Rather than answering the broad question, ‘What is a just income?’, in this essay I consider one component of income—economic rent—under one understanding of justice—as giving people what they deserve. As it turns out, the answer to this more focused question is ‘no’. People do not deserve their economic rents, and there is no bar of justice to their confiscation. After briefly covering the concept of desert and explaining what economic rents are, I analyze six types (...) of rent and show that each is unjustified from the point of view of desert. I conclude by drawing some political and economic lessons from the preceding analysis, and by describing how these considerations can create a more just and efficient economy. (shrink)

The concept of economic rent is among the oldest in political economy. This reflects the fact that economies have always included parties whose income appears more parasitic than productive. The concept of rent-seeking refers to the efforts of parties seeking to secure such income by way of gaining influence over economic regulation or otherwise gaining favors from government. In spite of its intuitiveness, however, it has proven difficult to precisely distinguish rent from other categories of (...) income. This chapter seeks to acquaint readers with this problem. The privatization of incarceration is then supplied as an important case study in current rent-seeking behavior. (shrink)

In this article I defend the claim that subsidies for university education should be substantially reduced. The normative justification for this conclusion derives from a theory of distributive justice called the Compensation Theory of Income Justice, which is most easily understood as a normative version of the positive economic theory of compensating differentials. Relying on the distinction between incentives and economic rents, and after considering two ‘received opinions’ about why large income differentials exist in modern societies, I note (...) that substantial portions of above-average incomes are likely to be artificial monopoly rents, rather than incentives or natural monopoly rents. Under the Compensation Theory of Income Justice the earning of artificial monopoly rents is not justified. Since subsidisation of university education fees increases lifetime artificial rents, the theory would recommend such subsidies be substantially reduced. I defend this conclusion against objections, the most notable of which is the view that university subsidies help to improve equality of opportunity to university education. I explain how it is possible to maintain the laudable aim of providing equality of opportunity while reducing the subsidisation and, as a consequence, the lifetime artificial rents. (shrink)

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement is an impressive — indeed, daunting — exercise in contractarian moral and political philosophy. The primary purpose of his treatise is to explicate practical rationality as constrained maximization and morality as compliance with these constraints. Gauthier offers an account of which constraints on straightforward utility maximization each rational individual will be prepared to accept and comply with on the condition that other individuals also will accept and comply with them as well as an explanation of (...) why compliance with those constraints counts as morality. However, although Morals by Agreement is in the great tradition of Hobbesian moral and political theorizing, Gauthier's morality by agreement does not begin with the Hobbesian state of nature. Gauthier does not start by envisioning a Hobbesian war of all against all which has been generated by rational individuals, each pursuing his own maximum utility, and then asking what constraints on this no-holds-barred utility maximization would be mutually advantageous and therefore mutually rational. (shrink)

Universal Basic Income (UBI) can serve as a beneficial public policy to reduce poverty and inequality, yet a great challenge is how to fund it. This article offers a roadmap for fully funding UBI in a manner that: eliminates poverty; bolsters the middle-class; eliminates the stigma and government bureaucracy of social welfare programs; reduces ever-expanding inequality; initiates a path to meeting climate change goals; reduces speculation; and increases fairness and opportunity in the tax code. As stand-alone policies, these revenue proposals (...) are valuable correctives in their own right. If the entire package of UBI and funding sources were in effect, society (and American capitalism) would be on a more stable, equitable, and environmentally sustainable footing. (shrink)

Contemporary, technoscientific capitalism is characterized by the configuration of a range of “things” as assets or capitalized property. Accumulation strategies have changed as a result of this assetization process. Rather than entrepreneurial strategies based on commodity production, technoscientific capitalism is increasingly underpinned by rentiership or the appropriation of value through ownership and control rights, monopoly conditions, and regulatory or market devices and practices. While rentiership is often presented as a negative phenomenon in both neoclassical and Marxist political economy literatures—and much (...) in between—in this paper, I conceptualize rentiership as a technoeconomic practice and process framed by insights from science and technology studies. So, rather than a problematic “side effect” of capitalism, the concept of rentiership enables us to understand how different forms of value extraction constitute, and are constituted by, different forms of technoscience. This allows STS to contribute a distinctive analytical approach to ongoing debates in political economy about economic rents and rent-seeking. (shrink)

In this article, I develop the point that whereas talent is the basis for desert, talent itself is not meritocratically deserved. It is produced by three processes, none of which are meritocratic: talent is unequally distributed by the rigged lottery of birth, talent is defined in ways that favor some traits over others, and the market for talent is manipulated to maximally extract advantages by those who have more of it. To see how, we require a sociological perspective on (...) class='Hi'>economic rent. I argue that talent is a major means through which people seek rent in modern-day capitalism. Talent today is what inherited land was to feudal societies; an unchallenged source of symbolic and economic rewards. Whereas God sanctified the aristocracy’s wealth, contemporary privilege is legitimated by meritocracy. Drawing on the work of Gary Becker, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jerome Karabel, I show how rent-seeking in modern societies has come to rely principally on rent-definition and creation. Inequality is produced by the ways in which talent is defined, institutionalized, and sustained by the moral deservingness we attribute to the accomplishments of talents. Consequently, today’s inequalities are as striking as ever, yet harder to challenge than ever before. (shrink)

