The complexity is interpreted by the author as one of the properties of postnonclassical science. The idea of ‘complexity‘ is studied in the context of contemporary science; the main stages of its genesis are also identified. The author believes that the concept of A. I. Uyemov is a good tool for the theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon of complexity that is so typical for contemporary culture . Base forming factor is the concept of the system, which, on the (...) one hand, expresses the sense of the system , and on the other hand, expresses the intention of human activity. This is not nothing but a systematic representation of modern innovative technologies that realize the unity of values and intentions of human. Systemness acts as a property of reality generated by the creative activity of a human in the implementation of its plans. Hence, the complexity of the systems as a characteristic does not apply to nature or to society per se, but to the human action, activity. Activities can be subdivided into theoretical research and practical technological process. In the first case, we are dealing with postnonclassical science of nature, and the second - with a specific occupation - the science and art of management. In the article, the questions of genesis of a sense and idea of the complexity are studied and an attempt to determine what is the complexity as well as the result of this attempt in modern conditions are given. (shrink)

A defining characteristic of modern science is its ability to make immensely successful predictions of natural phenomena without invoking a putative god or a supernatural being. Here, we argue that this intellectual discipline would not acquire such an ability without the mathematical zero. We insist that zero and its basic operations were likely conceived in India based on a philosophy of nothing, and classify nothing into four categories—balance, absence, emptiness and nonexistence. We argue that zero is a tangible (...) representation of nonexistence and constitutes all nonzero numbers, which together represent existence. It appears that zero’s journey out of India somewhat separated its mathematical and philosophical aspects, with the former being more valued by some cultures and the latter by others. The European culture, in which modern science grew, largely ignores a philosophy of nothing due to a deep-rooted Greek philosophical base, although this science relies on the notion of nonexistence through zero. Consequently, zero is a mere number of convenience without its foundational philosophy in science, and techniques to circumvent zero are developed. We insist that, while such techniques contribute to the progress of science and mathematics within the current framework, a tendency to avoid zero and its philosophy leads to approximations and may hinder a deeper understanding. Finally, we argue that nonexistence may notionally constitute existence, and hence may be the fundamental. This implies that, if a supernatural being exists, it is not the fundamental. The independence of modern science from a supernatural being is consistent with this. (shrink)

Early modern medicine was much more dependent on the senses than its contemporary counterpart. Although a comprehensive medical theory existed that assigned great value to taste and odor of medicaments, historical descriptions of taste and odor appears imprecise and inconsistent to modern eyes. How did historical actors move from subjective experience of taste and odor to culturally stable agreements that facilitated communication about the sensory properties of medicaments? This paper addresses this question, not by investigating texts, but by (...) going straight to the sensory impression, which certain substances convey. The aim is not to overwrite or rectify historical descriptions but to investigate whether modern methodologies for sensory assessment can be enlisted to understand the past. We draw on history of science for framing and research questions, pharmaceutical science for knowledge of pharmaceuticals and preparations, and food and meal science for assaying procedures and protocols. We show that sensory evaluation can yield precise descriptions that would not have been alien to early modern medicine makers. However, there are problems with translating descriptions of taste between different historical contexts. By comparing contemporary descriptions of sensations with eighteenth‐century ones, the article discusses how sensory descriptions are highly dependent on context, and subject to historical change. (shrink)

From the very beginnings of his thought, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk was convinced that modern man, and likewise the culturally and politically emancipated Czech nation, was in a deep existential crisis closely linked with the spread of irreligiosity. Masaryk gradually came to believe that this crisis could be positively overcome on two levels. On a theoretical level, he relied on his specific classification and systematization of the sciences. On a practical level, which was directly based on his notion of positive (...) sciences and a strictly rational scientific approach, it was a matter of developing a new direction and method, which he characteristically conceived of as realism. On the eve of the First World War, Masaryk’s position became understandably radicalized. He distanced himself from a more objectivist view of religion and countered theism with a scientific and philosophical anthropism. (shrink)

In rethinking skepticism as a method of philosophizing, which by its characteristics was quite effective in breaking up and overcoming scholasticism and dogmatism, criticizing Fidelism, in shaping and consolidating the foundations of the science of modern times, skepticism, which in its consistent application extended to the sphere of religious-theological, sacred, a significant contribution was made by the skeptic philosopher and naturalist Pierre Gassendi. As a specific environment for the development of its rather specific and perceived and interpreted (...) antique skepticism began as problems of philosophy, religion, and the bloc of sciences, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. were on the rise and became, in fact, the embodiment of a new worldview and worldview - physics, astronomy, mechanics, mathematics, and others. (shrink)

The paper is an introduction into the concept of intuition and intuitivism in the philosophy of N. O. Lossky, considered as a leading personality of the Russian philosophy of the first half of the XIXth century and who also has been affiliated with Slovakia: in 1941 – 45 he was the chair of the department of philosophy at The Slovak University in Bratislava. Nevertheless, the Slovak philosophers did not succeed yet in coming to terms with his philosophy and that led (...) to many misunderstandings. The background of Lossky’s philosophy was the specific character of Russian intellectual tradition. Among others in his philosophy this tradition reached its zenith. The argumentation of his monistic noetics was based on his belief, that all forms of valid knowledge are an immediate insight of objects in their originals. Due to this character of the theory of knowledge it is possible to preserve the vital, dynamic nature of reality and to conceive of subject as vital, living and creative being. Lossky tries to overcome the cleavage between knowledge and being, so characteristic for modern epistemology and science, by his doctrine of the noetic coordination of the subject and the object as the presupposition of the consciousness and knowing. The being, which determines the process of knowing, is not transcendent to this process, it is rather a part of it. (shrink)

This is the first volume to address directly the question of the speciation of modern Homo sapiens. The subject raises profound questions about the nature of the species, our defining characteristic, and the brain changes and their genetic basis that make us distinct. The British Academy and the Academy of Medical Sciences have brought together experts from palaeontology, archaeology, linguistics, psychology, genetics and evolutionary theory to present evidence and theories at the cutting edge of our understanding of these issues.Palaeontological (...) and genetic work suggests that the transition from a precursor hominid species to modern man took place between 100,000 and 150,000 years ago. Some contributors discuss what is most characteristic of the species, focussing on language and its possible basis in brain lateralization. This work is placed in the context of speciation theory, which has remained a subject of considerable debate since the evolutionary synthesis of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian theory. The timing of specific transitions in hominid evolution is discussed, as also is the question of the neural basis of language. Other contributors address the possible genetic nature of the transition, with reference to changes on the X and Y chromosomes that may account for sex differences in lateralization and verbal ability. These differences are discussed in terms of the theory of sexual selection, and with reference to the mechanisms of speciation.These essays will be vital reading for anyone interested in the nature and origins of the species, and specifically human abilities. (shrink)

This ambitious critical history of the variety of disciplines we group together as the social sciences argues that the defining characteristic of social science, both historically and in the present, is ideology. Based originally on a flawed ideal of science, the 'social sciences' have incorporated and refined a set of assumptions about the nature of state and society, assumptions which have been institutionalized with the growth of modern universities. The book is in three main parts. It deals (...) firstly with the history of certain key ides from the early modern period, before exploring the institutional and social features which have shaped the emergence of modern social science. Manicas goes on to reveal the ideological component of mainstream social science, concluding by suggesting and alternative realist philosophy for the future. Rigorous in scholarship and engaging in presentation, the book offers a brilliant combination of wide-ranging historical scholarship and a firm location in the current theoretical dilemmas of the social sciences. (shrink)

