A central question in the Japanese high vowel devoicing literature concerns whether vowels are devoiced through a categorical process or via gradient reduction. Examining how vowel height and consonantal voicing condition phrase-internal CV duration in a corpus of spontaneous Tokyo Japanese, it was found that CVs containing high vowels are substantially shorter before voiceless consonants, whilst non-high vowels do not exhibit comparable shortening. This quantitative difference between CV durations suggests a controlled temporal compression of the CV, consistent with views (...) that Japanese vowel devoicing is produced through a categorical process targeting high vowels preceding voiceless consonants, and supports previous observations made of elicited productions. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show a structural relationship in Dutch between sentences with the main verb "duren" (last) and specifying complements such as een week (a week) or "drie kwartier" (three quarters of an hour) on the one hand, and sentences with Duration Measuring Adverbials such as "gedurende een week" (for a week), "gedurende die week" (lit: for that week) on the other.

Bergson's central contention is that time is not measurable by any objective standard; in Duration and Simultaneity, that position is tried out against the major movement in physics of the day - Relativity. Bergson argues that Relativity fails to live up to the promise of a truly relative physics, and counter to its own spirit retains some of the objectivist assumptions of previous world views. Duration and Simultaneity was conceived in the desire to make good the new paradigm (...) to which Relativity was bound to lay claim; in the desire to be more Einsteinian than Einstein. (shrink)

Research into Bergson’s philosophy downplays a key development in his first work, Time and free will. It is there that Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing that succession is not a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for Bergson’s entire philosophy, one that allows him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of freedom in favor of one based on duration and multiplicity. This text has two aims. Firstly to add to Bergson (...) scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s initial argument against Kant, demonstrating that his engagement with Kant is much less incremental than has been suggested in secondary literature. Secondly, to reconstruct the consequences regarding freedom that Bergson immediately draws in departing from Kant, which illustrates the profundity and originality of his thought at the very inception of his oeuvre. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Descartes's goal with his doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world is to offer a unified and ultimate causal explanation for the possibility of motion and duration in the world, the permanence of created things, and the continuation of their motion and duration. This unified explanation seems to be the only one which, according to Descartes, satisfies the two basic requirements any ultímate cause should meet: the cause must be active and (...) not being in motion itself. God's recreations of the world is Descartes's solution to this search. I also show in this article, on the one hand, that this doctrine successfully overcomes, in particular, the four major conflicts which threaten its consistency, and, on the other, the new meaning which the laws of nature acquire under the doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world. /// En este artículo defiendo que la pretensión principal de Descartes al proponer la doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo es encontrar una explicación unificada y última de la posibilidad de movimiento y duración en el mundo, de la permanencia de las cosas creadas y de la continuación del movimiento. Esta explicación unificada es la única que, según Descartes, satisface los dos requisitos que parece buscar en la explicación causal última del movimiento: la causa debe ser activa y no debe estar ella misma en movimiento. Las recreaciones del mundo constituyen esa causa. Por una parte, también muestro cómo esta solución supera, en concreto, los cuatro conflictos mayores que amenazan su consistencia, y, por otra, el nuevo significado que las leyes de la naturaleza adquieren en consonancia con esta doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo. (shrink)

Perception of time is susceptible to distortions; among other factors, it has been suggested that the perceived duration of a stimulus is affected by the observer’s expectations. It has been hypothesized that the duration of an oddball stimulus is overestimated because it is unexpected, whereas repeated stimuli have a shorter perceived duration because they are expected. However, recent findings suggest instead that fulfilled expectations about a stimulus elicit an increase in perceived duration, and that the oddball (...) effect occurs because the oddball is a target stimulus, not because it is unexpected. Therefore, it has been suggested that top-down attention is sometimes sufficient to explain this effect, and sometimes only necessary, with an additional contribution from saliency. However, how the expectedness of a target stimulus and its salient features affect its perceived duration is still an open question. In the present study, participants’ expectations about and the saliency of target stimuli were orthogonally manipulated with stimuli presented on a short (Experiment 1) or long (Experiment 2) temporal scale. Four repetitive standard stimuli preceded each target stimulus in a task in which participants judged whether the target was longer or shorter in duration than the standards. Engagement of top-down attention to target stimuli increased their perceived duration to the same extent irrespective of their expectedness. A small but significant additional contribution to this effect from the saliency of target stimuli was dependent on the temporal scale of stimulus presentation. In Experiment 1, saliency only significantly increased perceived duration in the case of expected target stimuli. In contrast, in Experiment 2, saliency exerted a significant effect on the overestimation elicited by unexpected target stimuli, but the contribution of this variable was eliminated in the case of expected target stimuli. These findings point to top-down attention as the primary cognitive mechanism underlying the perceptual extraction and processing of task-relevant information, which may be strongly correlated with perceived duration. Furthermore, the scalar properties of timing were observed, favoring the pacemaker-accumulator model of timing as the underlying timing mechanism. (shrink)