To Aaron Pacitti and Michael Cauvel–whose journal article, “Rent-Seeking Behavior and Economic Justice: A Classroom Exercise” broadly argues that “understanding the [complexities] of rent-seeking behavior helps fill the gap between economics and politics”–the varieties of rent are wide and, therefore, can only be described in their category-specific positions. I will discuss three of these categories in more detail below, but for now, I propose that a useful working grasp of economic rent involves “the amount (...) paid to the owner of a factor of production over the cost that is to be necessarily incurred on utilizing such elements in the production process.” In math terms, ‘economic rent’ equals the agreed-upon-amount paid by the consumer (when that amount far exceeds the market value of the product) minus the cost spent by the producer to make the product (when that cost is far below the typical amount to produce the product). Originally, the concept of economic rent concerned land ownership and the production of natural goods. Two major economists, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, offered insights into the general makeup and logic of what they called, the rent of land and simply rent, respectively. (shrink)

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article (...) is dedicated to an exploration and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source. (shrink)

Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring mechanisms moderate the negative relation between corruption and firm value. The value consequences of political corruption are exacerbated for firms operating in low-rent product markets and mitigated for firms subject to external monitoring by state governments or monitoring (...) induced by disclosure transparency. Our results should inform managers and policymakers of the tradeoffs imposed on firms operating in politically corrupt districts. (shrink)

Agribusiness corporations primarily involved in providing livestock feed—colloquially known as the “ABCD” (Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and the Louis Dreyfus Company)—have begun to enter the fishing industry around the world. I argue that this recent entry of agribusiness multinationals in aquaculture, focusing particularly on Cargill, arises to take advantage of strategic opportunities to proliferate, or create links with respect to feed production and development within value chains. Concerning such opportunities, as I document, Cargill first leveraged its access to (...) cheap, overproduced grains in the 1990s, developing ways to insert corn and soy into what it calls “aquafeed.” Next, the multinational firm began proliferating links within fishing industry value chains in the form of introducing new technical assistance services, as well as creating feed supplements and additives. As I explain, these efforts to proliferate links in the supply chain exist as opportunities to charge rents, or surplus profits, which is possible because Cargill retains the right to control the new products and services. An additional link in the chain includes how the corporation has expanded its role in the global food system from its past as an intermediary, to engaging consumers in direct ways by attempting to create their preferences. I conduct my analysis of Cargill’s corporate strategy by focusing on reporting from the fishing industry publication, Aquafeed News, detailing developments from 2000 through 2023. (shrink)

Whenever you have a situation in which a person or group is in power over a community, some in the community will seek to obtain special favors at the expense of all others in the community. We are all familiar with this situation from our school days where some students would seek special favors -- like a high grade -- at the expense of the other students. Such behavior in the political/economic world is called..

The central concern of this essay : the emergence of the figure of the « wage shareholder ». There is nothing new about this figure in and of itself if one thinks of wage differentials linked to social hierarchies determined by the professions. Or again if one thinks of wage-earning shares obtained by sections of the wage-earning system at the expense of feminine, precarious, and immigrant wage earners. What is new is that today the wage share results from a double (...) process of wage individualization and « socialization of capital ». It is thus of a new nature, and its emergence therefore renders more indistinct the boundaries that separate the main categories of revenue : wage, annuity and profit. In this article, it is less a question of accounting for the figure of the wage-earning shareholder from a strictly economic point of view as to see it in terms of a double process that gives to it the functions proper to a machine producing subjectivity that unite the dangerous link between cognitive capitalism and neoliberalism. (shrink)

This article shows how research on the social structure of markets may contribute to the analysis the growing income inequality in contemporary capitalist economies. The author proposes a theoretical link between embeddedness and social stratification by discussing the role of institutions and networks in markets for the distribution of economic profits between firms. The author claims that we must understand profit and free competition as opposites, as economic theory does. In the main part of the article the author (...) illustrates six typical mechanisms of rent extraction from networks or formal and symbolic rules that embed markets. They emerge from material as well as symbolical access to and influence on the orientation of other market actors. Social structures in markets lead to unequal chances for rent extraction, even if actors produce them for coordination rather than for accumulation purposes. This is how market sociology and theory of capitalism can be linked more closely. (shrink)

