Nijedno drustvo, pogotovo ono koje, poput Srbije, u kratkom razdoblju proslo kroz duboke potrese koji jos uvek traju, ne moze se adekvatno analizirati bez pogleda iz ugla svakodnevnog zivota i iskustva obicnih ljudi. Primena savremenih socioloskih i antropoloskih teorija svakodnevice na Srbiju danas u potrazi za personalizovanim tumacenjem kojim obicni ljudi osmisljavaju samima sebi sve sto im se dogodi u poslednjih petnaestak godina, moze imati i sire teorijske implikacije, buduci da se iz nase perspektive lakse sagledava ogranicenost i neuniverzalnost teorija (...) nastalih u stabilnim drustvima. U ovom nacrtu markiraju se neke od tih teorija, polazne pretpostavke, kao i kljucni dogadjaji i simbolicki optereceni pojmovi nase najnovije istorije koji ce biti u zizi analize naracija obicnih ljudi prikupljenih tematskim terenskim istrazivanjem. (shrink)

The paper offers an analysis of the interview data collected in the project "Politics and everyday life: Three years later" in terms of three main topics: attitudes to the political sphere, change of social system, and the democratic public sphere. The analysis focuses on ambivalences expressed in the responses which, under the surface of overall disappointment and discontent, may contain preserved results of the previously achieved "social learning" and their positive potentials. The main objective was to examine (...) to what extent the processes of political maturation of citizens, identified in the 2002 study, have continued. After pointing to a number of shifts in people?s views of politics which generally do not contradict the tendencies outlined in 2002, it is argued that the process of rationalization of political culture has not stopped, but it manifests itself differently in changed circumstances. The republican euphoria of 2002 has been replaced by resignation, with a stronger individualist orientation and a commitment to professional achievement. Clanak analizira gradju dobijenu intervjuima u okviru istrazivanja "Politika i svakodnevni zivot - tri godine posle" u pogledu tri krupne teme: odnos prema politici, promena drustvenog poretka i demokratska javnost. Analiza se usredsredjuje na ambivalencije izrazene u iskazima ispitanika koje, ispod opste atmosfere razocaranosti i nezadovoljstva, mogu kriti ocuvane rezultate prethodnog "socijalnog ucenja" i njihove pozitivne potencijale. Osnovni cilj je ispitati u kojoj meri su procesi politickog sazrevanja gradjana, uoceni u istrazivanju iz 2002, nastavljeni i u kasnijem razdoblju. Posle izdvajanja jednog broja pomaka u odnosu na stavove prema politickoj sferi iz 2002, koji u osnovi ne protivrece tada ocrtanim tendencijama, zakljucuje se da proces racionalizovanja politicke kulture nije prekinut, ali se u novim uslovima ocituje na drugaciji nacin. Republikansku euforiju iz neposredno postpetooktobarskog razdoblja zamenila je rezignacija, uz narastanje individualizma i okretanje profesionalnom postignucu. (shrink)

Individual experience and social change: Herbert Marcuse as interpreted by Mark Fisher and the democratic utopia of everyday life In his last lectures, Mark Fisher re-evaluates the work of Herbert Marcuse and the entire tradition of the 1960s counterculture. He emphasizes that social change is not only a matter of objective conditions, but also a transformation of consciousness and culture. These remarks serve as a starting point for reflection on the role of everyday life and individual (...) experience in social change. Everyday life is a key category from this perspective, because it is the center of emancipatory activities, but also of the awareness of the need to fight for a better, more just world. Thus, the article shows the historical significance of Herbert Marcuse's concept and its relation to the present day as interpreted by Mark Fisher. The last part presents an outline of the democratic utopia of everyday life, which refers to the theoretical ideas of Herbert Maruse, but aims to change democracy in such a way that it would be resistant to the temptations of populism and authoritarianism. (shrink)

The paper contains a retrospective of the thesis that 'social learning' may be deployed as analytical framework to understand political change in Serbia, first proposed in 2001. The thesis contends that the events immediately before and after the toppling of Milosevic's regime in 2000 may be interpreted as outcomes of a process of collective learning by Serbian citizens. On the basis of the findings of three-wave qualitative study 'Politics and Everyday Life', as well as other research, the (...) paper seeks to answer the question whether the idea of 'social learning' stands or falls when confronted with the developments taking place in Serbian political life between 2001 and 2008. U clanku se izlaze retrospektivan pogled na tezu o 'socijalnom ucenju' kao analitickom okviru za razmatranje politickih promena u Srbiji, prvi put iznetu 2001. godine. Prema toj tezi, dogadjaji neposredno pre i posle smene Milosevicevog rezima 2000. godine mogu se protumaciti kao ishod jednog procesa kolektivnog ucenja, ciji su subjekt gradjani Srbije. Na osnovu nalaza tri talasa kvalitativne studije 'Politika i svakodnevni zivot', te rezultata drugih istrazivanja, u tekstu se pokusava odgovoriti na pitanje da li ideja 'socijalnog ucenja' opstaje ukoliko se suceli sa zbivanjima koja su obelezila politicki zivot u Srbiji u razdoblju od 2001. do 2008. godine. (shrink)

Purpose of the study is to find out the interdependence of the event as a factor of transformations in the established areas of human life and everyday routine as a way of existence of social being, which cover various types of human activity. Theoretical basis of the research is based on understanding of everyday routine as a form of social reality, a complex and multidimensional object that is constantly evolving, includes new forms of reality, and is (...) influenced by various social changes. The main function of everyday routine is the survival of individual and society, therefore the stable foundations of human existence play a dominant role in every life. In turn the event serves as a way of being existence, has a singular character, an individual expression, identifies elements that do not fit into the usual framework of everyday life. Originality of the obtained results lies in understanding event as the opposition of the phenomena world to the out of experience world of being, unexpected innovation that leads to the emergence of behaviours and structures that are new and unusual for everyday life. Event is not identical to empirical facticity, does not correspond to the usual understanding of phenomena and processes, and leads to a break from the everyday life, as it causes significant changes in human life on the individual and social levels. Unexpected change in everyday life caused by event is a traumatic collision with another dimension of being for an individual, as a result of it new meanings may open. Conclusions. On the background of everyday life, which is able to be in different states, function in a variety of relationships, to be manifested in numerous structures, junctions and connections, the event assumes the prospect of a new reality, contrary to previous representations. From existential point of view, event is always an interruption of everyday life, as for example, love or religious conversion. A large-scale event causes shocks that affect most or all individuals and communities that use multiple ways to react to an event – interpretation, selection, glorification, silence, valuations adjustment, phenomena, facts, celebration of holidays, rituals that are periodically repeated. (shrink)

It is well known that the European cultural space has been developing under the slogan of secularization over the last five centuries. It is social secularization that has become one of the main forces that has shaped the modern image of Europe. Secularization has affirmed the secular spirit inherent in modern man. Therefore, we Europeans now live in a secularized society. This is manifested in the fact that the appeal of citizens to God, the scale of appeals to (...) religious interpretation in finding out different aspects of reality, the participation of religious institutions in solving life's problems of society and personality are significantly reduced. The language of religion and its concepts are increasingly distant from everyday experience. There is less and less mutual space between the life of the modern world and church preaching. According to P. Berger, "the current situation does not contribute to the truth of the authority of religion.". (shrink)

Digitization and datafication of public space have a significant impact on how cities are developed, governed, perceived and used. As technological developments are based upon political decisions, which impact people’s everyday lives, and from which not everyone benefits or suffers equally, we argue that ‘the smart city’ should be part of continuous public debate; that it should be considered and treated as a social problem. Through nine focus groups, we invited respondents to explore and discuss instances and dilemmas (...) of the smart city. We investigated which interpretative repertoires they used to frame the smart city as a social and actionable problem. Following Blumer's and Gamson's theories on the social construction of problems and on collective action frames, we assessed respondents’ discursive interpretations and their subjective construction of their senses of injustice, agency and identity regarding this subject. We find that – in the context of the city of Rotterdam in The Netherlands – citizens do not experience and consider the smart city as a social and actionable problem. Although they do associate the technological development of smart cities with potential threats, this does not change or constrain their sense of ‘actionability’, nor their behaviour, as they consider themselves to be powerless individuals regarding what, in their eyes, is a complex, elusive and inevitable situation they are confronted with. Strikingly, rather than specifically and contextually reflecting on smart city issues, respondents tended to express their concerns in the more general context of digital and data technologies invading everyday life. (shrink)

Author considers cognitive assumptions of practical consciousness: some preconditions on which an interaction with the social and natural objects is based. Author follows the “constructivist" program in social theory in its classic version which is represented by social phenomenology and phenomenological sociology of knowledge (A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann). Author analyzes some latent axioms and presuppositions, “idealizations" and mechanisms of everyday consciousness which constitute individual social experience at the level of micro-interactions with the objects (...) and the “others". This analysis also refers to the intellectual heritage of classical theory of knowledge (epistemological ideas of I. Kant, E. Husserl). Author considers the status of the Other in the elementary systems of social interaction; discusses the necessity to assume the relative constancy and uniformity of the objective world elements including the existence of an integral self-identical “I" (actor's personality). The organized process of social experience uninterruptedly operated by cognitive schemes of practical consciousness is considered as one of the main conditions of reproduction of coordinated routines which support social order and institutional structures of the society. (shrink)

