Exception from Informed Consent (EFIC) regulations detail specific circumstances in which Institutional Review Boards (IRB) can approve studies where obtaining informed consent is not possible prior to subject enrollment.To better understand how IRB members evaluate community consultation (CC) and public disclosure (PD) processes and results, semi-structured interviews of EFIC-experienced IRB members were conducted and analyzed using thematic analysis.Interviews with 11 IRB members revealed similar approaches to reviewing EFIC studies. Most use summaries of CC activities to determine community members’ attitudes; (...) none reported using specific criteria nor recalled any CC reviews that resulted in modifications to or denials of EFIC studies. Most interviewees thought metrics based on Community VOICES’s domains (feasibility, participant selection, quality of communication, community perceptions, investigator/IRB perceptions) would be helpful.IRB members had similar experiences and concerns about reviewing EFIC studies. Development of metrics to assess CC processes may be useful to IRBs reviewing EFIC studies. (shrink)

Exceptionally Common Courage provides an extended, close reading of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard's well-known, pseudonymous book about Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. It then fits this (in)famous work into the broader and puzzling corpus that includes both other pseudonymous works and signed discourses by this same mercurial author. Though not the first to tackle Kierkegaard from the direction of either a single work or the whole authorship, this two-in-one book relates whole and part to whole and part in a way that (...) reads like a genuine musical counterpoint. The scholarly debates inevitably generated by any treatment of Fear and Trembling are here addressed in ways that arise from a detailed interpretation of the text itself without letting secondary material interrupt the primary train of thought. Along the way, Kierkegaard's ideas are brought into conversation with a much broader than usual cannon of interlocutors, including such figures as Elizabeth Stuart Phelps and James Baldwin, R.H. Tawney and Wendell Berry. And by the end, the complex movement of the entire authorship becomes audible above the various isolated and doctrinaire notes typically highlighted in comparable studies. The recurring melody is about existential courage, about the risk of emotionally investing in earthly goods against the ambiguous inevitability of their loss. Woven throughout Kierkegaard's so-called esthetic and religious writings, this common task of facing threats to the integral meaning of human experience stands out in arresting color. As the chapters unfold, this understanding of faith as a form of courage provides not just direction, but a topographical score for what is originally a highly indirect and elusive textual arrangement. (shrink)

ExcerptWalter Benjamin's famous statement in the eighth of his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” that “the state of [exception] in which we live is not the exception but the rule,”1 has become as normalized as its proposition asserts. Few turns of phrase have become as easily convertible, turning the “special property” (of the definition of a Greek idioma) through collocation into an implicit signified conventionalized by common usage. In the phrases turning on the elements “the exception” (...) and “the rule,” the antonyms are being assimilated to each other, neutralizing their oppositional relation—not as a matter of a mystical “attraction…. (shrink)

Within a state-space approach endowed with a generalized potential function, mental states can be systematically characterized by their stability against perturbations. This approach yields three major classes of states: (1) asymptotically stable categorial states, (2) marginally stable non-categorial states and (3) unstable acategorial states. The particularly interesting case of states giving rise to exceptional experiences will be elucidated in detail. Their proper classification will be related to Metzinger’s account of self-model and world-model, and empirical support for this classification will be (...) surveyed. Eventually, it will be outlined how Metzinger’s discussion of intentionality achieves pronounced significance within a dual-aspect framework of thinking. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin’s writings are often read in terms of their emphasis on undecidability. This article focuses on Benjamin’s view of decision as a philosophic capacity to suspend recognizable myth. Myth is recognizable as closure. Myth becomes recognizable as myth when exceptions and extremes arise in relation to it. Without necessarily following the specific exception or extreme (which may itself be mythic), philosophy is a politics that is attuned to the capacity of an exception or extreme to perform the (...) limit of a specific mythic form. In elaborating philosophically impelled decision as a capacity to take exception to myth, the article compares Benjamin’s works with writings by Agamben, Schmitt, Hiller, Sorel, Derrida and others. At various points in the article, and especially towards the end, the discussion of the notion of philosophic decision includes consideration of ways in which aspects of Benjamin’s enmity to myth might themselves become mythic, unphilosophic. (shrink)

