In this paper, I present and explore some ideas about how factive emotional states and factive perceptual states each relate to knowledge and reasons. This discussion will shed light on the so-called ‘perceptual model’ of the emotions.

The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal explanation of other mental attitudes and, in particular, some reactive (...) attitudes and factive emotions. Taking into account this sort of causal efficacy in determining which mental states are genuine mental states opens up new perspectives for defending the view that knowledge is the most general factive and genuine mental state. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of mood selection with attitude predicates in French. I start by examining the “contextual commitment” account of mood developed by Portner and Rubinstein Proceedings of SALT 22, CLC Publications, Ithaca, NY, pp 461–487, 2012). A key innovation of Portner and Rubinstein’s account is to treat mood selection as fundamentally depending on a relation between individuals’ attitudes and the predicate’s modal backgrounds. I raise challenges for P&R’s qualitative analysis of contextual commitment and explanations of mood selection. (...) There are indicative-selecting predicates that are felicitous in contexts where there isn’t contextual commitment ; and there are subjunctive-selecting predicates that involve no less contextual commitment than certain indicative-selecting verbs. I develop an alternative account of verbal mood. The general approach, which I call a state-of-mind approach, is to analyze mood in terms of whether the formal relation between the predicate’s modal backgrounds and an overall state of mind represents a relation of commitment. Indicative mood in French presupposes that the informational-evaluative state determined by the predicate’s modal backgrounds is included in the informational-evaluative state characterizing the event described by the predicate. The account provides an improved explanation of core mood-selection puzzles, including subjunctive-selection with emotive factives, indicative-selection with fiction verbs, indicative-selection with espérer ‘hope’ versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir ‘want’, and indicative-selection with commissives versus subjunctive-selection with directives. Subjunctive-selection with modal adjectives is briefly considered. The mood-selection properties of the predicates are derived from the proposed analysis of mood, independently attested features of the predicates’ semantics, and general principles of interpretation. (shrink)

Fear and Uncertainty discusses Robert Gordon's thesis according to which fear is an epistemic - as opposed to factive - emotion inasmuch as S's fearing p requires S's being uncertain whether p or ~p, and also requires that the uncertainty implicit in fearing be of a non-deliberative or 'external' kind. Hansberg argues against both parts of this thesis, which purports to offer part of the structure of the emotion of fear. First, she says, Gordon cannot account for those cases (...) of weakness of the will in which an agent fears that when the moment comes he himself will not act upon his own previous purpose. So an external uncertainty proves to be not so essential a requisite. Now, what about the uncertainty, whatever its form, condition? Hansberg finds several examples in which someone fears p even though he actually is certain that p (when one fears, for example, a medical treatment known to be painful, or when one fears one's own inminent death, say, by suicide). She also argues against Gordon's distinction between propositional fears and mere 'states of fear' with no semantic content, and disapproves of his inclusión of certain fears - like fear of a violent death, fear of injury to oneself, and many phobias - in the latter category. Those supposedly non-propositional states can, and often do, give rise to propositional states and intentional actions; so Gordon would have to explain how this is possible: some of those supposedly mere states of fear need a place in an explanation- by-reasons scheme. Finally, Hansberg claims that all fears do have a propositional structure, even though some fears have it in a concealed way. So, for example, if someone is afraid of death, he is afraid that he will die young, or that he will go to hell, and so on. Thus it is always possible to find propositional contents for fears which apparently have none, although in some cases this might be a difficult task. [Laura Lecuona] . (shrink)

Psychological constructivist models of emotion propose that emotions arise from the combinations of multiple processes, many of which are not emotion specific. These models attempt to describe both the homogeneity of instances of an emotional “kind” (why are fears similar?) and the heterogeneity of instances (why are different fears quite different?). In this article, we review the iterative reprocessing model of affect, and suggest that emotions, at least in part, arise from the processing of dynamical unfolding representations of valence (...) across time. Critical to this model is the hypothesis that affective trajectories—over time—provide important information that helps build emotional states. (shrink)

Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive (...) mental state. I argue, however, that Gettier cases pose a serious problem for Williamson’s epistemology: in these cases, thesubject may have a factive mental state that fails to be cognitive. Hence, knowledge cannot be the most general factive mental state. (shrink)

