It is possible to understand the expressive power of a logic as issuing from its capacity to express properties of its models. There are some ways to formally capture whether a property of models is expressible, among them is one based on the notion of definability, and one based on the notion of discrimination. If the logics to be compared are defined within the same class of models, one can employ the notions of definability and discrimination directly to obtain (...) formal conditions for relative expressiveness. This paper studies generalizations of these formal conditions to cases where the compared logics are defined within different classes of models. There have been proposed in the literature formal conditions of two main kinds: with forward and with backward model-mappings. It is shown that none of them is adequate, despite their initial reasonableness. Moreover, we argue that general and reasonable formal conditions for relative expressiveness involving forward mappings are not likely to be found, given that they turn out to be highly dependent on specific features of the compared logics. On the other hand, it will be argued that there is a reasonable formal condition involving backward model-mappings. (shrink)

We investigate expressiveness and definability issues with respect to minimal models, particularly in the scope of Circumscription. First, we give a proof of the failure of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem for Circumscription. Then we show that, if the class of P; Z-minimal models of a first-order sentence is Δ-elementary, then it is elementary. That is, whenever the circumscription of a first-order sentence is equivalent to a first-order theory, then it is equivalent to a finitely axiomatizable one. This means that classes of (...) models of circumscribed theories are either elementary or not Δ-elementary. Finally, using the previous result, we prove that, whenever a relation Pi is defined in the class of P; Z-minimal models of a first-order sentence Φ and whenever such class of P; Z-minimal models is Δ-elementary, then there is an explicit definition ψ for Pi such that the class of P; Z-minimal models of Φ is the class of models of Φ ∧ ψ. In order words, the circumscription of P in Φ with Z varied can be replaced by Φ plus this explicit definition ψ for Pi. (shrink)

In this paper we study the expressive power and definability for modal languages interpreted on topological spaces. We provide topological analogues of the van Benthem characterization theorem and the Goldblatt–Thomason definability theorem in terms of the well-established first-order topological language.

A pointwise definable model is one in which every object is \loos definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens $V=\HOD$, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if \ZFC\ is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of \ZFC. If there is a transitive model of \ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of \ZFC. What is more, every countable model of \ZFC\ has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. (...) Indeed, for the main contribution of this article, every countable model of Gödel-Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every set and class is first-order definable without parameters. (shrink)

We carry out a study of definability issues in the standard models of Presburger and Skolem arithmetics (henceforth referred to simply as Presburger and Skolem arithmetics, for short, because we only deal with these models, not the theories, thus there is no risk of confusion) supplied with free unary predicates—which are strongly related to definability in the monadic SOA (second-order arithmetic) without × or + , respectively. As a consequence, we obtain a very direct proof for ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness of Presburger, (...) and also Skolem, arithmetic with a free unary predicate, generalize it to all ${\Pi^1_n}$ -levels, and give an alternative description of the analytical hierarchy without × or + . Here ‘direct’ means that one explicitly m-reduces the truth of ${\Pi^1_1}$ -formulae in SOA to the truth in the extended structures. Notice that for the case of Presburger arithmetic, the ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness was already known, but the proof was indirect and exploited some special ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness results on so-called recurrent nondeterministic Turing machines—for these reasons, it was hardly able to shed any light on definability issues or possible generalizations. (shrink)

We study the expressive power in the finite of the logic Fixed-Point+Counting, the extension of first-order logic which is obtained through adding both the fixed-point constructor and the ability to count. To this end an isomorphism preserving (`generic') model of computation is introduced whose PTime restriction exactly corresponds to this level of expressive power, while its PSpace restriction corresponds to While+Counting. From this model we obtain a normal form which shows a rather clear separation of the relational vs. the arithmetical (...) side of the algorithms involved. In parallel, we study the relations of Fixed-Point+Counting with the infinitary logics L r ∞ω (∃ ≥ m ) m∈ω and the corresponding pebble games. The main result, however, involves the concept of an arithmetical invariant. By this we mean a functor taking every finite relational structure to an expansion of (an initial segment of) the standard arithmetical structure. In particular its values are linearly ordered structures. We establish the existence of a family of arithmetical invariants (J r ) r≥ 1 with the following properties: $\bullet$ The invariants themselves can be evaluated in polynomial time. $\bullet$ A class of finite relational structures is definable in Fixed-Point+Counting if and only if membership can be decided in polynomial time on the basis of the values of one of the invariants. $\bullet$ The invariant J r classifies all finite relational structures exactly up to equivalence with respect to the logic L r ∞ω (∃ ≥ m ) m∈ω . We also give a characterization of Fixed-Point+Counting in terms of sequences of formulae in the L r ωω (∃ ≥ m ) m∈ω : It corresponds exactly to the polynomial time computable families (φ n ) n∈ω in these logics. Towards a positive assessment of the expressive power of Fixed-Point+Counting, it is shown that the natural extension of fixed-point logic by Lindström quantifiers, which capture all the PTime computable properties of cardinalities of definable predicates, is strictly weaker than what we get here. This implies in particular that every extension of fixed-point logic by means of monadic Lindstrom quantifiers, which stays within PTime, must be strictly contained in Fixed-Point+Counting. (shrink)

