This chapter contains sections titled: References.

The first part of the article (§§ 1-3) illustrates the critical relation the authors establish with the leading figures of philosophical anthropology in terms of their engagement with “world-openness” (Weltoffenheit). This notion cannot be reduced to the objectivity that confronts man as a spiritual being, as in Max Scheler, but rather makes it possible to grasp the limits of distancing objectification; in Arnold Gehlen, the coercion to action derived from the indeterminacy of man’s relation with the world is not sufficient (...) to comprehend the role of culture for the constitution of the human animal itself; and with the biological means utilized by Helmuth Plessner it is not possible to account entirely for the human capacity to establish relations by means of society. Historical anthropology, as the second part (§§ 4-5) of the article shows, aims to respond to such deficiencies by bringing to light the numerous historical and cultural forms of openness to a plurality of worlds. Freeing itself of any abstract and binding anthropological norm that claims to define the essence of man, historical anthropology investigates human structures and phenomena through a series of transdisciplinary studies centering on themes such as the body, ritual, mimesis and the performative dimension in its entirety, performance and performativity. (shrink)

St. Mark's National Theological Centre, Charles Sturt University/Philosophy Dept, Faculties, ANU.

In the unpublished manuscript of a lecture course probably given by Foucault at the École normale supérieure of Paris in 1954–5 (‘On Anthropology’; the dating is still uncertain), Foucault undertakes an erudite and detailed reconstruction of the history of anthropological knowledge, from modernity (Descartes and Malebranche) to 20th-century Nietzschean commentaries (Jaspers and Heidegger), including analyses by Kant, Feuerbach, and Dilthey, among others. My article explores this lecture course to emphasize the importance of anthropological criticism for the young Foucault, addressing in (...) particular the anti-anthropological significance of the encounter with Nietzsche’s philosophy, which becomes an output power ( puissance de sortie) both of the figure of man and the notion of truth in which he was involved. These unpublished manuscripts will therefore allow me to find a common thread in Foucault’s work in the 1950s and 1960s (and even beyond): the exploration of new potentialities for thought opened by ‘the death of man’. (shrink)

This paper states that as there is the “death of God” (Nietzsche), there is also the "death of man" (Foucault). The first will be interpreted either as the truth of the God who dies (theologies of the death of God), or as the death of the principle (Heidegger), or as the death of the living God and of his resurrection power (Nietzsche's true interpretation). The second one can certainly consecrate the human as an “fabricated problem” (...) (Foucault), but even more this way can open up the new power relationship of the Übermensch. Therefore, after the fold of the "forces of finitude" comes the fold of the "new creative infinity" (Deleuze). It is in this way, and only by thinking about “the thread of the body”, that we will perhaps move away from the death of man (Foucault) and the death of God (Nietzsche). Going down to Freud’s “es”, but also reaching Nietzsche’s “Self” will be the condition to echo the power of the Übermensch and of the " Über God". Man does not only stand on the “back of the es” like the rider on his horse (Freud), but also on the “back of the Self” like the “back of the tiger” that cannot be tamed (Nietzsche). (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein is often held co-responsible for the so-called death of man as it was pronounced in the course of the previous century, no detailed description of his alternative to the traditional or Cartesian account of human being has so far been available. By consulting several parts of Wittgenstein's later oeuvre, Subjectivity after Wittgenstein aims to fill this gap. However, it also contributes to the debate about the Cartesian subject and its demise by discussing the criticism that the rethinking (...) of subjectivity received, for it has been argued that the anti-Cartesian turn in continental philosophy has lead to a loss of a centre for both ethics and politics. By further exploring the implications of the Wittgensteinian account of human being, this book makes it clear that a non-Cartesian view on the subject is not necessarily ethically and politically inert. Moreover, it argues that ethical and political arguments should not automatically take precedence in a debate about the nature of man. (shrink)

This paper is a philosophical inquiry about the state of man during the pandemic. By philosophy, I mean a rational investigation of profound and critical questions that seeks to address fundamental issues pertaining to the meaning of life. This study attempts to understand how the sovereign rule of the state is controlling the population in the midst of the coronavirus crisis. It argues that political power, through fear, has isolated human beings away from each other in the name of public (...) health protocols. State power plays on the vulnerabilities of the people to take advantage of the situation. The state apparatus is exercising full and unprecedented disciplinary measures as an extreme form of bio-power purportedly meant to mitigate the crisis. However, what is not seen is the reality that unjust structures and the unequal situations of individuals in human society have resulted to more hardships on the part of the poor, thereby diminishing their sense of self-worth. The most profound question when it comes to the pandemic, this paper argues, is existential – the reality of death. (shrink)

This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of philosophy, (...) nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning and the separation from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body and his relation with the soul – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible. (shrink)

In the article, I try to emphasize that our way of using language affects moral decisions and attitudes. As we think as we speak and simultaneously, we act. By using chauvinistic language, first of all, we simplify our reality; secondly, we push those beings that we define in the language to the margins. I think that our language is homocentric and therefore leads us to speciesism.