This paper considers a problem for dynamic presentism that has received little attention: its apparent inability to accommodate the duration of events (such as conscious experiences). After outlining the problem, I defend presentism from it. This defence proceeds in two stages. First, I argue the objection rests on a faulty assumption: that duration is temporal extension. The paper challenges that assumption on several different ways of conceiving of temporal extension. This is the negative case and forms the bulk (...) of the paper. Second, after diagnosing the error leading to the identification of duration with temporal extension, I outline a new presentist-friendly account of duration that avoids the problem. In particular, a non-reductive account of duration is offered that treats it as a primitive quality which bestows its possessor with a certain modal quality: that the possessor potentially does not change whilst there are changes in its environs. This is the positive case. Together the positive and negative cases provide presentism with an interesting and novel way of overcoming the problem of duration. (shrink)

The encounter between Bergson and Einstein that took place at the 1922 meeting of the Philosophical Society at the Collège de France gave rise to a lively debate about the relative merits of Bergson’s contribution to the understanding of time in relativity. In this paper, I argue that despite some serious shortcomings, Bergson’s philosophical intervention in the interpretation of relativity makes a novel and valuable contribution to the understanding of time in relativity. With reference to the so-called ‘paradox’ of the (...) twins, I begin by arguing that Bergson offers a corrective for the fallacious view that temporal passage is illusory. In the second section, I explain what Bergson means by a single, universal time. Given the fact that in relativity there is a plurality of times, this idea seems inconsistent with relativity, but I argue that Bergson’s single time is just duration, a time that is dependent on the temporal passage in a particular inertial frame. In a third section, I show that despite his failure to see it, Bergsonian duration is actually consistent with proper time, a time that is invariant regardless of which frame is used to perform the calculation. Once we make this connection between duration and proper time, we can see what Bergson’s intervention is really meant to accomplish; namely, to attach a concrete sense of the passage of time to relativity, thus ‘completing’ the theory of relativity so that it can account for the duration that we all feel and know with inimitable intimacy. In the end, my position is that Bergson helps us to see that time lapse is what it is not because it is measured as such, but rather because it is the lived time of a particular process that is invariant to change of inertial frame. (shrink)

Background: The aim of this study was to investigate associations between demographic and clinical variables and duration of untreated psychosis (DUP) in a sample of cases of psychosis across an adult early intervention in psychosis service and a child and adolescent community team. Method: Cross-sectional baseline data for cases of psychosis across the two teams on the caseload at a given time point were collected, including age of onset, gender, ethnicity, referral route, and DUP. Results: The median DUP across (...) the entire sample was 91 days, while those patients with initial treatment for psychosis from the child and adolescent team had a median DUP of 69 days. Using multiple linear regression, there were two variables that showed a significant association with DUP: referral route (p < .001), and age of onset, with earlier age of onset associated with shorter DUP (p = .015). Conclusion: These findings are discussed in relation to possible explanatory factors, with particular focus on service-level variables and pathways to care. It is suggested that the involvement of child and adolescent teams is vital to the work of early intervention in psychosis services. (shrink)

Previous psycholinguistic studies have suggested that English and Spanish express temporal duration through different metaphors. English tends to use the time-as-length metaphor (e.g. I have been w...