: Eastern Learning, which is an important part of modern new learning, refers to the Western natural science and socio-political thought that was assimilated by Japan from the end of 19th century to the beginning of 20th century. From the end of Ming Dynasty to the period before and after the revolution of 1911, China’s intake of new learning went through four stages. In the first three stages, a large number of Western books translated into Chinese were also (...) introduced into Japan, which became the basic literature and language medium of Japanese Dutch studies, English Studies and later the whole foreign studies. At the beginning of the 20th century, exiles, students studying in Japan and Japanese teachers introduced Eastern Learning into China, which had a profound impact on China’s modernization process. Eastern Learning is a new learning system with East Asian characteristics constructed by China and Japan in the process of Western Learning spreading to the East. (shrink)

Modernity is seen as a historical process that started with the Renaissance and took shape with the French Revolution. Modernity, which passed through historical turning points such as Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, gained its own character in these periods. In this study, the Enlightenment period and its ideas, which are accepted as one of the most important periods of modernity and the modern world, are discussed. During the Enlightenment period, it was emphasized that the human mind should be purified (...) from traditions and other old-fashioned features. It is no coincidence that one of the first concepts that comes to mind when modernity is mentioned is the rational mind. The fact that reason is the central and determining element and character of modern human life, modern institutions and society is related to the Enlightenment period. In this article, the Age of Enlightenment is discussed within the framework of its basic characteristics, the features it brought to modernity and its relationship with religion. In the article, the foregrounding of reason and the spread of rationalization to all areas of modernity are evaluated as an achievement of the Enlightenment period. This study, which was carried out with the literature review method of the qualitative research method, one of the research methods of social sciences, evaluated the Enlightenment as a turning point in which the goals of modernity were determined. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. According to the genre characteristics, the article is a form of publicizing analytical conclusions from the experience of research in the field of the philosophical Chinese studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine from 1991 to the present day. The material for understanding was supplied from the environment of scientific professional activity of prominent figures of Ukrainian philosophical Sinology from the H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the (...) NAS of Ukraine and the A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies of the NAS of Ukraine. The scientific achievements of academic Sinologists, who are leading researchers of Chinese philosophical education, science and culture from the archaic to modern times, are highlighted. They are, namely: V. Kiktenko, V. Pyrohiv, V. Hamianin, S. Kapranov, Y. Hobova and A. Usyk. M e t h o d s. The article uses an analytical approach based on the study of historical and philosophical sources. The methodological basis of the research is the main methods of historical and philosophical science: problem-categorical analysis, socio-cultural analysis and biographical analysis. At the same time, the methods of situational and contextual analysis of scientific texts are applied. R e s u l t s. Four conditional thematic vectors of the progress of academic philosophical Sinology in modern Ukraine are classified, namely the study of: 1. the history of ancient Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism; 2. the history of Chinese philosophy in the 19th – early 21st centuries; 3) the history of Ukrainian Sinology in the 18th – early 21st centuries; 4. the history of modern foreign Sinology. The director of the A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies of the NAS of Ukraine and the head of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists V. Kiktenko very effectively studies all these vectors, especially the last three of them. His colleagues at the institute V. Pyrohiv, V. Hamianin and Y. Hobova mainly research the first of these vectors, and primarily the history of Confucianism. Employees of the H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the NAS of Ukraine S. Kapranov and A. Usyk are also focused scientific attention on the history of Confucianism, in particular, the second of them studies social ethics and anthropology of Confucius. C o n c l u s i o n s. As a result it was established that modern domestic philosophical academic Sinology is a qualitatively new and innovative direction of Oriental studies in independent Ukraine. This discipline was formed as a result of the two-century progress of Ukrainian Chinese studies from the era of Hetmanshina until now. V. Kiktenko and his colleagues have made a significant and already internationally recognized contribution to the study of both the classical philosophical schools of Ancient China and their ideological heirs, in particular, the leaders of the PRC and the CCP from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping during these thirty years. V. Kiktenko also laid the foundations for the study both of the history of Ukrainian Chinese studies and of modern foreign, primarily Western European and North American, Sinology. (shrink)

_Purpose._ This research involves revealing the methodological significance of the anthropological understanding of values for conducting modern scientific research. _Theoretical basis._ Philosophical anthropology acts as an epistemological basis for answers to ontological questions that are part of the structure of such problems in modern science as the construction of a scientific picture of the world, the ordering of data of natural attitude, and anthropocosmism. The ontological basis for the formation of the anthropological theory of values is the (...) teaching of Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Rudolf Lotze, and Martin Heidegger. _Originality._ The creation of a scientific picture of the world, the research of natural attitude, and an anthropological approach to cosmology carried out from the viewing angle of the philosophy of values show the close mutual conditioning of these scientific issues. A successful determination of one’s value positions by a scientist-researcher is impossible without his/her agreeing with his/her picture of the world with the prevailing ideas about the world in their society. Such ideas are studied by anthropocosmism, which researches not so much the world in itself, but a view of this world from the standpoint of the existing state of society and the main intentions of its development. _Conclusions._ The value attitude of scientists at a certain stage of the development of scientific knowledge forms their picture of the world, which has the form of self-explanatory scientific provisions. The facts of modern physics must always, one way or another, receive their legitimation through the world of the human natural attitude. Even the unobservable characteristics of the microcosm are explained by appealing to knowledge about the observable characteristics of the world. The anthropocentric nature of cosmology is determined by the fact that in modern philosophy, the values of a person explain not only the way of one’s cognition but also the way of one’s inclusion in the world. (shrink)

On the example of the activities of the Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschule des Mittelstands Bielefeld – FHM Bielefeld, Germany) as a key par­ticipant in the UNICOM project, the modern university’s implementation of its Third Mission – its fulfillment of its public purpose and observance of public responsibility – is considered. A comparative analysis of the four missions of a modern university was carried out, thanks to which the necessary relationship between them was re­vealed as an integral (...) prerequisite for the successful functioning and development of a modern university. A modern university implements its Third Mission primar­ily in close interaction with communities and industrial communities – both local (primarily) and quite distant (additionally). At the same time, the university must find a balance between meeting the needs of different social groups, guided both by the principles of social responsibility and the interests of the university and these groups. FHM’s training concept is to be close to practice and compact in the transfer of knowledge. This concept is based on four essential characteristics: application-oriented, profiling, interdisciplinarity and internationalization. Four main organi­zations in the structure of FHM Bielefeld enforce the active networking of people, with the motivation and expertise to enable groundbreaking projects and solutions aimed to strengthen the innovation ecosystem of the city. Applied research and third mission are conceptualized in the steps of preconditions, activities, results and con­sequences. The third mission includes the implementation of a cooperation project with a civil society actor or the implementation of a continuing education program designed together with a company. The close interaction of universities with local communities is primarily aimed at ensuring the interests of university stakeholders from local civil society and should be based on academic virtues and values. (shrink)