Genetic testing practices are increasingly advancing clinical medicine. This process of ‘routinisation of genetics’ has been conceived as a medical and ethical problem mainly because of the assumption that non-geneticists might lack the necessary skills to provide these services. In particular, the relevant theoretical knowledge in clinical genetics is viewed as insufficient in general practitioners and physicians from other specialities. Empirical findings seem to indicate significant variations not only in theoretical but also in practical knowledge between geneticists and non-geneticists. Several (...) fields of practical knowledge—regarding for example the focus of clinical action, the relevance of therapeutic action or the normative framework—can be identified that are or could be areas of conflict when the routinisation of genetic services proceeds. From an ethical point of view, these variations in know how and background are especially relevant whenever the respective genetic service is concerned with medical information of exceptional normative quality, such as, for example, in prenatal genetic screening and diagnosis of untreatable conditions. Here, the clinically acquired practical knowledge of the non-geneticist could be particularly misleading insofar as there is no relation to therapy and—in a narrow sense—no clinical utility to be assessed. Non-geneticists need a chance to acquire the relevant theoretical and practical knowledge in order to understand and fulfil their own duties in the respective situations in a way that secures the important rights at stake of their patients and clients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Exception in Žižek’s ThoughtErik Vogt (bio)One cannot fail to be struck by the repeated occurrences and invocations of some logic of exception as well as by the proliferation of examples or stand-ins for exceptional positions (“Jew”; “woman”; “class struggle”) or exceptional collectives (“proletariat”; “slum dwellers”) in many of Slavoj Žižek’s writings. The significance of thinking exception is evident not only in Žižek’s powerful reconceptualization of (a (...) supposedly outdated) ideology critique and in his intriguing materialist account of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, but also in his interventions into contemporary debates as to what constitutes proper politics. For this reason, it might be appropriate, in a first sketch, to attempt to weave together some of the threads that combine into Žižek’s (critique of the) logic of exception.11The Symptom and Its Logic of ExceptionAlready Žižek’s early brilliant elaboration of a contemporary ideology critique in terms of a powerful coarticulation of Marx and Freud analyzes the “social symptom” in light of its hidden logic of exception [Sublime Object 11–53]. Since the “social symptom” is not to be grasped as some imbalance external to universality, but rather as its constitutive moment, it marks “a point of breakdown heterogeneous” to a given universal field that at the same time is “necessary for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form” [21]. A symptomatic ideology critique will seize on the logic of exception implicit in the fissures of universality by deciphering its “falseness,” insofar “as it necessarily includes a specific case which breaks its unity, lays open its falsity” [21]. What is impossible, then, is the claim to some totality or universality without including in it “the point of exception functioning as its internal negation” [23]. This seems to suggest that the “social symptom” does not present any obstacles to its ideological-critical decipherment according to the logic of exception. However, Žižek makes clear immediately that it often does not effect the dissolution of the “social symptom”; on the contrary, it might even reinforce it, insofar as this interpretive procedure appeals to and relies on an addressee that continues to be figured in terms of consistency, completeness, totality. Consequently, this interpretive procedure of dissolving the symptom remains stuck in the very logic of exception that it attempts to unearth [73–74]. This is the reason why Žižek suggests supplementing this notion of the “social symptom” as ciphered message with the notion of fantasy. He describes the relation between symptom and fantasy in the following manner: “Symptom implies and addresses some non-barred, consistent big Other which will retroactively confer on it its meaning; fantasy implies a crossed-out, barred, non-whole, inconsistent [End Page 61] Other—that is to say, it is filling out a void in the Other” [74]. A contemporary ideology critique will therefore have to account for both the exceptional status of the social symptom and its underlying social fantasy. In other words, ideology critiques must consist of two stages, of two complementary procedures:—one is discursive, the “symptomal reading” of the ideological text [...] demonstrating how a given ideological field is a result of a montage of heterogeneous “floating signifiers,” of their totalization through the intervention of certain “nodal points”;—the other aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the way in which [...] an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy.[125]In short, what is required from ideology critique is an interpretation of the social symptom in such a way that it brings to light the very fundamental fantasy that, precisely as a preideological blockage to interpretation, has then to be traversed and correlated to the identification with the symptom. The social symptom has to be grasped as master signifier and as objet a. And Žižek illustrates the working of (a theory of) ideology via anti-Semitism and its construction of the “Jew.”2Briefly, anti-Semitic ideology articulates the “Jew” through a network of symbolic “overdetermination”; that is, the “Jew” becomes the point of condensation for heterogeneous and often incompatible attributes. What has to be taken into account, moreover, is the inversion... (shrink)