The modern world citizen today rejects Christian morality as retrograde. Thus,a modern, syncretic, and global alternative to the human self emerges – New Age movement,which is becoming more widespread and sought after by quickly solving life’s problemsand ensuring personal happiness.The cultural Christianity of the Bulgarians facilitates the spread of New Age beliefs andpractices: the historically established “pagan Christianity” of the Bulgarians is manifestedby latent religiosity, dualistic, rich mythological demonology, and oral patriarchal tradition.At first sight, Bulgarian New Age is a (...) liberal religion (according to Peter Beyer): tolerantand ecumenical, with the aim of including more people to work for the benefit of theworld community. But more in-depth research reveals that the proximity in the doctrinesof Bulgarian New Age and Bulgarian Orthodoxy in everyday life allow their conflict-freecoexistence. Additionally, the sociological interpretation of Mark Satin’s quadrant showsthat, unlike the Western New Age, Bulgarian New Age beliefs and practices represent aconservative response to life’s challenges, closer to monolithic institutions than biolithicones: “the path of freedom = the path of suffering = the path of redemption”. Therefore,both the Bulgarian “high” New Age and Bulgarian Orthodoxy are two conservative responsesin a globalized and secularized world. Interpreted through Orthodox theology,Bulgarian New Age is a commune movement: “from below”, organic, informal, non-legal,non-institutionalized, non-hierarchical. In functional terms, it represents a “synthetic metanarrative”of traditional Bulgarian Orthodoxy and particularly Petar Danov’s teaching,which derives its strength from the claim for Bogomil heritage and avoiding the “confessionalcurse”, and the social change needs time and hard self-work. (shrink)

What makes the paper relevant is modern strategies of neoliberal politics, according to which the political life of citizens is replaced by everyday politics of individuals. It has been established that the modern concepts of everyday politics of homo sacer and homo sucker contain the limit of ideas about the political life of citizens. The paper considers an ontological model of the political life of citizens built on the basis of thinking as form-of-life (Agamben). The (...) return to the ontological level of research can be explained by the fact that in modern conditions, the survival of a person depends directly on the person’s ability to think. Thinking as the form-of-life of a community is seen as a force that allows citizens to resist not only the inertia of social existence, but also the life watched carefully by the authorities. The paper presents two interpretations of political life based on the following statements: ‘I think, therefore I resist’ (Badiou) and ‘I resist, therefore I think’ (Arendt). (shrink)

As its title is meant to suggest, this paper is a reply to Sir Tim Lankester’s article “International Aid: Experience, Prospects and the Moral Case”, published in the World Economics last year 1 . Therefore, I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude for the author’s responsiveness to my interest and queries in the area of development economics. The main point of Sir Lankester’s article was, I believe, to strengthen the case for international aid by showing first, that it (...) was not just a theoretical matter 2 and second, that its efficiency was not a self-evident fait accompli, but a still-to-achieve objective, entirely contingent upon human and institutional factors such as the will, interests, and past experience of donors, as well as the system of governance and existing policies from the recipient countries. Moreover, the human factor is actually two-fold, in the sense that one can focus either on the external part engaged in the aid mission – the donor –, or on the internal one – the recipient. Sir Tim Lankester looks into what motivates the former, whereas I intend to unpack the life-experience of the latter, for I strongly believe that what ultimately decides the success or failure of development projects has more to do with understanding their life situation, than with the actual quantum of aid. Although the two cases grounded on the above-mentioned claims may seem completely separated in Tim Lankester’s article for he allocates distinct sections to them, I have reasons to believe that they are not only inter-connected, but also deeply inter-dependent, which is crucial for the kind of existentialist scenario that I intend to outline here. In order to prove this, I am going to combine two sets of argumentative tools: one will be logical, the other – empirical. The former will help us address the issues at stake in Tim Lankester’s moral case, and find ways of strengthening it; the latter will help reminding the real goal of this attempt – which is to improve the prospects of aid missions in real-life scenarios, rather than in theory. The first, rather theoretical section will consist of an extended analysis of the moral case that Sir Lankester started to build. The focus will be not only on the supposedly fruitful aspects of social justice theories, but also on their potential risks; both heroes and villains will emerge from the analysis, and new leads will be discovered. The main criterion for testing whatever findings will remain the pragmatic one: questioning their implications on the life-experiences of the poor. The other approach that I have mentioned will consist of providing a description of life in a particular community, which I have known and learnt from. In this case, the ‘empirical’ obviously means more than just the use of examples – which can be invented, or refined: it actually involves relying on a set of personal experiences and convictions, thereby testifying in – rather than just advocating – the case for aid and development projects, under discussion here. Again, the purpose will be not so much to prove that my claim has the sort of objective validity that a theoretician would normally seek to achieve, as to enforce it by whatever relevant testimonies – be them contextual, perhaps even biased; in this case, the ‘biased’ aspect consists of using an example derived from lifeexperiences in a particular developing country: my own. And it is exactly what I regard as the strength of it; indeed, I would not be writing this, had I not learnt that lesson. (shrink)

The article analyzes the structure and manifestations of everyday life as the sphere of the empirical life of the individual believer and the religious community. Patterns of everyday life are not confined to certain universal conceptual or value systems, as there is no ready-made standards and rules of their formation. Everyday life is intersubjective space of social relations in which religious individuals, communities, institutions self-identified based on form of reproduction of sociality. Religious everyday life determined (...) by ordinary consciousness, practices, social aspects of life in the religious community, which are constituted by communication. The main religious structures of everyday life is mental cut ordinary religious consciousness, religious practice, religious experience, religious communication, religious stereotypes. Everyday life is the sphere of interaction between the social and the transcendental worlds, in which religious practices are an integral social relationships and the objectification of religious experience through the prism of individual membership to a specific religion, a means of inclusion of transcendence in the context of everyday life. Religious practices reflect understanding of a religious individual objects of the supernatural world, which is achieved through social experience, intersubjective interaction, experience of transcendental reality. The everyday life of the believing personality is formed in the dynamics of tradition and innovation, the mechanism of interaction of which affects the space of social existence. It exists within the private and public space and time, differing openness within the life-world. Continuous modification of everyday life, change its fundamental structures is determined by the process of modern social and technical transformation of society. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has foregrounded the significance of time to everyday life, as the routines, pace, and speed of social relations were widely reconfigured. This article uses rhythm as an object and tool of inquiry to make sense of spatio-temporal change. We analyse the Mass Observation (MO) directive we co-commissioned on ‘COVID-19 and Time’, where volunteer writers reflect on whether and how time was made, experienced, and imagined differently during the early stages of the pandemic in the UK. (...) We draw on Henri Lefebvre and Catherine Régulier's ‘rhythmanalysis’, taking up their theorisation of rhythm as linear and cyclical and their concepts of arrhythmia (discordant rhythms) and eurhythmia (harmonious rhythms). Our analysis highlights how MO writers articulate (a) the ruptures to their everyday rhythms across time and space, (b) their experience of ‘blurred’ or ‘merged’ time as everyday rhythms are dissolved and the pace of time is intensified or slowed, and (c) the remaking of rhythms through new practices or devices and attunements to nature. We show how rhythm enables a consideration of the spatio-temporal textures of everyday life, including their unevenness, variation, and difference. The article thus contributes to and expands recent scholarship on the social life of time, rhythm and rhythmanalysis, everyday life, and MO. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning Music:Embodied Experience in the Life-WorldEva Alerby and Cecilia FermIn the present age, which is often signified as post-modern or knowledge-intensive, the calls for learning echo loud. Discussions of learning, as well as teaching, permeate almost all levels and arenas of our society, and have a sure place in every-day conversation as well as scientific debate. The concept of learning can be understood and explained in many different ways. (...) Our intention in this article is to make visible and discuss how learning music can be understood and explained from a life-world approach.By life-world approach we mean that learning is constituted by the experiences that we are having in the world. From that perspective it can be seen as a process which leads to some kind of change, whose utmost purpose is—consciously or unconsciously—to create meaning and make managing the world possible. In addition, we stress that learning does not arise nor is formed in a vacuum, but instead is found in complex contexts. In turn this creates the necessity of making learning situated and contextualized.1How one understands how music is learned is consequently influenced not only by what fundamental assumptions one holds about learning but also by prevailing views of music. Furthermore, how musical ability is regarded and whether musicality is accepted as an emotional or cognitive phenomenon is also [End Page 177] important. Other assumptions that need to be considered are whether or not it is possible to divide musicality into smaller parts and if that is the case, what is the relationship between these parts. One further question that has to be illuminated is the question about biological and social influences on musicality.2 According to Sture Brändström,3 musicality is sometimes divided into two categories—absolute contra relativistic musicality. The first category implies that musicality is regarded as a native ability, already existing within the human being, an ability that some people have and others lack. The second category reflects an approach that assumes that musicality is something everybody can acquire, it can be learned and appropriated. We will return later to this issue.These questions reveal a dualistic approach, specifically: whether musicality is an emotional or a cognitive phenomenon, or absolute or relative, which in turn leads to the question of whether or not learning music is constituted within or outside the human being. To expose problems related to this dualistic approach in music education, we will examine musical learning using life-world phenomenology as a theoretical framework, a brief description of which follows.Phenomenology: A Way of ThinkingAt the turn into the twentieth century, the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), named his philosophical approach phenomenology, and with that the development of modern phenomenology began. Phenomenology is both a method and a way of thought.4 He distinguished the fundamental principle of phenomenology as—'back to the things themselves.' According to Husserl it is through experiences that we gain access to things themselves. The concept of experience was essential to his formulation, and it became a key signature for the whole of phenomenology. His starting-point was how the world is experienced in a subjective way, and the aim was to find a way to describe the meaning of these subjective experiences. In other words, phenomenology has been summarized as a description of how the world is experienced by the person in the world.Various thinkers have interpreted phenomenology in different ways. Jan Bengtsson5 emphasized that phenomenological method should be named in the plural as methods. The phenomenology of the life-world, which was developed as an alternative to the so-called epoché, the special method of transcendental phenomenology, is a philosophy of the life-world without transcendental reduction. It is the life-world that constitutes the basis of our lives. It is the everyday world of our experiences, which we take for granted and where we live our lives. In other words it is the life-world that constitutes people's being-in-the-world.6 Through our existence we experience the concrete world in all its complexity, which is both historically and contextually dependent. Consequently... (shrink)