The Chinese Model and Chinese Wisdom of Modernization 1: The Soviet model of socialism and the American model of capitalism are the two major solutions to modernization. Under the guidance of the traditional Chinese Doctrine of the Mean and the Marxist dialectical materialism, the Communist Party of China, by successively learning from these two major solutions and combining with the actual situation of China, has proposed Chinese solutions of socialism with Chinese characteristics to modernization of state governance and thus (...) offered to the world Chinese wisdom beyond the conflicts between two major ideologies, namely, socialism and capitalism. Keywords: State governance. Modernization. Chinese wisdom. Chinese situations. O modelo chinês e a sabedoria chinesa da modernização Resumo: O modelo soviético de socialismo e o modelo americano de capitalismo são as duas principais soluções para a modernização. Sob a orientação da doutrina chinesa tradicional do caminho do meio e do materialismo dialético marxista, o Partido Comunista da China, aprendendo sucessivamente com essas duas soluções principais e combinando-se com a situação atual da China, propôs soluções chinesas de socialismo com características chinesas, modernização da governança do estado e, assim, ofereceu ao mundo a sabedoria chinesa além dos conflitos entre duas grandes ideologias, a saber, socialismo e capitalismo. Palavras-chave: Governança estatal. Modernização. Sabedoria chinesa. Situações chinesas. El modelo chino y la sabiduría china de la modernización Resumen: El modelo soviético del socialismo y el modelo estadounidense del capitalismo son las dos soluciones principales para la modernización. Bajo la guía de la Doctrina tradicional china de la media y el materialismo dialéctico marxista, el Partido Comunista de China, al aprender sucesivamente de estas dos soluciones principales y combinar con la situación actual de China, ha propuesto soluciones chinas del socialismo con características chinas para modernización de la gobernanza estatal y, por lo tanto, ofreció al mundo sabiduría china más allá de los conflictos entre dos ideologías principales, a saber, el socialismo y el capitalismo. Palabras clave: Gobernanza estatal. Modernización. Sabiduría china. Situaciones chinas. 1This paper is related to “the Research of the Relationship between the Thought of the Communist Party of China about state Governance and Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture” supported by Beijing Social Science Fund Research Project Base Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020 1 This paper is related to “the Research of the Relationship between the Thought of the Communist Party of China about state Governance and Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture” supported by Beijing Social Science Fund Research Project Base. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Histories of Science in Early Modern Europe:IntroductionRobert GouldingIn 1713, Pierre Rémond de Montmort wrote to the mathematician Nicolas Bernoulli:It would be desirable if someone wanted to take the trouble to instruct how and in what order the discoveries in mathematics have come about.... The histories of painting, of music, of medicine have been written. A good history of mathematics, especially of geometry, would be a much more (...) interesting and useful work.... Such a work, if done well, could be regarded to some extent as a history of the human mind, since it is in this science, more than in anything else, that man makes known that gift of intelligence that God has given him to rise above all other creatures.1Such a history of mathematics was attempted by Jean-Etienne Montucla in his Histoire des mathématiques (first printed in 1758, and reissued in a [End Page 33] greatly expanded form in 1799).2 Montucla's great work is generally acknowledged as the first genuine history of mathematics. According to some modern historians, previous attempts at such a history had amounted to little more than collections of anecdotes, biographies or exhaustive bibliographies: "jumbles of names, dates and titles," as one writer in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography characterized them.3 Montucla, on the other hand, was thoroughly animated by the Enlightenment project expressed in Rémond's letter, and his Histoire was a philosophical history of the "development of the human mind," as he himself described it.4 It was precisely Montucla's vision of what mathematics meant and his conviction that mathematics itself must change in order to reflect the historical elevation of the human intellect, that allowed him to transform the scattered dates and anecdotes of his predecessors into a genuine history. All subsequent histories of mathematics—until the most recent social histories5 —have been in a sense "footnotes to Montucla."The papers here argue that there were indeed histories of mathematics before Montucla which are worthy of scholarly attention, and that the dismissal of Renaissance histories of science as nothing more than a "cloud of fine adjectives and metaphors" is unfair (although it contains a germ of truth). Anthony Grafton has argued in an article on the historical writings of Cardano, Rheticus, and Kepler, that the purpose of such texts was not so much to trace what actually happened, as to justify the study of a subject often derided—by both humanist and scholastic writers—as obscure, useless and undignified.6 The following four papers go further in arguing that writings in this genre (or, at least, some writings in this genre) were not limited to this characteristically humanist objective. Authors did not just use their histories to persuade others. They themselves relied on historical narratives in order to think about their discipline, define its parts, distinguish among its acceptable and unacceptable forms and prescribe its content [End Page 34] and method of teaching. By placing their discipline into a historical context shared by other, more mainstream humanistic arts, moreover, they could draw upon the large, narrative structures which Renaissance humanists had adapted to understand human intellectual and cultural development, origins, progress and decline.James Byrne's article highlights a disparity of vision between those humanists who treated the origin of the arts as just another subject for humanistic display; and those (like Regiomontanus) who were invested in the arts and wrote their histories from an insider's perspective. Alongside Regiomontanus, one could include several other authors treated in this collection, such as Thomas Vaughan, Peter Ramus, and Henry Savile. In each case, history provided a means for working through problems of the legitimacy and nature of their disciplines. While their writings are not "histories of the human mind," their interests went beyond mere rehearsal of anecdotes. Ramus's histories, for instance, written 200 years before Montucla's Histoire, had the kind of unifying vision which de Montmort demanded, and shared Montucla's concern to find a meaning in the development of mathematics. Ramus, and the supporters and detractors he spawned, were convinced that constructing the history of this science was crucial to understanding how and why human beings have... (shrink)

The epochal transition from the medieval to the modern world has long been thought in terms of the "infinitization" of the world-picture, that is, as the transition from the finite, hierarchically ordered medieval cosmos to the infinite and homogeneous universe of the new astronomy and physics. In this dissertation I argue that this process of "infinitization" must be understood intensively as well as extensively. Nature, in the modern age, is thought not only as infinitely extended in space, but (...) also as exhibiting an infinite richness in all of its parts. Each individual being is grasped as utterly unique and consequently as conceptually inexponable. Thus the infinitization of the real leads to an infinitization of the knowable-- the radical shift in ontology grounds a corresponding shift in epistemology, so that the progress of human knowledge is understood as an unending project infinitely extended over time. ;I take as my point of departure a consideration of Hans Blumenberg's reading of this epochal transition in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Blumenberg views the transference of the attribute of infinity from God to the world as characteristic of the modern rejection of the medieval tendency to locate the measure of self- and world-understanding in a transcendent deity. The "worldliness" of the modern age, Blumenberg holds, must be understood as a reaction to the extreme intensification of divine transcendence in late medieval Nominalism. In the face of an absconded God, human "self-assertion" aims at the realization of this-worldly possibilities through the mastery and alteration of reality. I agree with Blumenberg that the primary expression of this self-assertion has been seen in the progress of modern science. The possibility of that progress, however, is grounded in an understanding of nature as a law-like and yet inexhaustible field of investigation directing thought toward an objectivity that is never entirely realized. The origin of such an understanding, I argue, is to be found in late medieval Neoplatonic speculation on the nature of God's omnipresence in the world, in particular in the notion of the immanence of the infinite in the finite. (shrink)