I define 'skim semantics' to be a Davidson-style truth-conditional semantics combined with a variety of deflationism about truth. The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics precludes at least some kinds of skim semantics; thus I reject the idea that the challenge to skim semantics derives solely from Davidson's explanatory ambitions, and in particular from the 'truth doctrine', the view that the concept of truth plays a central explanatory role in Davidsonian theories of meaning for a language. The fate of (...) skim semantics is not determined by the fate of the truth doctrine, so rejecting the truth doctrine does not in itself open the way to skim semantics. I establish my thesis by showing that some recently proposed versions of skim semantics fail because of truth's expressive role. I also discuss the conditions that might permit skim semantics. (shrink)

After a vertebrate dies, many of its organ systems, tissues, and cells remain functional while its body no longer works as a whole. We define this state as the “twilight of death” − the transition from a living body to a decomposed corpse. We claim that the study of the twilight of death is important to ethical, legal and medical science. We examined gene expression at the twilight of death in the zebrafish and mouse reaching the conclusion that apparently thousands (...) of transcripts significantly increase in abundance from life to several hours/days postmortem relative to live controls. Transcript dynamics of different genes provided “proof-of-principle” that models accurately predict an individual's elapsed-time-of-death. While many transcripts were associated with survival and stress compensation, others were associated with epigenetic factors, developmental control, and cancer. Future studies are needed to determine whether the high incidence of cancer in transplant recipients is due to the postmortem processes in donor organs. In organismal death, some organ systems, tissues and cells remain functional while the body no longer works as a whole. In the “twilight of death” − the transition from a living body to a decomposed corpse − thousands of gene transcripts increase in abundance relative to live controls. (shrink)

The term functional domain is often used to describe the region containing the cis acting sequences that regulate a gene locus. “Strong” domain models propose that the domain is a spatially isolated entity consisting of a region of extended accessible chromatin bordered by insulators that have evolved to act as functional boundaries. However, the observation that independently regulated loci can overlap partially or completely raises questions about functional requirements for physically isolated domain structures. An alternative model, the “weak” domain model, (...) proposes that domain structure is determined by the distribution of binding sites for positively acting factors, without a requirement for functional boundaries. The domain would effectively be the region that contains these factor-binding sites. Specificity of promoter-enhancer interactions would play a major role in maintaining the functional autonomy of adjacent genes. Sequences that interfere with these interactions (frequently characterised as insulators) would be selected against if they occurred within the domain but not at the edges, or in the interdomain regions. As a result, insulators would often be found near the borders of domains without necessarily being selected to act as boundaries. BioEssays 22:657–665, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

We announce and explain recent results on the computably enumerable (c.e.) sets, especially their definability properties (as sets in the spirit of Cantor), their automorphisms (in the spirit of Felix Klein's Erlanger Programm), their dynamic properties, expressed in terms of how quickly elements enter them relative to elements entering other sets, and the Martin Invariance Conjecture on their Turing degrees, i.e., their information content with respect to relative computability (Turing reducibility).

The paper explores Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar in the sense of a discipline or an activity, as opposed to the object sense of the term (grammar as a body of rules for the use of a language). I argue that the Wittgensteinian activity of grammar consists in giving expression to rules of our language use. It differs from the traditional grammarian’s activity not only in focusing on a different type of rules, but also in that it does not aim at (...) an explicit and exhaustive treatment of a specific domain of language. Instead, Wittgenstein conceives its goal as therapeutic: the dissolution of particular philosophical problems. Further, I attempt to reconcile his seemingly contradictory remarks on the character of grammatical statements, defining the senses in which they respectively can, and cannot, be considered descriptive assertions. I confront G. P. Baker’s and P. M. S. Hacker’s conceptions of the Wittgensteinian grammatical activity and I argue in favour of the former. Finally, I critically examine N. Garver’s claim that Wittgenstein, in his later conception of philosophy as grammar, succeeded in formulating a successfully self-referential criterion of philosophical critique. I also argue that grammatical activity, despite Wittgenstein’s overt commitment, is in fact not the only method of his later philosophy. (shrink)

