While Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex is concerned with psycho-sexual development, it concomitantly presents a novel historical-political imagination. This article compares the post-Oedipal self with the selves envisioned by Nietzsche and Marx, suggesting that while these 19th-century theorists constructed selves that are able to transcend the normalizing and subjugating circumstances of modernity, Freud’s theory defines a healthy self as irredeemably embedded in the prevailing culture and life-orders. In making his case, Freud spurns the quests of Nietzsche (...) and Marx for wholeness of the individual and for self-authorship, and presents the self as structurally agonistic, riven and thoroughly molded by society. (shrink)

Is the expression “unconscious phenomena” a contradiction in terms? Do psychoanalytic discoveries compel phenomenology to adapt its methods in treating inapparent phenomena? What role does the body play in the manifestation of such phenomena? In this paper, I approach these questions (1) from within the clinical context of a post-traumatic somatization and (2) by spelling out the implications of Heidegger’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis in the Zollikon Seminars. Drawing new critical attention to Freud’s earliest theories and methods, developed in the (...) context of the investigation into hysteria, I argue that some of his fundamental insights may be read as following basic phenomenological intuitions. Following Heidegger’s reconfiguration of the field of phenomenology, the inapparent (“that which does not show itself as itself”) may be seen as taking center stage as the exhaustive model for phenomena as such. Placing particular emphasis on a set of Heidegger’s critical notions – “semblance” [Schein],” “understanding”, “motive” [Beweggrund] and “bodying-forth” [Leiben] — I argue that somatization could be conceptualized phenomenologically as a “bodying-forth” [Leiben] of an incapacity to understand or be understood, and that a similar mis-understanding may also befall practitioners who struggle to witness trauma, thus becoming the clinician’s own symptom. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud's 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality is a founding text of psychoanalysis and yet it remains to a large extent an "unknown" text. In this book Freud's 1905 theory of sexuality is reconstructed in its historical context, its systematic outline, and its actual relevance. This reconstruction reveals a non-oedipal theory of sexuality defined in terms of autoerotic, non-objectal, physical-pleasurable activities originating from the "drive" and the excitability of erogenous zones. This book, (...) consequently, not only calls for a reconsideration of the development of Freudian thinking and of the status of the Oedipus complex in psychoanalysis but also has a strong potential for supporting contemporary non-heteronormative theories of sexuality. It is as such that the 1905 edition of Three Essays becomes a highly relevant document in contemporary philosophical discussions of sexuality. This book also explores the inconsistencies and problems in the original theory of sexuality, notably the unresolved question of the transition from autoerotic infantile sexuality to objectal adult sexuality, as well as the theoretical and methodological shifts present in later editions of Three Essays. It will be of great interest to psychoanalysts and those with an academic interest in the history of psychoanalysis and sexuality. (shrink)

This chapter examines the apparent proximity between Schopenhauer’s and Freud’s views on the nature and importance of what is called, amongst other things, ‘sexuality’, the ‘sexual impulse’, the ‘sexual instinct’ or ‘the ‘sexual drive’. It argues, against the idea that Freud's conception is basically borrowed from Schopenhauer, for the originality of Freud’s early theory of sexuality and suggest that the significance of this theory, apart from its obvious psychiatric and social import, lies in its possible contribution to (...) a philosophical anthropology. The chapter returns to the first, 1905 edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality to argue for the originality of Freud’s conception of the sexual drive, in relation to both his philosophical and his psychiatric predecessors. It argues that Freud’s terminological shift in the Three Essays from the Geschlechtstrieb to the Sexualtrieb, both of which Strachey translates as ‘sexual instinct’ is evidence of a theoretical shift. Examining the notion of the Geschlechtstrieb in Freud’s predecessors and its relation to presumptions about the difference between the sexes allows the distinctiveness of Freud’s conception of the Sexualtrieb and thus his theory of sexuality to stand out. After examining the claims in the literature concerning the relation between Schopenhauer and Kant on the question of sexuality, it lays out the conception of the Geschlechtstrieb in Freud’s immediate psychiatric predecessors and its connection to the treatment of the same topic in Kant, Schopenhauer and Hartmann. It then demonstrates, with reference to Freud’s shift to the use of the term Sexualtrieb, how Freud develops a conception of the sexual drive and of sexuality that is quite different to the conception of the Geschlechtstrieb in Schopenhauer et al. The chapter ends by suggesting how Freud’s theory of sexuality is a contribution to a philosophical anthropology based on considerations quite foreign to his predecessors. (shrink)