No account of the development of contemporary empiricism is adequate which neglects the writings and the influence of Charles Peirce. Although he is not easily pigeon-holed and can not be claimed as the exclusive property of any school or movement, it is appropriate that the hundredth anniversary of his birth should be commemorated at this Congress. For the movement of which it is a manifestation is engaged in a coöperative, intensive cultivation of the methods of the sciences with the help (...) of the most advanced tools of modern logic; and Peirce's intellectual career was also a single-minded devotion to that task. It is fitting, also, that his birth-year be celebrated at Harvard by an international congress. For although he was denied the privilege of teaching at this university, much of his influence was propagated by William James and Josiah Royce, two of its great teachers; and however much he may have suffered from neglect during his life-time, his work surely merits recognition from a movement not confined by national bounds. It is characteristic of the best established sciences that though individuals may pursue researches in them independently of one another, the conclusions reached tend to support each other and to converge toward a common stream of sound beliefs; and such convergence is indeed the sole identifiable warrant for the confidence that some measure of the truth has been attained. It is therefore a happy sign that so many of the central ideas of the present movement have been independently developed on both sides of the Atlantic. One is not minimizing the contributions of the Vienna Circle in pointing out that many of its recent views have been taken for granted for some time by American colleagues, largely because the latter have come to intellectual maturity under the influence of Peirce. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of (...) legal principles. In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper. (shrink)

Abstract Psychology's goal has been to become a science, taking the modern natural sciences as the model. It has not been understood that each science undergoes a transition from early disunification to later unification, that a fundmental dimension is involved that differentiates sciences. Psychology is a modern disunified science, distinguished by its chaotic knowledge and ways of operating. A philosophy of science based on modem unified science, as philosophies generally are, is inappropriate as (...) a means of understanding psychology or of guiding its development. We need a philosophy to describe the special problems of theory construction of modern disunified sciences, and to advance paths by which to work on those problems. Theory tasks to be undertaken in large quantities range from articles to reduce artificial diversity to the construction of grand unified theory. Psychology must begin those tasks, and it must understand its characteristics as a modern disunified science, if it is to make good decisions concerning its development and organization. Otherwise it will continue on its path towards fragmentation, an impenetrable obstacle to full development as a science and a profession. (shrink)

The highly sophisticated techniques of modern engineering are normally conceived of in practical terms. Corresponding to the instrumental function of technology, they are designed to direct the forces of nature according to human purposes. Yet, as soon as the realm of mere skills is exceeded, the intended useful results can only be achieved through planned and preconceived action processes involving the deliberately considered application of well designed tools and devices. This is to say that in all complex cases theoretical (...) reasoning becomes an indispensable means to accomplish the pragmatic technological aims. Hence the abstracting from the actual concrete function of technology opens the way to concentrate attention on the general conceptual framework involved. If this approach is adopted the relevant knowledge and the procedures applied clearly exhibit a logic of their own. This point of view leads to a methodological and even an epistemological analysis of the theoretical structure and the specific methods of procedure characteristic of modern technology. Investigations of this kind, that can be described as belonging to an ana lytical philosophy of technology, form the topic of this anthology. The type of research in question here is closely akin to that of the philosophy of science. But it is an astonishing fact that the commonly accepted and carefully investigated philosophy of science has not yet found its counterpart in an established philosophy of technology. (shrink)

There exists a fundamental convergence between some major trends of modern epistemology—as outlined, for instance, by Filmer Northrop and Henry Margenau—and the theories actually developed within sciences of the human mind where two types of thought—one implicit and, the other, explicit—tend to refer to two different lines of development. Moreover, these theories can find in the psychology of Lev Vygotsky some seminal hypotheses of a major importance. In order to highlight this convergence, we parallel the role played by structured (...) conceptual systems in Vygotsky’s conception of intellectual development and Northrop’s epistemology. We show how these conceptual systems account for the notion of causality and can explain the success of scientific thought, i.e. its possible match with the real world, while this match falsely justified an overall biological model of intellectual development in Jean Piaget’s work. We conclude that dual process theorists should no longer neglect cognitive tools, and especially conceptual systems, which underpin the awareness and mastery of thought that are characteristic of type 2 processes. This whole analysis leads us to maintain that human psychology is not characterized in the first instance by a need to act, but a quest for meaning. (shrink)

First published in 1976, this is a volume of studies on the problems of theory-appraisal in the physical sciences - how and why important theories are developed, changed and are replaced, and by what criteria we judge one theory an advance on another. The volume is introduced by a classic paper of Imre Lakatos's, which sets out a theory for tackling these problems - the methodology of scientific research programmes. Five contributors then test this theory against particular and celebrated case-studies (...) in the history of the physical sciences. The volume ends with a characteristically forceful and original critique of the whole enterprise by Paul Feyerabend. the book is a companion volume to Method and Appraisal in Economics. Both are natural sequels to Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge and attempt to work out in particular cases the implications of some of the theories presented in that book. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with two interrelated sets of problems: How can we have knowledge in a universe of processes? How can knowledge be improved, and how is scientific progress possible? ;To address the epistemological question in conjunction with the ontological is not a common approach in contemporary philosophy of science. I therefore begin the dissertation by arguing that these two areas of philosophy are intimately interrelated, and that the one-sided concentration on epistemological issues has led to an unsatisfactory (...) account of the nature of knowledge. In particular it has led to a conflation of epistemology with methodology. I argue that methodologies carry with themselves certain presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and of human beings. ;I suggest that we should attempt to construct a philosophical system within which epistemology and ontology mutually support one another. Insights derived from modern science provide us with a basis for the construction of such a system. ;I begin this task by arguing that scientific knowledge can be viewed as an extension of perception. Relying on insights derived from Gregory and Piaget I emphasize the constructive characteristics of our perceptual system and argue that they find their counterpart in the constructive nature of modern science. ;Having outlined a constructivist view of knowledge I turn to the discussion of the ontological issues. ;I propose as an alternative the adoption of a metaphysics of processes. I outline such an ontology, basing my model upon ideas derived from Prigogine's research on dissipative structures and Pattee's investigation of hierarchical organization. I explain how dissipative structures create stability in an instable world and link this insight to the constructive features of our perceptual and conceptual systems. ;The resulting model shows how knowledge is possible in the strange world of processes which we probably inhabit. It further shows how knowledge can be improved and what progress through evolution means. This issue is pursued in greater detail in the last part of the dissertation. There I expound Waddington's cybernetic model of evolutionary change and show how it finds its counterpart in cognitive evolution. (shrink)

The article considers numerous factors that have influenced the formation and application of the social and human sciences. It shows that throughout history an orientation toward practice has always been a characteristic of these sciences. At the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth centuries, ideas related to the transformation of humanity and society fell under the rubric of social technologies and social engineering, which in recent years have experienced increasing prominence in modern science and technoculture.

The article is devoted to the study of electronic culture as a new phenomenon of the information age, as a special sphere of human activity associated with the creation of digital objects, the simulations of objects of “living” culture, virtual spaces and processes. The concept of “electronic culture” is explained in comparison with relative (but not identical) to it terms, such as cyber culture, Internet culture, online culture, digital culture, etc. The purpose of this study is to identify the internal (...) structure of electronic culture as a system of various information phenomena and processes, to examine the relations between them and their general characteristics as part of a single whole. The electronic culture is reviewed as a system of elements which are in different ways described by researchers in the modern social sciences and humanities. The author systematizes the main methodological approaches to the study of electronic culture and reveals meanings and connotations of the concept of electronic culture in various scientific discourses. The novelty of the study is associated with the modeling the structure of electronic culture from the perspective of existential-axiological analysis, with the identification of its key elements and the relations between them. A new typology of electronic culture objects of various nature is proposed: anthropological, ontological, social, communicative, existential, etc. The research describes various phenomena of information space as a general system, defines the basic concepts of electronic culture, developing in recent decades in the social sciences and humanities. (shrink)

Three major phases can be distinguished in the history of the development of science. During the first phase, science had almost no link with production, craft, existed within philosophy and was considered to be elite activity. The radical change in the development of science occurs in the new time, when science having separated from philosophy becomes an independent area of knowledge. Science of new time not only discovers the laws of nature, it exists in close (...) relation with production, and to some extent represents a basis for production. In this respect, the machine based production had a major impact. The next radical change in the development of science and its relations with production starts with technical revolution, which is of principal significance for both development of a man and for the understanding of the nature and concept of science. The most important value of technical revolution consists in its substantive impact on the nature of science and the change of its essential definitions and characteristics. In the context of technical revolution, a radical change occurs in the relation between science and production. In the modern automated production, science as a concentrated expression of laws directly merges with production, i.e. science itself becomes a direct productive force. A radical change occurs also in the nature of science. In the context of technical revolution, science transforms from a form of knowledge into the unity of science and activity, and an organic merger of science and production occurs. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophical and the theological reflections of John Paul II in relation to the essential characteristics of a dialogue of religion and modern science, the task of its improvement in the context of the formation and development of the culture of life.