The distributive justice literature has recently formulated several tax proposals, with limitarians or property-owning democrats proposing new or higher taxes on wealth or capital income intended to decrease the growing wealth gap. This essay joins this debate on inequality and redistributive taxation through the lens of the “benefit principle for public policy.” This principle says that specific rules and institutions are acceptable to the extent that they create benefits for all individuals in society, or at least don’t make anyone worse (...) off. This benefit principle opposes wealth accumulation to the extent that wealth was generated through rent-seeking—that is, income unrelated to economic productivity, which is not embedded in mutually beneficial exchanges. I maintain, however, that ruling out rent-seeking requires not ex post taxation, but primarily a more “predistributive corrective policy,” that is, reconfiguration of market institutions to prevent wealth accumulation through rent-seeking in the first place. The alternative response is, thus, not to tackle inequality as such but to reform the market to promote the occurrence of mutually beneficial exchange. (shrink)

The philosophy of economics has been largely guided by analytic philosophy. Even Marx has been appropriated without much scandal by economists who separate his scientific contributions from his politics. In this article, I place philosophical hermeneutics (i.e., Heidegger and Ricoeur) in dialogue with the conventional understanding of land as a factor of production. The history of political economy misunderstands land as an entity classifiable as property and capital. I argue instead that land's ontological role, deriving from Heidegger's concept of earth, (...) suggests that economics needs to account for it in a new way according to David Ricardo's notion of land rent. (shrink)

This article examines how corporate social responsibility (CSR) can serve as an external source of rents for governments that depend on foreign financing for state-building and development. The strategic, instrumental use of CSR has been overlooked in previous research on governments and CSR, especially in the Global South. To understand how CSR can serve as a lever for rents, the concept of “extraversion” is introduced to describe the way in which rent-seeking African governments instrumentalize their asymmetric external relations for (...) political and private benefit. The connection between CSR and rent-seeking is analyzed through a case study of large gas investments in Tanzania. The article finds that the government has set up regulation that enables local and central government authorities to appropriate, mediate, reclaim, or possibly trick CSR practices to gain rents. Based on the study, two contributions are made to the literature on CSR and governments. First, the instrumental use of CSR in the Global South is added to the variety of perspectives that can be taken when studying government agency. Second, CSR is conceptualized as a potential stream of rents for governments to exploit. The article ends with discussing that the outcome of CSR in a rent-seeking environment depends on whether the leveraged resources are managed well to support peaceful and locally beneficial economic development or whether they serve private accumulation through corruption. (shrink)

Liberal thought (in the sense of classical liberalism) is based on the juxtaposition of consent to coercion. Autocracy and slavery were seen as based on coercion whereas today's political democracy and economic 'employment system' are based on consent to voluntary contracts. This paper retrieves an almost forgotten dark side of contractarian thought that based autocracy and slavery on explicit or implicit voluntary contracts. To answer these 'best case' arguments for slavery and autocracy, the democratic and abolitionist movements forged arguments (...) not simply in favour of consent, but arguments that voluntary contracts to legally alienate aspects of personhood were invalid 'even with consent' – which made the underlying rights inherently inalienable. Once understood, those arguments have the perhaps 'unintended consequence' of making the neo-abolitionist case for ruling out today's self-rental contract, the employer-employee contract. The paper has to also retrieve these inalienable rights arguments since they have been largely lost on the Left, not to mention in liberal thought. (shrink)

This article provides an account of rent-seeking in relation both to economic policies and political practices in South Africa. The article draws attention to continuities and similarities in this regard between the two distinct periods of nationalist rule from 1948 to 1994 and from 1994 to 2012. The economic dimensions that are specifically addressed are industrial policy, the labour market, state administration and tenders and service delivery and welfare. The more specifically political dimensions addressed include the electoral (...) system, the relationship between constitutionalism and the judiciary, and the rule of law. The article highlights the dangers posed by excessive rent-seeking and especially its negative implications for redistribution, economic growth and the consolidation of democracy in a highly unequal society. (shrink)

The paper provides an economic interpretation of legal culture. Drawing on analogies from other products and services markets, I argue that combinations of legal language, procedures and conceptual structures constitute a network which, mainly through cost considerations, come to occupy a dominant position in particular jurisdictions. The facts that a particular legal culture will be adopted by political rulers and that practising lawyers can both control entry to the profession and ‘capture’ law‐making processes suggest that legal culture networks may (...) be protected against competition. To the extent that they have monopolistic power, lawyers can exploit the key features of legal culture to extract rents: the law used can be more formalistic, more complex and more technical than is optimal. Whether the monopolistic power of a particular legal culture is sustainable depends on the relative strength of potential competitive forces. These can take the form of alternative cultures becoming available for particular branches of the law, thus partially dismantling the network, or through transfrontier transactions opening up the network to competition from foreign systems. (shrink)