Although he developed one of the most important modern theories of time, Bergson has often been criticised for not thinking history. Drawing on his writings from Creative Evolution to The Two Sources, I show that, on the contrary, he was trying to define history in a new way, one that would not be exhausted by the traditional opposition to the natural sciences. Bergson’s new philosophy of history, free of teleology and determinism, allows us to think the specificity of the human (...) historical dimension without erasing its articulation with natural evolution. Against the critical readings Aron and Merleau-Ponty have offered, I maintain that Bergson’s philosophy does not withdraw into an individualist spiritualism but includes the collective dimension and the history of non-human, both natural and technological, reality. (shrink)

What is the nature of time? This new study engages with the philosophy of Henri Bergson on time and proposes a new way of thinking about the effects of future events on the past. According to Bergson, time is an integral feature of real things, just as much as their material or size. When a flower grows, it takes a period of real time for it to flourish, which cannot be quickened or slowed down, nor can it be eliminated from (...) the process of growth. Bergson named this real time 'duration' and argued that everything and everyone exist as duration, and that internal processes flow into one another, with no clear boundaries that separate one phase of duration from another. According to Bergson's philosophy, the past does not disappear but smoothly flows into the present, forming an indivisible dynamic unity. But what if the causal flow of temporal reality is not unidirectional? What if not only past events influence future ones, but future ones in their turn have retrospective effect on past occurrences? The author of this book analyses these key questions, asserts that the changeability of the past follows from Bergson's theory of time and proposes a theory of embodied time that involves the retrospective enrichment of reality. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 1 - 18 This essay addresses time’s dissemination both in the sense of an undoing or fracturing of unifying conceptions of time, as well as in the sense of ‘scattering seeds’ by conceiving of manifold temporalizing configurations of living beings, things, and events without an overarching sense of time. After a consideration of traditional conceptions of time, this essay explores the notion of duration in Bergson in order to make it fruitful for (...) thinking duration without centering it in human consciousness. The author suggests that we can begin to think the temporal happening of things and events in terms of different temporal configurations of various degrees and qualities of complexity that may be occasioned by chance, whereby chance is understood as the freeing of time-spaces of indeterminacy in which temporal configurations take shape or manifest themselves. 1. (shrink)

Are there illusions of duration? Certainly, many experiences of an event’s duration differ from its measure in clock duration, the measure of that event in seconds, minutes, hours, and so forth. However, I argue that an illusory duration requires more than difference from a real duration; it requires difference from a duration that is relevant to experience. It is plausible to hold that there are many kinds of real duration and reason to question (...) the relevance of all of them. In particular, the interpretation of experienced duration as illusory is typical because it is compared to clock time; the experience of duration goes wrong by being different from a clock measurement of duration. However, I argue that clock duration is not obviously relevant to evaluating the experience of duration.In response, one might hold that it is plausible to evaluate experience by clock duration because clocks more closely match reality than experiences do; on the scale of experience, clock time is no different to real duration. It is not that experienced duration is an illusion because it is merely different from clock duration; it is an illusion because it is different from real duration and we know this because of its difference from clock duration. It is like illusions of size: some object seems to be a size it is not and we know this by comparing it to an object we can otherwise accurately measure by meters.However, unlike size illusions, it is not clear what the ‘real duration’ is against which we should evaluate apparent duration. What is meant by ‘real duration’ involves either an appeal to the duration of substantial absolute time or some kind of duration in things, for example, duration which is the measure of change in some kind of process. is an irrelevant duration; few positions hold that we experience absolute time. As for, if real duration is a measure of change, then, for experienced duration to match clock duration, they must both agree on the relevant change. If there is a difference in what is treated as the real duration, then neither experience nor clocks can be treated as evaluable in terms of the other.Finally, we may have an illusory duration because there are cases of variation between experiences of the same duration. Yet, even here, we may be misled; we may not be directly comparing experiences. We compare the experienced durations through first measuring each in terms of clock duration. If there is a variability in the relationship between clock standard and some relevant standard for experience, then one expects anything accurately meeting one standard to differ from anything accurately meeting the other. The error is holding there is a stable relationship between the standards. This error is not a matter of our experience of duration, and so is not an illusion of duration. (shrink)