Human Towers are one of the most representative traditional sporting games in Catalonia, recognized in 2010 as Intangible Cultural Heritage by the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture. The objective of this research was to study the emotional states elicited by a representative performance of the colla de Castellers de Lleida. This research is based on an ethnographic case study, with mixed methods in which 17 key informants voluntarily participated. Participant observation was used; the data were (...) recorded in a field diary and oral sources. The content analysis was done using the Atlas.ti software. An SPSS database was also created. The statistical techniques were: Descriptive statistical techniques, cross tables with Pearson's Chi-square values. We also used a classification and regression trees to examine the predictive capacity of five independent variables of emotional states. The results reveal that the comments were mostly oriented toward well-being states, The internal cooperative logic of the Human Towers enhances the intense interpersonal relationships of socio-emotional well-being. (shrink)

Emotional fluctuations are ubiquitous in everyday life, but precisely how they sculpt the temporal organisation of memories remains unclear. Here, we designed a novel task – the Emotion Boundary Task – wherein participants viewed sequences of negative and neutral images surrounded by a colour border. We manipulated perceptual context (border colour), emotional-picture valence, as well as the direction of emotional-valence shifts (i.e., shifts from neutral-to-negative and negative-to-neutral events) to create events with a shared perceptual and/or emotional (...) context. We measured memory for temporal order and temporal distances for images processed within and across events. Negative images processed within events were remembered as closer in time compared to neutral ones. In contrast, temporal distances were remembered as longer for images spanning neutral-to-negative shifts – suggesting temporal dilation in memory with the onset of a negative event following a previously-neutral state. The extent of negative-picture induced temporal dilation in memory correlated with dispositional negativity across individuals. Lastly, temporal order memory was enhanced for recently-presented negative (versus neutral) images. These findings suggest that emotional-state dynamics matters when considering emotion-temporal memory interactions: While persistent negative events may compress subjectively remembered time, dynamic shifts from neutral-to-negative events produce temporal dilation in memory, with implications for adaptive emotional functioning. (shrink)

This paper intends to contribute to the evaluation of the project of analyzing speech act concepts in terms of mental state concepts, by examining Searle's and Vanderveken's proposed analyses of certain types of illocutionary acts as expressions of corresponding types of emotional states. It is argued that the proposed analyses are all defective, that the assumptions about underlying speech act/mental state parallelisms from which their initial plausibility might be taken to derive are themselves mistaken, and that the fact (...) that they have been proposed at all betrays insufficient attention to the distinction between semanti-cally and pragmatically determined aspects of utterance interpretation. It is concluded that these results disturb both the overall structure of Searle's and Vanderveken's theory of speech acts, and the logic of several other similarly reductionist claims in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

We call affective brainocentrism the tendency to privilege the brain over other parts of the organism when defining or explaining emotions. We distinguish two versions of this tendency. According to brain-sufficient, emotional states are entirely realized by brain processes. According to brain-master, emotional states are realized by both brain and bodily processes, but the latter are entirely driven by the brain: the brain is the master regulator of bodily processes. We argue that both these claims are (...) problematic, and we draw on physiological accounts of stress to make our main case. These accounts illustrate the existence of complex interactions between the brain and endocrine systems, the immune system, the enteric nervous system, and even gut microbiota. We argue that, because of these complex brain–body interactions, the brain cannot be isolated and identified as the basis of stress. We also mention recent evidence suggesting that complex brain–body interactions characterize the physiology of depression and anxiety. Finally, we call for an alternative dynamical, systemic, and embodied approach to the study of the physiology of emotions that does not privilege the brain, but rather aims at understanding how mutually regulating brain and bodily processes jointly realize a variety of emotional states. (shrink)