This paper explores changing production relations in agriculture in context of increasingly widespread and longer-duration male outmigration, as against previous, short-duration and seasonal migration. It investigates how de facto women-heads of households (WHHs) are changing a resilient crop-sharing system in absence of adequate access to productive assets, formal training or experience in farming, and while contributing labour to farming and coping with gendered demands on their time. Based on qualitative inquiry in one of the poorest parts of South Asia, the (...) Eastern Gangetic Plains, the paper shows that a section of WHHs are replacing sharecropping arrangements with fixed-value rental arrangements that resemble commercial contracts. The paper ends with a discussion on the implications of this emerging development. (shrink)

Many public debates about the societal significance and impact of agriculture are usefully framed by Paul Thompson’s distinction between the “agrarian” and the “industrial vision.” The key argument of the present paper is that the ongoing debate between these visions goes beyond academic philosophy and has direct effects on the political economy of agriculture by influencing the scope of rent-seeking activities that are undertaken primarily in the name of the agrarian vision. The existence of rent-seeking activities is shown (...) to reflect the fact that the agrarian vision is not universally supported, which is certainly true of the industrial vision as well. The key argument of the present paper is that these two philosophical visions of agriculture are not radically incongruent. Rather, they share a common ground within which they are even mutually supportive. If agricultural policy making is oriented toward this common ground, it may reduce overall dissatisfaction with the resulting institutional regime of agricultural production. Such an agricultural policy may also stimulate the emergence of new business practices that not only enable efficient agricultural production but also minimize negative ecological impact and preserve cultural landscapes. (shrink)

Economic analysis is being applied by scholars to an increasing range of legal problems. This collection brings together some of the main contributions to an important area of this work, the economics of contract law. The essays and illuminating notes, questions, and introductions provided by the editor outline the Law and Economics framework for analyzing contractual relationships. The first two parts of the book present a number of useful concepts - adverse selection, moral hazard, and rent seeking - (...) and a general way of thinking about the economics of contracting and contract law. The remainder of the book considers a wide range of topics and issues. The recurring theme is that contracting parties want to assign the responsibility for adjusting to particular contingencies to the party best able to control the costs of adjustment. The adjustment problem is exacerbated by the fact that the parties might engage in various types of strategic behavior, such as opportunism, moral hazard, and rent-seeking. Many contract law doctrines can best be understood as attempts to replicate how reasonable parties might resolve this adjustment problem. (shrink)

A review of economic thought since the sixteenth century reveals two streams of economic discourse, dirigisme and laissez-faire. Starting with the mercantilists, dirigiste approaches to economics embrace the real-world complexity of commodities that often differ greatly in attributes that are growth- and rent- augmenting. Most importantly, this means that free trade is likely to be polarising: it concentrates growth- and rent-augmenting commodities in countries that already enjoy a head start in these commodities. Advanced countries, therefore, support (...) laissez-faire, while lagging countries tend to support dirigisme. In order to rationalise their laissez-faire stance, advanced countries began developing a new economic discourse that strips commodities of their complexity. The foundations for this ideological reconstruction of economics were first laid by Adam Smith; this process eventually reached its climax with the neoclassical economists who stripped commodities down to one attribute: their capital intensity. In opposition to this laissez-faire economics, other writers, supportive of the interests of lagging countries, brought complexity back into their economic discourse; they argued that lagging countries had a fighting chance of catching up to advanced economies only by indigenising a growing array of growth- and rent-augmenting commodities. (shrink)

One of the goals of happiness research is to identify the key factors that influence it. Therefore, the present research is designed to examine the determining factors of subjective wellbeing in Pakistan. The present research is conducted by collecting the data of 1,566 households in Punjab, Pakistan, using the ordered logit and tobit model. The findings of this research confirm that income, education, government effectiveness, no perceived corruption, and perceived institutional quality improve wellbeing, while lower trust in family and friends, (...) poor health status, living on rent, and dissatisfaction with the services of hospitals lower the level of wellbeing. But individuals with more social ties, who face barriers in health services, live more happily satisfied with their lives. Crime victimization and worrisome terrorism also lower the level of SWB. Findings of research strongly emphasize policymakers and government institutions to improve their quality and take essential measures for improving the governance structure. (shrink)

This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commerical bribery in the Honda case may well have benefited Honda's dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose that (...) the term "commercial bribery" should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term "third-party payments" is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis. (shrink)

" Seuls les extrémistes sont cohérents... " Rothbard et l'Ecole austro-américaine dans la querelle de l'herméneutique.