Today even ambitious philosophers are ironic about pretensions to wisdom. Perhaps their single most characteristic pose in this age of debunking criticism is as "conversationalists" in the "great conversation of mankind" anxious "to help the argument along." The metaphor of culture as a conversation is telling in itself. It has replaced the "enlightened" image of "the republic of letters," that lost common homeland of intellectuals. The polity of ideas has given way to the marketplace on the one hand and the (...) "private" conversation on the other. It is, then, immensely difficult for us to understand a thinker like Fichte who saw himself as not only a sovereign citizen in the Republic of Letters, but as one of its magistrates, who perceived his thinking not as a "voice in the conversation of mankind" but as a "science of sciences," the embodiment of "reason's own self-produced knowledge of itself," the articulation of a principle from which all other sciences must be, in principle, strictly "deducible." It would be utterly quixotic for a contemporary philosopher to write a Wissenschaftslehre. (shrink)

Religion is a social ideology. Today the study of the history of the development of a religion as an ideology not only has a general significance but also a particular significance. It is possible for us to discern, from a plethora of evidence in places outside of China, that while scientific technology may be progressing and developing rapidly, progress has not brought about a decline in religious ideology but has indeed strengthened people's pursuit of religion. From our own domestic conditions, (...) too, we can see that for all sorts of reasons, there is a growing trend among people to adhere to one religion or another. Such a phenomenon, therefore, suggests a number of theoretical questions related to religion that ought to be studied seriously, such as: What is the essence of religion? "Is it a psychological characteristic of human beings to need some kind of religious faith? Axe religion and religious belief one and the same thing? Can religious faith be of benefit to social life? Are religion and science mutually contradictory? Are they mutually supplementary? Can religion be modernized? Naturally, these problems do not fall within the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, there are, I believe, related questions that ought to be given consideration by those who write the history of religions, such as why we study the history of religions at all, whether a good study in the history of religions ought to have a strong sense of the times, and whether or not it is sufficient to bring the people who have read such a study to consider seriously and earnestly the religious questions that exist in the contemporary world. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the mystical experience as a kind of altered states of consciousness. The purpose of the article is to solve at the conceptual level the problem of distinguishing genuine mystical experience and various kinds of surrogate states with quasi-mystical content. The theoretical basis for solving this problem was the study of the panorama of moments of divergence and convergence of discourses of the humanities and natural sciences, as well as theology. In the course of the (...) conducted research, the infra-personal processes going on in the vector of the dissolving and spreading "I" were revealed. They correspond to both mystical (dissolution in the Deity, in emptiness, in cosmic consciousness, etc.) and clinical states (confused or floating consciousness). The authors also consider in detail the ultrapersonal processes occurring within the framework of the dissemination of personal consciousness and which correspond to both mystical (the scattering of reality into many spirits, souls, astral projections and quasi-persona) and clinical conditions (schizophrenic type disorders). The novelty of the article lies in revealing the diverse directions of inauthentic mystical experience based on the systematic study of altered states of consciousness, as well as in determining the range in which an outlet to authentic forms of mystical experience can open. It has been established that in the spectrum of infra-personal and ultra-personal states there is such a feature of mystical and occult practices with the prefix "neo" as the achievement of mystical states according to the "accelerated course" programs. However, due to the inversion of the view characteristic of modern consciousness, in the ideology of neo-mysticism, destructive processes are often perceived as a new, higher stage in the evolution of mankind. With this interpretation, conditions arise for the perception of science as a "new religion", as well as the desire to find in scientific concepts a support for modern occultism and neo-mysticism. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between psychology and modern art design education in colleges, and to provide the basis for improving the quality of art education in colleges. Based on the relevant theory, the characteristics of educational psychology and art psychology and the correlation between them were analyzed from the angle of art education. According to the characteristics of college students' psychological development, the significance of art psychology-related courses was analyzed. Through the (...) form of questionnaire, a total of 200 students were randomly selected from Xi'an Academy of Fine Arts and Xi'an University of Science and Technology, respectively. A total of 400 questionnaires were issued, and 382 valid questionnaires were recovered. The results show that almost all students in two colleges think pedagogy and educational psychology are the theoretical basis for art teachers, while less than one-third of students in Xi'an University of Science and Technology think that art psychology is the theoretical basis for art teachers. The difference between the students' aesthetic and life values in the two colleges is significant. In the 15 directions of life values, there are significant differences in five directions: spirit—material, enrichment—emptiness, enthusiasm—apathy, hope—despair, and dedication—acceptance. It shows that the psychological and values of college students are changeable, and the educators should pay attention to the education in the related fields of psychology. This exploration was conducted based on educational psychology, which is of great significance for improving the educational level of art psychology in colleges and enable students to form correct aesthetic standards and life values. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of individual identity formation in modern conditions of neoliberalism. It is noted that the research of subjectivity, «I» (self), which is the source and condition for the formation of individual identity, actualizes the study of this problem in many social and humanitarian sciences. In the context of socio-philosophical analysis, identity represents itself as a complicated dynamic phenomenon that constantly needs new definitions, clarifications and additions. The effectiveness of using E.Erikson’s theory of individual identity in (...) modern conditions, its significance for the formation of «I» and P.Ricker’s concept of personalistic identity are analyzed. It has been clarified that a new request for the conceptualization of identity has been formed now, which is conditioned of the collapse of political ideologies, in particular, the communist one, the significant crisis of modern neoliberal ideology and the persistent search for new forms of collective involvement or solidarity of people in the current era of globalization. However, various forms of collective identity are imposed by society, its numerous communities, ideology, state institutions, mass media, social networks with their computer capabilities, dominance of advertisements, etc. Therefore, it is not surprising that now individuals are trying to find their own identity, going out from under the pressure of the collective, mainly discursive forms of identity, and already these efforts do not depend on them to a certain extent. The construct «collective identity» in many cases does not reflect the social I (social me) of the individual, as it was conceived in the last century, because society and its communities, which involve active, mobile and changing structures, cannot be thought in terms of subjectivity. Analogies and comparisons do not work here either on a conscious or unconscious level. In the studying identity, there is a significant problem of the transition from the individual to the collective level and vice versa. A collective or group does not have the qualities of individuality with its diversity of characteristics. Taking into account the conducted consideration, it can be stated that approaches to the formation of identity are now acquiring a profound semantic transformation. An assumption was made, which needs to be carefully investigated in the future, according to which the process of partial or complete absorption of individual identity by its collective forms is currently taking place. That’s why, there is an urgent need for the formation of a new interdisciplinary approach to the research of personal identity in the modern digital society. (shrink)