This last work by Paul de Man before his death in 1983 brings together what is essentially his complete work on the study of European Romanticism and post-Romanticism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Death of Osiris in Aeneid 12.458Joseph D. ReedAs aeneas ranges the battlefield in search of Turnus and the Aeneid storms toward its close, an odd note sounds. A Trojan named Thymbraeus slays a Rutulian named Osiris. Neither is mentioned before or again. Even when one considers the diversity in this poem of names of Italian warriors, which Virgil takes not just from Italian traditions but from all (...) over the Mediterranean world,1 Osiris is surprising. Why does the name of an Egyptian god intrude into a primeval scene of Roman origins? The reader cannot ignore this provocation, especially on recollecting the rich patterns of meaning that such a contemporary of Virgil as Tibullus works into his elegy on Messalla’s birthday through an invocation of Osiris.2 So unexpected is the name that Bergk emended Osirim to Osinim, recalling the Italian king Osinius mentioned at 10.655.3 But emendation is misguided: as this paper will argue, the suggestiveness of the name is satisfied on the levels of history, ideology, religion, and literary influence, all major domains of Virgil’s epic. And the slaying of Osiris by Thymbraeus can be shown to emblematize both the whole mission of Aeneas and the achievement of Augustus.Aeneas, cured of the wound on his thigh, arms himself and, with some final words of instruction to his son, goes into battle seeking Turnus. In a memorable simile, he is compared to a storm that brings horror to farmers and ruin to their crops. His example rouses his fellow Trojans against the Italians: ferit ense gravem Thymbraeus Osirim, Arcetium Mnestheus, Epulonem obtruncat Achates Ufentemque Gyas; cadit ipse Tolumnius augur, primus in adversos telum qui torserat hostis.(12.458–61)[End Page 399]With his sword Thymbraeus smites the gravem Osiris. The adjective is equivalent to fortis, according to Servius Auctus; Forbiger prefers a denotation of towering size, comparing gravis as epithet of the boxer Entellus at 5.437 and 447.4 “Massive” might capture the sense in English. The effect here is to highlight Thymbraeus’ prowess. Like Osiris, two of the other Italian victims, Arcetius and Epulo, are unknown except for this passage. (The important Ufens received six lines at 7.744–49, in the catalogue of Latin allies,5 and Tolumnius, as line 461 reminds us, began this phase of the battle at 12.257–67.)6 But both their names etiologize some ancestral Italic or Roman institution: Epulo suggests a prototype of the college of epulones, priests of Jupiter Epulo;7 Arcetius invites a connection with the Italian gens Arquitia.8 In this they are like their enemy Mnestheus, supposed eponym of the gens Memmia (5.117). Osiris stands alone among his compatriots in his nomenclatural irrelevance to anything Roman. But Thymbraeus shares the isolation of his victim: he is the only one of the Trojans here who is mentioned nowhere else; not only that, but Mnestheus, Achates, and Gyas are indeed famous, leaders of the Trojans throughout the poem, receiving notice during the introductory storm scene in book 1, the departure from Carthage in book 4, the games in honor of Anchises in book 5, and elsewhere. The catalogue here is introduced by a pair of unknown warriors.The two belong together and give each other meaning. If the name of Osiris applied to a follower of Turnus reduces the critic to perplexity and silence, we can approach its significance through that of the name of Thymbraeus, which has obvious relevance to the whole drift of the epic. Thymbraeus reprises a Thymbraeus killed by Diomedes in Iliad 11.320–21, also mentioned only once. Virgil has revived the obscure Trojan, as it were, to permit him the victory at last; the fact that each Thymbraeus is hapax legomenos in his epic reinforces the reference, especially for such learned readers as Virgil himself was and expected in [End Page 400] his audience.9 The name itself, “the Thymbraean man,” comes from the town Thymbra near Troy (first attested in Il. 10.430),10 and so unmistakably marks the first warrior in Virgil’s catalogue as a representative survivor of the fallen city. In fact, the mythological tradition preserves... (shrink)

Introduction: The man who drank the hemlock -- Socrates' philosophy -- Politics and society -- Plato and others : who created the death of Socrates? -- 'A Greek chatterbox' : the death of Socrates in the Roman Empire -- Pain and revelation : the death of Socrates and the death of Jesus -- The apotheosis of philosophy : from enlightenment to revolution -- Talk, truth, totalitarianism : the problem of Socrates in modern times.