Neoclassical and Austrian/evolutionary economic paradigms have different implications for integrating corporate social responsibility (corporate citizenship) and competitive strategy. porter's "Five Forces" model implicitly rests on neoclassical theory of the firm and is not easily reconciled with corporate social responsibility. Resource-based models of competitive strategy do not explicitly embrace a particular economic paradigm, but to the extent their conceptualization rests on neoclassical assumptions such as imperfect factor markets and profits as rents, these models also imply a trade-off between competitive (...) advantage and corporate social responsibility. Differences in Austrian/evolutionary economic model's assumptions about equilibrium, profits, and other economic concepts allow this paradigm to embrace alternative views of strategy such as the activities or dynamic capabilities views. These alternative views of strategy focus on learning and adaptation; they align more easily with corporate social responsibility. In practice this alignment comes about because social engagement facilitates the learning and adaptation that are a source of competitive advantage. Among the many business arguments for CSR such as improved employee morale/productivity or brand differentiation, this view prioritizes innovation. (shrink)

Drawing on a collection of Islamicate and Russian-language documentary materials presently held in Tashkent, I explore how the administration of Tashkent’s Kūkeldāš Madrasa oversaw and regulated the leasing-out of the madrasa’s waqf-endowed trade and artisanal establishments. By tracing shifts in the administration of leasing arrangements we may begin to illustrate a number of other, larger shifts in socio-economic practice over the course of the madrasa’s long existence, reflecting the consequences first of the rise of the Khoqand Khanate and secondly (...) of the Russian conquest and the establishment of the Turkestan Governorship-General. By attending to patterns of lease arrangements over the history of a single waqf establishment, we may begin to discern shifting patterns of practice which are all too often obscured when viewed against a wider canvas. (shrink)

Economists evaluate their models in terms of credibility. For example, Rothschild and Stiglitz argued from a model of a completive insurance market that under the “plausible” (632) assumption of information asymmetry, one can “credibly” infer the non-existence of equilibria in specific situations – despite the fact that, as they admit, the real ‘market … for insurance is probably not competitive’ (648).1 Another example is Richard Thaler’s column on anomalies of (micro-) economic theory. From 1987 to 2001, he headed every (...) article with the following sentence: ‘An empirical result is anomalous if it is difficult to rationalize, or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm’.2 Or, yet another example, Hans Lind concludes in a survey of mathematical models of rent control that ‘what is shown in the model[s]…is just one type of argument…for why a certain story is more credible than a competing story. (shrink)

This book presents the main economic argument developed by Marx in the three volumes of Capital in a coherent and comprehensive manner. It also delves into three long-standing debates in Marxist political economy: the transformation problem, the Okishio theorem, and theories of exploitation and oppression. Starting with discussions of methodology, including dialectics and historical materialism, the book explains key concepts of Marxist political economy: commodity, value, money, capital, reserve army of labour, accumulation of capital, circuit of capital, reproduction schemas, (...) prices of production, profit, interest and rent. Scholars of economics, sociology, geography, political science, anthropology, and other kindred disciplines, will find here an accessible yet rigorous treatment of Marxist political economy. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of firms’ legacy institutional imprints on its engagement in corporate misconduct. We discover that a closed economic regime’s protectionist policies inscribe imprints in the form of opaque organizational routines and cause incumbent firms to develop competitive limitations. Utilizing the theoretical principles of the organizational imprinting theory, this research attests to the endurance of corruptive routines and argues that the degree of closed economy imprints increases firms’ engagement in income-increasing earnings management in the post-liberalization period. (...) Furthermore, we find that the impact of imprints is weakened by firms’ choices on international exposure and internal innovation. By utilizing the historical data on Indian economic policies from 1956 to 1991 and analyzing a sample of 18,432 firm-year observations for 2,396 listed Indian manufacturing firms from 1997 to 2007, we find support for our hypotheses. (shrink)

The paper questions some of the premises in studying academic spin-offs in developed countries, claiming that when taken as characteristics of ‘academic spin-offs per se,’ they are of little help in understanding the phenomenon in the Eastern European countries during the transitional and post-transitional periods after 1989. It argues for the necessity of adopting a path-dependent approach, which takes into consideration the institutional and organisational specificities of local economies and research systems and their evolution, which strongly influence the patterns of (...) spin-off activity. The paper provides new findings and original arguments in support of Balazs’ seminal theses (Balazs 1995, 1996) about the emergence of academic spin-offs during the early transition. It reveals key economic and policy mechanisms bearing on academic entrepreneurship in Eastern Europe, such as the tensions between economic and political nomenclatures of former Communist Parties, where the dismantling or preservation of the power of political nomenclature resulted in different patterns of development—rapid reforms in the ‘first wave’ of EU accession countries or the establishment of rent-seeking and assets-stripping economies in countries like Bulgaria and Romania, making the transition period especially difficult. In the latter, a specific economic environment emerged, unknown in Western Europe and in the ‘champions’ of transition—such as suppression of the authentic entrepreneurship in a number of economic sectors, disintegration of corporate structures, etc. Thus, the paper reveals the common ground behind the two conflicting tendencies in post-socialist academic spin-offs, partially outlined in other research (Simeonova 1995; Pavlova 2000): as an authentic form of academic entrepreneurship grasping the opportunities opened up by the economic crisis and compensating failures in science and technology policy on the one hand, and as specific rent-seeking strategy draining valuable public assets on the other (the latter, in turn, boosting the negative attitudes in local scientific communities). The paper provides new findings about the evolution of the academic spin-offs in Bulgaria along the two polar trends and their positive and negative repercussions on parent research institutions. The results were achieved in the PROKNOW Project, EC 6th Framework Program. (shrink)