Emotions are traditionally considered to be brief states that last for seconds or a few minutes at most. However, due to pioneering theoretical work of Frijda and recent empirical studies, it has become clear that the duration of emotions is actually highly variable with durations ranging from a few seconds to several hours, or even longer. We review research on determinants of emotion duration. Three classes of determinants are identified: features related to the (a) emotion-eliciting event (event (...) class='Hi'>duration and event appraisal), (b) emotion itself (nature of the emotion component, nature of the emotion, and emotion intensity), and (c) emotion-experiencing person (dispositions and emotion regulatory actions). Initial evidence on the psychological and neural mechanisms that underlie their effects is discussed. (shrink)

Are there illusions of duration? Certainly, many experiences of an event’s duration differ from its measure in clock duration, the measure of that event in seconds, minutes, hours, and so forth. However, I argue that an illusory duration requires more than difference from a real duration; it requires difference from a duration that is relevant to experience. It is plausible to hold that there are many kinds of real duration and reason to question (...) the relevance of all of them. In particular, the interpretation of experienced duration as illusory is typically because it is compared to clock time; the experience of duration goes wrong by being different from a clock measurement of duration. -/- However, I argue that clock duration is not obviously relevant to evaluating the experience of duration. One might hold that it is plausible to evaluate experience by clock duration because clocks more closely match reality than experiences do; on the scale of experience, clock time is no different to real duration. It is not that experienced duration is an illusion because it is merely different from clock duration; it is an illusion because it is different from real duration and we know this because of its difference from clock duration. It is like illusions of size: some object seems to be a size it is not, and we know this by comparing it to an object we can otherwise accurately measure by meters. -/- However, unlike size illusions, it is not clear what the ‘real duration’ is against which we should evaluate apparent duration. What is meant by ‘real duration’ involves either (a) an appeal to the duration of substantial absolute time or (b) some kind of duration in things, e.g., duration which is the measure of change in some kind of process. (a) is an irrelevant duration; few positions hold that we experience absolute time. As for (b), if real duration is a measure of change, then, for experienced duration to match clock duration, they must both agree on the relevant change. If there is a difference in what is treated as the real duration, then neither experience nor clocks can be treated as evaluable in terms of the other. -/- Finally, we may have an illusory duration because there are cases of variation between experiences of the same duration. Yet, even here, we may be misled; we may not be directly comparing experiences. We compare the experienced durations through first measuring each in terms of clock duration. If there is a variability in the relationship between clock standard and some relevant standard for experience, then one expects anything accurately meeting one standard to differ from anything accurately meeting the other. The error is holding there is a stable relationship between the standards. This error is not a matter of our experience of duration, and so is not an illusion of duration. (shrink)

There is limited knowledge about sleep in adolescents with elevated levels of anxiety treated within primary health care settings, potentially resulting in sleep problems not being sufficiently addressed by primary health care workers. In the current study self-reported anxiety, insomnia, sleep onset latency, sleep duration, and depressive symptoms were assessed in 313 adolescents referred to treatment for anxiety within primary health care. Results showed that 38.1% of the adolescents met criteria for insomnia, 34.8% reported short sleep duration, and (...) 83.1% reported long sleep onset latency. Total anxiety symptoms were related to all sleep variables after controlling for age and sex. Furthermore, all anxiety symptom sub-types were associated with insomnia and sleep onset latency, whereas most anxiety subtypes were associated with sleep duration. Adolescents’ depressive symptoms accounted for most of the anxiety-sleep associations, emphasizing the importance of depressive symptoms for sleep. However, anxiety was associated with insomnia and sleep onset latency also among youth with low levels of depressive symptoms. The findings suggests that primary health care workers should assess sleep duration, sleep onset latency, and insomnia in help-seeking adolescents with anxiety. (shrink)

