This article discusses what arguments best support universal health care (UHC), with a focus on Norman Daniels’ equality of opportunity account. This justification for UHC hinges on the assumption of a close relationship between health care and health. But in light of empirical research that suggests that health outcomes are shaped to a large extent by factors other than health care, such as income, education, housing, and working conditions, the question arises to what extent health care is really necessary (...) to protect and promote health, and thereby opportunity. The author argues that, although this challenge to the equality of opportunity rationale is legitimate, it is not sufficiently specified to allow us to adequately assess the extent to which universal health succeeds in protecting equality of opportunity. The article concludes by outlining a more promising strategy for developing a viable rationale for UHC. (shrink)

Background: Existing ethical guidelines recommend that, all else equal, past receipt of a medical resource (e.g. a scarce organ) should not be considered in current allocation decisions (e.g. a repeat transplantation).DiscussionOne stated reason for this ethical consensus is that formal theories of ethics and justice do not persuasively accept or reject repeated access to the same medical resources. Another is that restricting attention to past receipt of a particular medical resource seems arbitrary: why couldn't one just as well, it is (...) argued, consider receipt of other goods such as income or education? In consequence, simple allocation by lottery or first-come-first-served without consideration of any past receipt is thought to best afford equal opportunity, conditional on equal medical need. There are three issues with this view that need to be addressed. First, public views and patient preferences are less ambiguous than formal theories of ethics. Empirical work shows strong preferences for fairness in health care that have not been taken into account: repeated accessto resources has been perceived as unfair. Second, while difficult to consider receipt of many other prior resources including non-medical resources, this should not be used a motive for ignoring the receipt of any and all goods including the focal resource in question. Third, when all claimants to a scarce resource are equally deserving, then use of random allocation seems warranted. However, the converse is not true: mere use of a randomizer does not by itself make the merits of all claimants equal.SummaryMy conclusion is that not ignoring prior receipt of the same medical resource, and prioritizing those who have not previously had access to the medical resource in question, may be perceived as fairer and more equitable by society. (shrink)

The Ramseyan thesis that the probability of an indicative conditional is equal to the corresponding conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is both widely confirmed and subject to attested counterexamples (e.g., McGee 2000, Kaufmann 2004). This raises several puzzling questions. For instance, why are there interpretations of conditionals that violate this Ramseyan thesis in certain contexts, and why are they otherwise very rare? In this paper, I raise some challenges to Stefan Kaufmann's account of why the Ramseyan thesis (...) sometimes fails, and motivate my own theory. On my theory, the proposition expressed by an indicative conditional is partially determined by a background partition, and hence its probability depends on the choice of such a partition. I hold that this background partition is contextually determined, and in certain conditions is set by a salient question under discussion in the context. I show how the resulting theory offers compelling answers to the puzzling questions raised by failures of the Ramseyan thesis. (shrink)

In this article, we defend a normative theory of prenatal equality of opportunity, based on a critical revision of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity . We argue that if natural endowments are defined as biological properties possessed at birth and the distribution of natural endowments is seen as beyond the scope of justice, Rawls's FEO allows for inequalities that undermine the social conditions of a property-owning democracy. We show this by considering the foetal programming of disease (...) and the possibility of germ-line modifications. If children of lower socioeconomic background are more likely to develop in a poor foetal environment and germ-line enhancements are available only to the rich, initial inequalities between the rich and the poor would grow, and yet FEO would be satisfied. In order to avoid the problem, we propose a revised FEO principle omitting any reference to the comparison of natural endowments. Our revised FEO requires that institutions mitigate social class effect from reproduction and gestation to the greatest extent compatible with parental freedoms and the value of the family. (shrink)

We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then Cas information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain (...) this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We conclude our study with some remarks on the supposed "independence" of two conditionals, and we interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantities. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Equal freedom is the common starting point for most contractual theories of justice from Hobbes and Rousseau to Rawls. But while equal freedom defines a common starting point for these theories, this does not result in a general consensus on the conception of justice. On the contrary, different ways of conceptualizing the contractual starting point leads to different conceptions of the demands of justice. To fully understand the relationship between equal freedom and justice we therefore first need to explicate how (...) and why the initial condition of equality is transformed into demands of justice. In this paper we discuss how this transformation takes place in the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls, with particular emphasis on the vexed relationship between motivation and justification. (shrink)

Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at (...) the same time. (shrink)

How do we know if people are equal? Contemporary philosophers consider a number of issues when determining if the goals of egalitarian distributive justice have been achieved: defining the metric of equality; determining whether the goal is equality, or simply priority or sufficiency; establishing whether there should be conditions, e.g. bad brute luck, for the amelioration of inequality. In all this, most egalitarians contend that what is to be equalized is not people’s actual shares of the good in (...) question, but rather, the opportunities to have such shares. I counter this view with an ‘egalitarian flourishing’ approach that, in seeking to make people equal in actual well-being, takes exception to the role of opportunity in contemporary argument. The flourishing view means a focus on outcomes, on how people live, in order to enable people to live equally flourishing lives. I argue that if we consider the complex dynamics of choice and circumstance, the role of nonmaterial considerations and the ideal of an egalitarian community, equality of opportunity proves to be an inadequate approach to the realization of the egalitarian ideal. (shrink)

According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by (...) presenting data that cast doubt on an assumption underlying all triviality arguments. (shrink)

A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this (...) condition and argues that they yield implausible verdicts about the instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation. (shrink)

The ideal of equality has led a double existence in modern society. In one guise the ideal has been at least very popular if not uncontroversial and in its other guise the ideal has been attractive to some and repulsive to others. These two aspects of equality are equality of democratic citizenship and equality of condition.

According to the Differences of Sex Development Regulations of the International Association of Athletics Federations, Caster Semenya and other athletes with heightened testosterone levels are considered non-eligible for middle distance running races in the women’s class. Based on an analysis of fair equality of opportunity in sport, I take a critical look at the Semenya case and at IAAF’s DSD Regulations. I distinguish between what I call stable and dynamic inequalities between athletes. Stable inequalities are those that athletes cannot (...) impact or control in any significant way such as inequalities in biological sex, body size and chronological age. Dynamic inequalities, such as inequalities in strength, speed and endurance, or in technical and tactical skills, can be impacted and to a certain extent controlled by athletes. If stable inequalities exert significant and systematic impact on performance, they provide a rationale for classification. If high testosterone level is an inborn, strong and systemic driver of performance development, inequalities in such levels can provide a rationale for classification. As is emphasised by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, this leads to a dilemma of rights: the right of Semenya to compete in sport according to her legal sex and gender identity, and the right of other athletes within the average female testosterone range to compete under fair conditions. I conclude with providing conditional support of the CAS decision in the Semenya case and of IAAF’s DSD Regulations. (shrink)

This article discusses the removal of voting rights from those convicted of crimes. I focus on two recent defences of penal disenfranchisement: firstly, I question one justification of the view that voting rights are conditional on the fulfilment of certain responsibilities that offenders fail to meet. Secondly, I criticise an expressivist justification of disenfranchisement based on the idea that it is uniquely suited to express dissociation from serious wrongdoing. While embracing the expressivist perspective of the latter line of argument, I (...) argue that disenfranchisement also expresses attitudes that are incompatible with the commitment to equality. Disenfranchisement conveys the judgment that offenders are not fit to participate in the democratic process. In doing so, it violates the duty of the state to treat all its citizens with equal respect and undermines offenders’ equal status. Moreover, this policy fosters objectionable inequalities of esteem: other members of the community are very likely to internalise the judgment that offenders are second‐class citizens and to regard them as inferior, which in turn undermines their status in society. (shrink)

Social or relational egalitarians try to defend democracy non-instrumentally as a constitutive element of a society where no one stands as inferior or superior to anyone else. However, they face an instrumentalist challenge from within: Why not uphold a non-democratic regime if it outperforms democracy in protecting or promoting egalitarian social relations, for example, by stably producing substantive political decisions that guard against social hierarchies? This article explores the best response to this challenge from the social egalitarian non-instrumentalist standpoint. It (...) argues that the instrumentalist challenge can be accommodated without abandoning the essential non-instrumentalist commitment to democracy; while a nondemocratic regime may be justified under less-than-ideal circumstances as a contingently effective means to realize more social equality, democracy can nevertheless be viewed as a necessary condition for the realization of full social equality. (shrink)