Derrida insists that any effort to think theological–political power “in its possibility” must begin with the death penalty. In this paper, I revisit the death of Moses Paul, “an Indian,” executed in New Haven in 1772 for the murder of Moses Cook, a white man. The Mohegan minister Samson Occom delivered Paul’s execution sermon and accompanied him to the gallows. Revised, Occom’s sermon was one of the first works published by a Native American author in English. Occom suggests (...) there can be a theological–political power that signals itself not by decreeing the death penalty, but by opposing it. Hence sovereignty can be thought, with and against Derrida, as the theologico-political power to restore life. By opposing death to grace, moreover, Occom achieves a division of sovereignties, creating an opening for Indigenous nations within the scaffolding of the settler state. Working in collaboration, then, Occom and Paul produce a political theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 379 the minister of a very influential and liberal congregation. In 1860 he began publication in Cincinnati of The Dial, successor to the New England transcendentalist journal, and used its pages to promote religious liberalism, philosophical transcendentalism, and social reform. In 1863 he went to London where he became the head of the Ethical Society. Under the influence of Feuerbach and "left-Hegelians" he travelled widely in the (...) interests of "free thought." The most amazing of these four, however, is August Willich: an East Prussian soldier, ready to fight again to restore the 1848 revolution in Germany, discouraged by Marx from doing so, emigrating to Cincinnati to raise funds among the German 1848 refugees there and urging them to continue the lost cause in Germany, then wholeheartedly fighting for the Union Cause as a General in the Civil War, and finally joining the Populist revolt. As Easton points out, these four all illustrate the close relation between Hegel and the spirit of 1848. In addition to the stories of these men and their ideals, the volume contains a hundred pages of excellent specimens of their writngs, and copious references to obscure source-materials. The book is both a valuable reference work and an entertaining set of short stories. I--IERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, CaliJornia Theory of. Man. By Francisco Romero. Translated from the Spanish by William F. Cooper, with an Introduction by William J. Kflgore. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xxix + 324. $8.00.) The late Argentinian philosopher Francisco Romero, who died unexpectedly in 1962 after a brilliant career of more than thirty years of teaching and writing, was by common acclaim of his fellow-philosophers in Latin America their most distinguished philosopher in recent years. He received many honors and distinctions both at home and abroad, including the grand award of honor of the Argentinian Society of Writers. The most eminent philosophers in Latin American prepared a notable Festschri]t in honor of his 70th birthday, whose publication was unfortunately delayed and, therefore, could not be presented to him personally in his life time.1 Franci~o Romero was in fact as well as in acclaim the "Dean of Latin American Philosophy." It was high time that his central work Teorga del Hombre 2 should be translated. It is his magnum opus and represents the most comprehensive and systematic development of his philosophy. Romero was fortunate in having as his translator William F. Cooper who knew Romero personally, and was intimately acquainted with his philosophy. In addition, he had the unusual privilege of doing much of the translation in Romero's own library in Buenos Aires. In short, the translation is a labor of love and esteem.8 I myself had the privilege of coming to know Professor Romero in 1943, when as secretarygeneral of our Philosophical Association I was commissioned to make contact with our Latin American fellow-philosophers with a view to exploring the possibility of organizing InterAmerican congresses of philosophy and of forming an Inter-American society of philosophy, both of which projects, in due season, were accomplished. Romero welcomed these undertakings with characteristic enthusiasm and offered his fullest cooperation and support. He had always been a most active and indefatigable promoter of better understanding between North and South America and, especially, of closer cooperation between the philosophers of 1Homenaje a Francisco Romero, Faculdad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Editorial Losada, Buenos Aires, 1952. 8In further attestation of Professor Cooper's special qualification for this translation it should be mentioned that he prepared for the Homenaje, already referred to, the most complete, up-to-date bibliography of Romero's extensive publications as well as an inventory of Romero's many works still in progress at the time of his death. 380 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the two Americas. All members of our association who came to know him in Buenos Aires were warmly welcomed, and no doubt also experienced, as I did, the warm and generous hospitality of Professor Romero and his wife in their home in Martinez. Francisco Romero was not only professor of philosophy at the Universities of Buenos Aires and La Plato, but was also... (shrink)

"Towards the Death of Humanity" is the endless demonstration of the disastrous side effects left on our environment, on life on this planet, on health and most of all on human dehumanization by a century of tremendous scientific and technological realizations and their material values. It illustrates how these unhealthy side effects are highly linked to the hasty and thoughtless decisions of scientists, intellectuals and governments to replace the humanities and the traditional methods of teaching with their own methods (...) of science, technology and their essentially material values. Unfortunately totally deprived of the smallest bit of humanity, this method of education has killed the rudiments of humanity acquired during the course of history, has dehumanized the people, their institutions and their societies. These side effects originate in the age-old desire of intellectuals and scientists to take hold of the power of religion over man and to satisfy their morbid need to build a new world, re-designed following Hegel' belief that the matter is eternal and God. Although these ideologies have lost all their legitimacy today because science has recently demonstrated that the matter is not eternal, scientists and intellectuals keep on teaching the falseness of their materialistic social system as if the logic of their reasoning were the only truth. This work promotes certain guidelines that individuals must follow to make the lucid and effective compromises needed to try and solve these destructive problems affecting man and society before the end of History. (shrink)