No philosopher in the second half of the twentieth century or the opening decade of the twenty-first did more to recover the voice of philosophy in the conversation of humankind than John Edwin Smith (1921-2009). From The Social Infinite (1950), his landmark study of Josiah Royce, to "Niebuhr's Prophetic Voice" (2009), he has shown in compelling detail how philosophical reflection is relevant to contemporary life. Indeed, virtually all of the eventual developments within contemporary philosophy in recent decades worthy of (...) our unqualified support (above all, the acknowledgment of history, the abiding importance of the religious dimension of human experience, the hermeneutic character of all our intellectual understandings, including those of experimental inquirers, the irreducibility of persons, the ubiquity of symbols, and the cutting edge of philosophical critique) were ones to which Smith was committed at the outset of his career. He not only anticipated these developments but also pointed the way forward beyond the stultifying impasses of so much contemporary thought. In particular, his conceptions of subjectivity, symbolization, interpretation, experience and philosophy itself provide invaluable resources for twisting free from our present impasses. The essays in this volume make the salience and implications of Smith's writings on these and other topics manifest. The authors assembled here bear eloquent witness to the wit of the man no less than the depth of the philosopher from whom they learned how to take up the urgent task of philosophical reflection in a world riven by seemingly intractable conflicts and characterized by mutual misunderstanding. John E. Smith was a widely learned man; he was also a deeply wise one. Hence, it should be no surprise that he aids us in creating ways to address such conflicts and to counter such misunderstanding. (shrink)

This study focuses on influence that older adults, living in nursing homes, have over everyday activities. Everyday activities are key to sustain a sense of stability, predictability, and enjoyment in the local world of people's everyday and therefore a critical dimension of the person‐centeredness framework applied within gerontology. This narrative ethnographic study aimed to shed light on how influence can be situated contextually, and how it can emerge through activities as well as how it is negotiated in (...) everyday by frail older adults living in a nursing home. Residents, staff members, and significant others from one nursing home in an urban area of Sweden participated in this study. Data were gathered through fieldwork, including participant observation and formal and informal conversations during a period of 6 months. Data were analyzed through a narrative interpretative approach. The findings are presented in narrative form as exemplars. The exemplars—Craquelures as justification, Seeking a place for other life worlds and An almost perfect trip—reveal a gap between the client‐centeredness framework and lived experiences regarding older adults’ influence in everyday activities. The role of everyday activities in the context of frailty is discussed in terms of ethical and responsive engagement, and implications for health‐care practices are considered. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to substantiate and develop the author's model of the structure of the life world of a modern person based on the analysis of fundamental sociophilosophical ideas about the structuring of the human life world. The scientific novelty consists in generalizing the views of various representatives of the phenomenological direction on the human life world and structuring the life world of a modern person, taking into account such factors as the socio-biological nature of a person, (...) the multidimensional nature of the human psyche and the peculiarities of the space of everyday life of a modern person. As a result, it is proved that the structure of the life world of a modern person is nothing more than a three-component system formed by the "objective world", reflecting the biological essence of a person and the experience of scientific research accumulated by mankind, the "social world", reflecting the social essence of a person and the moral and ethical norms developed by mankind, the" inner world", reflecting the peculiarities of the functioning of the human psyche in cognitive, emotional, evaluative and behavioral aspects. (shrink)

U tekstu se polazi od problemske konstatacije prema kojoj je kapitalizam kao način života toliko postao dominantan da sustavno prožima cjelokupno vrijeme pojedinca, i radno i slobodno vrijeme. Dakle, sustav je čovjekovo vrijeme u totalu stavio u zavjetrinu ekonomije. I njime upravlja i vlada .Dalje se u tekstu postavlja pitanje koliko će još proći »vremena da se deblokiraju potencijali čovjekove prirode zapreteni u ekonomiji slobodnog vremena« . U suprotnom »svaki napredak u proizvodnji s pasivnom proizvođačkom klasom može samo pospješiti izdvajanje (...) i jačanje nove gornje klase« . Tako nastaje dublja problemska situacija u kojoj se pojedinci pretvaraju u pasivne grupe i društvene zajednice i time cijelo društvo čine pasivnim i osrednjim.Rješenje se, prema Supeku, nalazi u izoštravanju »samosvijesti građanina« kojom bi se uspješno otklanjala pasivnost i nekritičnost čovjekove svijesti. Cijeli bi se taj proces mogao razvijati iz temeljne »usamljenosti« građanina, koja pretpostavlja sigurnu distancu od tržišnog konzumerizma. Samosvijest nastala usred vlastite usamljenosti, tj. usred kritičkog odmaka od svakodnevice, bila bi osnažena i kritički otvorena prema sebi i prema sredini u kojoj živi. I tada bi mogla »djelovati kako hoće«, a ne kako je diktirano odozgor.Ta temeljna i kritički distancirana usamljenost građanina razumijevala bi se kao kvalitetno novo iskustvo vremena u neovisnom i autonomnom prostoru slobode u kojem se konačno može ostvariti vlastito slobodno vrijeme bitno drugačije od pasivne besposlice.The initial concept of this text is the problem conclusion which claims that capitalism as a way of life has become so dominant that it systematically permeates the individual’s complete time, their working hours as well as their free time. In other words, man’s free time has been overtaken by the system and completely subjected to economy. And it is run by the government .Further in the text a question arises: How long “will it take to deliver the potentials of human nature which are entwined in the economy of free time” . Otherwise “every progress that is made in production using passive production classes can only help facilitate the separation and strengthening of the new upper class” . This leads to a deeper problem situation in which individuals are being turned into passive groups and social communities, which makes the entire society passive and mediocre.According to Supek, the solution is in sharpening the “citizens’ self-consciousness”, which could bring success in removing passivity and non-critical human consciousness. The entire process could be developed from the foundational “loneliness” of the citizen, which implies a safe distance from market consumerism. Self-consciousness, caused by personal loneliness, i.e., critical detachment from everyday life, would be strengthened and critically open toward itself and the society in which the person lives. And then it would be able to “do as it pleased”, and not as it has been ordered from a higher instance.This foundational and critically detached loneliness of citizens could be understood as a good and fresh experience of time in an independent and autonomous space of freedom, where a person could finally be able to achieve their own free time in a way that is largely different than just mere passive doing nothing. (shrink)

Background: As frail older people might have difficulties in expressing themselves, their needs are often interpreted by others, for example, by significant others, whose information health care staff often have to rely on. This, in turn, can put health care staff in ethically difficult situations, where they have to choose between alternative courses of action. One aspect that might be especially difficult to express is that of existential loneliness. We have only sparse knowledge about whether, and in what way, the (...) views of frail older persons and their significant others concerning existential loneliness are in concordance. Objective: To contrast frail older (>75) persons’ experiences with their significant others’ perceptions of existential loneliness. Methods: A case study design was chosen for this study. Individual interviews with frail older persons (n = 15) and interviews with their significant others (n = 19), as well as field notes, served as a basis for the study. A thematic analysis was used to interpret data. Ethical considerations: This study was conducted in accordance with the principles of research ethics. Findings: The findings showed three themes: (1) Meaningless waiting in contrast to lack of activities, (2) Longing for a deeper connectedness in contrast to not participating in a social environment and (3) Restricted freedom in contrast to given up on life. Discussion: Knowledge about the tensions between older persons’ and their significant others’ views of existential loneliness could be of use as a basis for ethical reflections on the care of older people and in the encounter with their significant others. Conclusion: It is of importance that health care professionals listen to both the frail older person and their significant other(s) and be aware of whose voice that the care given is based on, in order to provide care that is beneficial and not to the detriment of the older person. (shrink)

Anger is probably one of the mostly debated basic emotions, owing to difficulties in detecting its appearance during development, its functional and affective meaning (is it a positive or a negative emotion?), especially in human beings. Behaviors accompanied by anger and rage serve many different purposes and the nuances of aggressive behaviors are often defined by the symbolic and cultural framework and social contexts. Nonetheless, recent advances in neuroscientific and developmental research, as well as clinical psychodynamic investigation, afford a (...) new view on the role of anger in informing and guiding many aspects of human conducts. Developmental studies have confirmed the psychophysiological, cognitive and social acquisition that hesitate in the pre-determined sequence appearance of anger and rage in the first two years of life. The so-called affective neurosciences have shown the phylogenetic origin of the two circuits underlying the emergence of anger along with its evolutionary role for promoting survival. This view has been integrated by the psychodynamic theory of motivational systems that attribute a double role to anger: on the one hand, this affect works as an inwardly directed signal concerning a pressure to overcome an obstacle or an aversive situation; on the other hand, anger is also an outwardly directed communicative signal establishing differentiation and conflict within interpersonal relationships and affective bonds. Of course, human peculiar mental functioning requires the appraisal of such signals by higher cortical functions and, there is little doubt that the meaning that orientates individual behaviors is, eventually, construed on a social and cultural level. At the same time, everyday life experiences as well as clinical insights into psychopathic, narcissistic and borderline personality pathology clearly illustrate the necessity to correctly interpret and give answers to the basic questions raised around the topic of anger as a basic emotion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sources of MemoryJeffrey Andrew Barash“What does it mean to remember?” This question might seem commonplace when it is confined to the domain of events recalled in past individual experience; but even in this restricted sense, when memory recalls, for example, a first personal encounter with birth or with death, the singularity of the remembered image places the deeper possibilities of human understanding in relief. Such experiences punctuating (...) everyday life highlight the central place of memory as a source of human identity.With a few notable exceptions, such as Henri Bergson or Maurice Halb-wachs, this central role of memory was rarely a topic of interest in the theoretical orientations of our century. It played only a peripheral role in the different philosophical orientations and in the human sciences of this century until, very recently, new attempts have been made to comprehend the significance of memory, above all in the fields of intellectual history and philosophy. Without dealing exhaustively with the bibliography of works on memory, I will mention what seem to me to be the signs of a recent renewal of questioning in this area of interest to historians and philosophers alike. This will lead me to the specific problem I will address in the pages that follow.One of the chief sources of the historian’s recent interest in memory has been the historians’ conflict (Historikerstreit) of the 1980s concerning the interpretation of the German and European past since the rise to power of Nazism and in the aftermath of World War II. As the generations who lived through and—from a given perspective—remembered these events increasingly disappear, the question concerning their precise historical meaning has reemerged with a new urgency. In this vein, for example, as the relatively new periodical History and Memory: Studies in the Representation of the Past and the collection of essays Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution,” edited by Saul Friedlander, amply attest, the relation of memory to historical narrative is as important as it is problematic: to the extent that eyewitness memory claims a status of objectivity beyond the fictional sphere of [End Page 707] the imagination, its role in informing historical narrative involves the very issue of objectivity itself. 1Independently of this query concerning the relation of memory and history in recent scholarship focusing on the twentieth century, a number of studies have attempted to place the idea of memory in historical perspective during premodern periods. In this regard, we may cite Janet Coleman’s recently published work, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past and Mary Carruthers’s treatment of the subject of memory in the medieval period in The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture. 2 A number of other recent works in the field of intellectual history have attempted to grapple with the intriguing problem of the historicity of the phenomenon of memory in the West. This idea of the historicity of memory has been inspired at least in part by Pierre Nora’s essay, “Between Memory and History,” which introduced the multi-volume series he directed, Les Lieux de mémoire. In this vein, Patrick H. Hutton’s History as an Art of Memory, Matt K. Matsuda’s The Memory of the Modern, and Richard Terdiman’s Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis all center on the historical transforma-tions to which, according to the different perspectives of their works, “memory” has been subject. 3 Like Nora, they link this historicity of the social and cultural role of memory to the radical transformations that Western civilization has undergone in the modern period.In a philosophical perspective David Farrell Krell’s work, Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge, presents a very different idea of the phenomenon of memory. 4 Where the intellectual historians of modernity stress the mutations in the role of memory, Krell, following in the footsteps of Jacques Derrida, emphasizes one essential line of continuity that, to his mind, has tied [End Page 708] together the tradition of philosophical reflection on memory from Plato and Aristotle up until Freud: the metaphoric reference to memory as the faculty... (shrink)