Todos los particulares pueden obtener ingresos extra y recuperar el poder adquisitivo perdido en el contexto de la crisis, anuncia Airbnb. Este estudio analiza la forma que adquiere el trabajo de los anfitriones -las personas que alquilan su vivienda o habitación- en Airbnb. Se plantea que la actividad de los anfitriones adquiere la forma de trabajo abstracto, pero que es un trabajo que se articula y se desarrolla sobre la propia vida y cotidianidad de los anfitriones: sobre la esfera reproductiva (...) de la persona y sobre actividades no económicas. Para que los anfitriones pueden maximizar los beneficios que obtienen, adoptan la forma de empresarios de sí mismos. Como resultado, los anfitriones reducen su precariedad económica pero la actividad de hospedar en Airbnb les genera nuevas formas de precariedad vital.Everyone can earn extra income and recover the lost consumption power due to the crisis, adevertises Airbnb. This study analyzes the form that the work of Airbnb hosts - people who rent their home or room on the platforma- acquires. It is stated that the activity of the hosts is a type of abstract labour, but that develops over the life of the hosts: over the reproductive sphere of the person and over non-economic activities. In order for hosts to maximize the benefits they can obtain on Airbnb, they become entrepreneurs of themselves. As a result, hosts reduce their economic precariousness but the activity of hosting on Airbnb generates new ways of vital precariousness. (shrink)

Transition has not always been a success story. In some cases failure was due to the introduction of topdown legislature, which was not always compatible with the existing informal rules of the game. In other cases transition was just a euphemism for a fight for power with little substantial change.Still, most Western analysts indulged in analysing all East-European economies according to a rather standard pattern. This paper explains this approach by referring to the need to maintain rentseeking policies in the (...) West, to create new rents in the East. Western governments complied with the constructivistic view willingly, especially in the EU area, for social engineering was instrumental in order to acquire and expand consensus on the principles of state interference.La transition n’a pas toujours été une réussite. Dans certains cas, les échecs ont été dus à l’ instauration d’un corps législatif directif souvent incompatible avec les règles de jeu informelles. Dans d’autres cas, la transition fut un simple euphémisme pour une lutte pour le pouvoir, peu susceptible de donner lieu à des changements significatifs.De plus, la plupart des chercheurs occidentaux ont analysé les économies de l’Europe de l’Est avec les outils du modèle néoclassique standard. L’auteur explique cette orientation en invoquant la volonté de maintenir les politiques de recherche de rente à l’Ouest, et d’en créer de nouvelles à l’Est. Les gouvernements occidentaux ont volontairement cédé à une vision constructiviste, notamment dans la zone de l’Union Européenne, car l’ingénierie sociale a été un instrument majeur dans la réalisation et l’extension du consensus autour des principes d’interventions étatiques. (shrink)

Philosophers since Plato have questioned whether might makes right, and whether the weak are condemned perforce to suffer at the hands of strong, cunning, and ruthless elites and majorities. This essay argues that communicative and strategic uses of grievance, shame, “bullshit,” collective action, and economic rent seeking mitigate conventional forms of social might, thereby helping the weak and the few to prosper and flourish despite their inferior strength, numbers, and social status. The argument is supported empirically by macroeconomic (...) and ngram data. (shrink)

The term ‘predistribution’ draws attention to the need for policies and institutions that are designed to improve the position of the least advantaged members of society by generating a fairer distribution of opportunities and benefits from the operation of the free market system, with less reliance on redistributive tax-and-transfer mechanisms. Although the idea of progressive predistribution has only recently begun to attract the attention of politicians and commentators in the mainstream media, there is an older and more philosophically grounded predistributive (...) approach that goes back to the idea of the property-owning democracy proposed by Economist James Meade and further developed by liberal political philosopher John Rawls. In this article, I argue that neither the Meadeian/Rawlsian POD model, nor the more recent analysis of the idea of progressive predistribution, provide a clear and convincing account of the distinction between predistributive and redistributive mechanisms. I then argue that a more promising account of this distinction is provided by the idea of the socialization of economic rent through taxation of the rental value of land, and that there are good reasons to think that a shift in the burden of taxation away from production and employment and on to the rental value of land might turn out to be both more genuinely predistributive and more effectively progressive than other possible predistributive mechanisms that have recently been proposed, most notably the aggressive taxation of private inheritances as a means to broaden the distribution of privately owned capital and productive property. (shrink)

Like American politics, the academic debate over justice is polarized, with almost all theories of justice falling within one of two traditions: egalitarianism and libertarianism. This book provides an alternative to the partisan standoff by focusing not on equality or liberty, but on the idea that we should give people the things that they deserve. Mulligan argues that a just society is a meritocracy, in which equal opportunity prevails and social goods are distributed strictly on the basis of merit. That (...) gives citizens their just deserts. In addition to its novel conceptual approach, meritocracy is distinctive from existing work in two ways. First, it is grounded in research on how people actually think about justice. Empirical research reveals that people don't think that social goods should be distributed equally. Nor do they dismiss the idea of social justice. Across ideological and cultural lines, people want rewards to reflect merit. Second, the book discusses hot-button political issues and makes concrete policy recommendations. These issues include anti-meritocratic bias against women and racial minorities and the United States’ widening economic inequality. Justice and the Meritocratic State offers a new theory of justice and provides solutions to our most vexing social and economic problems. It will be of keen interest to philosophers, economists, and political theorists. (shrink)

This paper argues that the standard characterisation of the equity-efficiency trade-off as set out in this symposium by Joe Heath overstates the tension between these two values. The reason lies in the fact that economists tend to take individual labour supply preferences as given, which leads to a superficial analysis of the concepts of reservation wage and of economic rent. The paper suggests that we should instead think of reservation wages as variable and as influenced by social norms. (...) Social norms play a double role in this context. First, they represent a constitutive element of market competition; second, they can be a determinant of income inequalities. From this perspective, a certain share of high reservation wages sustained by contingent inegalitarian social norms should count as economic rent. The last section of the paper strengthens this conclusion further by drawing a parallel between expensive tastes in consumption and a certain class of high reservation wages. To the extent that the latter are underpinned by social norms rather than efficiency considerations, not paying them is both just and efficient. (shrink)

Natural resources, especially land, play an important role in many economic problems society faces today, including the climate crisis, housing shortages and severe inequality. Yet, land has been either entirely neglected or seriously misunderstood by contemporary theorists of distributive justice. I aim to correct that in this paper. In his theory of original acquisition, Locke did not carefully distinguish between the value of natural resources and the value that we add by laboring upon them. This oversight led him to (...) the mistaken conclusion that labor mixing gives the laborer an entitlement to both the improvement and the resource. I explain how Locke's false belief that the proviso was satisfied in his time was the fundamental cause of this error, and I develop a novel reading of the proviso using the law of rent. Instead, we should think, following Henry George, that the community is entitled to the economic value of natural resources, because the community created the value of resources, not the individual improver. I discuss an argument from George's "Progress and Poverty" that self-ownership is actually inconsistent with (rather than the ground for, as Locke thought) private appropriation of natural resources. This is because a necessary condition of our equal rights as self-owners is having free access to natural resources. If we do not have such access, George argues that natural resource owners can extract surplus value from their users (though I show why Marx’s belief that capital owners can also extract surplus value is mistaken). Nozick’s infamous argument that taxation is morally on a par with forced labor proves too much for his purposes, since George shows that payment of economic rents to natural resource owners is also morally on a par with forced labor. I then develop my own view of original acquisition, inspired by George. The self-ownership of improvers gives them an entitlement to improvements that they create. But the self-ownership of everyone else precludes an entitlement to natural resources value. Natural resource rents should not be enjoyed by those who improve the resource, but rather, by all community members in proportion to the share of demand for natural resources they are responsible for. Finally, I move from ideal theory to the real world, and discuss how George’s land value tax could be implemented in practice, and what its beneficial effects would be. We should be interested in this policy for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that the two countries that have implemented the most extensive suite of Georgist policies—Norway and Singapore—are the two wealthiest countries in the world (excluding micro-states and tax havens). Since the land value tax is not inefficient like other taxes, it is unique among social and economic policies in that it has the potential to both greatly increase and more fairly distribute society’s wealth. (shrink)

This essay explores the detailed argument of the Coase Theorem, as found in Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost” and subsequently defended by Coase in The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Fascination with the Coase Theorem arises over its apparently unassailable counterintuitive conclusion that the imposition of legal liability has no effect on which of two competing uses of land prevails, and also over the general difficulty in tying down an unqualified statement of the theorem. Instead of entering (...) the debate over what exactly the theorem holds, this article suggests that the core of Coase’s reasoning is flawed and to the extent that any version of the theorem relies upon this reasoning it can be disproved. It is further suggested that a version of the theorem which avoided the need for Coase’s core argument by focusing on “the efficiency thesis” at the expense of “the invariance thesis” would be insufficiently significant to merit the status of a theorem; and that, in any event, Coase’s reasoning does not sustain an efficient outcome. The heart of the essay comprises the allegation of an error made by Coase when he transferred his core argument to the context of economic rents. The essay commences by considering and modelling the nature of the counter-intuitive thrust to the Coase Theorem, which is used to trace the development of Coase’s reasoning, and ultimately to expose the flaw it contains. Ancillary observations are made on the relationship between the Coasean analysis of characteristically legal problems and the conditions of general market equilibrium, and the theoretical status of law-and-economics. (shrink)

Using the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent-seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens, any legal reform establishing and enforcement of private ownership also solves the corruption problem.