In The Christian Idea of Man Josef Pieper brings off an extraordinary feat. He acknowledges that whoever introduces the theme of "virtue" and "the virtues" can expect to be met with a smile - of various shades of condescension. He then proceeds to single out "prudence" as the fundamental virtue on which the other cardinal virtues are based. In defining it, he does away with the shallow connotations which have debased it in modern times. Similarly, he manages to divest it (...) of all traces of "moralism," which, to a large extent has become identified with the Christian idea of virtue and has made it fall into general disrepute. For Pieper, prudence is fundamentally based on a clear perception of reality - of things as they are - and the prudent person is the one who acts in accordance with this perception. It has nothing to do with knowing how to avoid decisions which might be to one's disadvantage. Similarly, justice, which is based on prudence, involves acting toward other persons according to one's perception of the truth of the circumstances - again, a perception of things "as they are." This is not a reference to any "status quo," but to the reality as constituted by the Creator. In referring to courage [fortitude], Pieper discusses the overcoming of fear. This does not imply having no fear but, precisely, overcoming it. With regard to the fundamental fear of death, Pieper rejects the approaches which contend that there is nothing to fear in death. On the contrary, there is everything to fear in death: it concerns the question of possible absolute annihilation! Here Pieper introduces the consideration of the "theological" virtues of faith, hope, and love [charity]. When confronted with the question of possible annihilation, the Christian's faith is paramount. Belief in God lets him confront danger and overcome even the most radical fear - through hope in God. His love of God does not wipe out fear but gives him courage. Moderation is seen as the last in the hierarchy of the cardinal virtues. Through its manifestation, in recent Christian thinking, with chastity and abstinence, it became in the Christian mind the most prominent characteristic of the Christian idea of man and one that dominated everything else. It has been reduced to the status of the most private of the virtues and is combined with a moralistic conception of the good. Pieper's analysis of moderation shows how this virtue needs to be rethought, although, even then, it will remain the last in the hierarchy of virtues. (shrink)

Bataille published two monographs on painting in 1955: one on Lascaux, the other on Manet. The text on Lascaux bears the subtitle The Birth of Art, and it would be natural to think that, as Steven Ungar suggests, Manet represented for Bataille “the birth of a modernist painting.” No doubt Manet’s importance comes from the fact that he, more than any of his contemporaries, was the first to break decidedly with traditional painting and thus inaugurated a new era of art. (...) And yet, why this singular interest in Manet? Is this “birth” of modern painting anything comparable to that other birth which is the birth of art itself? At Lascaux, art coincides with the birth of man—of Homo sapiens—in that it is man coming to have consciousness of himself. This birth of art, as Blanchot says, is a “perpetual birth,” a birth in which “art is revealed to be such that it can change infinitely and can ceaselessly renew itself, but cannot improve.” Why, then, is this other birth at the other end of history? Is it simply a rebirth of art in the sense of a constant renewal of its own possibilities? What importance does modern art have in the history of Western painting? (shrink)

The account of the death of Patroklos occupies a strategic position in the narrative economy of the Iliad: before this event, Achilles has withdrawn from combat out of indignation against Agamemnon; afterwards, his anger turns against Hector, whom he holds responsible for his friend's death. Achilles returns to battle and kills Hector in an act of vengeance that, as we have known from the beginning of the poem, will lead to his own demise, which is not actually recounted (...) in the Iliad. This episode stands out because it is atypical both in the contents of the narration and in the means of expression used (what are generally termed “formulas”). I will give some examples of these oddities and then propose an interpretation. Here is the text, in the translation by Richmond Lattimore:So long as the sun was climbing still to the middle heaven, so long the thrown weapons of both took hold, and men dropped under them; but when the sun had gone to the time for unyoking of cattle, then beyond their very destiny the Achaians were stronger and dragged the hero Kebriones from under the weapons and the clamour of the Trojans, and stripped the armour from his shoulders. And Patroklos charged with evil intention in on the Trojans. Three times he charged in with the force of the running war god, screaming a terrible cry, and three times he cut down nine men; but as for the fourth time he swept in, like something greater than human, there, Patroklos, the end of your life was shown forth, since Phoibos came against you there in the strong encounter dangerously, nor did Patroklos see him as he moved through the battle, and shrouded in a deep mist came in against him and stood behind him, and struck his back and his broad shoulders with a flat stroke of the hand so that his eyes spun. Phoibos Apollo now struck away from his head the helmet four-horned and hollow-eyed, and under the feet of the horses it rolled clattering, and the plumes above it were defiled by blood and dust. Before this time it had not been permitted to defile in the dust this great helmet crested in horse-hair; rather it guarded the hear and the gracious brow a godlike man, Achilleus; but now Zeus gave it over to Hektor to wear on his head, Hektor whose own death was close to him. And in his hands was splintered all the huge, great, heavy, iron-shod, far-shadowing spear, and away from his shoulders dropped to the ground the shield with its shield sling and its tassels. The lord Apollo, son of Zeus, broke the corselet upon him. Disaster caught his wits, and his shining body went nerveless. He stood stupidly, and from close behind his back a Dardanian man hit him between the shoulders with a sharp javelin: Euphorbos, son of Pantho(s, who surpassed all men of his own age with the throwing spear, and in horsemanship and the speed of his feet. He had already brought down twenty men from their horses since first coming, with his chariot and his learning in warfare. He first hit you with a thrown spear, o rider Patroklos, nor broke you, but ran away again, snatching out the ash spear from your body, and lost himself in the crowd, not enduring to face Patroklos, naked as he was, in close combat. (shrink)