ObjectiveAnti-epidemic work against coronavirus disease has become routine work in China. Our study was intended to investigate the emotional and psychological state of healthcare workers and look for the association between sociodemographic factors/profession-related condition and emotional state.MethodsA cross-sectional survey was conducted online among healthcare workers from various backgrounds. Symptoms of anxiety and depression were assessed by the Chinese versions of the seven-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder and the nine-item Patient Health Questionnaire, respectively. Supplementary questions were recorded to describe the (...) participants’ information about workplace violence, profession, and attitude related to the COVID pandemic. Wherever suitable, independent t-test, and one-way ANOVA were performed to detect group differences of GAD-7 and PHQ-9 total scores after grouping by sociodemographic variables, respectively, such as age, gender, marital status, educational level, after-tax income, department category, job title, experience of workplace violence, and anti-epidemic participation. Multiple linear regression analyses were utilized in order to look for the potential associated factors of GAD-7 and PHQ-9 total scores.ResultsA total of 2,139 questionnaires with valid response were completed. Approximately 86.44% of participants had minimal symptoms of anxiety, 11.08% mild, 1.59% moderate, and 0.89% severe. Meanwhile, 81.34% had minimal symptoms of depression, 14.07% mild, 2.90% moderate, 1.17% moderately severe, and 0.51% severe. Student’s t-test showed that participants with female gender, with experience of workplace violence scored higher on both GAD-7 and PHQ-9, and participants with experience of anti-epidemic front-line work during pandemic scored lower on both GAD-7 and PHQ-9. ANOVA showed that participants aging from 31 to 40, with higher educational level, with middle level of annual after-tax income, with department of internal medicine or surgery, or with middle level of job title scored higher on both GAD-7 and PHQ-9. Regression analyses showed that female gender, high job title, and the experience of workplace violence positively were associated with anxiety or depression. Doctoral education, department, job enthusiasm, and professional self-identity were negatively associated with anxiety or depression. Additionally, psychological support was negatively associated with depression.ConclusionAs the epidemic prevention and control against COVID-19 become normalized in China, emotional state of healthcare workers deserves extensive attention. Our study revealed that gender, educational level, department category, job title, the experience of workplace violence, job enthusiasm, and professional self-identity are the most important influencing factors of physician’s anxiety and depression. Self-tailored psychological intervention should be based on the predisposing factors above to mentally prepare healthcare workers for this long-lasting battle against COVID-19. (shrink)

I offer a counterexample to Timothy Williamson’s conjecture that knowledge is the most general factive mental state; i.e., that every factive mental state entails knowledge. I describe two counterexamples (Ernest Sosa’s and Baron Reed’s) that I find unpersuasive, and argue that they fail due to a specific feature they have in common. I then argue that there is a primitive mental state that is factive but does not entail knowledge, and that constitutes a counterexample to Williamson’s conjecture (...) that is not subject to the problems faced by Sosa’s and Reed’s counterexamples. Je propose un contre-exemple à la conjecture de Timothy Williamson selon laquelle la connaissance est l’état mental factif le plus général, c’est-à-dire que tout état mental factif implique la connaissance. Je décris deux contre-exemples (développés par Ernest Sosa et Baron Reed) que je considère comme étant peu probants, et je souligne que l’un et l’autre échouent à convaincre de par une caractéristique spécifique qu’ils partagent. Je soutiens ensuite qu’il existe un état mental primitif, factif mais n’impliquant pas la connaissance : ce dernier constitue un contre-exemple à la conjecture de Williamson sans être sujet aux problèmes rencontrés par les deux contre-exemples précédents. (shrink)

Volume 34, Issue 8, December 2020, Page 1646-1663.

Reinforcement learning relies on the reward prediction error (RPE) signals conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system. Previous studies showed that dopamine plays an important role in both positive and negative reinforcement. However, whether various reinforcement processes will induce distinct learning signals is still unclear. In a probabilistic learning task, we examined RPE signals in different reinforcement types using an electrophysiology index, namely, the feedback-related negativity (FRN). Ninety-four participants were randomly assigned into four groups: base (no money incentive), positive reinforcement (presentation (...) of money rewards), negative reinforcement (removal of money losses), and combined reinforcement (money rewards and removal of money losses) groups. In addition, in order to evaluate the engagement of emotional activity in the different reinforcement processes, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X) scales were applied before and after the experiment to detect the emotional changes. The results showed that there was no difference between groups in the dopamine-related learning bias. However, compared to the other three groups, negative reinforcement elicited smaller FRN (the difference-wave measure) during the learning, stronger positive affect and joviality, and less fatigue after the learning, in which the difference between the negative and positive reinforcement groups was smaller. The results indicated that pure avoidance motivation may induce distinct emotional fluctuations, which influence the feedback processing. (shrink)

In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to (...) entail a corresponding belief. If either of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing. (shrink)