In ‘Location and Perdurance’ (2010), I argued that there are no compelling mereological or sortal grounds requiring the perdurantist to distinguish the molecule Abel from the atom Abel in Gilmore’s original case (2007). The remaining issue Gilmore originally raised concerned the ‘mass history’ of Adam and Abel, the distribution of ‘their’ mass over spacetime. My response to this issue was to admit that mass histories needed to be relativised to a way of partitioning the location of Adam/Abel, but that did (...) not amount to relativising any fundamental natural intrinsic properties—the latter are all had unrelativised, and (so most perdurantists would say). (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to investigate how the subjective impression of English speech would change when pause duration at punctuation marks was varied. Two listening experiments were performed in which written English speech segments were rated on a variety of evaluation items by both native-English speakers and non-native speakers (native-Chinese speakers and native-Japanese speakers). The ratings were then subjected to factor analysis. In the first experiment, the pauses in three segments were made into the same durations, from (...) 0.075 to 4.8 s. Participants rated the segments on 23 evaluation items on a rating scale from 1 to 10. A varimax rotation after PCA (principal component analysis) led to two factors that were related to speech style. These two factors could be interpreted as representing speech naturalness and speech rate. Speech segments with a pause duration of 0.6 s received the highest naturalness evaluation, while perceived speech rate decreased as the physical pause duration increased, without any changes in utterance segments. In the second experiment, a full-factorial design of pause durations (0.15, 0.3, 0.6, 1.2, and 2.4 s) within and between sentences, i.e., for commas and for periods, was implemented in two speech segments. The original speech segments and speech segments without any pauses were also included as control conditions. From ratings on 12 evaluation items, similar to Experiment 1, two factors representing speech naturalness and speech rate were obtained. The results showed again that the perceived speech rate decreased with an increase only in pause duration. As for speech naturalness, the highest evaluations occurred when pause durations were 0.6 s within sentences, and either 0.6 or 1.2 s between sentences. This recommends fixing all pause durations to 0.6 s as a practical way to train non-native speakers to make their spoken English appear more natural. (shrink)

I use Jonathan Bennett’s, Gilles Deleuze’s and Pierre Macherey’s interpretations of Spinoza to extract a theory of time and duration from Spinoza. I argue that although time can be considered a product of the imagination, duration is a real property of existing things and corresponds to their essence, taking essence (as Deleuze does) as a degree of power of existing. The article then explores the relations among time, duration, essence and eternity, arguing against the idea that Spinoza’s (...) essences or Spinoza’s eternity are atemporal. Essences and eternity both involve necessary references to time, but the time involved is not that of the “fortuitous sequence of events” apprehended through sensory experience. Rather, the “time” is that implicit in the necessity of God’s self-determination through God’s differentiation into natura naturans and natura naturata, which is involved in the production and differentiation of eternal essences. (shrink)

Variation in the durations of exclusive breastfeeding (exBF) and any breastfeeding (anyBF) is associated with socioecological factors. This plasticity in breastfeeding behavior appears adaptive, but the mechanisms involved are unclear. With this concept in mind, we investigated whether durations of exBF and anyBF in a rural Maya population covary with markers of a form of socioecological change—market integration—and whether individual factors (individual learning, physiological plasticity) and/or learning from others in the community (social learning, norm adherence) mediate these changes. Using data (...) from 419 mother-child pairs from two Guatemalan Maya villages, we fit a bivariate linear mixed model. The model compared exBF and anyBF among children from households of varying degrees of market integration whose mothers follow what we inferred to be local infant-feeding norms. It controlled for other factors expected to affect breastfeeding durations. We found evidence that exBF is associated with whether mothers follow their population’s infant feeding norms, but no evidence that exBF is associated with the household’s level of market integration. Conversely, anyBF is significantly associated with the household’s market integration, but not with the villages’ inferred norms. Because deviations from exBF norms are likely to result in infant mortality and reduced fitness, we hypothesize that the incentive to conform is relatively strong. Relatively greater individual plasticity in anyBF allows mother-child pairs to tailor it to socioecological conditions. Deviations from anyBF norms may be tolerated because they may provide later-life health/fitness payoffs, while posing few risks to infant survival. (shrink)

To reason about continuous processes in some areas of artificial intelligence and embedded systems one has to express real-time properties. For such purpose a real-time logic has to be considered. Various such logics have been proposed. Some of these formalisms interpret formulas over intervals of time. These are called interval logics. Zhou Chaochen and Michael Hansen have introduced one such first-order interval logic called Neighborhood Logic (NL) which has two expanding modalities ◊r and ◊l. They have shown the adequacy of (...) these modalities by deriving other unary and binary modalities from them; in particular, they show that chop can be expressed in terms of these modalities. The logic is subsequently expanded to get a Duration Calculus (called DC/nl) by expressing temporal variables as integrals of state variables. Liveness and fairness properties of a computing system can now be expressed in DC/nl by means of neighborhood (expanding) modalities. We take up an investigation of DC/nl in detail. We present a proof system for it. We further show that most of the results that hold in the original Duration Calculus continue to hold in our logic with some modifications. In this process we discuss soundness, completeness, and decidability results for DC/nl. Thus this paper establishes DC/nl as a useful formalism for specifying and verifying properties of real-time computing systems. (shrink)