Levin follows the development of Freud's ideas up to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, claiming that "his writings through 1905 can easily be recognized as containing virtually all the fundamental elements of his system." The interpretation has two complementary emphases: "that his early theoretical models were much more closely tied to current medical and psychological literature than has previously been acknowledged, and that, contrary to presently accepted views, Freud, from his first studies of the neuroses, (...) consistently eschewed speculations concerning possible organic explanations for these diseases". (shrink)

Psychoanalysis is often divided into two parts: the clinical theory and the metapsychology. Recent historical and philosophical work has led some psychoanalysts to argue that the metapsychology is a cryptic biology and not a psychological theory at all. Evidence for this view is largely that metapsychological concepts can be traced to Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology", in which he seems to argue that systems of neurons perform both psychological and neuro-physiological functions. The conclusion these writers have (...) drawn is that Freud's metapsychology represents an attempt to unify two putatively incommensurable conceptual frameworks: the psychological and the physiological. ;In the first chapter I review the dispute between Wernicke and Freud on the issue of aphasia and place it in the context of 19th century psychological explanatory traditions. One of these traditions, developed by Franz Joseph Gall, predominates in Wernicke's work. The other tradition, associationism as developed by John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain, predominates in Freud's critique of Wernicke. I suggest that Wernicke's cerebral localization strategy amounts to a type-type identity theory, and that Freud presented both empirical and conceptual reasons for rejecting this commitment. ;In the second chapter I explicate Freud's "Project" and chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams. In the latter, I argue, Freud develops a version of functionalism. His break with his neurological background is exemplified by his insistence that psychology is autonomous. ;In the third chapter I evaluate critically the arguments presented by Merton Gill, George Klein, and Roy Schaffer that purport to show Freud's metapsychology is not a psychology at all, but a neuro-biology. Against this view I suggest that Freud describes mental structures that serve various design functions. These structures, attributed to persons by the metapsychology of infantile wishes and regression, are cognitively impenetiable. The notion that the design or functional architecture of a system is cognitively impenetiable is used to account for the protracted nature, perhaps interminability, of psychoanalytic therapy. Freud's therapeutic pessimism has its roots in theory rather than therapeutic failure. (shrink)

theories. What was Freud thinking, when, and why and what were the major influences which shaped his ideas? We follow the inner movement of his theory construction, its meaning and coherence, as well as his conceptual logic and personal directions concerning his evolving views of the reciprocal interactions between mind and body, the motivational force of instinctual drives, and the dominant role of sexuality rooted in evolutionary biology in human development, behaviour, and the creation of neurotic disturbances. We (...) follow Freud's construction and sequential reconstructions of his theoretical models concerning the nature, dynamics, and principles of unconscious mental functioning, including his changing concepts on the nature and purpose of dreams. We trace his changing views on the role of deferred action of early childhood experiences and the determining role of unconscious fantasy, psychic reality, in the formation of adult character structure and neuroses. Through such historical analysis this book provides grounding for a meaningful understanding of Freud's familiar concepts: id, ego, superego, and the Oedipus complex. We explore what these concepts meant to Freud, why he conceived them, and what functions they served in his theory of mind. This is the perfect book for students and trainees wanting to learn more about the development of Freud's ideas, as well as for established psychoanalysts and psychotherapists interested in expanding their knowledge of Freud's theories. (shrink)

Freud's Mass Psychology examines one of the key concepts in the theory of the psyche. Surprenant treats it as an epistemological issue rather than exclusively as a socio-political issue. Focusing on this neglected concept enables the author to raise anew the question of the 'application' of psychoanalysis, beyond a mechanistic understanding of this term and of Freud's writings. This study brings together important topics associated with psychoanalysis, recent French philosophy, and political thought. The original arguments that it (...) develops should interest anyone preoccupied with the relevance of psychoanalytic concepts in philosophy and in related disciplines, notably in the field of literary studies. (shrink)