In his famous work on the stranger, Alfred Schutz focuses on the interpretative discrepancies between in-groups and out-groups from the per­spective of a stranger approaching a new group. In doing so, Schutz emphasizes that strangers can overcome their strangeness within a social group by adapting to the prevalent cultural patterns. Shifting the perspective from the stranger to the in-group this essay aims to argue that the experience of the Other’s strangeness due to a discrepancy of interpretative schemes is only (...) one dimension of how the stranger is perceived in everyday life. A second dimension can be derived from Schutz’ work on appresentation. This essay will follow four analytical steps. First, this essay summarizes the Schutzian approach on perceiving the Other as a taken-for-granted part of everyday life within an assumed intersubjective understanding based on an assumed reciprocity of perspectives. Referring to Eberle’s description of an irreciprocity of perspectives, the second section analyzes the Schutzian stranger based on an intersubjective understanding. The third section then focuses on the appresentational pro­cesses of perceiving the stranger in everyday life. By using Goffman’s distinction between virtual and actual social identity, the interplay of categorizing and experiencing the Other in everyday life can be described. Finally, considering the question of how it comes that people can find themselves strangers in their own society, this paper closes by merging the argumentation with a description of the Schutzian perspective on the processes of stigmatization. (shrink)

In the decision of modern problems of education and, first of all, removal of extreme measures of unification and autonomic of its development the significant role is got with strategy of optimum forming of a harmonious parity of sensual and rational approaches in the organization and conducting educational processes in preparation of youth for a life. Educational process is indissoluble unity sensual and rational as preparation of the person for a life it is necessary includes as purchase versatile and a (...) profound knowledge and skills, and the certain personal attitude (feelings, behaviors) it to the world, other people and to itself. If sensual approaches are characterized mainly by problems of formation of practical knowledge of the person about the validity, progresses of its first-hand experience and the attitude to a life within the limits of culture of the nearest environment rational approaches at the most are focused on progress of intelligence of the person, on formation of its capacity completely to capture and interpret great volume of the information. Both that, and another approaches contain the dignity and the lacks. Therefore, in rational strategy of education scholastic theoretical speculations quite often replaces everyday, practical knowledge. As a result, the person not always correctly understands and estimates the importance of the decision of those or other problems in sphere of the activity and development of the country.Rational approaches dominate over modern education systems. Rational domination in educational processes shows that there is a gap between scientific and personal models of an image of the world of the modern person. All this considerably affects moral consciousness of modern youth and its civil socialization. For this reason, it is important to lead at reforming education systems to conformity (harmony) of sensual and rational approaches. (shrink)

Democratic school systems are expected to equip students with the knowledge, abilities, and attitudes needed for life as citizens, particularly through social science education. Disciplinary knowledge, derived from the academic counterparts to school subjects, is essential in developing these skills. However, research has also emphasized the importance of life-world perspectives, where students’ experiences are included and taken seriously in teaching. This study suggests that the theory of (civic) narrative competence can function as a bridge between the disciplinary domain (...) and the life-world domain in its focus on how students’ civic reasoning can be developed through teaching. The article uses narrative theory to explore how the students’ civic narratives changed and became more nuanced after a teaching segment focusing on social and political trust. In the article, we demonstrate how the students’ personal experiences colored their interpretations and orientations before the teaching segment and how their civic narratives were developed through the implemented teaching, which provided them with concepts, a theoretical model, and empirical examples. We found that the students did not discard previous perceptions after the teaching segment, but integrated them into their new knowledge and orientations, thus integrating the life-world and disciplinary domains. (shrink)

The disruptions to everyday life wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic include distortions in the experience of time, as reported widely by ordinary citizens and observed by journalists and social scientists. But how does this temporal disruption play out in different time scales—in the individual day as opposed to the medium- and long-term futures? And how might place influence how individuals experience and understand the pandemic's temporal transformations? This essay examines a range of temporal disruptions reported in day (...) diaries and surveys submitted to the Everyday Life in Middletown project, an online archive that has been documenting ordinary life in Muncie, Indiana, USA since 2016. Viewing these materials as instances of life writing, the essay probes the interactions between temporal disruptions and the local setting as they inflect the autobiographical selves our writers construct in their pandemic writings. It shows how living in Muncie—a postindustrial city with its particular combination of historical, demographic, economic, social, and political dynamics—structures the autobiographical stories available to our writers, and how the disruption of time produces new variations and problems for life writing. In the midst of a global crisis, we glimpse the pandemic's reshaping of a local structure of feeling in which a pervasive, local narrative of civic decline frames individual self-fashioning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK R]]JVIEWS room for different theories and new developments. He does not try to tie up every loose end. Furthermore, he avoids the rut of the specialist by willingly and capably addressing questions of biblical exegesis, philosophy, psychology, science, and popular culture with even-handed competence. Space does not permit me to discuss his fascinating analysis of the psychology of near-death experiences or specific rejoinders to important objections (e.g., the (...) Bible depicts the dead as bodily beings, not immaterial spirits; dualism is a result of the Fall; dualism implies that the whole person does not die; at death we pass out of time, and, hence, there is no intermediate state). But I can assure you that his account is cogent and illuminating. Lenoir-Rhyne College Hickory, North Carolina PHILIP BLOSSER: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective. Edited by KENNETH L DEUTSCH AND WALTER SOFFER. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. ix+ 304. $54.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). For Leo Strauss, the superiority of classical political philosophy over modern social science (and political theory based on social science) lies in at least four principles. First, it treats political matters as they actually appear to man qua philosopher and, in a qualified way, to the good citizen. Because Strauss claims that social science (and much post-classical political philosophy) abstracts from his canon of intelligibility, he thinks that it cannot lead to a humane, rational politics. (See "What is Political Philosophy?", in What is Political Philosophy? [Westport: Greenwood], pp. 27-28, and "Distinction between Facts and Values" in Natural Right and History [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 78-80.) Second, Plato and Aristotle believed that only the good man properly judges politics. This belief attracts Strauss, because it identifies virtue as the best claimant to political rule. ("What is Political Philosophy? ", pp. 36-38.) A third principle is derived immediately from this second: politics ought to be organized hierarchically. In the hierarchy, either the truly virtuous or gentlemen should rule, and those having a passive, obediential form of virtue should be the ruled. Fourth, this arrangement is rational and humane. For although the virtues of the ruler and the ruled are complementary in justice and necessary to it, still they are different and, in fact, require the stratification just mentioned. ("Classic Natural Right" in Natural Right and History, pp. 130-44.) BOOK REVIEWS 527 Because of the controversial nature of these principles and Strauss's eminence in political philosophy, one welcomes the present collection of essays by his disciples. They believe that in liberal democracies people confuse liberty with the uses to which liberty can and ought to be put. Doing so, people undermine that regime's foundations. Strauss and his disciples believe that modern natural right makes the clash between liberty and natural right inevitable, because its principal founders, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, conceived man as non-political. They conceived individuals as gaining certain advantages from governments hut as gaining no good in the exercise of politics itself. Classic natural right, by contrast, bases itself on the assumption that man is radically political. Moreover, it conceives politics as an arena for liberating, ennobling activities. Hobbes and Locke viewed the individual as independent of politics, which they placed at the low end of the range of human activity, along with everyday concerns and popular morality, rather than at the high end, as Strauss would. Thus for Strauss, liberal democracy is founded on modern principles, which are either apolitical and liberal (Locke) or apolitical and illiberal (Hobbes). Consequently, it cannot withstand the individualist and collectivist onslaughts that we have seen in this century. What, then, have Strauss's disciples to say about liberal democracy and the prospect of classic natural right in a Western world which is more or less permanently Hobbesian-Lockean? This can be answered by describing first the hook's divisions and then its diagnoses and prescriptions. In part one the contributors appraise the work of Strauss itself; in part two they define issues in liberalism ; and in part three they discuss liberalism in American political life. In the first part, Michael Platt outlines how Strauss's thought... (shrink)

This essay explores the unique temporal experience in anxiety. Drawing on first-person accounts as well as examples from literature, I attempt to show how anxiety not only disrupts our physiological and cognitive timing but also disturbs the embodied rhythms of everyday social life. The primary goal, however, is to articulate the extent to which human existence itself is a temporally structured event and to identity the ways that anxiety disrupts this structure. Using Martin Heidegger’s account of human existence (...) as a point of departure, I show how the mood of anxiety has the power to alter our self-interpretations by closing down or constricting our experience of the future. I argue that a constricted future impedes our ability ‘to be’ because it closes off the range of projective meanings that we would ordinarily draw on to create or fashion our identities. (shrink)

In the present article, the authors continue their sociological interpretations of theempiric data obtained in the research project “Aggregate Capital, Its Structure andRelation to Labour Migration” (2012). The following hypothesis has been proved: ahigher predisposition for the labour migration is more typical for economically activeregion’s inhabitants with fairly high amounts of some indicators of the aggregatecapital, especially physical capital, but with a comparatively lower amount of culturalcapital, which could transform into human capital and further into economic capital inLatgale or Latvia. (...) An in-depth analysis of the factors of life success has revealed that,in general, our respondents tend to assign the lead role not to the personal competitivecharacteristics (resources) but rather to the specificity of the social environment: anexplanation of life success by means of a set of variables that, on the whole, describeit as a socio-political innovation with criminal tendencies (political corruption) is themost spread one. (shrink)

THE CENTRALITY OF LIVED EXPERIENCE IN WOJTYLA’S ACCOUNT OF THE PERSON S u m m a r y The aim of this paper is to illuminate the centrality of lived experience in Karol Wojytla’s account of the person and identify its significance for philosophy and praxis in the contemporary period. Specifically the author intends to pursue the meaning of Wojtyla’s claim that “the category of lived experience must have a place in anthropology and ethics—and somehow be at the center of (...) their respective interpretations.” The paper seeks to recover an important insight into the task of philosophy: according to Karol Wojtyla, if philosophy is to perform its essential function in the recovery of our culture, we have no choice but to turn our attention to the subjectivity of human persons— and this can only be done by taking up the somewhat risky challenge of studying the reality of lived human experience. The paper will analyze Wojtyla’s argument that the problem of human subjectivity is at the epicenter of debates about the human person and will argue that his solution reconciles the dilemma posed by the historical antinomies that have characterized anthropology and epistemology, viz., the “objective” or ontological view of the human being and the “subjectivism” often associated with the philosophy of consciousness, and their corollaries, realism and idealism. At least in the English speaking context, where the validity of individual experience has risen to the level of almost dogmatic significance for social and political life, Father Wojtyla’s claim appears either to have gone unnoticed or to have been rejected. And perhaps, at least on the surface, this is not without reason. The modern interest in human subjectivity is blamed for many contemporary THE CENTRALITY OF LIVED EXPERIENCE IN WOJTYLA’S ACCOUNT OF THE PERSON S u m m a r y The aim of this paper is to illuminate the centrality of lived experience in Karol Wojytla’s account of the person and identify its significance for philosophy and praxis in the contemporary period. Specifically the author intends to pursue the meaning of Wojtyla’s claim that “the category of lived experience must have a place in anthropology and ethics—and somehow be at the center of their respective interpretations.” The paper seeks to recover an important insight into the task of philosophy: according to Karol Wojtyla, if philosophy is to perform its essential function in the recovery of our culture, we have no choice but to turn our attention to the subjectivity of human persons— and this can only be done by taking up the somewhat risky challenge of studying the reality of lived human experience. The paper will analyze Wojtyla’s argument that the problem of human subjectivity is at the epicenter of debates about the human person and will argue that his solution reconciles the dilemma posed by the historical antinomies that have characterized anthropology and epistemology, viz., the “objective” or ontological view of the human being and the “subjectivism” often associated with the philosophy of consciousness, and their corollaries, realism and idealism. At least in the English speaking context, where the validity of individual experience has risen to the level of almost dogmatic significance for social and political life, Father Wojtyla’s claim appears either to have gone unnoticed or to have been rejected. And perhaps, at least on the surface, this is not without reason. The modern interest in human subjectivity is blamed for many contemporary THE CENTRALITY OF LIVED EXPERIENCE IN WOJTYLA’S ACCOUNT OF THE PERSON S u m m a r y The aim of this paper is to illuminate the centrality of lived experience in Karol Wojytla’s account of the person and identify its significance for philosophy and praxis in the contemporary period. Specifically the author intends to pursue the meaning of Wojtyla’s claim that “the category of lived experience must have a place in anthropology and ethics—and somehow be at the center of their respective interpretations.” The paper seeks to recover an important insight into the task of philosophy: according to Karol Wojtyla, if philosophy is to perform its essential function in the recovery of our culture, we have no choice but to turn our attention to the subjectivity of human persons— and this can only be done by taking up the somewhat risky challenge of studying the reality of lived human experience. The paper will analyze Wojtyla’s argument that the problem of human subjectivity is at the epicenter of debates about the human person and will argue that his solution reconciles the dilemma posed by the historical antinomies that have characterized anthropology and epistemology, viz., the “objective” or ontological view of the human being and the “subjectivism” often associated with the philosophy of consciousness, and their corollaries, realism and idealism. At least in the English speaking context, where the validity of individual experience has risen to the level of almost dogmatic significance for social and political life, Father Wojtyla’s claim appears either to have gone unnoticed or to have been rejected. And perhaps, at least on the surface, this is not without reason. The modern interest in human subjectivity is blamed for many contemporary THE CENTRALITY OF LIVED EXPERIENCE IN WOJTYLA’S ACCOUNT OF THE PERSON S u m m a r y The aim of this paper is to illuminate the centrality of lived experience in Karol Wojytla’s account of the person and identify its significance for philosophy and praxis in the contemporary period. Specifically the author intends to pursue the meaning of Wojtyla’s claim that “the category of lived experience must have a place in anthropology and ethics—and somehow be at the center of their respective interpretations.” The paper seeks to recover an important insight into the task of philosophy: according to Karol Wojtyla, if philosophy is to perform its essential function in the recovery of our culture, we have no choice but to turn our attention to the subjectivity of human persons— and this can only be done by taking up the somewhat risky challenge of studying the reality of lived human experience. The paper will analyze Wojtyla’s argument that the problem of human subjectivity is at the epicenter of debates about the human person and will argue that his solution reconciles the dilemma posed by the historical antinomies that have characterized anthropology and epistemology, viz., the “objective” or ontological view of the human being and the “subjectivism” often associated with the philosophy of consciousness, and their corollaries, realism and idealism. At least in the English speaking context, where the validity of individual experience has risen to the level of almost dogmatic significance for social and political life, Father Wojtyla’s claim appears either to have gone unnoticed or to have been rejected. And perhaps, at least on the surface, this is not without reason. The modern interest in human subjectivity is blamed for many contemporary maladies, including subjectivism, relativism and the pride of place now given to any individual point of view, no matter how ill informed. Claims about the existence of truth or an objective moral order often cannot find a foothold when confronted with the argument that such realities do not resonate with a particular individual’s personal “experience.” The priority given to subjective personal experience in determining what constitutes right thinking and moral human behavior, assuming that question is even asked, is now a commonplace assumption; it is something alternately deplored or celebrated both by intellectuals and the “man on the street.” Given this situation, that a philosopher of Father Wojtyla’s stature and obvious moral authority should make such an argument is a matter of critical importance, especially for those who seek to ground human action in objective moral norms in an era where an arguably flawed account of human subjectivity clearly has taken center stage. The paper shows that Wojtyla is not adverting to experience as an adjunct to moral relativism or personal preference as an approach to questions of the true and the good. On the contrary, the author shows that the philosopher Karol Wojtyla provides a way to remain grounded in the metaphysical and ontological categories that not only comprise our intellectual heritage, but refer to real and profound truths, while simultaneously accounting for the subjectivity and dynamism of the person. The paper concludes with an argument that this account provides a key hermeneutical device for understanding the enormous importance of the work of Pope John Paul II. (shrink)

The aggravation of the global environmental and military-political crisis has become evidence that the postmodern era has ended and the time has come for post-postmodern and profound civilizational transformation, the technological base of which is renewable energy and artificial intelligence; the main social environment is distributed capitalism (J. Rifkin) and social networks; and the main driving forces and mechanisms of social self-organization are humanity, competitiveness and double reflection (E. Giddens). Since humanity has not yet fully actualized the (...) basic values of survival and development and has not paid enough attention to the problem of climate catastrophe, more drastic measures to mitigate it will be implemented in the process of its deployment (A. Honnacker) and in the difficult conditions of military-political opposition to democracy and authoritarianism. One of the main rational worldview and practical guidelines of post-postmodernism is classical Pragmatism, which is based on human experience, an important element of which should be scientific knowledge, which is confirmed experimentally. Societies that are dominated by pragmatic and democratic egalitarian relations that promote human self-realization and creative freedom can channel natural aggressiveness into competition to improve the well-being of all its members. The ruling elite in totalitarian societies, in which man is humiliated and exploited, and in which aggressiveness accumulates due to polarization into upper and lower classes of the population, may start wars in order to prevent self-destruction from within, directing aggression outwards against other countries. Therefore, the global community in today's conditions needs to expand the worldview and orientation horizon of every citizen of the world from the everyday concerns of life support to the understanding and actualization of the absolute values of survival and development of humanity. Pragmatism, from a purely methodological point of view, is aimed at ensuring that a person is guided by life experience in his activity and cognition, putting forward certain hypotheses regarding his own activity and cognition, simultaneously and/or later experimentally testing these hypotheses on the basis of practical results. Thanks to the pragmatist approach, a person increasingly experiments with the choice of innovative behavior models and avoids predetermined outdated life guidelines and ideological grand narratives. Based on her own experience and online social communication with other people, he or she is convinced of the effectiveness of certain value models of behavior that have not only a socio-economic, but also a moral dimension. A pragmatist approach focused on global human values of survival and development is an important tool that should ensure urgent civilizational transformation and the avoidance of destructive environmental and military-political disasters. In the conditions of modern civilizational transformation, survival is possible only with a radical intensification of the development of human-centered social self-organization. (shrink)

HLDING A‐G and HEGGDAL K. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 345–356 Patients’ experiences of health transitions in pulmonary rehabilitationPeople who live with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) experience major changes in health. Coping with the illness and caring for themselves places extensive demands on them. Thus, pulmonary rehabilitation (PR) is recommended as a means to facilitate healthy transitions in everyday life with COPD. This study explores the experience of patients with COPD in terms of their transitions in health during and (...) after PR. The research was inspired by interpretive phenomenology. Thirty‐three individual qualitative interviews were conducted with eighteen patients recruited from Norwegian PR units. A thematic analysis of the interviews was performed. The interviewees described participation in PR as a time of increasing awareness of opportunities for health and well‐being with strengthened hope. The year following PR was dominated by their ongoing challenge to acknowledge limitations and explore opportunities in everyday life. Continuation of healthy transitions was facilitated by peer and professional support. The study highlights the personal resources that patients with COPD have access to in order to promote their own health. The study also highlights their vulnerability during illness and rehabilitation. The findings critique time‐limited PR and support the current trends towards patient‐centred rehabilitation efforts that incorporate user involvement and self‐management education. (shrink)

Nuestro trabajo intenta presentar, en su primera parte, la práctica de la filosofía clínica a partir de su pertinencia dentro de la filosofía antigua (clásica) en tanto ejercicio espiritual de transformación de sí. Con ello se quiere referir con el concepto de espíritu en comprender un ejercicio no como producto sólo del pensamiento sino a una totalidad psíquica y emocional del individuo, en sentirse dentro de la perspectiva del todo. Era un arte de vivir, un modo de vida que intenta (...) comprender más profundamente la totalidad de la existencia. La filosofía no es una disciplina que perseguía plantarse ante la dimensión única del conocimiento teórico sino en el marco del yo y del ser: consiste en un itinerario, un proceso, un viaje para la ampliación de la conciencia, que busca aumentar la captación, la atención, la vivencia y expansión del ser. En su segunda parte nos adentramos a examinar la figura del tirano en y como conciencia política degradada. Para ello nos centramos en el proceso de la personalidad de la condición de lo tiránico y del tirano dentro de la vida política, pero también como éste se nos presenta como germen en nosotros mismos y de cómo se establece a partir de ello –junto a las condiciones sociales requeridas-, su existencia proyectada en un individuo particular. La filosofía clínica es una filosofía crítica en la medida que tiene por asunto el pensamiento en sí mismo; es una filosofía con conciencia de sí misma; coloca al pensamiento en una sala de observación y cuidados intensivos ¿Se trata de comprender la política como un ejercicio espiritual? Por supuesto, un ejercicio cotidiano a lo largo de nuestra existencia, donde pueda permitirnos desarrollar una atención,una inteligencia, un crecimiento y una transformación de nuestra individualidad social autónoma como ciudadano de una región y del mundo, pero comprometida con su comunidad de vida. De un modo de aprender el dominio de uno mismo, del cumplimiento de los deberes, de la libertad pública y privada, que nos lleva a renunciar de todo aquello que no dependa de nosotros y ocuparnos de lo que sí depende; mantener una rectitud de acción en conformidad con el grado de evolución de nuestra razón. On the tyranny in Plato Our work attempts to present, in its first part, the practice of clinical philosophy from its relevance as a spiritual exercise of self-transformation within ancient (classical) philosophy. The¡ concept of spirit is meant to bring about an understanding of this exercise not as a sole product¡ of thinking, but as the involvement of the individual’s psychic and emotional totality, which entails that the individual should feel as a part of the whole. It was an art of living, a way of life that attempts to understand more deeply the totality of existence. Philosophy is not a discipline that sought to face the sole dimension of theoretical knowledge. Rather, it is built around the framework of self and being. It consists of a route, a process, a journey to broaden consciousness. It seeks to increase uptake, attention, experience and expansion of being. In the second part we examine in depth the figure of the tyrant as degraded political consciousness. To this aim we focus on the process of the personality of the tyrannical and the tyrant within political life, but also on how the latter is a seed within ourselves, and on how, on this basis,his existence projected onto a particular individual becomes established –together with the required social conditions. Clinical philosophy is a critical philosophy inasmuch as its subject-matteris thought in itself; it is a philosophy with self-awareness; it places thought in an observation and intensive care room. Are we to understand politics as a spiritual exercise? Of course, an everyday exercise throughout our existence, which enables us to develop a degree of attention, intelligence, growth and transformation of our social autonomous individuality as citizens of a region and the world, while sill committed to our life community. It enables us to learn self-control, to carry out our duties, to exercise public and private freedom, in a way that makes us give up everything which doesnot depend upon us and pay attention to what actually does. It enables us to maintain rectitude of action, in agreement with our reason’s degree of evolution. (shrink)

The odds of encountering a senior citizen selling on the street have increased. The claim that they have no choice but to work and sell on the street, despite the dangers, illnesses, and psychological issues they may face, to provide for their family’s needs is very evident. Therefore, this study explores the quality of life, lived experiences, challenges, and coping mechanisms of senior citizen street vendors in Bulacan, Philippines. The study employed Heideggerian Phenomenology and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Moreover, the (...) following themes arise (1) Golden years, (2) Socially connected, and (3) Unknown journey. These themes highlighted the experiences and challenges faced by the participants. Moreover, it is highly suggested that local government agencies enhance and strictly monitor the existing program that alleviates mental and physical health concerns and senior citizens' safety and financial assistance. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to the problem of the relations between the common sense and the various forms of the Irrational: contradictory and absurd situations, paranormal experience, depersonalization and excessive passion. First of all, the author precises the concept of common sense, distinguishing it from the so-called everyday conscience. The difference is in the personal and responsible character ofthe common sense thought and behaviour. The common sense is described as a extraordinary flexible instrument of the practical life and (...) a particular phenomenon of the rationality. The paper demonstrates that the common sense is stable. It can be examinated and seduced by the very different irrational situations which might destroy it. But the common sense can save itself even in the paranormal experience and quit from the social daily absurd because it isn't merely logic, — it has capacity to the interpretation, humour and playing. However, the common sense cannot survive any demolition of the personality or diminution of its roles. The author examines psychological phemomena including the hypertrophy of emotion and will. It will be shown that too strong passions and loss of self controlling makes the common sense step back. The formal rule of bureaucracy is also the moment which pushs the common sense aside. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic caused unexpected and unavoidable changes in daily life worldwide. Governments and communities found ways to mitigate the impact of these changes, but many solutions were inaccessible to people with visual impairments. This work aimed to investigate how blind individuals subjectively experienced the restrictions and isolation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, a group of twenty-seven blind and seventeen sighted people took part in a survey addressing how COVID-19 impacted life practically and psychologically, how it affected (...) their daily habits, and how it changed their experiences of themselves and others. Results demonstrated that both sighted and blind individuals had a hard time adapting to the new situation. However, while sighted people struggled more with personal and social aspects, the frustration of the blind population derived mostly from more practical and logistical issues. Likely as consequences, results showed that blind people engaged more in their inner life and experienced fear and anger as main emotions. This study suggests that changes in life associated with COVID-19 have been subjectively experienced differently based on the presence or not of blindness, and that tailored future interventions should be considered to take care of the different needs of blind individuals. (shrink)

Individuals actively and continually construct the knowledge required for their working lives. Two outcomes arise from this constructive process: (i) individual change (i.e. learning) and (ii) the remaking of culturally-derived practices comprising work. These arise through a relational interdependence between the contributions and agency of the personal and the social. The relationship is interdependent because neither the social nor personal contributions alone are sufficient. The social experience is important for articulating and providing access to work (...) performance requirements. However, personal factors such as individuals' capacities, subjectivities and agency shape how workers interpret and engage with what they experience and, consequently, how they learn and remake practice throughout their working life. This case is elaborated through a discussion about learning with considerations of intersubjectivity, personal epistemologies, pedagogy and curriculum as experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Compassionate Justice: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Two Gospel Parables on Law, Crime, and Restorative Justice by Christopher D. MarshallGlen StassenCompassionate Justice: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Two Gospel Parables on Law, Crime, and Restorative Justice CHRISTOPHER D. MARSHALL Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012. 386 pp. $33.60Christopher Marshall is known to Society of Christian Ethics members for his highly acclaimed book on restorative justice, Beyond Retribution, and for his plenary (...) address at the SCE annual meeting published in the JSCE 27, no. 2 (2007). The plenary address forms one chapter of the present Compassionate Justice. Well [End Page 221] informed on ethics, criminal justice, and human rights, Marshall is a New Testament scholar at Victoria University in New Zealand.Marshall points out that the two best-known of Jesus’s parables—the Compassionate Samaritan, and the Prodigal Son—have been the most influential of Jesus’s parables in Western culture and legal theory. The Compassionate Samaritan is Jesus’s response to a lawyer’s question that answers a central legal question of the time: Who is my neighbor, whom I am obligated by Leviticus 19:7 to love as myself? In the Prodigal Son, the three main characters in legal offense are clearly portrayed as the offender, the victim, and the law-abiding community; in turn, as Marshall points out, “the older brother’s reaction centers directly on the justice of his father’s actions” (192–93). Marshall argues that present legal theory can learn from careful dialogue with these two parables. These parables are not only historically influential but also so insightfully and beautifully crafted that dialogue with them can bring incisive insights. In addition, dialogue with them presses Anglo-Saxon liberalism where it is weak and needs to grow.The parable of the Compassionate Samaritan opens up questions about the need for Good Samaritan laws that defend persons who come to the aid of a person in danger of death (e.g., from an accident, fire, or drowning) against liability for inadvertently and unintentionally causing damage. Under present Anglo-Saxon law, such good Samaritans can be sued for damages. This is not the case, however, in most European countries. Similarly, most European and Latin American countries have bad Samaritan laws: Where “victims are in mortal danger and unable to save themselves,” there is a legal duty for “those who are consciously aware of the victim’s predicament, who are close enough to intervene, and who have the effective means of intervention available to them” to come to the aid of the victims. “The most glaring exception to this pattern,” Marshall argues, “occurs in Anglo-American legal systems” because of liberalism’s maximization of individual liberty even against coercion to come to the aid of persons who would die if no help arrives (155). Samaritan laws “give formal expression to the supreme value of human life, to the bonds of solidarity and empathy that comprise human identity and that bind people together in social community, and to ongoing need human beings have to be committed to one another’s rescue and restoration when severe harm befalls them” (174).Responding to the parable of the Prodigal Son, Marshall argues that both compassion and repentance are crucial for understanding the humanity and the sufferings of persons being defended or judged by law. This does not replace the standard tools of legal interpretation; it takes account of the more holistic context (288–90). In fact, “unreflective compassion can be dangerous and distorting” (296). Marshall discusses the complications insightfully and in a balanced [End Page 222] way. He concludes with an extensive discussion and refutation of perhaps the most important book-length criticism of restorative justice.Marshall’s interpretation of these two parables surpasses any other that I have read. His sensitive and thoughtful analysis of the experience of victimization goes beyond any other interpretation of the Compassionate Samaritan that I have seen. In this he resembles Daniel Philpott’s interpretation of victimization in Just and Unjust Peace (Oxford University Press, 2012). His description of the shameful rupture of relationship with father, family, and community by the prodigal son goes well beyond what I have seen previously. I think... (shrink)

Aesthetic desire and distaste prime everyday life in surprising ways. The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic casts much-needed light on the complex mix of meanings our aesthetic activities weave into cultural existence. Anchoring aesthetic experience in our relationships with persons, places, and things, Monique Roelofs explores aesthetic life as a multimodal, socially embedded, corporeal endeavor. Highlighting notions of relationality, address, and promising, this compelling study shows these concepts at work in visions of beauty, ugliness, detail, nation, ignorance, and cultural (...) boundary. Unexpected aesthetic pleasures and pains crop up in sites where passion, perception, rationality, and imagination go together but also are in conflict. Bonds between aesthetics and politics are forged and reforged. Cross-disciplinary in outlook, and engaging the work of theorists and artists ranging from David Hume to Theodor W. Adorno, Frantz Fanon, Clarice Lispector, and Barbara Johnson, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic lays open the interpretive web that gives aesthetic agency its vast reach. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the experiences of women who found refuge in Serbia during the war in the former Yugoslavia. I look at the women's experiences of both leaving home and coping with everyday life in refuge. The exploration of refugee women's experiences is mainly based on analyses of their own stories, which I collected while researching women and war. In spite of all the hardship of their lives, refugee women who fled to Serbia have been treated by (...) Western media, the public and aid organizations as ‘UNPEOPLE’ or as non-existent. Making their experiences visible as women, refugees and citizens is the main purpose of this article. (shrink)

In everyday life, the way people dress is thought to furnish the attentive observer with information about them. In ethnomethodological terms, we would say that clothing is a source of “social information,” allowing subjects to form an idea of the “social and personal identity” of other people. For the sake of convenience, albeit simplifying somewhat, we may distinguish three aspects of this phenomenon: the dress observed, the interpretative process, and the results of the interpretation. This article (...) is concerned with the process of interpretation itself. What I am trying to aim at is this: how to represent this process in a metalanguage, by means of a kind of artificial mechanism capable of simulating it adequately. And I shall be arguing that semiotics can provide a worthwhile conceptual framework for such a metalanguage. (shrink)

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

Institutional education of young people for religious dialogue and tolerance inthe Republic of Serbia began with the introduction of optional teaching subjects ReligiousEducation and Civic Education in primary and secondary schools in 2001. At the sametime, a radical reform of the educational system was started in accordance with neoliberalideological principles and development strategies. Explicit and hidden religious andpolitical contents can also be observed in many other teaching subjects that have undergonereform changes in teaching contents, especially in primary education. Religiouseducation is (...) conducted according to the confessional model for recognized churches andtraditional religious communities living in Serbia. As a general goal of Religious Education,it was pointed out that it should provide students with a complete religious view ofthe world and life, as well as enable them to freely adopt the spiritual and life values of theChurch or community to which they belong. Then, that this goal should be achieved inan open and tolerant dialogue, with respect for other religious experiences and views. Inthe tasks of Religious Education, it is indicated that it should develop in students the aspirationtowards responsible shaping of common life with other people, peoples, religiouscommunities and cultures different from their own. On the other hand, Civic Educationis defined as education for democracy and civil society. The main goal of teaching in thissubject is to acquire knowledge and develop skills for the role of a responsible citizen forlife in a democratically organized and humane society based on respect for human andcivil rights, the right to diversity and the development of multiculturalism. The teachingcontent in these, as well as in other complementary subjects, has been influencing theformation of basic value attitudes and rules of behavior for two decades, thus creating anew religious and political culture among young people that contributes to a more tolerantattitude towards many social issues and a better understanding of various social phenomenaand relationships. It is a well-founded assumption that young people studying inSerbia have the educational potential for religious dialogue and tolerance. (shrink)

Theoretical and empirical research in bioethics frequently focuses on ethical dilemmas or problems. This paper draws on anthropological and phenomenological sources to develop an alternative framework for bioethical enquiry that allows examination of a broader range of how the moral is experienced in the everyday lives of individuals and groups. Our account of moral experience is subjective and hermeneutic. We define moral experience as “Encompassing a person's sense that values that he or she deem important are being realised or (...) thwarted in everyday life. This includes a person's interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of lived encounters, that fall on spectrums of right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust”. In our conceptualisation, moral experience is not limited to situations that are heavily freighted with ethically-troubling ramifications or are sources of debate and disagreement. Important aspects of moral experience are played out in mundane and everyday settings. Moral experience provides a research framework, the scope of which extends beyond the evaluation of ethical dilemmas, processes of moral justification and decision-making, and moral distress. This broad research focus is consistent with views expressed by commentators within and beyond bioethics who have called for deeper and more sustained attention in bioethics scholarship to a wider set of concerns, experiences and issues that better captures what is ethically at stake for individuals and communities. In this paper we present our conceptualisation of moral experience, articulate its epistemological and ontological foundations and discuss opportunities for empirical bioethics research using this framework. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is aimed to introduce Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological teaching into the philosophical discourse through the systematization of anthropological issues in his philosophical and theological works. Provision of insight into the peculiar features of his adequate anthropology implies the fulfillment of the following tasks: first, identification of the methodology and the meaning of the principal concepts; secondly, study of the thinker’s key ideas; thirdly, presentation of the periodization of his anthropological doctrine development. Theoretical basis comprises of Karol Wojtyła’s works (...) written before and during the pontificate, excluding his poetic writing. The fulfillment of tasks involves processing the substantial database of academic research devoted to Karol Wojtyła’s views. It will help identify less-explored issues in Karol Wojtyła’s legacy, as well as contradictory aspects in the interpretation of the thinker’s ideas. In view of the growing interest of philosophical anthropology to everyday life, this aspect of Karol Wojtyła’s teaching is an important point in the analysis of his philosophical and anthropological considerations. Therefore, general research methods and approaches will help study Karol Wojtyła’s views on the nature of a human being, as well as individual and social dimensions of a person’s life. Originality lies in systematizing Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological ideas. The disclosure of the methodology, the key concepts and their interpretations, and the periodization of the development of Karol Wojtyła’s anthropological views can reveal his connection with the philosophical trends and define his place in modern philosophy. Conclusions. Wojtyła justifies the need for a new anthropological doctrine with an inappropriate place of a human being in the value system of the modern world, as he or she has evolved from the aim of everything ever created to the means. The basis of the new doctrine of a human being, namely adequate anthropology, is, according to him, human identity, dignity and "moral greatness". Karol Wojtyła’s "new human being" is the result of an integrated approach to studying the anthropological issues of the present and the response to "cultural impoverishment" and "the decline of mankind". (shrink)