orbit and far beyond it. Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant critical re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and so called "method" in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflec tion in which all the above-mentioned work has either its (...) core or its source. In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least a satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl, through his already systematised and "authorized" work, and his courses, and later on in his spontaneous reflection (which did not find its way into a definitive corpus but was nevertheless sufficiently coherent with his previously established body of thought to be considered a continuation of it), uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts by philosophers (e. g., Merleau-Ponty, who drew upon this material and found there his own inspiration) who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the youngergenerationofphilosophers today. (shrink)

I suspect that my idea of what it would be like to take a course given by William Barrett is fairly accurate. The flyleaf of his new book reports that Barrett, now Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Pace University, received the Great Teacher Award at New York University. That note and a reading of Barrett's books, the classic Irrational Man, The Illusion of Technique, The Truants, and especially Death of the Soul, lead me to suspect that in the classroom (...) Barrett is as marvelous a communicator as he is on the written page. (shrink)

Chapter One THE MAN-APES A Lesson for Thomas Hobbes Probably the most exciting development in modern anthropology is the discovery of the australopithecines ...

The study began with an introduction to Philosophy of Man. This Philosophical-Christological approach started with sense of self-awareness on this seemingly vain technological modern world. In the history of philosophy, there were three objects of study evolving by themselves, world, man and God in orderly fashion and repeating in interval phases. Self-experience shows three objects: first, existential unity (past), second, experiential unity (present) and third, transcendental unity (future). Western Philosophy banked on Aristotle’s notion of man as rational animal that led (...) to Dualism turned into Monism and finally into Pluralism making it harder to capsulate man’s unity. Thus, the universal question “what is man?” including his end remains unanswered. The problem with Western-Aristotelian Thought was its dependence on rationality as ultimate and highest faculty of man. The Greeks believed in immortality of soul but contradicted reality that human mind has no power over death (mortality). Faith transcends mortal-natural state of man however not in proud and arrogant manner but in utter surrender and subjection (Paschal). Faith turns truth from objective to personal. God’s and man’s identity was both revealed. Man as God’s image becomes definite in the revelation about Christ, the Son of God - the Perfect Man Eph. 4.13. KEYWORDS: Philosophy, Christ, Perfect Man, Philosophical-Christological approach,Christian anthropology, Qualitative Research Design, Philippines. (shrink)

The beliefs of ancient Mesopotamia included many important topics, which looked into the secret of man’s existence, life, and well-being, and the matter went beyond that when he beliefs with his death or the cessation of his life, so the idea of death for him was mysterious, frightening, or chilling the soul, and surrounded by the unknown. So the study of death and life is one of the topics, which draws knowledge of the emotional state towards knowing (...) mortality and how to deal with it, especially, when the people of Mesopotamia thought about, all this leading us to a better understanding of death. The people of Mesopotamia did not doubt about the inevitability of death for man, and made immortality the share of the gods, but Mesopotamian mythological thought leads us to differentiate between the death of gods and the death of humans. Through literary texts we know that the death of gods means disappearing and then appearing or returning again. It also means changing from one state to another as a result of an act that was not death in the true sense, but rather it is their transformation from one state to another. Or they took the permanent form or nature consecrated to them after they were killed, or the final stable form whose accompanying entity was known. (shrink)

In Epiphany Term, 1942, C.S. Lewis delivered the Riddell Memorial Lectures in the Physics Lecture Theatre, King's College, Newcastle, which was then a constituent college of the University of Durham. The Riddell Memorial Lectures were founded in 1928 in memory of Sir John Buchanan Riddell of Hepple, onetime High Sheriff of Northumberland, who had died in 1924. His son, Sir Walter, was, like his father, a devout Christian, active throughout his life in public affairs. He was Fellow, and subsequently Principal, (...) of Hertford College, Oxford, and Secretary, and subsequently Chairman, of the University Grants Committee---at a time when the interventions of the UGC in academic affairs were entirely benign. I myself have a special personal interest in the founder of the Riddell Lectures. Sir Walter and my father were contemporaries at Oxford and close friends. Owing to his untimely death I never knew him, though I am credibly assured that he must have viewed me when I was taken to Hepple in a Moses' basket at the age of six months. In being invited to give this lecture on the Riddell Lectures, I am not only honoured but enabled to discharge a debt of family.. (shrink)

The place (or absence) of God in Nietzsche's thought remains central and controversial. Nietzsche's proclamation of 'the death of God' is one of the most famous (and parodied) slogans in modern philosophy, seeming to encapsulate the nineteenth-century loss of religious faith in the affirmation that God has "turned out to be our oldest lie" and yet the nature of Nietzsche's own 'theology' is far from clear. This volume engages with Nietzsche's arguments about God, theology, and religion. The volume extends (...) the discussion to an engagement of Nietzsche with alternative models of God, with ancient Greek religions, and with discussions of diversity (race, class, gender, sex) in dis/conjunction with religion. The chapters examine Nietzsche's genealogy of religion and his claims about the place of God and theology in the history of Western thought ("that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato's faith"), as well as his engagements with alternative conceptions of God. The volume also examines the historical and contemporary reception of Nietzsche's arguments about God by religious and non-religious thinkers, asking to what extent Nietzsche's philosophy of God speaks to the challenges of today's globalized philosophy and religion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HAPPINESS: THE NATURAL END OF MAN? KEVIN M. STALEY St. Anslem Oollege Manchester, New Hampshire I AONG THE QUESTIONS the philosopher considers, none perhaps ris more important than that of ' the good life.' This question looks for the distinguishing marks of a. life which is fully human and which constitutes the actualization of one's uniquely human potential. For the ancient philosophers, such a life was considered the highest (...) good that one could achieve, the end and the raison d' etre of one's activity. This end was known as happiness. As a Christian theologian well versed in the writings of the ancients, Thomas Aquinas also had occasion to reflect on the nature of happiness. His inquiry possessed a dimension which was completely lacking to the ancients, namely, the belief that man is destined to enjoy the ' face to face ' vision of God. Thomas left no doubt that this, man's most ultimate end, was to be possessed after death through the gifts of grace. On the other hand, in his Sententia Libri Ethicorum he gives Aristotle his due, commenting with approval on many 0£ Aristotle's conclusions. In his discussion of happiness in the Summa Theo~ logiae, one can also find the Philosopher's doctrine of happiness, here distinguished from ·supernatural beatitude as imperfect from perfect beatitude. Are we to assume then that inquiry rinto the nature of happiness is twofold, admitting of a. theological and philosophical dimension? A philosopher would, on this showing, be concerned ·with the natural, albeit imperfect, end and the theologian with the supernatural end of man. Many philosophers within the Thomistic tradition have ~15 216 KEVIN M. STALEY been comfortable with this assumption. Recently, for example, John Finnis has stated, St. Thomas very plainly says, the task of ' considering and determining the ultimate end of human life and human affairs' belongs to the principle practical science; Aristotle called it ethics and Thomas moral philosophy.1 Others do not share Finnis' confidence in this regard. Alan Dona.gan, for example,,argues to the contrary that Thomas' final word on the end of man was that Aristotle was simply mistaken. According to Donagan, Thomas saved Aristotle's thesis that the ultimate end of human life is eudaimonia by two drastic amendments. First, he reinterpreted eudaimonia as what he called beatitudo: the total satisfaction of desires of an intellectual creature by a vision of God's essence.... Secondly, he denied that human beings could either attain beatitudo, or even learn what it really is, except by grace.2 If Donagan is correct, then the philosopher is clearly not competent to discuss the end o£ man, since the consideration of supernatural beatitude lies beyond the power of unaided.reason. Finnis recognizes the distinction between perfect and imperfect beatitude, and his position need only entail that it is the latter which is the concern of philosophy proper. However, although the notion of 'imperfect beatitude' served well Thomas' purpose of integrating the thought of the Philosopher within the framework of Christian theology, the fact remains that Thomas did not disengage this notion from its theological context. That is rto say, he did not carry out 'an explicit treatment of imperfect beatitude as the natural end of man. In itself, this need not imply that such an inquiry is impossible or ill-conceived. Nevertheless, the notion of ' imperfect beatitude ' (construed as some sort of natural end of man 1" Practical Reasoning, Human Goods, and the End of Man", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Society, v. 58, 1984, p. 26. 2 Human lilnds and Human Actions (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1985), p. 38. HAPPINESS: THE NATURAL END OF MAN? 217 amenable to philosophical treatment), is still quite problematic ; and Finnis himself has recognized the difficulty. Happiness signified, even for Aristotle, a good which is perfect and in every way final.3 Finnis observes that "the 'perfect,' the 'fully satisfactory,' is what the concept of eudaimooia /bemitudo is about; an 'imperfect beatitude' is, by definition, a state which is not ' adequate to the aspira.tion of human nature '." 4 Thus, the very concept of ' imperfect happiness ' appears at best to be paradoxical, at worst self-contradictory -at least to the philosopher. This... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reports of the Death of the AuthorDonald KeeferReports of the death of the author have been greatly exaggerated. Throughout Western history, the death of a hero, the disappearance of something sacred, the fall of a leader, or the defeat of a powerful people has signaled cultural crises and the coming of anxiety-filled transformations towards an unknowable future. When Friedrich Nietzsche wrote the belated obituary on the (...) death of God, he was well aware of its enormity. He complains that millennia will pass before humanity will overcome its living in the “immense frightful shadow” of God. 1 Roland Barthes’s 1968 notice on “The Death of the Author,” however, announces an analogous loss of the “Author-God” with nothing but smug confidence: “We know to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.” 2 Since his actual death in 1980, and despite his writings contra the author, Barthes has become the sort of Author declared moribund in his article, as he is attentively read and dutifully quoted with adulation by artists, art and literary critical theorists alike. 3For Abigail Solomon-Godeu, writing on photography, the death of the author, and by extension, the artist and composer, as theorized by Barthes, was a cornerstone in a new age of cultural production and consumption. Readers would be liberated from the tyranny of authorial authority. She links the transgressive edge of “appropriative art,” found in such works as photographer Sherry Levine’s photographs of famous photographs, to playing out the cultural consequences of Barthes’s manifesto. “The dismantling of the notion of unique subjectivity Barthes understood as a salutary blow struck against ossified and essential retrograde bourgeois humanism.” 4 The paramount irony is [End Page 78] that the Four Henchman of the Authorial Apocalypse, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Paul De Man, are given the godlike status of founding fathers of postmodernism by practically every writer on the current art scene. The program to “challenge the symbolic itself,” is accepted as a sacred charge by the new cultural clerisy. 5Nearing three decades of postmortem of the author, what has changed? The “death of the author” has given birth not to the reader, but to a booming industry of “discursive practices,” or the production of texts on texts. And clearly, not one of the producers of these texts would happily give credit to discourse itself for their byline. Despite postmodern misgivings about authority and propriety, we can still be sued for appropriating without their permission words and ideas theoretically the product of language itself! 6 Isn’t it high time that we began to demand some sort of truth in advertising or reporting on matters such as these?Margit Sutrop has lamented in the pages of this journal the resilient attitudes of those cultural critics who take as axiomatic Barthes’s claims: “Even the sharpest philosophical analysis has had no influence on those speaking about the death of the author.” 7 In fact, many of the critiques are so good, one must wonder if our continuing concern with Barthes isn’t bordering on overkill. Sutrop sees that Barthesian proponents have too much invested in the thesis to be moved. She then acknowledges that arguments might prove fruitless against the force of a metaphor. This is a very troubling concession however. There is nothing surprising about a community’s lack of self-criticism except when that community advertises itself as the party that dares to challenge all. The convenience of certain “truths,” or beliefs not subject to correction ought always to make us suspicious.The truth is Barthes’s attack has much less to do with authors than with a style of reading: “We know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God), but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (DOA, p. 146). The tenacity of Barthes’s supporters is a function of the sort of reading that Barthes licenses here and in his other works. Clearly... (shrink)

True enough, not many of the human lot we know, not least of all thosewe may chance upon in life in an intricate tangle of modern socialformations where individuals get to interface rather unreflectively mostof the time, would be so generous as to bestow a casual interest in philosophy. Two thousand years ago, this kind of antipathy toward philosophy made its point well when a man named Socrates was condemned to death, proof rather of the unchanging isometrics of equivocation (...) in the face of the compelling demands of justice and truth that Socrates exposed to be the skeleton in the cupboard of power, hiding under the façade of indestructibility. This pervasive practice would have by now covered an entire époque of Western intellectualtradition from the death of Socrates to the contemporary, disguised asunwavering love of everything that abounds in beauty and vitality, adetermined search for the fundament that holds everything together under the condition that Man is free and that Life is precious as too rich and valuable for the taking. (shrink)

Socrates is a man of faith whose love and pursuit of the truth is grounded in religious conviction. Faith, whatever else it may be, involves guiding one's life in terms of a transcendent dimension, recognizing a reality lying behind any particular experience. In Plato's Phaedo, a literary and philosophical masterpiece, we enter the narrative of Socrates' trial and execution on the day of his death, examining arguments for the immortality of the psyche. The dialogue combines logical argument and mythological (...) speculation, and presents Socrates simultaneously as an abstract theorist and an unforgettably singular person. Distinct persons, such as Socrates, have an interest in continuing to exist as the individuals that they are. When we cease to exist, we lose the opportunity to engage in any activity that is worth doing, such as—emphatically, for some of us—doing philosophy. What Socrates is presented as having discovered in the Phaedo—with the ostensibly absent Plato lurking behind every line in this literary gem of a text—is a way of transforming oneself with an eye on immortality. That Socrates dies utterly without fear is the supreme vindication of the philosophical life. (shrink)