The thesis that knowledge is a factive mental state plays a central role in knowledge-first epistemology, but accepting this thesis requires also accepting an unusually severe version of externalism about the mind. On this strong attitude externalism, whether S is in the mental state of knowledge can and often will rapidly change in virtue of changes in external states of reality with which S has no causal contact. It is commonly thought that this externalism requirement originates in the (...) factivity of knowledge. However, despite a number of recent defenses of non-factive accounts of knowledge, epistemology has yet to consider whether a non-factive approach might produce a version of the mental state thesis that can avoid strong externalism. Here I do just that, exploring how three different proposals for weakening factivity might be adapted to theories of knowledge as a non-factive mental state. Contrary to what we might expect, however, none of these proposals are compatible with anything close to attitude internalism about knowledge—or even a substantially weaker externalism. All told, the widespread view that wraps up the severe externalism required for knowledge to be a mental state in factivity is mistaken. Knowledge’s external-world connection runs far deeper than the factivity constraint. (shrink)

Embodied Appraisals and Non-emotional States We present the embodied appraisal theory of emotions and show how it handles a variety of intuitions we hold about affective states. While appreciating its integrative potential, we point out possible difficulties that it might face from further investigation of embodied non-emotional states. Following Darwin and his work on the expression of emotions, we suggest that some obviously non-emotional mental states comply with the criteria set by Prinz's theory. (...) Therefore it is doubtful whether his definition of emotions is correct and whether perceptual approaches are useful in explicating the nature of emotion types. (shrink)

Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that (...) really matters for mental state attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones. (shrink)

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic has led to the shutdown of society and created sudden and long-lasting changes in teaching practices, forcing many nursing students to study remotely at home. These students’ relatedness with their teachers and peers has been limited and mainly online. Several studies have indicated that students’ emotional states and mental health have been negatively affected by the pandemic, representing a serious challenge for many countries. Because they use only digital tools, online students have perceived a decline (...) in teacher and peer support. Likewise, these students have reported feelings of sadness, loneliness, anxiety, and stress, affecting their learning and competence development.AimsTo investigate the associations between peer support, teacher support, emotional state, and perceived competence in nursing students during the pandemic.MethodsThis cross-sectional study collected quantitative survey data from 329 nursing students at a large university in Norway. Structural equation modeling was used to test seven associations among peer support, teacher support, emotional state, and perceived competence.ResultsTeacher support had a significant direct effect on perceived competence, while peer support almost had a significant direct effect. However, the emotional state was directly affected by peer support and had a direct impact on perceived competence. Hence, teacher and peer support is important to nursing students’ perceived competence.ConclusionDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, both peer and teacher support can significantly support students’ competence development. Therefore, students should utilize the support of their teachers and peers in a structured manner to bolster their competence development. (shrink)

An approach to emotion is described in which emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by stimuli that are the goals for action. This leads to a theory of the evolutionary adaptive value of emotions, which is that different genes specify different goals in their own self-interest, and any actions can then be learned and performed by instrumental learning to obtain the goals. The brain mechanisms for emotion in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and (...) anterior cingulate cortex provide a foundation for understanding the neural basis of emotion. Classically conditioned effects may modulate the actions initiated by this system. In addition to this instrumental learning system, some stimuli may elicit responses, for example approach, withdrawal, or fixed action patterns, but intervening states are not required for this type of adaptive response. In addition, a rational thought system involved in multistep planning can allow gene-specified goals to be deferred or avoided in order to achieve longer-term types of goals that may be more advantageous to the individual than to the genes. (shrink)