In this paper, the relations between science and technology, intervention and representation, the natural and the artificial are analysed on the background of the formation of modern science in the sixteenth century. Due to the fact that technique has been essential for modern science from its early beginning, modern science is characterised by a hybridisation of knowledge and intervention. The manipulation of nature in order to measure its properties has steadily increased until artificial (...) things have been produced, such as laser beams, chemical compounds, elementary particles. Furthermore, the structural bracing of natural science, technological development, and industrial exploitation of nature go also back to the foundation of modern science. In order to strengthen the debate on technoscience against this background, the specific characteristics of technoscientific objects have to be clarified as have the specific characteristics of the social organisation of technoscience and its performance. (shrink)

One of the most important characteristics of modern science is its replicability and objectivity. This means that a scientific result is taken as such only when it has been reproduced by other scientists. Indeed, the replicability of a scientific result in an objective and independent way by members of a scientific community is the cornerstone of science. Experimental laser physics is an example of “normal” science, where it is no doubt that the phenomenon could be (...) replicated; however, the replication process may not be straightforward since it requires a good understanding of the physics behind it, as well as good technical skills. In this article, two laboratory cases of experiments on laser physics are presented: the first one deals with a Nitrogen N2 laser with a Polloni excitation circuit, and the second one deals with a transversally excited TEA carbon dioxide laser. For the nitrogen laser, it will be shown that reproducibility failed, and therefore, the reported experiment cannot be taken as a valid contribution to the advancement and understanding of nitrogen laser physics and technology. On the other hand, for the case of the TEA carbon dioxide laser, several comments are presented on the development of this finally successful experiment. Both cases show the importance of being technically up-dated in order to reproduce or improve the results reported by other researchers. Finally, a discussion about: What can we learn about the research practice from these two cases? It is presented, as well as the conclusions about the case studies; we hope they may be useful to philosophers of science and young scientists alike. (shrink)

The article presents the standpoint that naturalistic tendencies in modern science, which are especially expressed in neuroscience, push up social knowledge toward the need to revise its attitudes and norms, which consist in consistent sociocentrism and biophobia, and, hence, a simplified understanding of the phenomenon of “genetic reductionism”. We show that the application of the methods of natural science to social disciplines often marked visible progress and even conceptual breakthroughs in their development. Achievements of modern neuroscience (...) affect a traditional area of social and humanitarian knowledge as political science, which leads to the formation of an independent area of research – political neuroscience. Through the optics of this research, cognitive styles characteristic of individuals and social groups with different value orientations imply the dominance of certain ideological sympathies and antipathies, which attributed to the opposite poles of the ideological scale – liberalism and conservatism. Considerable empirical material allows us to conclude that these ideological positions are exist due to differences in their ontogenetic “foundations”, which allows us to develop I. Kant's ideas about a priorism and transcendentalism in the context of the Kantian research program in contemporary neuroscience. The result of the implementation of this program to the political sphere was the discovery of the genesis of political views, and the demonstration of the peculiarities of their dynamics. They are based on the difference in the activity of certain neural sets, which in their turn are influenced by culture and society, forming an integral system “brain – culture – society”, where each component of which affects other components. Features and changes in the socio-cultural context of the development of an individual or a group of people may have an effect upon the architectonics of the brain and shift, due to its plasticity, of the political views along the scale of ideologies “liberalism – conservatism”. At the same time, carriers of different cognitive styles and, therefore, with a sufficient degree of probability of ideological views, percept the world in which they live in differently, and evaluate its past and possible future in diverse ways. (shrink)

Jack Goody’s work on the origins, spatial extent and defining characteristics of modernity has vigorously questioned claims that only European history led to assorted modern characteristics: capitalism, science, democracy, romantic love, and inwardly-motivated personal restraint. He argues that many societies which experienced the Bronze Age urban revolution share certain important material similarities (and some differences) which set them apart from others, and are best understood by constructing an analytical grid rather than categorical stages. With respect to (...) alleged affective differences, Goody takes a more strongly relativist stance, rejecting any developmental divide in the prevalence of romantic love, internalized self-discipline, etc. These useful steps nonetheless generate new problems. One concerns the relationship between material/technical changes, which seem to suggest a few very general historical periods (one marked by early metallurgy, writing, etc., and another by the modern energy revolution), and affective traits, which have no history in this schema. A second concerns periodization itself; while agreeing that periods defined by the experience of one region (e.g. a feudal era) are usually unhelpful, some general terms (such as early modern) do seem essential for conceptualizing developments that, though less epochal than writing or fossil fuels, are nonetheless important. (shrink)

Postmodernism in philosophy holds that traditional philosophy has come (or should come) to an end, and that it must be succeeded by something else, such as “thinking” (Heidegger), empirical science (Quine), linguistic therapy (Wittgenstein), or an “attempt to prevent the conversation of the West from attaining the secure path of science” (Rorty). Clearly, the claim to be postmodern presupposes a view of traditional philosophy, of its characteristics, and of its genesis. In this essay, such a view will (...) be developed, and its consequences for our conception of philosophy will be discussed. The view defended here is different from those of Heidegger and Rorty. For ease of exposition the discussion will refer to Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (shrink)

The philosophers René Descartes (1596–1650), Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), Benedict Spinoza (1632–77), and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) are grouped together as rationalists because they held that human beings possess a faculty of reason that produces knowledge independently of the senses. In this regard, they contrast with empiricist philosophers, such as John Locke and David Hume, who believed that all knowledge arises from the senses. The rationalists contended that proper use of reason would yield the first principles of metaphysics, the most basic (...) science of all. Metaphysics was also called “first philosophy,” and it took as its subject matter nothing less than the basic properties and principles of everything. For our purposes, it is important to note that the rationalists believed that metaphysics could provide foundations for specialized disciplines, including ethics and physics, and also medicine and other applied subjects. The rationalists and their followers developed theoretical positions of ambitious intellectual scope, ranging from metaphysical conclusions about the existence and nature of God to detailed theories of physical and physiological processes. Although they put great store in the faculty of reason for establishing overarching principles, they looked to observation and experience to provide data and evidence for their detailed theories. They took special interest in the metaphysics and physics of the human organism, and this led them to psychological topics concerning the characteristics and principles of animal behavior, the process of sense perception, the passions, and emotions, and appetites, the cognitive operations of the mind (including attention and understanding), and the relation between mental phenomena and bodily processes in the brain and sense organs. The various rationalists, but especially Descartes, made original contributions to these topics. After considering the character of psychology as a discipline in the seventeenth century, we will examine these contributions in turn. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that science fiction draws inspiration from science fact. It is a less familiar thought—though still widely acknowledged—that science has sometimes drawn its inspiration from science fiction. (Arthur C. Clarke’s idea of geostationary communications satellites is a well-known example.) However, the debt of science to science fiction extends beyond such specific examples of scientific and technological innovations. This essay explores the paradoxical-sounding thesis that science itself, as we now know it, (...) was originally the product of a science fiction vision. At a time when the collective endeavours of early modern researchers amounted to something less than science, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) helped show what wonders might be achieved by organised and methodical state-sponsored scientific research. Bacon’s vision was highly prescient: many of the scientific possibilities he sketched have since become realities. It was also highly influential: early modern science bears the characteristic stamp of Bacon’s vision, and that same influence is discernible right down to the present day. (shrink)