Implicitly or explicitly, youth work practitioners, scholars and advocates typically invoke a set of egalitarian values to explain, justify and promote the ethical basis of their work. Despite such commitments, there exists conceptual ambiguity surrounding equality across much of the youth work literature which has significant consequences for how youth work is framed and defended. This article introduces the interdisciplinary field of Equality Studies and argues that an Equality Studies approach provides a means to (i) clarify (...) class='Hi'>equality-related normative goals within the youth work field and (ii) enhance radically orientated youth work by strengthening the conception of equality at its core. It analyses three areas of conceptual ambiguity within the youth work literature with respect to the value of equality, in each case demonstrating how an Equality Studies approach can help remedy the problem. These areas are: (i) the assumption that equality means ‘sameness’; (ii) the limits of equality of opportunity and anti-discrimination; and (iii) the relationship between equality and other values. It then evaluates the concept of ‘equity’, arguing that it is a vague, inadequate and unnecessary vehicle for capturing egalitarian concerns. The article concludes with some comments on the feasibility of radically egalitarian youth work. (shrink)

The paper highlights some of John Stuart Mill’s views on the problem of gender equality, as expressed in his The Subjection of Women. The paper outlines the historical context of Mill’s conception and gives an analysis of his criticism of social conditions which lead to the subordination of women. It shows also the philosopher’s main ideas and arguments for equality and friendship between women and men. Attention is paid also to several main lines of contemporary reception of Mill’s (...) views from the perspective of feminist philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I argue against Ronald Dworkin's rejection of the labour auction in his ‘Equality of Resources’. I criticize Dworkin's claims that the talented would envy the untalented in such an auction, and that the talented in particular would be enslaved by it. I identify some ways in which the talent auction is underdescribed and I compare the results for the condition of the talented of different further descriptions of it. I conclude that Dworkin's deviation from the (...) ‘envy test’ criterion results in an inequality between the talented and the untalented which cannot be justified in egalitarian terms. Correspondence:c1 m.christofidis@ucl.ac.uk. (shrink)

In order to resolve the controversial discussion regarding content effects in deductive reasoning, we propose distinguishing between two inferential sources—an argument's form , and additional relations people associate with the argument's content —and analysing their interplay. Both sources are equally necessary in order to understand the role content plays in deductive reasoning. People make valid deductions from the content relations ( content competence ), but in thematic reasoning tasks, these deductions lead to the intriguing phenomenon known as content effects . (...) Focusing on the interplay of both sources of inferences, the dual source distinction enables a novel class of predictions to be made, namely the correct mastery of the logical connectors ( form competence ) in tasks that require the individual to think about an argument's form in relation to its content. To illustrate the dual source approach and its implications, the selection task paradigm of conditional reasoning with a point of view is used in combination with two content domains: conditional promises with cheating and non-cheating perspectives and technical systems with causal perspectives. Experimental findings corroborate all three phenomena: content competence, content effects, and form competence. The dual source distinction is discussed with regard to current theories of reasoning. (shrink)

Notice --- Hobbes and Adams as Thucydideans --- Ancient Greece --- Alternative Concepts of the Human Condition --- Medieval Monarchy --- Renaissance Republics --- Founding Fathers --- The Moral Recuperation of Self-Interest --- Other Human Worlds --- Now is the Whimper of Our Self-Contempt --- Culture is the Human Nature.

Much of the literature on basic equality has focused on the question of what grounds the equal moral status of persons, typically understood as fully competent adults. However, less has been said about what justifies the equal moral status of those human beings who do not hold a wide range of sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as severely cognitively disabled human beings and children. This chapter contributes to filling this gap by developing a novel theory of the basis of children’s (...) moral equality. Specifically, I argue that children’s moral equality is entailed by a commitment to a kind of respect which requires providing children with those social conditions that foster their development into well-adjusted adults who hold a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. This is because unequal consideration and treatment precludes, or at least is a significant obstacle to, the provision of some goods that are crucial to the cultivation of a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. Children’s moral equality, then, is a constitutive requirement of what is owed to them qua moral status-holders. (shrink)

The author develops the concept of communicative equality based on Habermas’ theory of communicative action aimed at understanding. Linguistic interaction presupposes communicative equality as a priori condition of mutual understanding. It raises the critical issue of a role and place of misunderstanding and disagreement that we can meet in everyday communication. Following Rancir’s examination of disagreement the author is tracing sensible perception of social inequality by a part of communicators, as well as the emergence of political disagreement (...) as its consequence. The main part of the article devotes to realization of a conflict produced by speaking beings’ equality and experiencing inequality of distribution of parts of the common good. The author analyses Rancir’s innovative interpretation of concepts of politics, the politics of aesthetics, the police, the wrong, and new reading Aristotle’s and Plato’s notion of blaberon. The double logic of communication as both equality in mutual understanding and as the class struggle for social equality is shown, followed Ranciеr, on the example of historian and philoso- pher Ballanche, who in the early 19th century direct compared events of the French Revolution and the secession of Roman plebeians on Aventine Hill. The critics of Habermas’ theory of discursive rationality occupy the particular place of the article. His model of communication rejects an active role of the third person, i.e., the observer’s position in communicative actions oriented towards understanding. But addressing to other historical example of both the theorist-observer and one of Ukrainian revolution 1917–1921 leaders, writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko assists to clarify the meaning of “the third person” in communicative formation of a new political and cultural community. Finally, referring to Schmitt’s concept of the political as the existential conflict of recognition or negation of an opponent’s way of existence allows for a conclusion that studying existential dimension of communication can add to analysis of communication. (shrink)

Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., ?if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow?) and q, if p (e.g., ?I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill?). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 (...) revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low-probability statements relative to high-probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability. (shrink)

Does it make sense to hold that, if it is bad that some people are worse off than others, it is worse if those who are worse off come to be so through sheer bad luck that it is beyond their power to control? In her contribution to this symposium, Susan Hurley cautions against a closely related fallacy: from the fact that people have come to an unequal condition through unchosen bad luck, it does not follow that, if we (...) aim to undo the influence of unchosen luck, we ought to institute equality of condition. Forswearing the fallacy that Hurley analyses is compatible with answering the question affirmatively, and more generally with holding that principles of distributive justice should be sensitive to the distinction between chosen and unchosen bad luck. This essay explores how this might be done. (shrink)

Contemporary political theories have made significant progress toward identifying the principles for an egalitarian society. From this perspective, Edward Bellamy's radical and pluralistic egalitarianism can be read not only as a relevant precedent but as a source of sophisticated arguments capable of enriching current debates. Although unfairly overlooked as theoretical works, Bellamy's utopias can be read today as offering insights that bring together and combine key modern ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Therefore, this article argues that Bellamy's conception (...) of equality involves several dimensions and functions as a background condition for effective freedoms; that these liberties are not at odds with voluntary equality; and that fraternity—understood in Rawlsian terms—makes sense in a free and equal soci- ety, as it is guaranteed both by institutional means and by personal decisions. (shrink)

In a recent public engagement study on heritable human genome editing (HHGE) conducted among South Africans, participants approved of using HHGE for serious health conditions—viewing it as a means of bringing about valuable social goods—and proposed that the government should actively invest resources to ensure everyone has equal access to the technology for these purposes. This position was animated by the view that future generations have a claim to these social goods, and this entitlement justified making HHGE available in the (...) present. This claim can be ethically justified in the Ubuntu ethic (deriving from South Africa) as it (a) emphasizes the interests of the community, and (b) espouses a metaphysical conception of the community that transcends the present generation and includes past and future generations. On this basis, a compelling claim can be made on behalf of prospective persons in favor of equal access to HHGE. (shrink)

Resumen: En los últimos años ha cobrado relevancia académica en el ámbito de los derechos humanos, un debate sobre la propuesta de la estudiosa estadounidense Martha Albertson Fineman de entender la vulnerabilidad como una condición humana universal, innata y constante. Esta nueva conceptualización de la vulnerabilidad se ha presentado como la base teórica de un paradigma alternativo a la teoría liberal del Estado y de los derechos. El presente trabajo analiza algunos puntos críticos de este nuevo paradigma en su relación (...) con la idea de igualdad, especialmente en la medida en que se presenta como una nueva formulación de la idea de igualdad sustantiva, capaz de transcender las limitaciones que se señalan a la noción liberal de igualdad formal y al derecho antidiscriminatorio construido sobre esa noción. Abstract: The proposal advanced by US theorist Martha Albertson Fineman for reconceptualising the notion of vulnerability as a human condition, universal, inherent and constant, has acquired growing academic moment in the field of human rights. This new conceptualisation has been presented as the theoretical foundation for a new political and legal paradigm, alternative to liberal theory. This essay assesses some critical points in this new paradigm in its relation with the idea of equality, especially inasmuch as vulnerability appears as a new formula for substantive equality, capable of transcending the limitations of the liberal notion of formal equality and the antidiscrimination law that is founded thereupon. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Enlightenment and Its Antecedents Equal Rights and American Constitutional Law Liberty and Equality under the Constitution The Radical Critique and the Radical Dilemma Rawls Dworkin Equality of Capabilities Equality Unmodified or Spheres of Justice Is Equality a Value? References.

Alain Badiou’s relationship to the work of Baruch Spinoza is a complex one. Though Badiou admires Spinoza’s courageous pursuit of the more geometrico, he is ardently critical of Spinoza on a number of fundamental ontological issues. Because of this, Spinoza often has had to bear the brunt of Badiou’s theoretical attacks. But how successful is Badiou’s attack on Spinoza? In this paper, I aim to show that this attack fails by examining the critique of Spinoza that Badiou provides in his (...) “Spinoza’s Closed Ontology,” which can be found in his Theoretical Writings. Badiou’s essential claim is that the ontology of Spinoza’s Ethics employs structures or procedures that are heterogeneous to that ontology. I rely on Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, as found in his Expressionism in Philosophy, to pinpoint precisely where Badiou’s reading of Spinoza goes wrong. I show not only that Badiou’s critique of Spinoza fails to recognize a central structural feature of Spinoza’s ontology, namely the two powers of God—the power to exist and act, and the power to think and know—but also that this misrecognition is the condition for the possibility of Badiou’s mistaken critique. The paper then discusses how it is that these issues relate, more broadly, to the relationship between Deleuze and Badiou. (shrink)

Directive 2002/73 enacted by the Council and Parliament of the European Union introduces substantial and procedural amendments to the European Community's `old' Equal Treatment Directive 76/207, providing, in particular, clarification of the definitions of concepts such as direct and indirect discrimination and harassment. Yet, while the European Commission has praised the progressive nature of the new European legislation, a critical assessment of its provisions reveals some serious shortcomings and a host of missed opportunities. Although the new Directive generally reflects the (...) spirit of the case law of the E.C.J., it does so without any originality or pro-activism meaning that the European legislature has once again left the initiative of pursuing sex equality in the E.U. to the Court. (shrink)

Source [1] Andrew E. P. Mitchell, Federica Galli, Sondra Butterworth. (2023). Editorial: Equality, diversity and inclusive research for diverse rare disease communities. Front. Psychol., vol. 14. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1285774. "It is also important to recognize that certain mental health disorders are classified as rare conditions and have their own cultural concepts of distress, as defined in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)" and require “equal attention and support for individuals and their families, both physically and emotionally”. [1].

The classical liberal argument that each human being has equal moral value and is deserving of equal concern and respect has had an enormous impact on our understanding both of equality and of individuals. Using this as a foundation, liberals have formulated theories of what is required for treating individuals with equal concern and respect that have provided ever more substantive interpretations of what individuals need to flourish in social relations marred by a legacy of discrimination and inequality. Yet (...) the view that relationships are of primary significance in the lives of individuals and that individuals are essentially interdependent and dependent beings has played a limited role in equality theory. If anything, these features of selves have been perceived to be inimical to equality, aspects of human lives that need to be transcended or left behind in the political community of fully participating members. ;This essay argues that insights into the relational features of language and of selves in communities provide what is needed to make up for the shortcomings of liberal conceptions of equality. Through a critique of Nozick's libertarianism, Rawls's liberal substantive theory, and communitarianism, a relational conception of the self and a relational theory of equality begin to emerge. I use Gilligan's inadequate account of relationships as a springboard for developing the idea that the interactive relationships between the oppressed and the oppressor, the disadvantaged and the advantaged, the powerless and the powerful have important implications for what should count as full equality and even for political action to eliminate inequalities. ;The essay closes by applying relational insights to a practical policy issue, the issue of affirmative action. Here we begin to see in concrete detail how relational theory can expand an understanding of the conditions needed for treating all individuals with equal concern and respect. (shrink)

In this book I argue that school integration is not a proxy for educational justice. I demonstrate that the evidence consistently shows the opposite is more typically the case. I then articulate and defend the idea of voluntary separation, which describes the effort to redefine, reclaim and redirect what it means to educate under preexisting conditions of segregation. In doing so, I further demonstrate how voluntary separation is consistent with the liberal democratic requirements of equality and citizenship. The position (...) I defend is not opposed to integration but rather is a justified response to the daily experience of frustration and disappointment with a system that has failed members of marginalized groups for too long. I argue that most voluntary separation experiments in education, far from being motivated by a sense of racial, cultural or religious exclusion, are in fact driven among other things by a desire for a quality education, not to mention community membership and self respect. As such, voluntary separation represents a morally robust pragmatic strategy that is able to answer liberal challenges concerning involuntary stratification, ethnocentrism and democratic deliberation. (shrink)

Urban space is the spatial projection of various social and economic activities. Given the complexity of urban functions and the ongoing expansion of urban areas, the spatial differentiation of various economic activities within cities tends to become more and more clear; moreover, there tends to be spatial inequalities in resource allocation. Taking Beijing as an example, this study develops a spatial accessibility model at the town level by integrating the spatial distribution of economic activities with the transport system and evaluating (...) the accessibility to various economic activities. The equality of the residents’ economic-related travel activity is also evaluated in line with the population distribution. The results show that the accessibility to economic activities generally decreases in going from the urban center to the peripheral suburbs, and this “core to edge” difference is readily apparent. In general, residents tend to choose areas to settle in which have a high degree of accessibility, however, the attractiveness of accessibility is constrained within certain limits, as evidenced by a reduction of population in the center of Beijing. Additionally, there are inequalities with respect to traveling experiences. For instance, 27.8% of residents experience very convenient travel conditions, mostly in the Xicheng, Dongcheng, and Haidian districts, and this equates to a high level of accessibility; about half of the residents in Beijing live in areas ranked as being of medium accessibility and where the distribution of economic activities and transportation facilities are insufficient. Residents living in the outlying Changping, Mentougou, Shunyi, and Fangshan districts have relatively poor access to transportation indicating a low level of accessibility. Overall, the evaluation method for spatial equality considers comprehensively the distribution of economic activities, transportation, and population distribution and can provide a reference framework for optimization of the urban spatial structure to improve urban spatial equality. (shrink)

In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given (...) of a representation theorem establishing the conditions under which a rational agent's preferences for conditionals determines the existence of unique measures (up to choice of scale) of her degrees of belief and desire. (shrink)

Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction. Drawing on social epistemology and theories of equality and distributive justice, we provide an account of epistemic equality. We regard participation in, and influence over a knowledge-generating discourse in an epistemic community as a limited good that needs to (...) be justly distributed among putative members of the community. We argue that rather than trying to operationally formulate an exact criterion for distributing this good, epistemic equality may be realized by insisting on active participation of members of three groups in addition to credited experts: relevant disempowered groups, relevant uncredited experts, and relevant stakeholders. Meeting these conditions fulfills the political, moral, and epistemic aims of epistemic equality. (shrink)

The discovery of selective associability of cues in classical conditioning has often been treated as an embarrassment to Pavlov, because he has been represented as a proponent of the "equivalence of associability of cues." According to that doctrine, except for the influence of differences in stimulus intensity, all environmental stimuli are equally susceptible to becoming conditioned stimuli if they are arranged in a suitable time-relation to any effective unconditioned stimulus . The current paper asks whether Pavlov explicitly made such a (...) claim and, if not, whether he could have endorsed equivalence of associability. Scientific controversy, the role that "the classics" play in scientific specialties, and the emblematic standing of the founding figures of a discipline or specialty constitute a framework for discussion of Pavlov's stand on the equivalence of associability. (shrink)

Lewis argued that ‘there is no way to interpret a conditional connective so that, with sufficient generality, the probabilities of conditionals will equal the appropriate conditional probabilities’. However, as Lewis and others have subsequently recognized, Lewis' triviality results go through only on the assumption that ‘if’ is not context-sensitive. This leaves a question that has not been adequately addressed: what are the prospects of a context-sensitive theory of ‘if’ that complies with Stalnaker's thesis? I offer one interesting constraint on any (...) such theory. I argue that no context-sensitive theory satisfies Stalnaker's thesis if it satisfies three plausible assumptions: first, that the truth of an indicative is determined by the world of evaluation and by the set of worlds in the relevant epistemic context in which the antecedent is true; second, that one can learn an indicative conditional without learning that the antecedent and consequent are both true; third, that belief revision is conservative in the sense that it does not reduce the probabilities to zero unnecessarily. The result gives us a clearer picture of the real costs of a truth-conditional context-sensitive Stalnaker's thesis-compliant semantics. (shrink)

The egalitarian values of equality and priority are standardly given maximal scope in that they are applied to the overall condition of peoples' lives and to temporally complete lifetimes. They are also standardly restricted to interpersonal choices. This paper argues that egalitarian values can also reasonably be applied to particular dimensions of lives, to people at particular times, and to choices made about one person's life. It contends that these special applications of egalitarianism are easier to defend in (...) the case of priority than in the case of equality. (shrink)

The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.

Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The suggestion is that (...) in the absence of information that would discriminate between the individuals, equal treatment minimizes the expected unfairness of the outcome. A related suggestion is that equal treatment under these circumstances also minimizes the maximal possible unfairness of the outcome. Whether these suggestions are correct or not depends on the properties of the underlying unfairness measure. The required properties are specified. The essay also considers the normative status of equal lotteries on unequal treatments. (shrink)

This paper aims to find the bright spots for implementing the new zoning system applicable to Indonesian education by comparing other countries that have already applied. Some other writers still have pros and cons with the zoning system, starting from the implementation, benefits, and even different things that affect the quality of education in Indonesia, namely the needs of teaching staff. To find a problem approach, the authors use theoretical references from Viennet and Pont. Data collection was collected from various (...) education policy books, journals related to the zoning system, publications from the Ministry of Education and the Central Statistics Agency and then concluded as a result of the journal that was analyzed qualitatively. Developed countries have implemented a zoning system for schools to overcome conducive classrooms, but there are new problems facing developed countries today with zoning conditions. The implications of the developed countries' zoning system can be used as material for the evaluation of the Indonesian government to avoid the same thing. This paper concludes that equitable distribution of facilities and infrastructures, as well as the quality of teachers and the needs of the number of teachers, are important keys in implementing the zoning system to run as expected. (shrink)

Presumption of Equality requires that individuals be treated equally in the absence of relevant information that would discriminate between them. Our objective is to make this principle more precise, if viewed as a principle of fairness, and to determine why and under what conditions it should be obeyed. Presumption norms are procedural constraints, but their justification can be sought in the possible or expected outcomes of the procedures they regulate. This is the avenue pursued here. The suggestion is that (...) in the absence of information that would discriminate between the individuals, equal treatment minimizes the expected unfairness of the outcome. A related suggestion is that equal treatment under these circumstances also minimizes the maximal possible unfairness of the outcome. Whether these suggestions are correct or not depends on the properties of the underlying unfairness measure. The required properties are specified. The essay also considers the normative status of equal lotteries on unequal treatments. (shrink)

The new result of this paper is that for θ-stable we have S1[θ] = D[θ, L, ∞]. S1 is Hrushovski's rank. This is an improvement of a result of Kim and Pillay, who for simple theories under the assumption that either of the ranks be finite obtained the same identity. Only the first equality is new, the second equality is a result of Shelah from the seventies. We derive it by studying localizations of several rank functions, we get (...) the followingMain Theorem. Suppose that μ is regular satisfying μ ≥ |T|+, p is a finite type, and Δ is a set of formulas closed under Boolean operations. If either R[p, Δ, μ+] < ∞ or p is Δ-stable and μ satisfies “for every sequence {μi : i < |Δ| + ℵ0} of cardinals μi < μ we have that equation image holds”, then S[p, Δ, μ+] = D[p, Δ, μ+] = R[p, Δ, μ+].The S rank above is a localized version of Hrushovski's S1 rank. This rank, as well as our systematic use of local stability, allows us to get a more conceptual proof of the equality of D and R, which is an old result of Shelah. A particular case of the theorem offers a new sufficient condition for the equality of S1 and D[·, L, ∞]. We also manage, due to a more general approach, to avoid some combinatorial difficulties present in Shelah's original exposition. (shrink)

Equality is typically presumed to be an end of justice; however, in this chapter, we argue that it is better understood as a condition of justice. Our argument draws on the Just World Fallacy, the phenomenon of people mistakenly believing fortuitous patterns of reward or harm to be reflective of justice. This phenomenon can undermine relationships of equality even where differences in reward or harm are ostensibly deserved. If everyone received equal pay, then the propensity for people (...) to defer to the more successful or derogate the less successful would be diminished, and thus there would be greater scope for people to enter into the sorts of relationships of equal respect and regard that just communities require. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of constraining class-specific residual variances to be equal by examining and comparing the parameter estimation of a free model and a constrained model under various conditions. A Monte Carlo simulation study was conducted under several conditions, including the number of predictors, class-specific intercepts, sample size, class-specific regression weights, and class proportion to evaluate the results for parameter estimation of the free model and the restricted model. The free model yielded a (...) more accurate estimation than the restricted model for most of the conditions, but the accuracy of the free model estimation was impacted by the number of predictors, sample size, the disparity in the magnitude of class-specific slopes and intercepts, and class proportion. When equality constraints were imposed in residual variance discrepant conditions, the parameter estimates showed substantial inaccuracy for slopes, intercepts, and residual variances, especially for those in Class 2. When the residual variances were equal between the classes, the restricted model showed better performance under some conditions. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of the ethical and value dimensions of the ecological crisis in the situation caused by war, and to the clarification of the significance of human responsibility for one’s actions in relation to nature. It is shown that the observance of moral and ethical norms and orientation to the values vital to man are a necessary condition for the preservation of human life and nature. The analysis of the tasks set in the article (...) is carried out on the basis of the use of ideas of communicative philosophy and discursive ethics, which allows to form knowledge about the ecologically constructive relations of man with nature, to assess the scale of environmental problems in the conditions of war, and to search for ways to mitigate the consequences of the ecological crisis for man and nature.It is substantiated that the ecological crisis has value and cultural origins, therefore the awareness of the need to adhere to universal human values and the correlation of human actions in relation to nature with the norms of cultural and historical universalism becomes especially relevant. Attention is focused on the fact that in the conditions of war, barbaric expansion into the natural world, soullessness, merciless treatment of the plant and animal world, man and humanity must be guided in their actions by humanistic consciousness and moral principles, determine their actions by understanding responsibility for life. It has been established that modern man’s recognition of the importance of moral and ethical norms and humanistic values is an alternative to a lifestyle built on an unlimited, aggressive, exploitative attitude towards nature. Despite the difference between the types of culture and different cultural systems, the dominance of different value systems, people must equally ensure equal rights and bear joint responsibility for life. The most promising development strategy for humanity in a war situation should be the preservation of human life in unity with nature. (shrink)

Why do so many—including philosophers—care about equality? Mere envy? This book investigates how Homo sapiens developed, thrived in, and nurtured a certain social condition that happened to abet our continual survival. Empirical evidence points to a natural, possibly inborn, sense that humans live most humanly as equals: No one told them what to do; no one had significantly more goods. Humans evolved in such a condition of social equality and autonomy. This condition of individual autonomy (...) in turn shaped our species and led humans to demand social equality to this day. All changed when groups stopped roving for food, settled down, and cultivated land. Some individuals started storing goods clandestinely, gaining wealth and power. Inequality set in and, ever since, a struggle between haves and have-nots. People strive to reestablish some degree of equality, philosophical theories notwithstanding. This book’s empirical theory of equality’s ontology explains why humans over the millennia strive for equality and help assess whether theories of equality, if implemented in policy, could accommodate this need. Equality is essentially bound up with autonomy, liberty and justice. Any political theory neglecting these interconnections may fall short of its goals. While industrial societies will unlikely implement the book’s theory, at the least it can illuminate common theories of equality and where they fly or fail. (shrink)

Rough set theory is an excellent mathematical tool for the analysis of a vague description of actions in decision problems. Now, in this paper by considering the notion of an equality algebra, the notion of the lower and the upper approximations are introduced and some properties of them are given. Moreover, it is proved that the lower and the upper approximations define an interior operator and a closure operator, respectively. Also, using D-lower and D-upper approximation, conditions for a nonempty (...) subset to be definable are provided and investigated that under which condition D-lower and D-upper approximation can be filter. (shrink)