There are now over 1.1 million people overseen by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), with about 33,000 detained in jails and federal detention centers around the country at any particular time. The average detention time is two months, but some are detained for much longer periods. Since its inception, one hundred and twenty one deaths and countless cases of medical neglect have occurred. Given its secrecy, and lack of accountability and oversight, it is not clear how many of these deaths (...) are the result of grossly inadequate medical care. ICE is a branch of a government agency in a democratic country, thus the citizens on whose behalf it allegedly operates have an obligation to ensure that it operates in conformity with the fundamental principles of justice on which this nation was founded. ICE is a young and rapidly growing bureaucracy with little oversight. It operates using a mix of federal, state, local and private centers, many of which are penal institutions. It has a history of serious abuse, and even when it operates in conformity with its penal standards, it inflicts additional harm onto vulnerable people, especially asylum seekers and parents of minor children. It thus requires our constant vigilance and concern. Our immigration policies and detention practices are deeply troubling, but until we elect to reform them, we have a special obligation to the vulnerable populations that we house in ICE detention. (shrink)

The life of the brain is believed to be a major factor determining the existence of subjective reality during clinical death. The duration of the existence in question cannot be measured in the units of astronomical time for two reasons. Firstly, it is impossible to determine once and for all how long the brain survives after cardiac arrest and termination of breathing. Secondly, the duration of subjective time during near death experience (NDE) differs from that typical of daily (...) regular experience. Immobilization, loss of the sensation of one’s body, state of affect and severe sensory deprivation ensure that consciousness is focused and fixated in and onto itself exclusively which, in its turn, diminish and slacken the course of time so that it expands to eternity and subjective reality goes beyond the usual limits of the temporal “past-present-future” paradigm. (shrink)

Every culture has its own taboos. Communication works better when the participants share more assumptions and knowledge about each other (Scollon & Scollon, 2000). However, in many cases, participants realize the existence of the rules associated with taboos only after they have violated them. Those who do not observe these social “rules” might face serious results, such as total embarrassment or, as Saville-Troike (1989) puts it, they may be accused of immorality and face social ostracism. This paper reports that certain (...) verbal and non-verbal taboos among Chinese people centuries ago still affect their language and behavior choices. Two types of Chinese possible taboos in language and behavior are introduced and compared with cultures of the Koreans and Americans: (1) gift-giving taboos which are phonologically linked to the “separation” and “death” in Chinese society, and (2) verbal expressions which are linked to the twelve zodiac-animals in Chinese traditional metaphors. This research paper also tries to answer two questions related to Asian culture and history: (1) whether Koreans share more of these phonologically-linked taboos than Americans do because Korean language has very similar sounds to Chinese; and (2) whether Koreans share with Chinese people more of the zodiac-animal-linked metaphors (i.e., the rat, the bull/cow, the tiger, the rabbit, the dragon, the snake, the horse, the sheep/lamb, the monkey, the chicken, the dog, and the pig) than Americans do because Korean people also use the same animals as a cycle of every twelve years. Data were collected in two ways: questionnaires and interviews. (shrink)

In 1980, the late French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, a long-time sufferer of manic-depressive illness, murdered his wife and was committed to a psychiatric hospital. Never allowed to stand trial, he was eventually released and spent the years until his 1990 death in fitful obscurity. The posthumous publication of his autobiography, especially when taken in tandem with the first volume of the biography by his friend Yann Moulier Boutang, allows his readers hitherto unavailable insights into the man, and even (...) into the possible interpenetration of the man and his philosophy.Contrary to the claims of his editors, however, Althusser's autobiography is far from a portrait of madness from the inside. The author's attempt at an "objective" self-portrait, even with its objective mistakes and ellipses, is at a very far remove from the depiction of madness as experienced by the madman. The entire thrust of Althusser's self-interpretation, moreover, with its psychoanalytic excavation of neurotic determinants, appears to aim at the reduction of psychosis to more readily comprehensible mental turbulence. A similar reduction is at work in the author's seeming inability, or unwillingness, to trace the links between the institutional and political contexts of his life and the more intimate, personal sphere--and that remains the case even when he seems to be tracing those very connections.The question remains--and it is the overriding question of this article--whether any relationship can be traced between Althusser's interpretation of Marxist philosophy and his selfinterpretation. The answer lies in Althusser's ultimately fissured and fragmented account of the social "whole" as a "structure of structures," in which psychic factors are irrelevant to historical understanding and vice-versa.The limitations of Althusser's self-understanding are thus seen to parallel the limitations of his conception of Marxism. (shrink)