Freud held complex and fascinating views on the question of mental causation. In this chapter, I propose an interpretation of Freud's views on this question, bringing together ideas from psychoanalysis, philosophy of psychoanalysis, and philosophy of mind. Faced with the impasse of the problem of how the mind interacts with the body, Freud created a two-dimensional picture of mental causation, with one dimension involving mechanistic causes and the other involving intentional causes. My thesis is that Freud's best-developed picture (...) of mental causation thesis describes mental causes as intentional causes using psychological vocabulary. I analyze three moments in Freud's work with a focus on mental causation. In the first topography, Freud uses a hybrid vocabulary, describing the mind in terms of both mechanistic causes and intentional causes. In his second topography, the mind increasingly assumes an intentional description. The third moment is Freud’s theory of anxiety, in which the arational cause of the unconscious drives, initially presented as a motor of the mind, gives rise to anxiety as an affective state that forces the self to find a solution for its mental conflicts. In the last part, I argue that Freud’s theory gradually moves from a reductionist approach to the mind-body problem on which mental causation is understood in terms of physical mechanisms, to a non-reductionist view where the mental becomes causally efficacious in its own right. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) created a theory of psychology that has had a more profound influence on twentieth‐century thinking about human life and human culture than any other produced in this century. Freud presented his theory as the product of scientific work. He did not offer it as part of a philosophical system and did not advance philosophical arguments to defend it. Rather he based it on evidence he gathered from the observations he made as a physician specializing in (...) nervous disorders, and he enlarged and modified it on the basis of further observations and reflections. Consequently, it is necessary first to explain how the theory developed and what its central ideas are before discussing its philosophical import. (shrink)

This volume contains Freud’s speculations on various aspects of religion, on the basis of which he explains certain characteristics of Jewish people in their relations with Christians. From an intensive study of the Moses legend, Freud comes to the startling conclusion that Moses himself was an Egyptian who brought from his native country the religion he gave to the Jews. He accepts the hypothesis that Moses was murdered in the wilderness, but that his memory was cherished by the people and (...) that his religious doctrine ultimately triumphed. Freud develops his general theory of monotheism, which enabled him to throw light on the development of Judaism and Christianity. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of “sensualism”, led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object‐dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object‐relations, one that anticipates the well‐known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers (...) a broader metaphysical basis in which all types of “essential objects” are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object‐relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the “libidinal” nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau‐Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object‐relations and self‐relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of “primary narcissism”. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object‐dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self‐ and object‐relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of “positive self‐relation”. (shrink)

First published in 1981, this collection of essays was taken from Peters' larger work, Psychology and Ethical Development in order to provide a more focused volume on moral education for students. Peters' background in both psychology and philosophy makes the work distinctive, which is evident from the first two essays alone: 'Freud's theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget' and 'Moral Education and the Psychology of Character'. He also displays balance in his acceptance (...) that reason and feeling are both of great importance where the subject of moral education is concerned. Although written some time ago, the book discusses issues which are still of considerable interest and importance today. (shrink)

This paper addresses the emergence of the ‘death drive’ in Sigmund Freud’s later work, and thesignificance of this development for his psychoanalytic theory as a whole. In particular, the paper arguesthat the ‘death drive’ is a pivotal concept, articulating a connection between what are commonlyunderstood as the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ functions of the psyche. Moreover, the death drive is pivotal in asecond sense, in that it articulates a turn away from the strictly empirical realm of science, to a (...) dark andobscure field indicated , but not comprehended, by observable phenomena. Finally, thepaper suggests that as Freud’s departure from his scientific methodology into the wilderness of speculation,the death drive represents his most valuable contribution to psychoanalysis. With the death drive, Freud isable to engender a new perspective of human being: one that is not already encompassed by themechanistic neurological viewpoint from which his researches first issued. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis and Deconstruction: Freud's Psychic Apparatusdemonstrates the relevance of deconstructive thinking for the clinical practice of psychoanalysis. Arguing that deconstruction has been misrepresented as a form of literary theory or a philosophy of language, the book puts Derrida, Heidegger and others working in the tradition of deconstruction into dialogue with debates in the contemporary psychoanalytic field. Attempting to retrieve what was radical in Freud's portrayal of the mind as a machine, Jared Russell stresses the importance of psychoanalysis (...) for an understanding of the relationship between the human and its current hyper-technological environment. Interventions into contemporary debates address psychoanalytic concepts such as the nature of the clinical frame, the intersubjective dialogue, unconscious communication and the experience of time. Russell argues that deconstruction, and in particular Derrida's work, can anticipate and help clarify ongoing developments at the cutting edge of psychoanalysis today. Psychoanalysis and Deconstruction: Freud's Psychic Apparatuswill appeal not only to a philosophically informed audience but also to clinicians attempting to secure a place for psychoanalytic practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century. ticipate and help clarify ongoing developments at the cutting edge of psychoanalysis today. Psychoanalysis and Deconstruction: Freud's Psychic Apparatuswill appeal not only to a philosophically informed audience but also to clinicians attempting to secure a place for psychoanalytic practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

The book reviewed is a chronological reconstruction of Freud's theory of mind which claims a particular significance for the later theoretical writings as motivated by both prior developments in the body of theory and new materials to explain.