An impressive characteristic of Dudley Shapere's studies in the philosophy of the sciences has been his dogged reasonableness. He sorts things out, with logical care and mastery of the materials, and with an epistemological curiosity for the historical happenings which is both critical and respectful. Science changes, and the philosopher had better not link philosophical standards too tightly to either the latest orthodox or the provocative up start in scientific fashions; and yet, as critic, the philosopher must not only (...) master the sciences but also explicate their meanings, not those of a cognitive never-never land. Neither dreamer nor pedant, Professor Shapere has been able to practice the modern empiricist's exercises with the sober and stimulat ing results shown in this volume: he sees that he can be faithful to philosoph ical analysis, engage in the boldest 'rational reconstruction' of theories and experimental measurements, and faithful too, empirically faithful we may say, to both the direct super-highways and the winding pathways of conceptual evolutions and metaphysical revolutions. Not least, Shapere listens! To Einstein and Calileo of course, but to the workings of the engineers and the scientific apprentices too, and to the various philosophers, now and of old, who have also worked to make sense of what has been learned and how that has happened and where we might go wrong. (shrink)

I use van Heijenoort’s published writings and manuscript materials to provide a comprehensive overview of his conception of modern logic as a first-order functional calculus and of the historical developments which led to this conception of mathematical logic, its defining characteristics, and in particular to provide an integral account, from his most important publications as well as his unpublished notes and scattered shorter historico-philosophical articles, of how and why the mathematical logic, whose he traced to Frege and the (...) culmination of its formative period in the incompleteness results of Gödel, became modern logic, as distinct from the traditional logic of Aristotle, and why and how the logistic tradition that led from Frege through Russell, rather than the algebraic tradition that led from De Morgan and Boole through Peirce and Schröder, came, in his view, to define modern logic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Early modern alchemy studied both matter and life, much like today's life sciences. What material life is and how it comes about intrigued alchemists. Many found the answer by assuming a vital principle that served as the source and cause of life. Recent literature has presented important cases in which vitalist formulations incorporated corpuscular or mechanical elements that were characteristic of the New Science and other cases in which vitalist thinking influenced important figures of the Scientific Revolution. (...) Not merely speculative, vitalist ideas also motivated chymical practice. The unity of life science and material science that is found in many formulations of Renaissance alchemy disintegrated in Georg Ernst Stahl's version of post-Cartesian vitalism. (shrink)

The main characteristic of modern science is that its new theories contain the old ones as their particular cases. In this respect, one can speak of "modern" science only since 17th century discoveries of Galileo, Kepler and Descartes. Yet, one can find certain traits of the modern scientific mode of thinking as early as in 14th century; they include interest in the practical use of science, introduction of experiment and mathematical method. Late medieval (...) class='Hi'>science was powerfully influenced by the doctrines of Aristotle, who found the essence of scientific pursuit in establishing the causes of the phenomena observed in the world in the inductive process of abstraction, which has three main stages of generalization: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. In physics the solutions were hinged on the concept of natural directions and the belief that uniform motion requires permanent application of power. The foundations of Aristotelean physics were first questioned in the 14th century. Duns Scotus and Wiliam of Ockham critically discussed the doctrine of induction, originating the shift of interest towards observation. Peter of Abano started the theory of experiment. Some criticism came from the theologians, who questioned certain limitations of the Aristotelean frame of mind. The main subject of controversy was the concept of vacuum, discussed especially with the reference to motion. Here the Aristotelean standpoint was criticised from the positions of atomism and Platonism by a number of scholars starting from Robert Grosseteste, through Giles of Rome and Nicholas of Autrecourt, to Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno. Other controversial problems included plurality of the worlds, privileged positions in the universe, circular motion of the earth. Here an important contribution was made by Nicolas Copernicus. Another group of scholars, which helped to overcome Aristoteleanism, was the so-called Merton school of Oxford. Their new theories of motion, which distinguished between its kinematic and dynamic aspects, quickly spread through Europe and are said to have influenced Galileo. Yet another source of inspiration was found by Galileo in the views of the nominalist school of Paris, notably Nicholas of Oresme and John Buridan. By reaping the benefit of their innovations and overcoming their deficiencies Galileo was able to lay foundations for the modern science, first fully formulated by Newton. (shrink)

Well-developed educational system leads to a strong country. The Chinese government has emphasized and clarified the priority of developing the Chinese educational system, and it has accelerated efforts to modernize it to position China as one of the world leaders in education. This essay discusses the priority of developing the Chinese educational system, and it outlines the main factors for the construction of a modern theoretical system of education with Chinese characteristics. It argues that this construction should be (...) based on the actual practice of education in China in the new era, it should be deeply rooted in the methods and wisdom of traditional Chinese education, it should incorporate the educational ideology and concepts nurtured by the modern Chinese revolutionary culture, it should draw on the latest scientific advancements and achievements throughout the world and keep pace with the development of the times, and, finally, it should be informed by the study of the nature and development of human beings with special attention to the theoretical issues embedded in educational activities themselves, which relate to the deepest levels of a philosophical worldview. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Modernity as a Rhetorical Problem: Phronēsis, Forms, and Forums in Norms of Rhetorical CultureJames Arnt AuneThe true paradises are the paradises that we’ve lost.—Marcel Proust, The Past RegainedThomas B. Farrell’s Norms of Rhetorical Culture (1993, 6) remains both a masterly synthesis of previous constructive work in rhetorical theory and the essential starting point for anyone committed to reconciling the practical impulses of Aristotelian rhetoric, ethics, and politics with the (...) critical imperatives of modernity. In what follows, I try to make a very simple point about Farrell’s recuperation of Aristotelianism: he neglects matters of social causation and institutional design that were essential to Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric. In turn, by displacing the social in favor of the cultural—a displacement characteristic of much recent work in the human sciences (Schudson 1997)—Farrell lacks a coherent account of the gap between the normative aspirations of classical rhetoric and the empirical characteristics of public life in modern liberal democracies.The problem appears most clearly in chapter 7 of Norms : “Criticism, Disturbance, and Rhetorical Community.” Farrell defines culture as “the common definition of places for the invention and perpetuation of meaning. A culture offers to those who live in it symbols and families of practices that [End Page 402] permit ongoing performances of meaning and value” (1993, 277). Summarizing his previous arguments, Farrell contends that Aristotle’s Rhetoric informs modern “cultural occasions” in three ways: “the impetus for rhetorical meaning, which we find in Aristotle’s seminal understanding of phronēsis, typified by deliberative prudence; a concept of rhetorical form, which we have found in the prototype for public inference and judgment—the enthymeme; and a modern rhetorical forum, a space of engagement wherein the modern constraints of rhetorical culture might assert themselves” (1993, 277). Although these three concepts are inherently useful, both for analyzing past rhetorical episodes and for projecting emancipatory rhetorical possibilities in the present, they are insufficiently grounded in a historical account of the differences between ancient and modern prudential deliberation, rhetorical forms, and rhetorical forums. An adequate history of these differences would require attention to modern social systems as a whole, which include the economy, the polity, and social institutions such as the family, schools, religious and ethnic organizations, and, most crucially for contemporary social systems, the entire apparatus of the culture industry, including the news and entertainment “media.”The cultural aspect of the modern social system, loosely following Talcott Parsons (1951), includes norms, which make for communal solidarity, and values, which undergird the whole system. Although a thoroughgoing account of the place of rhetoric in the entire contemporary social system of a modern liberal democracy such as the United States or Canada would have required a book three times as long as Norms, there are three ways in which modernity complicates the appropriation of Aristotle’s concepts. First, rhetorical meaning is very different in a social system in which individual autonomy takes precedence over communal solidarity as a fundamental value (Pippin 1999). Second, rhetorical forms function differently in a social system in which those forms can be commodified (Aune 1994, 2001). Third, rhetorical forums are also far more complex, especially in an extended republic like Canada or the United States, requiring greater attention to the way in which constitutions literally create persons who speak (such as the president or prime minister) and spaces for speaking (Congress, the state or provincial houses [White 1984]). The need to raise massive sums of money to obtain media access for common rhetorical deliberation, as is especially the case in the United States, complicates the notion of a rhetorical forum immensely. Even without adopting a broadly Marxian framework, it is clear that the rise and development of capitalism have permanently altered rhetorical deliberation and its forms and forums. [End Page 403] In what follows, I expand on these three criticisms first, by developing a historical account of the social changes that necessitate a rethinking of classical rhetorical theory; second, by comparing and contrasting Farrell’s work with two other contemporary Aristotelianisms, one antimodernist and the other solidly modernist; and third, by developing a framework for normative and empirical investigation of rhetoric that is, I hope... (shrink)

New materialism challenges conventional theories of understanding human being and subjectivity, which it regards as shaped by mechanistic models characteristic of early modern philosophy that regarded matter as largely passive. Instead it gives weight to topics often overlooked in such accounts: the body, the role of affect and the emotions, gender, temporality, agency and vitalism. This collection, which includes an international roster of contributors from philosophy, history, literature and science, is the first to ask what is 'new' about (...) the new materialism and place it in interdisciplinary perspective. Against current theories of new materialism it argues for a deeper engagement with materialism's history; questions whether matter can be 'lively'; and asks whether new materialism's wish to revitalize of politics and the political lives up to its promise. (shrink)

This chapter examines a key focal characteristic of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, its delineation of how a ‘science of man’ can inform and structure an account of ‘society’. The key contribution of the Scots to the rise of the human sciences lies in a conception of society as a set of interlocked institutions and behaviours. The Scots provided an analysis of both social statics and social dynamics, which shifted the focus away from the individualism that characterized early modern (...) jurisprudence. Humans as social beings are best understood in society and not as monadic individuals. The Scottish analysis also sidelined the centrality traditionally allotted to the political. Humans are social as well as political animals. Political institutions are simply one kind of institution among several, to be given no greater priority than the rest. (shrink)

"The Invention of Modern Science proposes a fruitful way of going beyond the apparently irreconcilable positions, that science is either "objective" or "socially constructed." Instead, suggests Isabelle Stengers, one of the most important and influential philosophers of science in Europe, we might understand the tension between scientific objectivity and belief as a necessary part of science, central to the practices invented and reinvented by scientists."--pub. desc.

Max Weber analyzes the science of the Modern Period. The revolution in physics at the beginning of the 20th century, the creation of quantum mechanics bring to the fore another type of scientific thinking. It is important to note that past knowledge in this case is not refuted, not destroyed, it becomes marginal and enters into communication with its competitor. It is this type of communication with Weber’s philosophy of scientific thinking that helps us to understand its specificity. (...) According to Weber, new knowledge is derived from the previous one, refuting its truth. On this basis, Weber writes that science is different from the art, where the created works retain their significance regardless of the time when they were created. For modern science the predecessor is necessary as another, without which not any communication is possible. Classical science, about which Weber writes, is necessary and continues to function. Satisfying the reemerging needs of society, it can detect previously hidden possibilities and, at the same time, encourage new scientific thinking to strengthen its position.The concept of revolution disappears gradually from the works on science. Instead, sociological concepts such as an innovation center or a technopark that combine simultaneously changes in the logic of knowledge and in the technical equipment of society are becoming popular. Logical and social characteristics of science are combined, the boundary between them becomes less noticeable. If in the era of classics the artificial world surrounding man was built on the basis of the laws of nature, now it is being created on the basis of the laws of thinking. For Weber, this world was silent and dead, this is what classical science testified to. Now the world around us is endowed with artificial intelligence, and we must be able to communicate with it. To understand Weber, it is necessary to establish contact with the world of classics, and not to try to destroy it and to declare it worthless. (shrink)

It is very well known that from the late-1960s onwards Feyerabend began to radically challenge some deeply-held ideas about the history and methodology of the sciences. It is equally well known that, from around the same period, he also began to radically challenge wider claims about the value and place of the sciences within modern societies, for instance by calling for the separation of science and the state and by questioning the idea that the sciences served to liberate (...) and ameliorate human societies. But what is less known is how, if at all, these two sets of challenges were connected, and why Feyerabend felt it important to raise them at all. In this chapter, my aim is to explore these issues by considering why Feyerabend used radical strategies to challenge the authority of science, and what purpose, if any, they were supposed to serve. Why, for instance, did Feyerabend defend alternative medicine, psychical abilities, astrology, magic and witchcraft and why did he argue that ‘Western science’ is complicit in environmental destruction, intellectual imperialism, social oppression, and spiritual destitution. Located in their historical and political context, such defences and arguments seem peculiar, not least because science was recognised not only as a central site of the intellectual and ideological competition between the West and the Soviet Union, but also because Western victory in that site was considered inevitable. What, then, did Feyerabend think he was trying to achieve by raising radical challenges to a central component of the cultural and intellectual prestige of the Western world grounded in appeals to practices and traditions which most would regard as eccentric at best and absurd at worst? My suggestion is that Feyerabend was making a subtler point than one might suppose. For the purpose of these radical challenges was to determine if the members of Western societies would in fact honour the epistemic standards – of tolerance, critical enquiry – which were identified as being characteristic of science and definitive of the social and political values of Western liberal democracy. I suggest that Feyerabend was trying to demonstrate that scientists were, too often, guilty of the same intolerant and dogmatic attitudes which were, according to prevailing propaganda, the property of illiberal totalitarian societies. Science does not reflect the superior epistemic and political values of Western societies but are, in fact, reflective of the same vices ascribed to the Soviet Union. If that is the case, then the sciences are not symbols of our epistemic and political values, but quite the reverse, hence Feyerabend’s talk of the ‘dogmatic’, ‘totalitarian’, ‘ratiofascist’ nature of modern science. But there is a positive upshot to Feyerabend’s challenge. For even if the sciences do not yet reflect the epistemic and political values of liberal democratic Western societies, they might yet be reformed so that they are. And there is a parallel between Feyerabend’s strategy and that of many of the other radicals of the time – student activists, environmentalists, and pacifists – namely to test the commitment to tolerance and deliberative debate of the establishment by asking it to seriously engage with ideas and convictions opposed to its own. For both science and society can become ‘tyrannical’ through the same means: by exempting themselves from critical scrutiny, by promoting self-serving ‘myths’ about themselves, and by derogating and excluding alternatives, including the ‘outsider’ perspectives they offer. The chapter concludes by suggesting that Feyerabend is distinctive in virtue of his willingness to offer radical criticisms of the authority of science such that it can fulfil its legitimate ideological role – namely, of symbolising and instantiating our core epistemic and political values – such that we can offer a sincere and meaningful answer to Feyerabend’s question ‘what’s so great about science?’. (shrink)