This is a brief review of the Rasa theory of Indian aesthetics and the works I have done on the same. A major source of the Indian system of classification of emotional states comes from the ‘Natyasastra’, the ancient Indian treatise on the performing arts, which dates back to the 2nd Century AD (or much earlier, pg. LXXXVI: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). The ‘Natyasastra’ speaks about ‘sentiments’ or ‘Rasas’ (pg.102: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951) which are produced when certain ‘dominant (...) class='Hi'>states’ (sthayi Bhava), ‘transitory states’ (vyabhicari Bhava) and ‘temperamental states’ (sattvika Bhava) of emotions come together (pgs.102, 105: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). This Rasa theory, which is still widely followed in classical Indian performing arts, classifies eight Rasas or sentiments which are: Sringara (erotic), Hasya (comic), Karuna (pathetic), Raudra (furious), Vira (heroic), Bhayanaka (terrible), Bibhatsa (odious) and Adbhuta (marvellous). There was a later addition of the ninth sentiment or Rasa called Santa (peace) in later Sanskrit poetics (pg.102: Natyasastra, Ghosh, 1951). According to ancient Indian aesthetics (especially in the context of Bharatas’ ‘Natyasastra’, Anandavardhana’s ‘Dhvanyaloka’ and Abhinavagupta’s ‘Abhinavabharati’), ‘Rasa’ is the relishable state of elemental human emotions called ‘Bhavas’. Bharata’s ‘Natyasastra’ originally spoke of eight Rasas. The concept of the 9th Rasa was a later interpolation by the Kashmiri Shaivist Abhinavagupta (10th Century AD) and also his predecessor Anandavardhana (9th Century AD). Abhinavagupta extends the eight Rasas by adding the concept of the Santa Rasa which he regards as the essence of all Rasas. It is this 9th Rasa which according to Abhinavagupta lets the Rasika attain the aesthetic detachment and savour the essences of all other Rasas and therefore the true aesthetic delight. The introduction of 9th Rasa integrates the concepts of Bharata’s Rasasutra and Patanjali’s Yoga theory – the detachment necessary to introspect inwards into the inherent state of freedom and bliss (aesthetic consciousness). (shrink)

The article aimed to determine the relationship between neuroscience and emotional states in university faculty members from Latin America during the post-pandemic stage of COVID-19. It highlights the importance of understanding emotions from a neuroscientific perspective to develop strategies that enhance emotional management and resilience in the educational context. The descriptive-correlational research included a sample of 318 faculty members from various Latin American countries. The results revealed severe levels of stress (88.4%) and anxiety (92.1%), as well as (...) inadequate (40.9%) or moderate (46.9%) levels of resilience among the faculty members. A strong positive correlation was found between neuroscience and emotional states (rho=0.860), as well as a good positive correlation between neuroscience and resilience (rho=0.739). The study concludes that the knowledge and application of neuroscience principles could contribute to lower levels of stress and anxiety and increase resilience in university faculty members, emphasizing the importance of integrating these disciplines into the understanding and management of emotions in the educational field. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the metaphysics of emotion. It defends the claim that all emotional states, whether dormant or active, are dispositional, arguing against the prevailing view that dispositional emotional states are dispositions to go into actual emotional states. A clear distinction may be made between first-order and second-order emotional dispositions, where second-order emotional dispositions are dispositions of emotional sensitivity and first-order emotional dispositions are the emotional states (...) themselves. Active emotional states are treated as dispositional emotional states in the process of being manifested, not as different states altogether. Describing active states as occurrent states is misleading as it suggests an exclusive distinction between active/occurrent and dispositional, which is what is being questioned. The idea that dispositional states have no subjectivity is challenged, as is the argument that being flooded with a feeling as a result of an encounter with a frightening or aggravating situation cannot be the manifestation of a disposition. (shrink)

This study measured hand and head action strengths of eight typical emotional states using an authentic but implicit emotion elicitation task. Participants listened to and then retold five stories in which eight typical emotional states were experienced by the narrators. The number of hand and head gestures that occur naturally while experiencing an emotional state was used as an index to determine the hand and head action strength of that emotional state. Results showed a (...) larger number of head gestures than hand gestures, suggesting that head action strengths of the eight emotional states are stronger than their hand action strengths. These findings are consistent with the data extracted from Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms (LSN), although the two sets of data were gathered in two completely different experimental conditions and in two different languages. Furthermore, our data showed a prototypical directionality effect for the typical emotional states, specifically, happiness, anger and pride were primarily accompanied by upward gestures but downward gestures for sadness and shame; surprise was primarily accompanied by forward gestures but backward gestures for fear and disgust. (shrink)