This book studies various perspectives in the history of European philosophy on the relationship between time and movement. Ever since the pre-Socratic thinker Zeno of Elea linked time and space to understand bodily movement, his so-called paradoxes of motion have remained unsolved. One of his most important critics, the French philosopher Henri Bergson, criticized the usual connection between time and space and established a new way of understanding time as duration (durée). Whereas Zeno presented an objectivist understanding of time, (...) Bergson emphasized its subjectivist meaning. Both contradictory positions seem incompatible, referring to pure intellect (Zeno) on the one hand or pure sensation (Bergson) on the other. Looking at Hegel's Phenomenology, this book shows that the outer and inner consciousness of time became crucial to his principle of movement and change. In his view, time is an integral part of dialectical processes that are historically substantiated. Hegel sought to subordinate pure concepts and ideas so that they would become indispensable moments of the self knowing spirit. Cassirer appreciated the idealism of coming into being but rejected Hegel's concept of the absolute. Instead, he established his philosophy of symbolic forms, in which the development of different perceptions and conceptions of time - from situational affective experience to the mathematical system of relations - determines the direction of the symbolic formation process. In the end, the sensitive concept of time is replaced by the relational concept of natural numbers, in which all here-and-now experiences are embedded. Finally, Bourdieu attempts to reintegrate symbolic forms into social processes. The book reflects on the concepts mentioned here by discussing their pros and cons in order to shed more light on the relationship between time and movement in European thought. (shrink)

The study of the meanings of temporal expressions in natural language can proceed in two ways. The first consists of borrowing an ontological theory concerning how time “really” is, and then showing how temporal expressions are interpreted in this model. Let us call this the physicalist approach. The other approach is to start off by studying the temporal presuppositions employed in the language, and defining a model as the structure which satisfies these conditions. This approach we shall call the analytist (...) approach. The two approaches share their goal, which is to provide a temporal model for natural language. However, they are driven by different motivations. The physicalist approach is ontology-driven. It views time as part of reality, and its structure as independent of linguistic considerations. It attempts to interpret the language in this model, possibly by adding assumptions about the language. The analytist approach, on the other hand, is language driven. It assumes that language “mirrors” reality to the extent in which it is describable in the language, and tries to define a temporal model based only on linguisticconsiderations. A theory is “complete”, in a sense, if it combines both approaches and its (analytist) language- driven model can be constructed in a (physicalist) ontology-driven structure. (shrink)

The problem I shall discuss is specific, even minute. Yet, being philosophical, it arises and can be profitably discussed only in a context anything but minute, namely, that of a conception of philosophy and its proper method. I could not possibly unfold my conception once more for the sake of a minute problem. Nor do I believe that as things now stand this is necessary. I shall merely recall two propositions which are crucial in the context, and, in stating them, (...) shall freely use its vocabulary. The undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language all refer to phenomenal things wholly presented. These things all are either individuals or characters, and, if characters, either relational or nonrelational. These are the two propositions. It may throw light on another crucial point not always well understood if I imagine someone to ask: Wholly presented to whom? The answer is: To the person to whose world the philosopher, who, himself always speaks commonsensically, fits the ideal language. (shrink)

For Descartes, duration is an attribute of everything that takes up time. Things with duration have successive temporal parts. Hume agrees that duration entails succession. However, his skeptical empiricism constrains him from attributing duration to everything that takes up time. To all appearances, some things—steadfast objects—take up time without being successive. Seeing Hume’s idiosyncratic view as a successor to Descartes’s under skeptical empiricist constraints makes Hume’s easier to understand and appreciate.

