetics and cognitive sciences and referable to problems of justice theory and political philosophy concerning the inclusion in society of disabled people. In this article I will limit myself to analyzing, against the background of this complex problem, the link between person, legal fiction and the right to disability starting from the criticism addressed by Nussbaum to Rawls based on the convention and following the methodology developed by Marchisio and Curto in order to clarify the legal connection between thirdness, disability, and person.However, I go one step further by including the issue of disability as justice within the evolution of the notion of the legal person, through the inclusion of fictio iuris and rhetorical methodology in positive law, as a criterion for the interpretation of art. 19 CRPD. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the is/ought debate in legal theory through a phenomenological reading of the concept of normality. An analysis of Siniscalchi, Fuller and Manderson looks at the issue from the perspective of law and literature, and then applies Giambattista Vico’s rhetorical methodology within the contemporary debate. The question: “is Hume’s law really visible within Hume’s thought?” also paradoxically poses the figure of phantoms and fictions at the heart of the current theoretical debate on law. A history of the phantom (...) placed at the centre of the history of Western institutions still remains to be written, but a comparison of very diverse and incongrous approaches such as the extended order of Hayek, the dogmatic anthropology of Legendre, the eunomics of Fuller and the new science of Vico shows how the mystery of consciousness and the mystery of institutions are inextricably entwined. It is impossible at the moment to draw a coherent doctrine from these conflicting perspectives, but their convocation is sufficient to demonstrate how the theory of law is always suspended between the unknown and the human attempt to inhabit it, moving us toward an affective turn that has yet to be fully conceived in the theory of law, following the iconic turn. The anthropological primacy of fictio and the aesthetic-legal dimension in the constitution of language is not that of a logic and separation from the body and meaning, but the exact inverse, even in the unavoidable constant tension between the two poles: logic is born through the gesture of the body that precedes it, as myth precedes the foundation of the State; the origin of the concept is affective, as Hume, and perhaps Vico himself, would have passionately affirmed. (shrink)