Research on mental health of non-professional caregivers has focused on caregivers of people with specific diseases, especially dementia. Less is known about caregivers of people with other diseases. The aims of this study were (a) to determine the caregivers’ emotional state in a random sample of caregivers of people in situations of dependency, (b) to analyze the association between each disease of the care-recipient (a variety of 23 diseases included in the International Classification of Diseases) and the emotional (...) state of the caregiver, and (c) based on the theoretical model, to analyze the relationship of the different study variables in the appearance of the emotional distress of the caregiver. A sample of 491 non-professional caregivers was selected randomly (89.0% women, average age 55.3 years). Trained psychologists collected sociodemographic and care-related characteristics and evaluated the global emotional distress, somatic symptoms, anxiety-insomnia, social dysfunction, depression, probable mental disorder case, self-esteem and social support. It was found that (a) the caregivers showed moderate emotional distress, and 33.8% presented a probable mental disorder. (b) Caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy was related to suffering from social dysfunction, and caring for a care-recipient with autism was related to having a probable mental health case. (c) Social support mediated the relationship between social class, daily hours of care, monthly family income, self-esteem and global emotional distress. There is an important impact on the emotional state of the caregivers. This impact was similar in caregivers of care-recipients with different diseases, except in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy (related to social dysfunction), and in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with autism (related to having a probable mental health case). (shrink)

The thesis that knowledge is a factive mental state plays a central role in knowledge-first epistemology, but accepting this thesis requires also accepting an unusually severe version of externalism about the mind. On this strong attitude externalism, whether S is in the mental state of knowledge can and often will rapidly change in virtue of changes in external states of reality with which S has no causal contact. It is commonly thought that this externalism requirement originates in the (...) factivity of knowledge. However, despite a number of recent defenses of non-factive accounts of knowledge, epistemology has yet to consider whether a non-factive approach might produce a version of the mental state thesis that can avoid strong externalism. Here I do just that, exploring how three different proposals for weakening factivity might be adapted to theories of knowledge as a non-factive mental state. Contrary to what we might expect, however, none of these proposals are compatible with anything close to attitude internalism about knowledge—or even a substantially weaker externalism. All told, the widespread view that wraps up the severe externalism required for knowledge to be a mental state in factivity is mistaken. Knowledge’s external-world connection runs far deeper than the factivity constraint. (shrink)

Uncertainty and emotion are an inevitable part of everyday life and play a vital role in mental health. Yet, our understanding of how uncertainty and emotion interact is limited. Here, an online survey was conducted to examine whether uncertainty evokes and modulates a range of negative and positive emotions. The data show that uncertainty is predominantly associated with negative emotional states such as fear/anxiety. However, uncertainty was also found to modulate a variety of other negative and positive (...) class='Hi'>emotional states, depending on the valence of an anticipated outcome and the sub parameter of uncertainty. Uncertainty increased the intensity of negative emotional states and decreased the intensity of positive emotional states. These findings support prior research suggesting that uncertainty is aversive and associated with negative emotional states such as fear and anxiety. However, the findings also revealed that uncertainty is involved in eliciting and modulating a wide array of emotional phenomena beyond fear and anxiety. This study highlights an opportunity for further study of how uncertainty and emotion interactions are conceptualised generally and in relation to mental health. (shrink)

New types of artificial intelligence products are gradually transferring to voice interaction modes with the demand for intelligent products expanding from communication to recognizing users' emotions and instantaneous feedback. At present, affective acoustic models are constructed through deep learning and abstracted into a mathematical model, making computers learn from data and equipping them with prediction abilities. Although this method can result in accurate predictions, it has a limitation in that it lacks explanatory capability; there is an urgent need for an (...) empirical study of the connection between acoustic features and psychology as the theoretical basis for the adjustment of model parameters. Accordingly, this study focuses on exploring the differences between seven major “acoustic features” and their physical characteristics during voice interaction with the recognition and expression of “gender” and “emotional states of the pleasure-arousal-dominance (PAD) model.” In this study, 31 females and 31 males aged between 21 and 60 were invited using the stratified random sampling method for the audio recording of different emotions. Subsequently, parameter values of acoustic features were extracted using Praat voice software. Finally, parameter values were analyzed using a Two-way ANOVA, mixed-design analysis in SPSS software. Results show that gender and emotional states of the PAD model vary among seven major acoustic features. Moreover, their difference values and rankings also vary. The research conclusions lay a theoretical foundation for AI emotional voice interaction and solve deep learning's current dilemma in emotional recognition and parameter optimization of the emotional synthesis model due to the lack of explanatory power. (shrink)