This paper considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. I defend an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. I show its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explain-ing the phenomenology of duration experiences. I then consider whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. I argue that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do (...) not exhibit. In-stead, the assignment of epistemic features to particular processing stages appears to answer to pragmatic needs, not psychological facts. (shrink)

Two experiments examined false recall for lists of semantically and phonologically associated words as a function of presentation duration. Veridical recall increased with long exposure durations for all lists. For semantically associated lists, false recall increased from 20–250 ms, then decreased. There was a high level of false recall with 20 ms durations for phonologically associated lists , which declined as duration increased. In Experiment 2, for lists presented at 20 and 50 ms rates, false recall given zero (...) correct recall was observed frequently, suggesting that conscious recollection of studied words was not necessary for phonological false memory. Differences between phonologically and semantically associated lists were consistent with a feature integration model based on automatic initial processing of phonetic features of words. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically changed the patterns of lifestyle and posed psychological stress on pregnant women. However, the association of sleep duration and screen time with anxiety among pregnant women under the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic scenario has been poorly addressed. We conducted one large-scale, multicenter cross-sectional study which recruited 1794 pregnant women across middle and west China. Self-reported demographic characteristics, lifestyle, and mental health status were collected from 6th February to 8th May 2020. We investigated the (...) association of sleep duration and screen time with the risk of anxiety by multivariable logistic regression analysis and linear regression analysis after adjusting potential confounders. The dose-response relationship of sleep duration and screen time with anxiety was visualized using a cubic spline plot. Our data revealed that almost 35% of pregnant women suffered from anxiety during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sleep duration was dose-dependently associated with a lower risk of anxiety among pregnant women, while screen time exhibited a conversed effect. Notably, sleep duration synergistically combined with screen time to diminish the risk of anxiety. Taken together, sleep duration and screen time were independently and jointly associated with anxiety. Therefore, promoting a more active lifestyle and maintaining higher sleep quality could improve the mental health of pregnant women, especially under public health emergency. (shrink)

This article examines the temporal politics of the 2017 California Gender Recognition Act (CGRA). The author first offers a brief history of the dominant temporal requirements for “gender recognition” in prior legislation around sex/gender markers on identity documents in the United States and United Kingdom, focusing on how this legislation places temporal boundaries around legitimate gender identity. Then, turning directly to the CGRA, the author asks to what extent the act's emphasis on self-identification revises or intervenes in these prior conceptualizations (...) of time and identity by the state administration of sex/gender systems. The article closes with an exploration of the temporality of identity documentation itself, speculating about how this legislation might be placed more directly into conversation with the role of time in colonial and racial state building. (shrink)

We evaluated the relationships of daily sleep duration and inconsistency with soft tennis competitive performance among 15 healthy collegiate soft tennis players (13 male, 2 female, mean age = 19.7 ± 0.8 years, height = 170.8 ± 7.3 cm, weight = 60.3 ± 5.6 kg, soft tennis experience = 8.7 ± 2.0 years). Sleep duration and inconsistency were determined by a 50-day sleep diary, which recorded sleep and wake times of sleep. Soft tennis athletic performance was evaluated by (...) a service and baseline stroke accuracy test and the spider run test. Mean sleep duration was 7.4 ± 1.7 h. No correlation was found between long-term mean sleep duration and athletic performance. But inconsistency in sleep duration (SD of sleep duration) was inversely correlated with service score after controlling for soft tennis experience and sex (r = −0.56, p = 0.046). There was no significant relationship between sleep inconsistency and other athletic performance. This result indicates that reducing the instability of sleep duration (i.e., sleep regular hours) in the long-term may have a positive effect on soft tennis players’ service performance. Although participants’ current mean sleep duration (7.4 h) was not as sufficient as the recommendation in sleep extension experiments (9–10 h), it revealed the importance for athletes to maintain regular sleep in daily life. (shrink)

Cognitive and biological theories of emotion consider surprise as an emotional response to unexpected events. Four experiments examined the latency and the duration of one behavioural component of surprise: The interruption of ongoing action. Participants were presented with an unannounced visual event—the appearance of new perceptual objects—during the execution of a continuous action—a rapid alternate finger tapping—which allowed a precise measurement of the latency, and the duration of an action interruption induced by the surprising event. Of the participants, (...) 78% interrupted the tapping with a mean latency of 214 ms and a mean duration of 995 ms. Variations of the number and perceptual heterogeneity of the new objects revealed that the perceptual analysis of the surprising event contributes significantly to the interruption duration. (shrink)