Arithmetical definability has been extensively studied over the natural numbers. In this paper, we take up the study of arithmetical definability over finite structures, motivated by the correspondence between uniform AC0 and FO. We prove finite analogs of three classic results in arithmetical definability, namely that < and TIMES can first-order define PLUS, that < and DIVIDES can first-order define TIMES, and that < and COPRIME can first-order define TIMES. The first result sharpens the equivalence FO =FO to FO = (...) FO, answering a question raised by Barrington et al. about the Crane Beach Conjecture. Together with previous results on the Crane Beach Conjecture, our results imply that FO is strictly less expressive than FO = FO = FO. In more colorful language, one could say that, for parallel computation, multiplication is harder than addition. (shrink)

Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the standard readings, (...) for example by adopting sequent rules with multiple conclusions. Another is to explore what readings the natural deduction rules do enforce. When the notion of a model of a rule is generalized, it is found that natural deduction rules express “intuitionistic” readings of their connectives. A third approach is presented here. The intuitionistic readings emerge when models of rules are defined globally, but the notion of a local model of a rule is also natural. Using this benchmark, natural deduction rules enforce exactly the classical readings of the connectives, while this is not true of axiomatic systems. This vindicates the historical motivation for natural deduction rules. One odd consequence of using the local model benchmark is that some systems of propositional logic are not complete for the semantics that their rules express. Parallels are drawn with incompleteness results in modal logic to help make sense of this. (shrink)

The theme of this book is the crisis of the early modern state in eighteenth-century Britain. The revolt of the North American colonies and the simultaneous demand for wider religious toleration at home challenged the principles of sovereignty and obligation that underpinned arguments about the character of the state. These were expressed in terms of the 'common good', 'necessity', and 'community' - concepts that came to the fore in early modern European political thought and which gave expression to the problem (...) of defining legitimate authority in a period of increasing consciousness of state power. The Americans and their British supporters argued that individuals ought to determine the common good of the community. A new theory of representation and freedom of thought defines the cutting edge of this revolutionary redefinition of the basic relationship between individual and community. (shrink)

This article assesses the current state of the philosophical debate regarding the expression of emotion in music, or expressive properties of music. It defines the question, explores a few false‐starts and then considers the solution that expressive properties are a matter of a certain ‘way of appearing’ of the music. This solution is associated with Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson, whose work is discussed. It is argued that work in this area has reached an impasse, and it is not clear (...) where we should go next. (shrink)

Among emotions, surprise has been extensively studied in psychology. In linguistics, surprise, like other emotions, has mainly been studied through the syntactic patterns involving surprise lexemes. However, little has been done so far to correlate the reaction of surprise investigated in psychological approaches and the effects of surprise on language. This cross-disciplinary volume aims to bridge the gap between emotion, cognition and language by bringing together nine contributions on surprise from different backgrounds - psychology, human-agent interaction, linguistics. Using different methods (...) at different levels of analysis, all contributors concur in defining surprise as a cognitive operation and as a component of emotion rather than as a pure emotion. Surprise results from expectations not being met and is therefore related to epistemicity. Linguistically, there does not exist an unequivocal marker of surprise. Surprise may be either described by surprise lexemes, which are often associated with figurative language, or it may be expressed by grammatical and syntactic constructions. Originally published as a special issue of Review of Cognitive Linguistics 13:2 (2015). (shrink)

We define process algebras with a generalised operation ∑ for choice. For every infinite cardinal κ, we prove that the algebra of transition trees with branching degree <κ is free in the class of process algebras in which ∑ is defined for all subsets with a cardinality <κ. We explain how the expressions of a fragment of the specification language μCRL may be used to denote elements of our process algebras. In particular, we explain how choice quantifiers may (...) be used to denote infinite sums. We show that choice quantifiers can simulate both the existential and the universal quantifiers of first-order logic, while the input prefix mechanism can only simulate the universal quantifier. (shrink)