Henryk Kamieński (1813–1866), a philosopher, economist, and theorist of struggle for national independence, idealized petty ownership as the most appropriate form of ownership both in ethical and economic aspects. He analyzed the problem on three levels. In his proposals for a specific solution of the agrarian question, presented in the Warsaw periodicals, Kamieński supported the introduction of agricultural rent paid by peasants and the abolishment of serfdom. Calling serfdom a land usury had an ethical implication. In the protection (...) of the manor over peasants Kamieński sees the desire of manor owners to hold the victims of this usury in their hands. Replacement of serfdom with an agricultural rent was for him the first step in granting landownership to peasants. Kamieński emphasizes that petty ownership is conducive to production growth. He believes that the spread of it is an opportunity for peasants to heighten their national consciousness and a chance of civilized advancement of Polish territories. This line of thinking is clearly evident in his studies published abroad, devoted to the conception of combining a national uprising with granting freehold to peasants. Kamieński also discusses the values of petty ownership in agriculture in his theoretical work Filozofia ekonomii materialnej ludzkiego społeczeństwa [Philosophy of material economics of human society], in which he presents his vision of a system of social justice. For him, petty ownership is a guarantee of respect for human rights, the most effective safeguard of preserving the autonomy of human individual. In this reasoning we could see certain elements of personalism, which brings Kamieński’s standpoint closer to that of Pope John Paul II. (shrink)

Alternative food movements work to create more environmentally and economically sustainable food systems, but vary widely in their advocacy for social, racial and environmental justice. However, even those food justice activists explicitly dedicated to equity must respond to the unintended consequences of their work. This paper analyzes the work of activists in Oakland, CA, who have increasingly realized that their gardens, health food stores and farm-to-table restaurants play a role in what scholars have called green gentrification, the upscaling of neighborhoods (...) through the creation of environmental amenities. Gentrification has had grave consequences for the low-income communities of color that food justice activists seek to serve. Activists are reflexive about this dynamic, and have developed strategies to push back against displacement. Most commonly, non-profit organizations and individual social entrepreneurs found businesses that seek to raise the profile of people of color in the trendy Oakland food scene while employing long-term residents in well-paying, green jobs. However, while these efforts are an essential component of a broader agenda to create both food justice and development without displacement, even these relatively high paying “good food jobs” cannot keep up with escalating rents. For this reason, we also highlight the direct action and policy-oriented strategies engaged by a smaller number of food justice activists, and argue that these are necessary compliments to a market-based approach. (shrink)

A discussion of the economic work of Genovesi, the first professor of political economy in Europe. Genovesi supports a physiocratic theory of value as the net produce of agricultural work; a theory of interest as the motive of human action, intermediate between the extreme poles of excessive self-love and benevolence; a doctrine of innate rights as a limit to the sovereign's action; a commercial policy that limits dependence on foreign countries. He also took a position in the eighteenth-century debate (...) on "luxury", taking a firm stance in favour of moderate luxury, considered not vice but virtue as the right means between excessive parsimony and prodigality. He also discusses the function of the classes not dedicated to "mechanical arts" and not producing "rents" but nevertheless useful to society (Adam Smith's "unproductive" workers) in which he includes the proprietary classes which he defends against Rousseau's radical criticism, limiting himself to advocating the abolition of inalienable properties. Finally, he advocates population growth as a way to increase public happiness, the development of agriculture, the freedom of grain trade and the interest rate. (shrink)

The 1840s brought a certain revival both in intellectual life and efforts to modernize agriculture in the Kingdom of Poland. Count Andrzej Zamoyski (1800–1874) played an inspiring role here. In all his properties replaced feudal service by rents. Moreover, even though the villein system was still in place, he was a spokesman for a transition to this more modern form of managing for the totality of the landed gentry. On his initiative, the periodical “Roczniki Gospodarstwa Krajowego” (“Polish Farming Annual”) came (...) out. “Roczniki” brought in representatives of the Kingdom’s landed gentry supporting actions aimed at economic development and the promotion of civilization, soon to be called organic work. Representatives of the landowning party supporting the idea of organic work were popularly called “klemensowczycy”, because of their participation in conventions held in Andrzej Zamoyski’s estate in the village of Klemensów. The leader of the “klemensowczycy” blazed a trail for Poland’s progress of civilization, where he was characterized by Occidentalism, understood as referring to historical experiences of the Western world. (shrink)