The concept of the exception has heavily shaped modern political theory. In modernity, Kierkegaard was one of the first philosophers to propound the exception as a facilitator of metaphysical transcendence. Merging Kierkegaard’s metaphysical exception with early modern political theorist Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, Carl Schmitt introduced sovereignty to metaphysics. He thereby made an early modern concept usable in a post-metaphysical world. This essay carries Schmitt’s appropriation one step further. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s replacement of transcendental metaphysics (...) with contingent creaturehood, it reintroduces the anti-foundationalist concept of repetition that was implicit in Kierkegaard’s paradigm but which was not made lucid until Benjamin crafted from the Schmittian exception a vision of political life grounded in creaturely existence. -/- . (shrink)

This article investigates Karl Barth's ethics of war and its reception by placing the discussion within the larger framework of the general ethics of Church Dogmatics II/2 and the special ethics of Church Dogmatics III/4. It gives careful attention to the infamously problematic “exceptional case” to illumine what sort of “exception,” if any, the provocative passages on war entail. The outlines of Barth's ethical framework and the Grenzfall, or borderline case, provide the background for the re‐evaluation of three common (...) interpretations of his views on war. (shrink)

BackgroundIn specific situations it may be necessary to make an exception to the general rule of informed consent for scientific research with an intervention. Earlier reviews only described subsets of arguments for exceptions to waive consent.MethodsHere, we provide a more extensive literature review of possible exceptions to the rule of informed consent and the accompanying arguments based on literature from 1997 onwards, using both Pubmed and PsycINFO in our search strategy.ResultsWe identified three main categories of arguments for the acceptability (...) of a consent waiver: data validity and quality, major practical problems, and distress or confusion of participants. Approval by a medical ethical review board always needs to be obtained. Further, we provide examples of specific conditions under which consent waiving might be allowed, such as additional privacy protection measures.ConclusionsThe reasons legitimized by the authors of the papers in this overview can be used by researchers to form their own opinion about requesting an exception to the rule of informed consent for their own study. Importantly, rules and guidelines applicable in their country, institute and research field should be followed. Moreover, researchers should also take the conditions under which they feel an exception is legitimized under consideration. After discussions with relevant stakeholders, a formal request should be sent to an IRB. (shrink)

Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to this question, in particular the thesis that there are no laws outside of fundamental physics, are examined and rejected. It is suggested that one can account for exceptions by conceiving of laws as strictly universal determination relations between (instances of) properties. When a natural property is instantiated, laws of nature give rise to other, typically dispositional properties. In exceptional situations, such properties manifest themselves either in an (...) unusual way or not at all. (shrink)

What is the link between patients' rights to NHS treatment and PCTs' duties to live within their budgets? This was the issue in Rogers v Swindon PCT [2006], in which a patient had been denied trastuzamab (Herceptin®) for early-stage breast cancer. In principle, rationing is lawful and PCTs have to make hard choices about spending priorities, but they may not ignore the interests of needy patients in doing so. Rather, they must balance the 'corporate' interests of the PCT with the (...) 'clinical' interests of individuals. One way of doing so is to adopt an Ethical Framework at the macro-level to guide NHS resource allocation, but to also recognize 'exceptional cases' at the micro-level, even if the treatment is generally considered to be a low priority. This article is primarily concerned with these micro-level cases. Patients and clinicians should know how the balance is struck. Such a system operates in Berkshire, but there is plenty of room for debate about how it should develop. (shrink)

This paper revisits Giorgio Agamben’s text The Time That Remains and through a comparative analysis contrasts the author’s reading of St Paul’s Romans to relevant Derridean thematics prevalent in the text. Specific themes include language, the law, and the subject. I illustrate how Agamben attempts to revitalise the idea of philosophical anthropology by breaking away from the deconstructive approach. Agamben argues that language is an experience but is currently in a state of nihilism. Consequently, the subject has become lost; or, (...) more specifically, the subject and its object have not disappeared in language but through language. The resuscitation of experience is thus required to defeat this condition: only in language does the subject have its site and origin. Unlike deconstruction, which highlights an inherent paradox within a situation unearthing a questionable foundation, Agamben argues that, by investigating the “exception,” one finds neither a norm nor an inherent truth of the situation, but the confusion which surrounds them both. (shrink)

This article examines the lasting phenomenological consequences of inhabiting “spaces” of exception by rethinking the operation of sovereign violence therein. Taking as its point of departure Giorgio Agamben’s suggestion that the ‘state of exception’ is the ‘rule’ of modern politics, I argue that arbitrary sovereign violence has taken the place of the ‘sovereign decision’ of Carl Schmitt’s original theory. However, recognizing that it is neither enough simply to articulate the institutional grid of intelligibility of the state of (...) class='Hi'>exception nor expose the logics of sovereignty that make possible arbitrary violence, it draws on phenomenology, affect theory, and trauma studies to reorient our focus from the sovereign to the subject upon whom sovereign power is executed. Ultimately it proposes a new understanding of modern subjecthood as one of existential insecurity generated by the ‘new age of anxiety’ permeating social and political life today. (shrink)

For the first time a uniform compositional derivation is given for quantified sentences containing exceptive constructions. The semantics of exceptives is primarily one of subtraction from the domain of a quantifier. The crucial semantic difference between the highly grammaticized but-phrases and free exceptives is that the former have the Uniqueness Condition as part of their lexical meaning whereas the latter are mere set subtractors. Several empirical differences between the two types of exceptives are shown to follow from this basic lexical (...) difference. (shrink)

Investigations of innate talent should narrow the definition of talent to deal with constituent abilities, identify touchstone phenomena, and provide detailed explanations of these phenomena. A list of relevant phenomena is proposed.

This paper is not a study of F.H.Bradley’s influence on T.S.Eliot, nor of the relationship between philosophy and poetry. Despite its concern with poetry, language and thought, it does not attempt to enlist Eliot as a ‘poet in a destitute time’. () It has grown out of a confrontation with Eliot’s writing and the contradictions inherent in his poetry where, it might be said, jouissance erupts in negations. ().

In this paper, I have proposed a compositional semantic analysis of exception NPs from which three core properties of exception constructions could be derived. I have shown that this analysis overcomes various empirical and conceptual shortcomings of prior proposals of the semantics of exception sentences. The analysis was first formulated for simple exception NPs, where the EP-complement was considered a set-denoting term and the EP-associate was a monadic quantifier. It was then generalized in two steps: first, (...) in order to account for quantified EP-complements, and second, in order to account for polyadic quantifiers as the EP-associates. An additional assumption that was made in several places was that EPs may operate at the level of implications. The consequences of this assumption, though, still have to be investigated. (shrink)

abstract In what follows I respond to Henry Shue's paper by focusing on three principal themes. The first is the relation of philosophical theory to practice, in which I agree that philosophers have to run the risks attendant upon applying reason to concrete cases. The second is the use of examples in moral philosophy, in particular the example used in the justification of torture as an exception; here I draw distinctions between different types of examples in philosophy and the (...) uses to which they are put. Thirdly, in a brief consideration of our responses to climate change I suggest that, contra Shue, we are not being asked to go beyond a normal requirement so much as to re-establish the boundaries of what counts as normal. (shrink)

In Rogers, the Court of Appeal held that the decision of Swindon N.H.S. Primary Care Trust to refuse to fund Herceptin for the treatment of Ann Rogers against breast cancer was irrational. The P.C.T. maintained that their decision was not resource driven but based on the fact that Herceptin was, at that time, not licensed by the European Medicines Agency (E.M.E.A.) for use in early stage breast cancer. Yet it was prepared to fund its use in ‹exceptional circumstances’ which could (...) only be based upon the personal situation of the patient. In this note, I focus upon the ‹exceptionality’ argument in the context of the patient as consumer of healthcare and women as carers. I argue for a focus upon caring rather than consumerism in healthcare. (shrink)

The former consensus stipulating the singularity and incomprehensibility of Nazism and the "Final Solution" has been challenged in recent years from two perspectives. Microhistorical works and studies of poststructuralist orientation have emphasized the normal and ordinary aspects that link Nazism and the Holocaust to the postwar period. Both approaches differ in their understanding of the concept of historical truth, but together they stress the need for close-range, contextualist methods for studying the emergence of the "Final Solution" and the development of (...) its representation and memorialization since 1945. This paradigmatic change in the perception of Nazism from an exceptional to an exemplary event apparent in recent scholarship in the United States follows similar developments in Germany. In both countries the rejection of the concept of singularity and the use of contextualist methods developed as a result of a more general generational transformation. Younger scholars born after World War II seek to integrate Nazism within its wider historical context and use knowledge about Nazism and the "Final Solution" as a key to better understanding of the modern era and contemporary societies, a project hitherto discouraged by the notion of Nazism's exceptionality. (shrink)

Exceptions are often cited as a counterargument against formal causation. Against this I argue that Aristotle explicitly allows for exceptions to essences in his biological writings, and that he has a means of explaining them through formal causation – though this means that he has to slightly elaborate on his general case theory from the Posterior Analytics, by supplementing it with a special case application in the biological writings. Specifically for Aristotle an essential predication need not be a universal predication. (...) Rather an essential predication is where a property belongs essentially to a species or genus. This essential predication serves a causal and explanatory role, and is not dependent on a corresponding universal predication. (shrink)

RESUMEN Para analizar la gubernamentalidad neoliberal, se asume como problema la caracterización de las formas contemporáneas de ejercicio del poder bajo una nueva modalidad de soberanía política localizada en el mercado. Se proponen las nociones de inmunidad y excepción como claves hermenéuticas, y se establece un diálogo entre las derivas foucaultianas de los trabajos de R. Esposito y G. Agamben. Se muestra cómo la relación entre poder y vida asume una forma estratificada y diferenciada, siguiendo una racionalidad de gobierno que (...) encuentra en el cálculo del riesgo el operador funcional de sus intervenciones estratégicas sobre la población. ABSTRACT In order to analyze neoliberal governmentality, the article addresses the issue of the characterization of contemporary forms of exercise of power under a new modality of political sovereignty located in the market. It suggests the notions of immunity and exception as hermeneutical keys and establishes a dialogue between the Foucauldian drift of the work of R. Esposito and G. Agamben. The article also shows how the relation between power and life takes on a stratified and differentiated form when it follows a rationality for government that makes risk calculation the functional operator of its strategic interventions in the population. (shrink)

Thought experiment is one of the most widely-used and least understood techniques in philosophy. A thought experiment is a process of reasoning carried out within the context of a well-articulated imaginary scenario in order to answer a specific question about a non-imaginary situation. The aim of my dissertation is to show that both the powers and the limits of this methodology can be traced to the fact that when the contemplation of an imaginary scenario brings us to new knowledge, it (...) does so by forcing us to make sense of exceptional cases. ;The dissertation has five chapters: an introduction, three case studies and a conclusion. My main contention is that certain patterns of features which coincide only fortuitously may nonetheless play a central role in the organization of our concepts, and that to the extent that imaginary scenarios involve disruptions of these patterns, our first-order judgments about them are often distorted or even inverted. ;In the introduction and conclusion, I discuss the role of imaginary exceptions in the acquisition of new knowledge. I argue that appeal to imaginary cases is unavoidable because the world is neither maximally replete nor effortlessly navigable, and that appeal to exceptional cases is indispensable if we wish to avoid mistaking accidental regularities for regularities that reflect deeper truths about the world. ;In the first case study, I discuss a famous thought experiment of Galileo's, and I try to show that the guided contemplation of an imaginary scenario can provide us with new scientific knowledge in a way that argument alone cannot. In the second case study, I try to show that standard interpretations of the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus founder because they ignore the importance of the background norms against which we can make sense of local instances of extrinsically-determined identity. And in the third case study, I try to show that thought experiments in the personal identity literature are inconclusive because they disregard the explanatory role played by contingent facts about the ways human beings come into existence. (shrink)

This chapter shows how libertarianism can be seen to be a moral theory that explains exceptions to earlier moral norms and principles and the chapter shows how various exceptions to libertarian principles, including necessity and unconscionability exceptions, can be seen to lead beyond libertarianism to contractarian theories of morality and justice. The chapteer raises a general problem for contractarian theories and shows how the problem applies to the theories of Rawls and Habermas. This sets the stage for the book’s own (...) meta-level consequentialist explanation of the exceptions in the next chapter. (shrink)

This paper deals with the exceptions-tolerance property of generic sentences with indefinite singular and bare plural subjects (IS and BP generics, respectively) and with the way this property is connected to some well-known observations about felicity differences between the two types of generics (e.g. Lawler's 1973, Madrigals are popular vs. #A madrigal is popular). I show that whereas both IS and BP generics tolerate exceptional and contextually irrelevant individuals and situations in a strikingly similar way, which indicates the existence of (...) a basically equivalent tolerance mechanism, there is also a difference between them, unnoticed so far, which concerns the degree to which the properties of the legitimate exceptions can be characterized in advance. Following claims in Greenberg (2003), I argue that both this newly observed difference as well as the traditional felicity differences result from an underlying contrast in the type of ‘non-accidentalness’ expressed by the two types of generic sentences, and more formally, in the accessibility relations that their generic quantifier (Gen) is compatible with. To capture the new difference in tolerance of exceptions, I develop an improved version of the exceptions-tolerance mechanism for generic sentences suggested in Kadmon & Landman (1993), namely, a restriction on the set of individuals and situations quantified by Gen, which is partially vague to two different degrees using supervaluationist methods. The different degrees of vagueness in this restriction are shown to be systematically dependent on the two types of accessibility relations that IS and BP generics are compatible with, which are redefined as precise and vague restrictions on the generic quantification over worlds. (shrink)

This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...) with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism. (shrink)

Nous tenons généralement pour acquis et même évident que les êtres humains ont une supériorité sur les autres espèces et sur la nature en général. Ne sommes-nous pas appelés à "dominer la nature" et, par l'intelligence et l'esprit d'entreprise, à en tirer le meilleur pour le bénéfice de tous? Or, cette exception humaine est aujourd'hui de plus en plus vivement contestée, surtout à l'égard des animaux, mais aussi par la mise en cause de la domination de la nature dont (...) on mesure les effets catastrophiques pour notre avenir commun. Cette contestation n'est pas une question purement académique. Elle a des répercussions considérables sur le statut de l'homme et sur son rapport au monde. Ce livre prend la mesure des conséquences de ces critiques, mais veut surtout défendre la thèse d'une exception de l'humanité en développant une anthropologie de la vulnérabilité humaine qui, loin des rationalismes ambitieux, donne à l'espèce humaine sa juste place, admet sa fragilité et fonde aussi le respect qu'on lui doit. Il récuse tout autant le mythe d'une société prétendument "postmortelle" qui, en réalité, relève des mêmes illusions que les thèses sur la fin de l'exception humaine. (shrink)

Interest in home birth appears to be growing among American women, and most obstetricians can expect to encounter patients who are considering home birth. In 2011, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) issued an opinion statement intended to guide obstetricians in responding to such patients.In this article, I examine the ACOG statement in light of the historical and contemporary clinical realities surrounding home birth in the United States, an examination guided in part by my own experiences as an (...) obstetrician in home-birth-friendly and homebirth-unfriendly medical milieus. Comparison with other guidelines indicates that ACOG treats home birth as an ethical exception: comparable evidence leads to strikingly different recommendations in the case of home birth and the case of trial of labor following a prior cesarean; and ACOG treats other controversial issues that involve similar ethical questions quite differently.By casting the provision of information as not just the primary but the sole ethical responsibility of the obstetrician, ACOG statement obviates obstetricians’ responsibilities to provide appropriate clinical care and to make the safest possible clinical environment for those mothers who choose home birth and for their newborns. What, on its face, seems to be a statement of respect for women’s autonomy, implicitly authorizes behaviors that unethically restrain truly autonomous choices. Obstetricians need not attend home births, I argue. Our ethical duties do, however, oblige us (1) to refer clients to skilled clinicians who will attend home birth, (2) to continue respectful antenatal care for those women choosing home birth, (3) to provide appropriate consultation to home birth attendants, and (4) to ensure that transfers of care are smooth and nonpunitive. (shrink)

There has been a resurgence of interest in cosmopolitanism in contemporary political theory, based upon the hopeful premise that it heralds an ameliorative response to the malignity of sovereignty's lack and the treacherous violence of sovereignty's excess. The promise of cosmopolitanism inheres in the claim that state sovereignty is and should be supplemented by an international system backed by the legitimacy of international law, grounded in the sovereignty of human rights. Drawing upon Foucault and Agamben, my argument in this essay (...) is that the laudable endeavour of liberal cosmopolitans is flawed in two ways: first, cosmopolitanism cannot escape sovereign violence, because it cannot escape sovereignty; and second, cosmopolitans misconstrue the composition of the very sovereignty they aim to escape. This means that cosmopolitan theorists are unable to identify cosmopolitan practices of sovereignty that also entail forms of violence: cosmopolitan exception. Cosmopolitan exception denotes violent sovereign practices that cannot be differentiated from the protection of rights. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that in emergency cases, physician autonomy is soci-etally constrained under Principle VI of the American Medical Association's “Principles of Medical Ethics”1 The issue will be seen to turn on whether the contextual use of “emergency” should be construed narrowly or broadly; I argue for a broadened rendering. Although a societal emergency is not defined here, I recommend that the condition of inner city healthcare presents a paradigm “patient” for such emergency care. I further urge (...) that because societal constraints on physician autonomy are ambiguous and only derived indirectly in the AMA document, further AMA comment on physician autonomy and societal responsibility would advance clarity on the profession's commitment to the public trust. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBased on the case of Rosa, a nine‐year‐old girl who was denied a therapeutic abortion, this article analyzes the role played by the social in medical practice. For that purpose, it compares the different application of two similar pieces of legislation in Costa Rica, where both the practice of abortion and sterilization are restricted to the protection of health and life by the Penal Code. As a concept subject to interpretation, a broad conception of medical necessity could enable an ample (...) use of the therapeutic exception and a liberal use of both surgeries. The practice of therapeutic sterilization has been generalized in Costa Rica and has become the legitimate way to distribute contraceptive sterilization. In contrast, therapeutic abortion is very rarely practiced. The analysis carried out proposes that it is the difference in social acceptance of abortion and sterilization that explains the different use that doctors, as gatekeepers of social morality, make of medical necessity. (shrink)

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, states have funneled exceptional amounts of public funding into research and development of diagnostics, treatments and vaccines to help fight the virus. In th...

L’article examine le problème des restrictions qu’il faut apporter à la loi des trois états : la loi du développement de l’esprit est-elle valable à tous les degrés de l’échelle hiérarchique? Ou bien la mathématique fait-elle exception à la loi historique? La réponse apportée par Brentano est assez surprenante et semble même contradictoire. Dans certains textes, il soutient que la mathématique est soumise au même régime que les autres branches du savoir ; et que si restriction il y a, (...) ces restrictions doivent être pensées avec Comte, et non pas contre lui. Dans d’autres textes, Brentano semble se ranger à la position critique de J. S. Mill. Comment concilier ces affirmations apparemment contradictoires? On se propose de répondre à cette question en montrant que la position de Brentano a évolué au tournant des années 1870, et en indiquant le rôle de la nouvelle classification des sciences dans cette évolution. (shrink)

Drawing on comparisons to genetic exceptionalism, Cheung et al. (2025) reject psychedelic exceptionalism—that psychedelics raise unique concerns regarding increased vulnerability and diminished aut...

abstract Because we are more comfortable with judgements of conceptual conceivability than with judgements of practical possibility, we content ourselves with imaginary cases, which are useless for making many decisions that practical people most need to make, notably all-things-considered decisions about when to follow an admitted general principle and when to make an exception. The diverse cases of climate change, preventive attack, and torture all illustrate how the avoidance of the difficult task of integrating empirical judgements with conceptual judgements (...) through the flight into the sanitized abstraction of imaginary cases undermines attempts at practical ethics. All three cases involve allegedly exceptional, or emergency, situations, although climate change seems to require more than the usual compliance with general principle while preventive attack and torture supposedly require less than the usual compliance. By my lights the proposed exceptions are, respectively, fully, sometimes, and never justified. But the fundamental point is that one unfortunately cannot decide any of the cases without assessing what is in fact likely as well as what is conceptually possible. (shrink)

A proposal by Ferguson [2003, Argumentation 17, 335–346] for a fully monotonic argument form allowing for the expression of defeasible generalizations is critically examined and rejected as a general solution. It is argued that (i) his proposal reaches less than the default-logician’s solution allows, e.g., the monotonously derived conclusion is one-sided and itself not defeasible. (ii) when applied to a suitable example, his proposal derives the wrong conclusion. Unsuccessful remedies are discussed.

When faced with a rule that they take to be true, and a recalcitrant example, people are apt to say: “The exception proves the rule”. When pressed on what they mean by this though, things are often less than clear. A common response is to dredge up some once-heard etymology: ‘proves’ here, it is often said, means ‘tests’. But this response—its frequent appearance even in some reference works notwithstanding1—makes no sense of the way in which the expression is used. (...) To insist that the exception proves the rule is to insist that whilst this is an exception, the rule still stands; and furthermore, that, rather than undermining the rule, the exception serves to confirm it. This second claim may seem paradoxical, but it should not, once it is realized that what does the confirming is not the exception itself, but rather the fact that we judge it to be an exception; and that what is confirmed is not the rule itself, but rather the fact that we judge it to be a rule. To treat something as an exception is not to treat it as a counterexample that refutes the existence of the rule. Rather it is to treat it as special, and so to concede the rule from which it is excepted. The point comes clearly in the original (probably 17th Century) Latin form: Exceptio probat (figit2) regulam in casibus non exceptis. Exception (i.e. the act of excepting) proves (establishes) the rule in the cases not excepted. Clearly this form of reasoning cannot apply when the rule that we are considering has the form of a simple universal generalization. Here there can be no exceptions, only counterexamples. So what we need, and what will be developed.. (shrink)