Bacterial populations are heterogeneous, which in many cases can provide a selective advantage during changes in environmental conditions. In some instances, heterogeneity exists at the genetic level, in which significant allelic variation occurs within a population seeded by a single cell. In other cases, heterogeneity exists due to phenotypic differences within a clonal, genetically identical population. A variety of mechanisms can drive this latter strategy. Stochastic fluctuations can drive differential gene expression, but heterogeneity in gene expression can also be driven (...) by environmental changes sensed by individual cells residing in distinct locales. Utilizing multiple single cell approaches, workers have started to uncover the extent of heterogeneity within bacterial populations. This review will first describe several examples of phenotypic and genetic heterogeneity, and then discuss many single cell approaches that have recently been applied to define heterogeneity within bacterial populations. (shrink)

We study the expressive power of open formulas of dependence logic introduced in Väänänen [Dependence logic (Vol. 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts), 2007]. In particular, we answer a question raised by Wilfrid Hodges: how to characterize the sets of teams definable by means of identity only in dependence logic, or equivalently in independence friendly logic.

The vision underlying the development of the Semantic Web is that the whole complex of our knowledge forms a huge semantic network, which should be represented and made explicit by means of languages such as RDF, RDFS or OWL. However, these languages have important expressive limits, since none of them reaches the full expressive power of a first-order language. As a result, large parts of our knowledge—in particular, mathematical and scientific theories—cannot currently be made available on the Semantic Web as (...) linked data, not even in principle. In this work, we are going to define FOOL (first-order ontology language), a new ontological language compatible with RDF, which allows the expression of any formula of a first-order language as a connected RDF graph. FOOL is as expressive as a first-order language, but unlike it, its statements do not have a serialized form. Instead, like a RDF statement, each statement of a FOOL knowledge base is a connected graph, and different statements link to each other through the meaningful nodes they share. In this way, the semantic relationships between statements are made explicit, and given FOOL’s compatibility with RDF, virtually the entire complex of our knowledge can in principle be made available on the Semantic Web as linked data. The semantic relationships made explicit by a FOOL ontology are not those of logical consequence, but they are meaning connections between statements represented as graphs. It is not far-fetched to think that, by devising appropriate measures of the linking patterns between statements, such relations can be mechanized, thus opening the way to new and possibly unforeseen results and applications. (shrink)

A first order representation (f.o.r.) in topology is an assignment of finitary relational structures of the same type to topological spaces in such a way that homeomorphic spaces get sent to isomorphic structures. We first define the notions "one f.o.r. is at least as expressive as another relative to a class of spaces" and "one class of spaces is definable in another relative to an f.o.r.", and prove some general statements. Following this we compare some well-known classes of spaces and (...) first order representations. A principal result is that if X and Y are two Tichonov spaces whose posets of zero-sets are elementarily equivalent then their respective rings of bounded continuous real-valued functions satisfy the same positive-universal sentences. The proof of this uses the technique of constructing ultraproducts as direct limits of products in a category theoretic setting. (shrink)

This paper extends a notion of local grammars in formal language theory to autosegmental representations, in order to develop a sufficiently expressive yet computationally restrictive theory of well-formedness in natural language tone patterns. More specifically, it shows how to define a class ASL\ of stringsets using local grammars over autosegmental representations and a mapping g from strings to autosegmental structures. It then defines a particular class ASL\ using autosegmental representations specific to tone and compares its expressivity to established formal language (...) grammars that have been successfully applied to other areas of phonology. (shrink)

The point of the present paper is to draw attention to some interesting similarities, as well as differences, between the approaches to the logic of noncontingency of Evgeni Zolin and of Claudio Pizzi. Though neither of them refers to the work of the other, each is concerned with the definability of a (normally behaving, though not in general truth-implying) notion of necessity in terms of noncontingency, standard boolean connectives and additional but non-modal expressive resources. The notion of definability involved is (...) different in the two cases (‘external’ for Zolin, ‘internal’ for Pizzi), as are the additional resources: infinitary conjunction in the case of Zolin, and for Pizzi, first, propositional quantification, and then, later, most ingeniously, the use of a propositional constant. As well as surveying and comparing of the work of these authors, the discussion includes some some novelties, such as the confirmation of a conjecture of Zolin’s (Theorem 2.7). (shrink)

The word _meṇḍaka_, a derivative of _meṇḍa_ (“ram”), is generally translated as “made of the ram” or “about the ram” or “horned.” However, in the Pāli _Milindapañha_ (_Questions of Milinda_), the word _meṇḍakapañha_, literally, a question about the ram, is also rendered as a logical conclusion that refutes an imaginary dilemma. Hence, in this treatise, the word _meṇḍaka_ is a special logical term which means an imaginary dilemma that can be logically refuted. This raises the question as to why the (...) word _meṇḍaka_ has come to be associated with this logical technique. To answer this question, this paper examines various aspects of the word and its possible connections to a dilemma and its refutation. The discussion ranges from the meaning of this word in a tale in the _Jātaka_ (Birth Stories), within the contextual usage in a _meṇḍaka_ question, to a relatively recent commentarial text (_aṭṭhakathā_) which gives a different perspective on the etymology of the word. The _Milindapañha_ is explicit in defining a _meṇḍaka_ question as knotty, hard to penetrate, and difficult to resolve, some of which an opponent puts forth to undermine certain aspects of the Buddhist system. However, the way certain _meṇḍaka_ questions are framed, though not directly stated, seem to utilize the principles of logic in a dilemmatic form of argument. With that, a _meṇḍaka_ question, at least in the _Milindapañha_, could also mean “a dilemmatic expression put forth by a challenger to undermine an opponent, but which can be logically refuted.”. (shrink)

People dedicate significant attention to others’ facial expressions and to deciphering their meaning. Hence, knowing whether such expressions are genuine or deliberate is important. Early research proposed that authenticity could be discerned based on reliable facial muscle activations unique to genuine emotional experiences that are impossible to produce voluntarily. With an increasing body of research, such claims may no longer hold up to empirical scrutiny. In this article, expression authenticity is considered within the context of senders’ ability to (...) produce convincing facial displays that resemble genuine affect and human decoders’ judgments of expression authenticity. This includes a discussion of spontaneous vs. posed expressions, as well as appearance- vs. elicitation-based approaches for defining emotion recognition accuracy. We further expand on the functional role of facial displays as neurophysiological states and communicative signals, thereby drawing upon theencoding-decodingandaffect-inductionperspectives of emotion expressions. Theoretical and methodological issues are addressed with the aim to instigate greater conceptual and operational clarity in future investigations of expression authenticity. (shrink)

We are all privy, or rather participants, in an unprecedented scientific and technological outbreak whose rules have been taken in even by cultures ideologically deviating from the standards of the West, even though this revolution started there. So, we cannot refer to a heterogeneity of cultures or to conflicts, whether constant, manifest or underlying, since the theoretical mind and its logical reasoning have been universally accepted. Είμαστε όλοι κοινωνοί ή μάλλον συμμέτοχοι, μιας άνευ προηγουμένου επιστημονικής και τεχνολογικής έκρηξης, η οποία, (...) παρόλο που ξεκίνησε από το περιβάλλον της σύγχρονης Δύσης, οι κανόνες της έχουν αφομοιωθεί ακόμη και από πολιτισμούς που ιδεολογικά, απέκλιναν ή/και αποκλίνουν από τα δυτικά πρότυπα. Δεν μπορούμε επομένως να μιλάμε για ανομοιομορφία πολιτισμών, συγκρούσεις, συνεχείς φανερές ή υπολανθάνουσες, δεδομένου ότι τα επίπεδα του θεωρητικού νου, όσον αφορά στη λογική ανάλυση, έχουν καταστεί οικουμενικά αποδεκτά. (shrink)

Though the use of the word “spirituality” abounds, the meaning can vary greatly. Three increasingly narrow categories seem to cover the essence of “spirituality” within American culture: general, Christian, and biblical. General spirituality is broad and all-inclusive. Christian spirituality introduces the necessity of Christ and the Holy Spirit, but has been undermined to a degree by the elevation of personal subjectivism. As a result the need has arisen for a third category. Biblical spirituality emphasizes the Bible as the basis for (...) shaping one's understanding of and experience with God, as well as determining what is and is not of the Spirit of God. The Bible is still relevant and should be the spiritual basis for determining what appropriate expressions of faith are, grounding spirituality in an objective standard. Biblical spirituality should be advocated today within the church in capturing the essence of New Testament spirituality. (shrink)

We are defined by our faces. They give identity but, equally importantly, reveal our moods and emotions through facial expression. So what happens when the face cannot move? This book is about people who live with Mbius Syndrome, which has as its main feature an absence of movement of the muscles of facial expression from birth.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental DisorderJukka Varelius (bio)Keywordsmental disorder, definition, psychological capacity for autonomy, Matthews, SavulescuI thank Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu for their thought-provoking comments. Unfortunately, I am not here able to discuss all the important points they raise, but must settle for briefly addressing their main criticisms of my view.Reply to MatthewsI believe that some arguments are rationally irresolvable, but (...) do not think that about all philosophical arguments. In terms of moral philosophical argumentation, though not only that, I share the rather common belief that we should proceed by seeking reflective equilibrium between requirements of logic, the best factual knowledge about ourselves and our environment, and our strongly held evaluative intuitions. (This is not to say that there would always be a clear distinction between facts and values.) By such intuitions I refer, for example, to the intuition that it is morally wrong to torture babies for fun. If we are considering whether it is morally permissible to act in a particular way and realize that acting in that way is in the morally relevant respects similar to torturing babies for fun, we conclude that it is not morally permissible to act in that way. That question is solved for persons who accept the moral intuition that it is wrong to torture babies for fun and wish to take facts and logic into account. This method is useful in the context of defining mental disorder, too.Although we have some strongly held intuitions as to what mental disorder is about, such as that person A is a paradigm case of a mentally disordered person, referring to them has not sufficed to solve the controversy concerning the demarcation of mental disorder. Therefore, I want to consider the possibility that referring also to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder could help us in solving it. At this stage of enquiry at least, I thus believe that the controversy is solvable, but only among persons who share certain points of departure. Accordingly, the "our" in expressions like 'our goals for demarcating mental disorder,' whose reference Matthews enquires about, refer to those who share the intuition that A is a paradigm example of a mentally disordered person, consider the demarcation goals significant, want to take [End Page 67] facts into account, and wish to make logically valid inferences.If one cares about the other things but does not want to consider A's case, one can focus on some other case of a person whose psychological capacity for autonomy is diminished. (Unless, of course, one thinks that no such persons exist and all whom we believe to lack psychological capacity for autonomy are really playacting, malingering, etc.) I, however, now continue with A's case. We have, ex hypothesi, sufficient reason to believe that A lacks not merely relevant information, but also the psychological capacity that understanding it and making use of it in assessing her beliefs and desires presupposes. If someone who knows this about A still insists that A is in perfect mental health and wants, say, to treat her as an object of entertainment in a human zoo, my argument is unlikely to reach him. But who is he to say that we should not care about A's loss of capacity for autonomy and the misfortunes it involves?And of course, also rationally establishing that a person who lacks such capacity is mentally healthy or that the controversy on the nature of mental disorder is not rationally resolvable presupposes that the discussants share some points of departure, including evaluative intuitions. Instead of the intuitions that to be ill is essentially to suffer harm, that behavior governed by one's feelings is always autonomous, and so on, that Matthews refers to, proponents of such views are, however, well advised to resort to less obscure and less controversial intuitions. What, for example, is meant by 'harm'? Is a person who is so overwhelmed by emotions that she is unable to think clearly always autonomous with respect to the actions she performs while in that state? If one takes that all intuitions are useless... (shrink)

Actions expressing strong emotions such as anger can be appropriate responses when an agent judges a serious injustice to have been committed. Certainly, a woman can experience these conditions and express herself through actions such as gesturing aggressively, gritting her teeth, or lashing out verbally. If she is consequently labeled “crazy,” “hysterical,” or “a bitch,” what has gone awry? This paper offers an analysis of the common charge of inappropriateness in the case of women’s actions expressing emotion. To begin, I (...) will present core normative distinctions that define appropriate emotional expression. Following this, the “double-bind” of women’s actions expressing emotion will be explored with reference to the conflicting normative practices outlined in the first section of the paper. Put briefly, when a female agent surpasses gendered behavioral expectations, she is seen as having failed what can be called the first test of social coping. The perception of this failure shuts down further avenues for interpreting her behavior. Instead, the social inappropriateness of her emotion is used as further proof of irrationality. The arguments of the second section leave no doubt that gendered norms in the case of actions expressing emotions must be rejected both on epistemological and moral grounds. The final section of the paper explores epistemically and ethically viable alternatives for deciding the rational appropriateness of actions expressing emotion. (shrink)

Natural language provides motivation for studying modal backwards-looking operators such as “now”, “then” and “actually” that evaluate their argument formula at some previously considered point instead of the current one. This paper investigates the expressive power over models of both propositional and first-order basic modal language enriched with such operators. Having defined an appropriate notion of bisimulation for first-order modal logic, I show that backwards-looking operators increase its expressive power quite mildly, contrary to beliefs widespread among philosophers of language (...) and formal semanticists. That in turn presents a strong argument for the use of operator-based systems in the semantics of natural language, instead of systems with explicit quantification over worlds and times that have become a de-facto standard for such applications. The popularity of such explicit-quantification systems is shown to be based on the misinterpretation of a claim by Cresswell, which led many philosophers and linguists to assume that introducing “now” and “then” is expressively equivalent to explicitly quantifying over worlds and times. (shrink)

This paper criticizes contemporary relativist scepticism concerning the universal validity of the concepts ‘art’ and the ‘aesthetic’. As an alternative, it offers a normative definition of art based on intrinsic aesthetic meaning contextualized by innovation and refinement in the diachronic history of art media. In section I, anti-foundationalist relativism, and softer versions (found in the Institutional definitions of art) are expounded in relation to art and the aesthetic. In section II, it is argued that antifoundationalism is conceptually flawed and tacitly (...) racist, and is, in effect, a cultural expression of global consumerism. Section III analyses the scope of the aesthetic in non-western contexts, and then offers a critique of the Institutional definitions as also being conceptually flawed, tacitly racist, and consumerist in orientation. In section IV the positive basis of a normative definition of art is outlined in detail and defended at length against possible relativist objections. It is finally argued that the normative approach taken in this paper shows how cultural conservatism can be a left-wing project. (shrink)

We study definability in terms of monotone generalized quantifiers satisfying Isomorphism Closure, Conservativity and Extension. Among the quantifiers with the latter three properties - here called CE quantifiers - one finds the interpretations of determiner phrases in natural languages. The property of monotonicity is also linguistically ubiquitous, though some determiners like an even number of are highly non-monotone. They are nevertheless definable in terms of monotone CE quantifiers: we give a necessary and sufficient condition for such definability. We further identify (...) a stronger form of monotonicity, called smoothness, which also has linguistic relevance, and we extend our considerations to smooth quantifiers. The results lead us to propose two tentative universals concerning monotonicity and natural language quantification. The notions involved as well as our proofs are presented using a graphical representation of quantifiers in the so-called number triangle. (shrink)

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not only do both concepts (...) grow out of the same problem set, but they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919. (shrink)

Societies have always used their heritage to remain resilient and to express their cultural identities. Today, all the still-available experiences accrued by human societies over time and across space are, in principle, essential in coping with the twenty-first century grand challenges of humanity. Artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms can assist the next generation of historians, heritage stakeholders, and decision-makers in decoding unstructured knowledge and wisdom embedded in selected cultural artefacts and social rituals, encoding data in machine-readable systems, aggregating information (...) according to the user’s needs in real time, and simulating the consequences of either erasing, neglecting, putting in latency, or preserving and sharing specific human experiences. What our global society needs is a multilingual and transcultural approach to decode-encode the treasure of human experience and transmit it to the next generation of world citizens. This approach can be the pathway to work on a new science of heritage, its ethics, and empathy. (shrink)

BackgroundStudies have shown that research participants fail to appreciate the difference between research and medical care, labeling such phenomenon as a "therapeutic misconception" (TM). Since research activity involving human participants is increasing in the Middle East, qualitative research investigating aspects of TM is warranted. Our objective was to assess for the existence of therapeutic misconception amongst Egyptians.MethodsStudy Tool: We developed a semi-structured interview guide to elicit the knowledge, attitudes, and perspectives of Egyptians regarding medical research.Setting: We recruited individuals from the (...) outpatient settings (public and private) at Ain Shams University in Cairo, Egypt.Analysis: Interviews were taped, transcribed, and translated. We analyzed the content of the transcribed text to identify the presence of a TM, defined in one of two ways: TM1 = inaccurate beliefs about how individualized care can be compromised by the procedures in the research and TM2 = inaccurate appraisal of benefit obtained from the research study.ResultsOur findings showed that a majority of participants (11/15) expressed inaccurate beliefs regarding the degree with which individualized care will be maintained in the research setting (TM1) and a smaller number of participants (5/15) manifested an unreasonable belief in the likelihood of benefits to be obtained from a research study (TM2). A total of 12 of the 15 participants were judged to have expressed a TM on either one of these bases.ConclusionThe presence of TM is not uncommon amongst Egyptian individuals. We recommend further qualitative studies investigating aspects of TM involving a larger sample size distinguished by different types of illnesses and socio-economic variables, as well as those who have and have not participated in clinical research. (shrink)

Probably no one has done more than Frankena to bring about the recent shift in philosophical interest from the primarily linguistic concerns of metaethics to what he calls “meta-morals,” that is, to questions about morality as a whole. Instead of investigating what so-called ethical terms stood for, or whether ethical utterances employed propositions or proposals or imperatives or whether they expressed feelings, beliefs, descriptions or prescriptions, or whether they conformed to ordinary propositional logic or to an imperatival or some other (...) logic of their own, Frankena set out to investigate the moral enterprise itself. Quite recently he put together the results of these reflections in two series of lectures, “Three Questions About Morality” and Thinking About Morality. My own views had always been very close to his, but these recent lectures, which for the first time put his thoughts on this topic together in a systematic way, have made clear to me that, while the starting point of our investigations is indeed the same, our conclusions diverge on a number of important points. I want to take up some of the problems to which we offer different solutions. (shrink)

The notion of conceptual normativity is grounded on the idea that our conceptual contents are established by the norms of the discursive social practices we engage in. This idea involves two major problems. First, where do the norms of discursive practices come from and how can the contents that they establish be objective? Second, what is the role of the vocabulary that we use to express such norms as explicit rules? This article draws the outline of an account that could (...) possibly answer both questions. First, it explores the viability of a naturalism about conceptual normativity. Second, it defines the characters of a rational expressivist analysis of the language of the rules. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman equates expression with metaphorical exemplification. That is, a character C in a symbol system expresses a property P if three conditions are fulfilled: C has P ; C exemplifies P ; and C has P metaphorically. Two points are emphasized. The first point is that a character actually is what it metaphorically is: sad music really is sad, really does express sadness, just as loud music really is loud. The decision to apply to works of art language that (...) is literally applicable only to persons is arbitrary, in that no reason can be given for it other than its felt aptness; but, once the decision to use the terminology has been made, decisions about which terms are applicable to which works are no more arbitrary than any other decisions about the applications of terms. The second point is that there is no intimate connection between the concept of expression as thus defined and the concepts of emotion or feeling. The latter merely furnish one common set of metaphors. (shrink)

We introduce CE- cell decomposition , a modified version of the usual o-minimal cell decomposition. We show that if an o-minimal structure $\mathcal{R}$ admits CE-cell decomposition then any definable open set in $\mathcal{R}$ may be expressed as a finite union of definable open cells. The dense linear ordering and linear o-minimal expansions of ordered abelian groups are examples of such structures.

It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework (...) the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege’s atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form—in particular, by their form of predication. (shrink)

This article aims to shed some light on the concepts embedded in the expressions ‘services of general interest’ (‘SGI’), ‘services of general economic interest’ (‘SGEI’), ‘non-economic services of general interest’ (‘NSGI’) and ‘social services of general interest’ (‘SSGI’). It is submitted that the expression ‘SGI’ conveys a general concept which comprises both SGEI and NSGI. SGEI may be distinguished from NSGI in that only the former involve an economic activity. In contrast to SGI, SGEI and NSGI, the expression ‘SSGI’ (...) is nowhere to be found in primary EU law. This means that it is for the EU legislator and, as the case may be, for the Member States to define such expression. Furthermore, this article supports the contention that a definition of the principles and conditions underpinning the operation of SGI must be capable of adapting to changing times and social perceptions, whilst being respectful of the vertical and horizontal allocation of powers set out in the Treaties. Vertically, a definition of SGI must not impinge upon the powers retained by the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation, it is for the Member States to define the services they consider to be of general interest, unless they commit a manifest error of assessment. In the presence of EU harmonising measures, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States is, if still existent, narrowed down, given that national authorities are required to comply with the objectives pursued by the EU legislator. Horizontally, a definition of SGI must not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Commission in the realm of competition law. Moreover, in light of Article 9 TFEU and secondary EU legislation, the specific features of SSGI must be taken into consideration when determining the compatibility with EU State aid rules of public service compensation awarded to the providers of those services. An EU conceptual framework for the SGI must thus be the result of a constructive dialogue between the different levels of governance, as well as of a balanced solution among different policy areas in relation to which the EU enjoys competences. (shrink)

Linked with existence of the almighty, the operation of division by zero which is considered as undefined or indeterminate or infinite sometimes, has been a topic of serious altercation among mathematicians and philosophers for so long. History is evident of the various attempts made to clearly define the algebra of zero, including the idea of division by zero. This includes the evolution of the idea of zero division and various insights from mathematicians like Euler, Craig and more. The realm of (...) the paper contains all such significant attempts and it deals with the idea of the history that wishes to explore the evolution of infinity and undefined. The prime aim of this paper is to clearly distinguish the three concepts of Undefined, Indeterminate and Infinity, along with the concept of division by zero. It strives to provide a notation to undefined expressions, along with citing justifications and results with the help of unpretentious examples from key branches. (shrink)

Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion (...) of bisimulation is required that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models, two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling. (shrink)