The everyday realities of educational practices of the Third Reich are reconstructed in the memoires of involved observers of these processes. The most of them can be used as a factual supplement to theoretical reflections on totalitarian transformations in education as their subjective perceiving. Despite of different origin and life attitudes all the authors of translated fragments are concentrated on those features of totalitarian educational innovations which show their completely incompatibility with the humanistic tradition in education. The everyday (...) life of universities’ and school’s communities in the Third Reich was determined by the national-socialist ideology. The recalling on Heidegger’s activities as the rector of the University in Freiburg (H. Gottschalk, H. Jonas, K. Löwith, G. Cesar) expose the ambiguity of his way of thinking and acting, what was also noticeable in his habitus. His nationalism was not combined strong with the anti-Semitism in the university’s management. The race theory as a part of national-socialismideology wasn’t definitive for the everyday life in those educational institutions, where the educational traditions were connected with the humanistic values existing in families (L. Schmidt, G. Cesar). Some attempts to stimulation of the pro-social behavior of pupil and students (helping and solidarity) were not effective in the Third Reich because of their directive nature (G. Cesar). The comparison of the national-socialism model of the school and the Lichtwark School taking by L. Schmidt demonstrates the advantages of non-indoctrinated educational institutions withthe pedagogical and socialfreedom used for the all-side development of pupil personality. The experience of the membership in BMD (League of German girls), connected with the force working is critically analyzed by G. Cesar and L. Schmidt. The social status of women and their educational influence in the family of the Third Reich design is reconstructed by B. Vinken. She shows that the fascist ideology provides only the subordinated role of women in all spheres of the social life including the educational practices. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:William James, W. E. B. Du Bois, and the Art of New Religious IdealsKolby Knight (bio)And I don’t know a soul who’s not been batteredI don’t have a friend who feels at easeI don’t know a dream that’s not been shatteredOr driven to its knees...Oh, and it’s alright, it’s alright, it’s alrightYou can’t be forever blessedStill, tomorrow’s going to be another working dayAnd I’m trying to get some restThat’s (...) all, I’m trying to get some rest—Paul Simon, “American Tune” (1973) / Recreated by Allen Toussaint (2016)William James and W. E. B. Du Bois believed that an artful life could produce new and world-changing religious ideals. As cosmopolitan scholars who studied in the United States and Europe, both men confidently interlaced original interpretations of Shakespeare, Wagner, and Goethe into their academic accounts of individual and social behavior. Beyond their patronage of the arts, James and Du Bois also saw themselves as scientists and artists who had the responsibility to create new pathways and religious ideals at a time when many European and American intellectuals depicted Western civilization as the endpoint of history.This article explores the pragmatic visions of science, art, and religion respectively offered by James and Du Bois. Pragmatism, here, refers to an active mode of study that looks closely at the interaction between specific thoughts and behaviors in particular situations without assuming a standard of truth which influences or evaluates human life from the outside of experience. As pragmatists, James and Du Bois did not believe their work consisted of merely the explication and description of preexisting truths, but more importantly the religious creation of what James called “new facts,” including healthier habits of thought and practice.1 [End Page 71]In this article, I will trace how the two men, as religious naturalists and leaders in the development of a pragmatic social science at the turn of the twentieth century, challenged evolutionary theories which envisioned Western civilization as the highest standard of aesthetic and intellectual development. Part one demonstrates how James, as a psychologist who prioritized the study and development of “first-hand” experiences, worked against visions of science that saw “lower” emotions as a hindrance to impartial intellectual discovery. It also explores how James centered personal religious experiences in his effort to de-center “impersonal” scientific frameworks which depicted human behavior and thinking as beholden to evolutionary laws which transcended individual experience. Part two considers James’s dissatisfaction with the “bad habits” of his privileged intellectual class, and how his own experience of “soul-sickness” and “stage fright” led him to contest both celebratory histories of Western progress and institutional arrangements which juxtaposed his “mystifying” intellectual performances to the lives of everyday people.Part three moves to how Du Bois, as a sociologist and former student of James, refocused James’s religious pragmatism within the context of his experience of anti-Black racism in the United States. This section traces how Du Bois saw his intellectual career as a work of art which could empower Black individuals to see themselves beyond what David Lloyd describes as “the racial regime of aesthetics” which imagines the progress of “lower humans” as dependent on higher civilizational and educational agents. This section also offers a tripartite interpretation of Du Bois’s experience of “double-consciousness” that considers its aesthetic, social, and political dimensions.2 While James expressed a desire to discard his own sense of double-consciousness, Du Bois’s experience of anti-Black racism made his two-ness more enforced and insidious. The fourth section looks at Du Bois’s disillusionment with white standards of beauty and intelligence as an experience akin to what James described as “soul-sickness.” It shows that whereas James believed that his negative emotional experiences could lead him to “new religious ideals” taking shape within the spiritual energy [End Page 72] and discomforts of his own individual body, Du Bois’s negative experience of racism led him to immerse himself in the religious and artistic vitality of Black social worlds which resisted the oppressive mechanisms and caricatures of... (shrink)

BackgroundThe experience sampling method is an increasingly popular data collection method to assess interpersonal dynamics in everyday life and emotions contextualized in real-world settings. As primary advantages of ESM sampling strategies include minimization of memory biases, maximization of ecological validity, and hypothesis testing at the between- and within-person levels, ESM is suggested to be appropriate for studying the daily lives of educational actors. However, ESM appears to be underutilized in education research. We, thus, aimed to systematically evaluate the methodological (...) characteristics and quality of published ESM studies of social interactions among children and adolescents in school settings, as well as to explore how much variance in social interaction variables could be attributed to the within-person level.MethodUsing Academic Search Complete, APA PsycINFO, APA PsycArticles, ProQuest, Web of Science, Wiley Online Library, and SAGE Journals, and in accordance with PRISMA guidelines and pre-defined eligibility criteria, we conducted a systematic literature search of experience sampling studies up to November 2020. To assess methodological quality, we used a modified checklist for reporting of ESM studies.ResultsOf the originally 2 413 identified studies, a final 52 experience sampling studies were included in the present review. Findings on sample and study design characteristics generally revealed wide variability. Even if high-quality studies were associated with higher scores on the training of participants in using the ESM procedure, and use of incentives, these design strategies did not reveal a statistically significant impact on compliance. The intraclass correlation coefficient was reported in nine studies and on average 58% of the variance in social interaction variables could be attributed to within-person fluctuation between timepoints.ConclusionThe current study is the first to systematically review ESM-based studies on social interactions among children and adolescents in the school context. These observations suggest that ESM is a potentially favorable technique for extracting complex social phenomena in real-world settings. We hope that this review will contribute to improving the quality assessment of ESM studies as well as to inform and guide future experience sampling studies, particularly regarding social phenomena with children and adolescents in educational settings. (shrink)

Hujjat al-Islam Imam al-Ghazali is a thinker, mystic, jurist, and theologian who has still influenced today since his time. In his al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal, he writes about how he survived the crisis that his inquiries about life had driven him to depression. Due to the distress caused by the crisis in him, he left the place where he lived and moved away from people. During this abandonment, he confesses his experiences, inquiries, introspection, and ways of getting to know himself in (...) al-Munqidh. In this article, I will try to understand how he reached guidance from this crisis, what his method was, and how he gained personal religious experience. I will examine the differences and similarities of the way of Sufism from the clergy, where the concept of rational theosophy corresponds in al-Ghazali’s thought. He shows us the limits of reason on the way to reach precise information. He talks about realities that cannot be explained within these limits, what he has learned in the uzlat, and why the love for the world is dangerous. The reason why al-Ghazali returned to social life is explained with the idea of 'fiqh of priorities' in Islam. Al-Ghazali attributes the "nour" that descends to his heart to the will of God in explaining his salvation from the turning point in his life. (shrink)

Ibogaine is a hallucinogenic alkaloid, derived from Tabernanthe iboga, a plant unique to the rainforests of West Africa. Its traditional use as an epiphanic sacrament in local magico-religious practice inspired its appropriation by Western drug addicts by whom it is now hailed as both a catalyst of psychospiritual insight and an effective alleviator of cravings and withdrawal. While scientific and early clinical studies confirm its role in reducing physical withdrawal and craving, debate continues concerning the significance of its “visionary” properties. (...) An analysis of many addicts’ testimonies of recovery, however, places the visionary experience at center stage. I set out to understand mechanisms of transformation and healing, via a comparative phenomenological exploration of this experience, through the opposing lenses of psychoanalysis and cultural constructivism. I propose that at the heart of the healing encounter is a culturally shaped creative journey to an imaginal unspoilt state in personal or collective history. How this experience is recovered and integrated into life is critically considered. I argue a secular account is vital as the ibogaine scene strives toward social and medical legitimacy. If and how such a framework can sit alongside spontaneously emergent spiritual and religious idioms and experience will also be tentatively explored. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art as a Political Act:Expression of Cultural Identity, Self-Identity, and Gender by Suk Nam Yun and Yong Soon MinHwa Young Choi Caruso (bio)IntroductionA number of artists of color, including Asian American women, are creating art from the basis of their lived experiences. Within minority groups searching for their cultural identity, establishing self-identity is an important process. For various psychological and sociological reasons, artists seem inspired to seek deeper meaning (...) and a broader participation in cultural work.1 Asian American women artists, in particular, are currently making art as a means of exploring self-identity, cultural identity, and gender issues. Korean/Korean American minority women artists are creating art as a reaction to their cultural upbringing, which questions issues of identity, gender, ethnicity, politics, cultural, and socioeconomic status. These contemporary artists are breaking away from traditional cultural expectations and overcoming social barriers as artists, women, and Koreans/Korean Americans. With the growing public awareness of women's consciousness and sense of self as women in Korea and as an ethnic minority in America, these artists are redefining their identity. Despite the traditional patriarchal Confucian hierarchy; lack of social, institutional, and political support; and stereotypic gender, cultural, and socioeconomic status expectations for women, a few have stepped out of their traditional roles as women and have become successful artists in Korea and America.The artworks of these artists are worthy of investigation because they appear to be a culturally, socially, and politically motivated artistic expression of the complex multifaceted Korean/Korean American life experiences as women and as Korean immigrant members of a cultural (ethnic) minority in American society. Therefore, two main research questions can be posed: [End Page 71]• Given that art can be constructed out of layers of different experiences and influences, to what extent do the dimensions of cultural identity, self-identity, and gender interweave and contribute to the function of art as a political act for Korean/Korean American women artists?• How do Korean/Korean American cultural, social, and female experiences influence the artistic expression of Korean/Korean American women artists?In order to answer these questions, I selected case study methodology2 and adapted elements of interpretive biography,3 and narrative approaches as developed by Wallace and Gruber.4 According to Denzin,5 interpretive biography involves the collection and analysis of personal experiences, life documents, stories, accounts, and narratives that describe turning-point moments in individuals' lives. Denzin argues that personal experiences and personal stories are derived from a larger cultural, ideological, and historical context. The intent of the biographical project is to problematize the social, economic, cultural, structural, and historical forces that shape, distort, and otherwise alter lived experiences.By using narrative case study methods, I explore elements of self-identity formation, cultural identity, gender issues, personal thoughts, artistic expression, meaning of artworks, professional achievement, and life circumstances. I examine each participant's life in the Korean and American historical, cultural, social, and political environments. I interpret participants' outer lives (what they do) and inner lives (feelings, thoughts, inner self) to capture their deep, profound life experiences. I examine salient themes of their art expression and how the role of art and artistic activity is a part of political, cultural, social, and feminist activism. I further investigate their professional activities in order to identify the multiple roles that contribute to personal and professional identity formation.For the purpose of this study, I selected the contemporary Korean woman artist Suk Nam Yun and the contemporary Korean American woman artist Yong Soon Min as primary participants. These two women artists, despite many social and cultural barriers, chose to become artists; feminists; and social, cultural, and political activists; in addition to fulfilling traditional Korean family and domestic roles. Yun and Min are regarded as the leading contemporary Korean/Korean American women artists whose artworks deal with issues of cultural, social, feminist, political, and hybrid identity and art as political activism.Lippard acknowledges that visual images play an increasingly important role in society.6 Art that connects everyday experience with social critique and creative expression becomes a vital means of reflecting upon the nature of society and social existence.7 Artworks can function as... (shrink)