I argue that the exception must be a legitimate possibility within law as a revolutionary project, in much the same way that civil disobedience is. In this sense, the exception is not outside law if by "law" we mean not positive law as defined by extant legal documents (statutes, legislative committee reports, written judgments, etc.) but law as a living tradition consisting of both abstract norms and a concrete historical understanding of them. So construed, the exception is (...) what can be exemplary - a law unto itself that best interprets and creatively extends (and transcends) the law that already exists, in order to make it inclusive of the other. In the final analysis, immigration law forces us to consider both the concrete individuality and abstract humanity of refugees, asylum seekers and other homeless persons who have been displaced by global economic underdevelopment. When combined with the "statelessness" of desperate classes of immigrants, this fact about immigration law reveals a revolutionary possibility for future development and perfection leading to its own transcendence: from an inhospitable immigration law that is administered exclusively by the nation state to a cosmopolitan law of universal citizenship under the auspices of a global human rights regime. (shrink)

Introduction : Picturing technology -- A sense of the transcendental -- The blank page -- Embodiment conditions -- Three exceptional technologies -- Which way to turn? -- Conclusion : Exceptional technologies, not technological exceptionalism.

You find yourself in a court of law, accused of having hit someone. What can you do to avoid conviction? You could simply deny the accusation: 'No, I didn't do it'. But suppose you did do it. You may then give a different answer. 'Yes, I hit him', you grant, 'but it was self-defence'; or 'Yes, but I was acting under duress'. To answer in this way-to offer a 'Yes, but...' reply-is to hold that your particular wrong was committed in (...) exceptional circumstances. Perhaps it is true that, as a rule, wrongdoers ought to be convicted. But in your case the court should set the rule aside. You should be acquitted. Within limits, the law allows for exceptions. Or so we tend to think. In fact, the line between rules and exceptions is harder to draw than it seems. How are we to determine what counts as an exception and what as part of the relevant rule? The distinction has important practical implications. But legal theorists have found the notion of an exception surprisingly difficult to explain. This is the longstanding jurisprudential problem that this book seeks to solve. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, Defeasibility in Question, introduces the topic and articulates the core puzzle of defeasibility in law. Part II, Defeasibility in Theory, develops a comprehensive proof-based account of legal exceptions. Part III, Defeasibility in Action, looks more closely into the workings of exceptions in accusatory contexts, including the criminal trial. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented acceleration of research. Thousands of papers have been published in a very short time across a wide range of academic disciplines. This has already led to instances of research misconduct and articles have been withdrawn from prominent journals very soon after being published. It has also led to calls for the relaxation of generally accepted research ethics rules and rules concerning the protection of personal data during what is claimed to be an (...) exceptional time of crisis where research need to be speeded up and not hampered by rules more suitable to normal times. This chapter will outline some areas of research where there have been calls for the relaxation of research ethics rules, e.g. challenge studies in vaccine development, use of personal health data in epidemiology and the use of data from contact tracing apps. It will explicate and analyse the arguments presented for allowing such relaxation in exceptional times of crisis from a philosophical point of view. And it will ask to what extent the Covid-19 pandemic is an exceptional time of crisis in comparison with other important historical moments in medical research, and how the calls for exception relaxation of general rules fit with the history of research ethics and regulation. It will be argued that (1) the Covid-19 pandemic is far less exceptional than it initially appears, (2) the arguments for a relaxation of research ethics and data protection rules are less than convincing, and (3) the lesson we should really learn from Covid-19 is that adherence to a well justified set of rules can act as a protection against false exceptionalism and a counter to the temptation to bend the rules in crises. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without (...) class='Hi'>exception. The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Why are causal generalizations in the higher-level sciences “inexact”? That is, why do they have apparent exceptions? This paper offers one explanation: many causal generalizations cite as their antecedent—the $F$ in $Fs\,\, {\textit{are}}\,\, G$ —a property that is not causally relevant to the consequent, but which is rather “entangled” with a causally relevant property. Entanglement is a relation that may exist for many reasons, and that allows of exceptions. Causal generalizations that specify entangled but causally irrelevant antecedents therefore tolerate exceptions.