'I very soon had an opportunity to interpret Dora's nervous coughing as the outcome of a fantasized sexual situation.'A Case of Hysteria, popularly known as the Dora Case, affords a rare insight into how Freud dealt with patients and interpreted what they told him. The 18-year-old 'Dora' was sent for psychoanalysis by her father after threatening suicide; as Freud's enquiries deepened, he uncovered a remarkably unhappy and conflict-ridden family, with several competing versions of their story. The narrative became a (...) crucial text in the evolution of his theories, combining his studies on hysteria and his new theory of dream-interpretation with early insights into the development of sexuality. The unwitting preconceptions and prejudices with which Freud approached his patient reveal his blindness and the broader attitudes of turn-of-the-century Viennese society, while his account of 'Dora's' emotional travails is as gripping as a modern novel.This new translation is accompanied by a substantial introduction which sets the work in its biographical, historical, and intellectual context, and offers a close and critical analysis of the text itself. (shrink)

Using the concepts developed by Lacan to analyse the inner logic of Freud's thought Samuels provides a bridge between Lacanian theory and traditional categories of psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Sigmund Freud’s five long case histories have been the focus of seemingly endless fascination and criticism. This article examines how the long case-history genre developed and its impact on the professionalization of psychoanalysis. It argues that the long case histories, using a distinctive form that highlighted the peculiarities of psychoanalytic theory, served as exemplars in the discipline. In doing so, the article extends John Forrester’s work on ‘thinking in cases’ to show the practical implications of that style of reasoning. (...) The article illustrates how the form disappeared once the theoretical basis of the movement was set. The genre never became institutionalized, although the content of the five long case histories did, because of Freud’s accepted role as theoretician of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Through an exacting yet accessible reconstruction of eleven of Freud's essential theoretical writings, Susan Sugarman demonstrates that the traditionally received Freud is the diametric opposite of the one evident in the pages of his own works. Whereas Freud's theory of the mind is typically conceived as a catalogue of uninflected concepts and crude reductionism - for instance that we are nothing but our infantile origins or sexual and aggressive instincts - it emerges here as an organic whole (...) built from first principles and developing in sophistication over time. Sugarman's exciting interpretation, tracking Freud's texts in the order in which he wrote them, grounds his claims in the reasoning that led to them and reveals their real intent. This fresh reading will appeal to specialists and students across a variety of disciplines. (shrink)

Yet such a contrast fails to provide an adequate account of the full scope of either philosophy or psychoanalysis. On the one hand, philosophical inquiry is not wholly pre-empted by the question of reality; it may also extend into the realm of phantasy, as can be seen in Plato's effort to determine the epistemological value of eikasia or in Husserl's consideration of Phantasie as a basis of insight into essences. On the other hand, psychoanalysts are as concerned about reality as (...) they are about phantasy. Indeed, one of the key phrases of psychoanalytic therapy is "adaptation to reality." The reason for this concern with reality is clear: if phantasies are modifications or distortions of the real, it is imperative to discern what the character of reality is, especially since it is held out as the standard of a sound state of mental health. (shrink)

Vienna was the birthplace of the world-renowned Circle that bears its name as well as of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theories. For that reason alone, it is of interest to inquire into the philosophical relations between logical empiricism and Freudian psychoanalysis as construed by their advocates. Relatedly, it is of sociocultural significance to understand the intellectual and personal interactions between the representatives of these two highly influential systems of ideas.

Abraham Drassinower takes a fresh look at Freud, countering his prevalent image as a man pessimistically renouncing the possibility of social, political, and cultural change.

The life and work of Sigmund Freud continue to fascinate general and professional readers alike. Joel Whitebook here presents the first major biography of Freud since the last century, taking into account recent developments in psychoanalytic theory and practice, gender studies, philosophy, cultural theory, and more. Offering a radically new portrait of the creator of psychoanalysis, this book explores the man in all his complexity alongside an interpretation of his theories that cuts through the stereotypes that surround him. (...) The development of Freud's thinking is addressed not only in the context of his personal life, but also in that of society and culture at large, while the impact of his thinking on subsequent issues of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and social theory is fully examined. Whitebook demonstrates that declarations of Freud's obsolescence are premature, and, with his clear and engaging style, brings this vivid figure to life in compelling and readable fashion. (shrink)

Michael T. Michael evaluates Freud s theory of dreams in light of major criticisms and scientific research. Approaching the issue from the vantage of the history and philosophy of science, he argues that the theory is a live hypothesis fully deserving of continued scientific exploration.".

A reprint of Freud's lectures of 1910. In his philosophically critical preface, Allers briefly but effectively points up logical and scientific weaknesses in Freud's theories, attributes their peculiar success to the appealing ambiguity of approach as between the scientific and the historical, then finds their chief merit in furthering the recognition of man's "historicity."--L. K. B.

With respect to the reproach by habermas and ricoeur that freud will fall prey to a "scientistic self-misunderstanding" i submit that it was not freud, but these hermeneuticians themselves, who forced the clinical theory of psychoanalysis onto the procrustean bed of a philosophical ideology demonstrably alien to it. as against the generic "disavowal" of causal attributions advocated by some hermeneuticians, i maintain that it is a nihilistic, if not frivolous, trivialization of freud's entire clinical theory. far from (...) serving as a new citadel for psychoanalytic apologetics, the embrace of such hermeneuticians is, i submit, the kiss of death for the legacy that was to be saved. (edited). (shrink)

Kant’s critical theory on moral feeling can be divided into two stages: early and late. In the early stage, Kant was committed to accepting and transforming the traditional concept of moral feeling, while in the later stage he turned to developing his own unique theory on the topic. His beliefs about moral feeling changed between these two stages, both regarding the basic meaning of moral feeling and the function of moral feeling in moral philosophy. This paper argues that (...) these shifts help clarify the framework of Kant’s moral philosophy and introduce a new dimension to Kant’s definition of feelings and the relationship between sensibility and intellectuality. Namely, sensibility is not only determined by intellectuality but also has its unique initiative. Through acting on the body, intellectuality generates intellectual feelings, which in turn assist humans in realizing their intellectual purpose as a limited rational being. (shrink)

During his years as a member of the Frankfurt School, Erich Fromm developed a strong interest in the idea that there were distinctive male and female character orientations. Drawing on the positive evaluation of matriarchy made in the nineteenth century by the Swiss anthropologist J. J. Bachofen, Fromm argued that a “matricentric” psychic structure was more conducive to socialism than the patricentric structure which had predominated in capitalism. His interest in maternalism and his opposition to patriarchy played an important part (...) in his rejection of Freud's theory of drives and in the development of a humanistic ethics in which love plays a central part. The idea of a gendered humanism is central to Fromm's social thought, although there is a danger that the over‐emphasis of sex‐based character differences unintentionally re‐opens the danger of the kind of sexual stereotyping which he resolutely opposed. (shrink)

Freud’s psychoanalysis of Little Hans is a defining moment in psychoanalytic theory, because it marks the first psychoanalytic attempt ever to analyze childhood as an actuality rather than a set of recollected experiences. This article aims to explain Deleuze and Guattari’s dismissal of Freud’s interpretation as an act of silencing the children that is meant to corroborate his own theories of psychosexual development and particularly the Oedipus complex. Deleuze and Guattari are not against psychoanalytic interpretation in and of (...) itself as a creative intervention into the lived actuality of the analysand, but they think that Freudian psychoanalysis misses the opportunity by tracing every aspect of individual existence back to familial figures and relationships. While Freud considers the case of Little Hans as a verification of his theory of sexuality, Deleuze and Guattari regard the case as a perfect example of how psychoanalytic suggestion often distorts the utterances of the analysand for its own interests, thereby failing altogether to grasp the logic of becoming as an escape from familial determinations. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to explore the value of psychoanalysis in the early twenty-first century through reference to Freud, Lacan, and Stiegler’s work on computational madness. In the first section of the article I consider the original objectives of psychoanalysis through reference to what I call Freud’s ‘normalisation project’, before exploring the critique of this discourse concerned with the defence of oedipal law through a discussion of the post-modern ‘individualisation project’ set out by Deleuze and Guattari and others. (...) Tracking the development of ‘the individualisation project’ in history, I consider its connections with the cybernetic theories of Wiener and Shannon in the psycho-cyber-utopianism of the 1990s, before moving on to consider the other side of the psychoanalytic-cybernetic interaction through a discussion of Jacques Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle in the second section of the article. In reading Lacan’s seminar on Freudian drive in terms of the cybernetic repression of death, I set up the conclusion to the article which involves a discussion of Bernard Stiegler’s ‘survival project’ that relies on a recognition of the limit of death in order to produce human significance and oppose the madness of our contemporary computational reality. (shrink)

Freud, Psychoanalysis and Symbolism offers an innovative general theory of symbolism, derived from Freud's psychoanalytic theory and relocated within mainstream scientific psychology. It is the first systematic investigation of the development of Freud's treatment of symbolism throughout his published works, and discovers in those writings a broad theory which is far superior to the widely accepted, narrow, 'official' view. Agnes Petocz argues that the treatment of symbolism must begin with the identification and clarification of (...) a set of logical constraints and psychological requirements which any general theory of symbolism must respect, and that these requirements have been neglected by existing accounts across a number of disciplines. Her newly proposed 'Freudian broad' theory of symbolism, by contrast, does meet these requirements, but only after it has been rehabilitated within a revised psychoanalytic context, encompassing major changes to our understanding of the concepts of unconscious and repression and the role of language. (shrink)

Two strands of enlightenment rationality—the mechanistic/deterministic and the self-overcoming—are distinguished, and the presence of the later in the work of Sigmund Freud is delineated. Beginning with Freud's investigations of hysteria, Freud's view of the person as a self-overcoming entity is spelled out in his theory of the unconscious and his theory of sexuality. It is argued that Freud provides, in the realm of empirical science, evidence that converges with the ontological conception of the person as a (...) "being-in-the-world" developed by Heidegger in the philosophical classic, Being and Time. (shrink)

Originally published in 1984, this book broke new ground in assessing Freud as both an exemplary late-Victorian and as a pivotal figure in the creation of modern thought and culture. In his close reading of various of Freud’s theoretical and clinical texts, including two of the most famous case histories, Steven Marcus uncovers the steps in the development of Freud’s thought, the dynamics and contradictions and ‘the intellectual and emotional urgings, forces and conflicts that were at work… as the (...) first original insights and discoveries that constituted the inception of psychoanalysis as a theory, discipline of inquiry, and new kind of therapy, came suddenly, often unexpectedly and without being bidden, upon Freud’. Central to Professor Marcus’ inquiry is the relationship of Freud’s work to cultural change and to the very process of disclosure, formation and construction in the transition to modernity. Freud’s writings, and the psychoanalytic discipline of which they are the foundations, are placed in the context of their contribution to modern modes of thought, and of their influence on our notions of the centres of significance of each existence as a whole. Freud and the Culture of Psychoanalysis is a major contribution to our understanding of how ideas and theories become internalized into the intellectual framework of our lives and affect the way we think about the world. By moving backward and forward from pre-Freudian to post-Freudian thinkers, Professor Marcus takes us on a journey through cultural transition that is also an exploration of how the individual interacts with his own moment in history to forge new modes of consciousness. (shrink)

Philosophical concerns rarely force their way into the average mathematician’s workday. But, in extreme circumstances, fundamental questions can arise as to the legitimacy of a certain manner of proceeding, say, as to whether a particular object should be granted ontological status, or whether a certain conclusion is epistemologically warranted. There are then two distinct views as to the role that philosophy should play in such a situation. On the first view, the mathematician is called upon to turn to the counsel (...) of philosophers, in much the same way as a nation considering an action of dubious international legality is called upon to turn to the United Nations for guidance. After due consideration of appropriate regulations and guidelines (and, possibly, debate between representatives of different philosophical factions), the philosophers render a decision, by which the dutiful mathematician abides. Quine was famously critical of such dreams of a ‘first philosophy.’ At the opposite extreme, our hypothetical mathematician answers only to the subject’s internal concerns, blithely or brashly indifferent to philosophical approval. What is at stake to our mathematician friend is whether the questionable practice provides a proper mathematical solution to the problem at hand, or an appropriate mathematical understanding; or, in pragmatic terms, whether it will make it past a journal referee. In short, mathematics is as mathematics does, and the philosopher’s task is simply to make sense of the subject as it evolves and certify practices that are already in place. In his textbook on the philosophy of mathematics (Shapiro, 2000), Stewart Shapiro characterizes this attitude as ‘philosophy last, if at all.’. (shrink)

The concept of intrasemiotics designates the semiosis of the interpenetration between the biological and psychological autopoietic systems as Luhmann defines them in his theory. Combining a Peircian concept of semiosis with Luhmann’s theory in the framework of biosemiotics makes it possible for us to view the interplay of mind and body as a sign play. The recently suggested term ‘sign play’ pertains to ecosemiotics processes between animals of the same species stretching Wittgenstein’s language concept into the animal world (...) of signs. With intrasemiotics there is an inner interplay. Lorenz in ethology has used the concept of motivation, and Uexküll the concept of tone, mostly describing the outgoing effect on perception and the reactions on perception. One could view intrasemiotics as the interplay between Lorenz’ biologically defined motivations and Freud’s Id, understood as the psychological aspect of many of the natural drives. In the last years of development of his theory Lorenz studied how emotional feedback can introduce just a little learning through pleasurable feelings also into the instinctivesystems because, as he reasoned, there must be some kind of reward going through instinctive movements, thus making the appetitive searching behaviourfor sign stimuli possible. But he never found an acceptable way of modelling motivation in biological science. A cybersemiotic model may combine these approaches, defining various concepts of thoughtsemiotics, phenosemiotic and intrasemiotics, combining them with the already known concepts of exosemiotics, ecosemiotics, endosemiotics to an approach which studies the self-organising semiotic processes in living systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Misnomer of Freud's "Seduction Theory"Hall TriplettSigmund Freud's theory of 1896 was buried without a name in 1897, less than two years after it appeared. The process by which it acquired a name, "seduction theory," and the role this name played in the history of psychoanalysis are essential parts of the legend-making in Freud's biography. The label, bestowed half a century after publication, (...) reflected two major rhetorical transformations. First, from a theory presented with highly general claims of infant sex abuse, assault, and trauma, the theory was repackaged as a theory of seduction. Second, from a theory reportedly based in actual, traumatic experience, followed by repressed memory, it was transformed into one of fantasy. The name "seduction theory" has therefore operated as a misleading, strategic misnomer for the theory that Freud published in 1896.Freud announced his theory in three publications, referred to here in order of publication as the Paris paper,1 the Berlin paper,2 and "The Aetiology of Hysteria," published in Vienna.3 In his final publication the emphasis on trauma was greatest. In the space of five pages in the Standard Edition of Freud's works he used the word "traumatic" or "traumatically" fifteen times.4 Although he was extending the traumatic memory theory that he had shared with Josef Breuer in 1895,5 he touted his new modification as "the discovery of a caput [End Page 647] Nili [source of the Nile] in neuropathology."6 Sixteen months later he would privately renounce it. The theory was resurrected in the 1980s as support for the recovered memory movement.7It is essential to recall that the issuance of scientific claims is quite different from scientific validation. Getting the name of a theory right more than a century after publication is one matter only; assessing the basis of its underlying claims raises yet another challenge, particularly when the theory has been transformed with such extensive variation as Freud's theory of 1896.Therefore, the early death of the theory, described only in private letters to Wilhelm Fliess, is critical to an understanding of the entire historical episode. It is essential also to note that when Freud published his retrospective revisions of the theory, he did not know that his contemporary letters to his intimate friend would become competing evidence of the actual events of the mid-1890s.8When Freud secretly abandoned his theory on 21 September 1897 he wrote to Fliess, "I no longer believe in my neurotica."9 Implied already is the fact that Freud's belief in his theory was all that had supported it. One of his retrospective comments unwittingly substantiates this fact. In 1914, in his "History of the Psycho-analytic Movement," he conceded that his theory "broke down under the weight of its own improbability."10Furthermore, abandoning a theory in secrecy with no public defense is itself tantamount to a confession that supporting evidence is missing. Freud had acknowledged the absence of supporting data in his Berlin paper when he stated, "In this kind of communication it is not possible to bring forward the evidence needful to support my assertions, but I hope to fulfill this obligation later in a detailed presentation."11 His claim that it was "not possible to bring forward the evidence" must be challenged. Presenting scientific evidence is always possible when one has it. Moreover, in his "later" paper, by far the longest of 1896, he evaded the presentation of "actual material," opting instead to discuss potential objections.12 He did not present a single case history of hysteria, arguing that this would have taken too much time; yet he had closed his Berlin paper with a case history of paranoia that was purportedly based in the female patient's "sexual relationship" with her brother during childhood.13 [End Page 648] This case is not persuasive, but it demonstrates Freud's eagerness in 1896 to share a case when he believed that he had one to share.The style of a live lecture in "The Aetiology of Hysteria," as though Freud were speaking to an audience of potential objectors, is highly misleading, even fictional. As he explained in his letters... (shrink)

Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge takes the reader on tour of the nature, value, and limits of self-knowledge. Mitchell S. Green calls on classical sources like Plato and Descartes, 20th-century thinkers like Freud, recent developments in neuroscience and experimental psychology, and even Buddhist philosophy to explore topics at the heart of who we are. The result is an unvarnished look at both the achievements and drawbacks of the many attempts to better know one's own self. Key topics (...) in this volume include: Knowledge - what it means to know, the link between wisdom and knowledge, and the value of living an "examined life" Personal identity - questions of dualism, bodily continuity, and personhood The unconscious - including the kind posited by psychoanalysis as well as the form proposed by recent research on the so-called adaptive unconscious Free will - if we have it, and the recent arguments from neuroscience challenging it Self-misleading - the ways we willfully deceive ourselves, and how this relates to empathy, peer disagreement, implicit bias, and intellectual humility Experimental psychology - considerations on the automaticity of emotion and other cognitive processes, and how they shape us This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free 'Know Thyself' MOOC created through collaboration of the University of Connecticut's Project on Humility and Conviction in Public Life, and the University of Edinburgh's Eidyn research centre, and hosted on the Coursera platform. The book is also suitable as a text for interdisciplinary courses in the philosophy of mind or self-knowledge, and is highly recommended for anyone looking for a short overview of this fascinating topic. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis with particular regard to the problem of nihilism, and the philosophy of history that Edmund Husserl and Georg Lukacs argue is needed in its wake to restore reason's capacity to give order and direction to human life. I understand nihilism not merely as the theory that life is devoid of value, but rather as an historical crisis in the sense of autonomy that results from the separation of fact and value in the (...) thoroughly rationalized modern world. How, I ask, does Freud respond to this crisis? And how does his response stand in relationship to those offered by philosophers? Does psychoanalysis too provide a philosophy of history? ;To answer these questions, I first examine the development of psychoanalysis in response to the suffering of neurotics as a crisis in the authority of science to address human needs. I then explicate the problem of nihilism as it is registered by both Husserl and Lukacs, examine the philosophies of history that they each construct in response to it, and consider Freud's theory of civilization in relationship to them. ;By constructing philosophical methodologies to defend reason's teleology, I argue that both Husserl and Lukacs implicitly disavow the problem that they purport to address by presupposing the autonomy of reason, and treating the problem of nihilism as the result merely of a misconception concerning its place and function in the world. As late as 1923 Freud too presupposes reason's autonomy from the terror expressed in religion. However, with his subsequent recognition of the problem presented by the unconscious sense of guilt, Freud no longer treats the rational overcoming of illusion as an intrinsic good. He sees civilization too as radically ambivalent and revises his social theory as a critique of the discontent that immanently plagues it. Rather than a philosophy of history, I argue that Freud constructs a critique of the problem presented by the persistent demand for teleological orientation in a post-historical world. (shrink)

In the autumn of 1912, C. G. Jung, then president of the International Psychoanalytic Association, set out his critique and reformulation of the theory of psychoanalysis in a series of lectures in New York, ideas that were to prove unacceptable to Freud, thus creating a schism in the Freudian school. Jung challenged Freud's understandings of sexuality, the origins of neuroses, dream interpretation, and the unconscious, and Jung also became the first to argue that every analyst should themselves be (...) analyzed. Seen in the light of the subsequent reception and development of psychoanalysis, Jung's critiques appear to be strikingly prescient, while also laying the basis for his own school of analytical psychology. This volume of Jung's lectures includes an introduction by Sonu Shamdasani, Philemon Professor of Jung History at University College London, and editor of Jung's Red Book. (shrink)

The essay focuses on the impact of Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization in Germany in 1968. First, the essay discusses how Freud’s theory was used in the late twenties at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Then, it focuses on how certain of Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas were developed in Eros and Civilization . Finally, it shows how Marcuse’s work became relevant for the intellectual development of the student movement in Germany.