This experiment used event-related potentials to study the tactile-visual information conflict processing in a tactile-visual pairing task and its modulation by tactile-induced emotional states. Eighteen participants were asked to indicate whether the tactile sensation on their body matched or did not match the expected tactile sensation associated with the object depicted in an image. The type of tactile-visual stimuli and the valence of tactile-induced emotional states were manipulated following a 2 × 2 factorial design. Electrophysiological analyses (...) revealed a mismatched minus matched negative difference component between 420 and 620 ms after stimulus onset in the negative tactile-induced emotional state condition. This ND420-620 component was considered as a sign of the cross-modal conflict processing during the processing of incongruent tactile-visual information. In contrast, no significant mismatched minus matched negative difference component was found in the positive tactile-induced emotional state condition. Together, these results support the hypothesis that a positive emotional state induced by a positive tactile stimulation improves tactile-visual conflict processing abilities. (shrink)

The main focus of this article is the occurrence of some polarity items (PIs) in the complements of emotive factive verbs and only. This fact has been taken as a challenge to the semantic approach to PIs (Linebarger 1980), because only and factive verbs are not downward entailing (DE). A modification of the classical DE account is proposed by introducing the notion of nonveridicality (Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1998, 1999, 2001) as the one crucial for PI sanctioning. To motivate (...) this move, it is first shown that two solutions in the direction of weakening classical monotonicity do not work: Strawson DE (von Fintel 1999) and weak DE (Hoeksema 1986). Weakening DE systematically either overgenerates or undergenerates, in either case failing to characterize the correct set of licensers. Nonveridicality is introduced as a conservative extension of DE and is shown to account for PIs also in contexts that are not DE (i.e. questions, modal verbs, imperatives, directive propositional attitudes). This theory, augmented with the premise that certain PIs (i.e. the liberal class represented by any) are subject to a weaker polarity dependency identified not as LICENSING but as RESCUING by nonveridicality, explains the occurrence of this particular class with only and emotive factive verbs. Crosslinguistic comparisons illustrate that the occurrence of PIs with only and emotive factives is not a general phenomenon, and further support the dual nature of polarity dependency and the semantic characterization of the elements that license or rescue PIs. (shrink)

The association between emotional expression and physiological emotional states is at best, modest. Using data from the autonomic nervous system (ANS), central nervous system (CNS), and hormonal systems there appears to be an association which accounts for approximately 10—20% of the variance between them. Excluding measurement error, it is proposed that the need for action and regulation accounts for the low levels of synchrony. Understanding system responses allows for the study of individual differences as a way of (...) understanding both emotional expressions and states. (shrink)

Over the past several decades the ‘affective revolution’ in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More specifically, (...) the ethics of affective consent interventions is assessed in terms of key elements of autonomy, comprehension and voluntariness. While there may appear to be a moral obligation to manage the affective environment to ensure valid informed consent, in circumstances where volunteers may be prone to problematic therapeutic expectancy, this moral obligation needs to be weighed against the potential risks of human instrumentalization. At this point in time we do not have enough information to be able to justify clearly the programmatic manipulation of human subjects' affective states. The lack of knowledge about affective interventions requires corresponding caution in its ethical justification. (shrink)

Although implicit tests of positive and negative affect exist, implicit measures of distinct emotional states are scarce. Three experiments examined whether a novel implicit emotion-assessment task, the rating of emotion expressed in abstract images, would reveal distinct emotional states. In Experiment 1, participants exposed to a sadness-inducing story inferred more sadness, and less happiness, in abstract images. In Experiment 2, an anger-provoking interaction increased anger ratings. In Experiment 3, compared to neutral images, spider images increased fear (...) ratings in spider-fearful participants but not in controls. In each experiment, the implicit task indicated elevated levels of the target emotion and did not indicate elevated levels of non-target negative emotions; the task thus differentiated among emotional states of the same valence. Correlations also supported the convergent and discriminant validity of the implicit task. Supporting the possibility that heuristic processes underlie the ratings, group differences were stronger among those who responded relatively quickly. (shrink)

Phraseology is a treasury of language. It is the fruit, which was born in the result of a long process of the practical use of the language. Phraseologisms give the speech power, persuasiveness, brilliance and imagery. They enliven the language and make it more emotional. In this article, we focus on the negative psycho-emotional state of a person. The negative psycho-emotional state of a person is emotion and feelings that are formed in the result of the negative (...) mood of a person and related to the dissatisfaction with vital needs. The authors of the article identified 5 phraseological subgroups that characterize the negative psycho-emotional state of a person: anger ; disgust, hatred; terror ; anxiety, agitation; sadness, melancholy. (shrink)

The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices.