Giải quyết biến đổi khí hậu và ô nhiễm môi trường đang và sẽ là thách thức lớn của nhân loại trong thế kỷ 21. Con người không còn nhiều thời gian để sửa chữa, phục hồi đưa hệ sinh thái môi trường (tự nhiên) trở về trạng thái an toàn. Trong khi các nỗ lực trong thời gian qua chưa thực sự hiệu quả thì COP26 mở ra cơ hội lớn để nhân loại tiến gần đến mục tiêu (...) kiềm chế nhiệt độ của trái đất không vượt quá 1.5 độ C. Mặc dù Việt Nam cùng với 146 quốc gia trên thế giới đã có cam kết mạnh mẽ nhất trong việc giảm phát thải vào năm 2050, tuy nhiên việc cụ thể hóa cam kết thông qua các giải pháp sáng tạo là rất quan trọng. Sử dụng (áp dụng, vận dụng) hệ sáng tạo 3D và nguyên lý bán dẫn giá trị, tác giả đề xuất hệ sinh thái “giải pháp trụ cột” cần thực hiện gồm có tăng cường thông tin, truyền thông, nghiên cứu khoa học về môi trường (biến đổi khí hậu, ô nhiễm môi trường...); xây dựng, chuyển đổi và nâng cao văn hóa và môi trường; đẩy mạnh phát triển kinh tế gia tăng phúc lợi; xây dựng (chuyển đổi) lớp doanh nhân có văn hóa, trách nhiệm môi trường; tăng cường mở rộng sự hợp tác quốc tế về mọi mặt đặc biệt là trong lĩnh vực kinh tế, truyền thông và khoa học; và thực thi các giải pháp nêu trên một cách kỷ luật. (shrink)

Resumen En esta conversación, María del Rosario Acosta y Jean-Luc Nancy reflexionan sobre los distintos registros de la palabra "murmullo" y la relación que puede establecerse entre cada uno de ellos y la pregunta por la crítica política y de lo político en el pensamiento de Nancy. El aspecto sonoro del murmullo permite acercarse, por un lado, a una reflexión sobre la circulación del sentido en términos de resonancia. Conduce también a la pregunta por la singularidad de la experiencia de (...) la escucha en la constitución de ser-en-común, y por el papel del testimonio -y la desaparición de espacios para su escucha- en medio de las múltiples violencias que afectan nuestro presente histórico. Nancy revisa algunas de sus posturas anteriores frente a estas preguntas, profundiza en otras, y trae a colación temas nuevos que no se encuentran desarrollados en otros de sus escritos. Como texto inédito, esta conversación es un homenaje a su voz en el contexto de su muerte reciente. Nos recuerda que el murmullo de su pensamiento seguirá circulando entre nosotres.In this conversation, María del Rosario Acosta and Jean-Luc Nancy reflect on the different registers of the word "murmur" and the relationship that can be established between each of them and the question of the political and political criticism in the thought of Nancy. The sound aspect of the murmur allows us to approach, on the one hand, a reflection on the circulation of meaning in terms of resonance. It also leads to the question of the uniqueness of the experience of listening in the constitution of being-in-common, and of the role of testimony -and the disappearance of spaces for listening to it- during the multiple violence that affects our historical present. Nancy reviews some of his previous positions on these questions, delves into others, and brings up new themes that are not developed in other of his writings. As a previously unpublished text, this conversation is a tribute to his voice in the context of his recent death. He reminds us that the murmur of his thoughts will continue to circulate. (shrink)

O episcopado francês e a lei de Separação - Reflexão sobre um processo de reconhecimento ( The French episcopate and the Law of Separation -Reflection on a process of recognition - L`épiscopat français et la loi de Séparation - Retour sur un processus de reconnaissance). O “princípio da modernidade” – introduzido pela Revolução Francesa e ratificado por um conjunto de leis durante o século XIX – rompe com o tradicional “princípio do Estado confessional católico” e estabelece o regime de separação (...) entre a Igreja Católica e o Estado francês. Como a Igreja recebeu o regime de separação entre Igreja e Estado, constituído à sua revelia e, geralmente, contra ela? O artigo propõe-se a responder a pergunta, destacando dois pontos de vista: a) o da ruptura, segundo o qual a instituição católica, marcada pelo princípio do Estado cristão, nutre forte hostilidade contra o regime laico, ainda que estabelecendo com ele acordos práticos; b) e o da continuidade, sob o qual a Igreja acolhe e defende o princípio da “sã laicidade” e justifica a liberdade pública de consciência. Baseado em minuciosa leitura de documentos oficiais da Igreja e do episcopado francês, o artigo dialoga com os dois pontos de vista evocados, analisando seus termos e interpretando criticamente seus pressupostos e suas teses. Palavras-chave: Estado confessional; Estado laico; Laicidade; Episcopado francês.The "principle of modernity" - introduced by the French Revolution and ratified by a set of laws during the nineteenth century - breaks with the traditional "principle of the Catholic confessional state" and establishes the separation between the Catholic Church and the French State. How did the Church receive the system of separation of church and state, made in absentia and generally against the church? This paper seeks to answer that question, highlighting two points of view: a) the break, according to which the Catholic institution, marked by the principle of the Christian State, nourishes strong hostility against the secular regime, although establishing practical agreements with such regime b) the point of view of continuity, under which the Church welcomes and embraces the principle of "healthy secularism" and justifies the public liberty of conscience. Based on careful reading of official documents of the Church and of the French episcopate, this article dialogues with the two mentioned points of view , analyses and interprets in a critical way their terms, assumptions and theses. Keywords : State religion; Secular state; Secularism; French episcopate. Résumé Le “principe de la modernité” – introduit par la Révolution française et ratifié par un ensemble de lois durant le XIXème siècle – rompt avec le traditionnel “principe de l’État confessionnel catholique” et établit le régime de séparation entre l’Église catholique et l’État français. Comment l’Église a-t-elle reçu le régime de séparation entre Église et État, institué malgré elle, et, généralement, contre elle? L’article se propose de répondre à cette question en soulignant deux points de vue: a) celui de la rupture qui fait que l’institution catholique, marquée par le principe de l’État chrétien, nourrit une forte hostilité envers le régime laïque, bien qu’elle passe des accords pratiques avec lui; b) celui de la continuité, qui fait que l’Église accueille et défend le principe de la “saine laïcité” et justifie la liberté publique de conscience. Basé sur une lecture minutieuse de documents officiels de l’Église et de l’Épiscopat français, l’article dialogue avec ces deux points de vue, analyse leurs termes, tout en interprétant de manière critique leurs présupposés et thèses. Mots-clés: État confessionnel. État laïque. Laïcité. Épiscopat français. (shrink)

Resumen En sociedades preindustriales con estado, la religión como sistema de creencias que era simultáneamente sistema de programación colectiva y modo de expresar y vivir la dimensión absoluta de la realidad, el estado necesitaba de la religión y la religión del estado. La industrialización, las sociedades de innovación y cambio, y la subsiguiente democratización, han roto ese pacto y dependencia mutua. En las nuevas sociedades industriales, las religiones no podrán ofrecer sistemas de creencias con la pretensión de que se conviertan (...) en proyecto de vida colectiva, porque, interpretadas desde una epistemología mítica que da por real lo que dicen los mitos, son voluntad divina a la que hay que someterse. Por el contrario, si no se quiere quebrar la tradición, las religiones deberán hacer una oferta de espiritualidad, de calidad humana profunda, a las sociedades globalizadas en continua transformación, cuando más lo necesitan. Las nuevas sociedades no precisan de creencias que fijen, sino de calidad, de espíritu de vida. Las religiones y los estados debieran reconocer esta nueva situación por el bien de los pueblos, de la convivencia entre ellos y por el bien del planeta. Sociedades de una tecnociencia poderosa en continuo crecimiento y sin calidad, pueden ser muy peligrosas. Palabras clave : Mito; creencia; estado; religión; sociedad de conocimiento.In pre-industrial societies with a formal State, in which the religion appeared as a belief system that was both a programming system and a collective way of expressing and living the absolute dimension of reality, the state needed religion and religion needed the state. Industrialization, society in innovation and change, and the subsequent democratization broke this pact and its mutual dependency. In the new industrial societies, religions could not offer those beliefs systems that claim to be converted to a collective life project, interpreted from an mythic epistemology that take as real what the myths say, like a divine will to which we must submit. On the contrary, if you do not want to break with tradition, religions must offer a spirituality of profound human quality to the globalized societies, in continuous transformation, when they need it most. Such new societies do not need to support them, but they do need of a real density of spirit and of spirituality that gives quality to life. Religions and States must recognize this new situation for the good of peoples and the relationship between them and the good of the planet. Societies with a powerful techno science continuously growing and without quality can be very dangerous. Key words: Myth; belief; State; Religion; Knowledge Society. Resumo Nas sociedades pré-industriais com um Estado formal, em que a religião aparecia como aquele sistema de crenças que era simultaneamente um sistema de programação coletiva e um modo de expressar e viver a dimensão absoluta da realidade, o Estado necessitava da religião e a religião do Estado. A industrialização, as sociedades de inovação e mudança e a subseqüente democratização romperam esse pacto e dependência mútua. Nas novas sociedades industriais, as religiões não poderão oferecer sistemas de crenças com a pretensão de que se convertam em projeto de vida coletiva, interpretadas a partir de uma epistemologia mítica que dá por real o que dizem os mitos, como vontade divina à qual se deve submeter. Pelo contrário, se não se quer romper com a tradição, as religiões deverão ofertar uma espiritualidade, de qualidade humana profunda às sociedades globalizadas, em contínua transformação, quando mais a necessitam. As novas sociedades não precisam de crenças em que se fixar, mas de densidade de espírito e de espiritualidade que confira qualidade à vida. As religiões e os Estados devem reconhecer esta nova situação pelo bem dos povos, da convivência entre eles e pelo bem do planeta. Sociedades com uma tecnociência poderosa em contínuo crescimento e sem qualidade podem ser muito perigosas. Palavras-chave: Mito; crença; Estado; Religião; Sociedade do Conhecimento. (shrink)

S’intéressant à l’imaginaire religieux des jeunes Québécois, notre formulons l’hypothèse qu’après avoir été « religion nationale » jusqu’à la Révolution tranquille (1960-70) pour ensuite devenir une « religion culturelle » (1970-2000), le catholicisme québécois entrerait progressivement dans une nouvelle phase. S’il est trop tôt, à l’évidence, pour identifier les formes qu’il prendra, des indicateurs – tant locaux, mondiaux que « transreligieux » – nous permettent de constater l’émergence d’un catholicisme de marché chez les jeunes. Ainsi, l’exculturation (Hervieux-Léger, 2003) constatée au (...) Québec comme ailleurs aurait son revers. Nous assisterions, simultanément, à une reconnexion du catholicisme à la culture de la société de consommation. En fait, ces mutations ne seraient pas tant des ruptures que des processus continus, en cascades, dont le déclencheur « originel » pourrait être associé au processus de modernisation qui s’opère dès la fin du XIXe siècle au Québec. Ainsi, bien que l’univers religieux des jeunes soit notre objet, nous tenions à inscrire notre exploration dans un regard plus large sur le religieux et la religion; et ce, pour mieux comprendre religieux et la jeunesse qui est toujours le produit d’une époque, une construction sociale dépendante du monde adulte. (shrink)

La conscience, par laquelle nous sommes présents au monde, emprunte à notre corps la triple forme des dimensions spatiales que Descartes appelait „longum, latum et profundum” ; la diversité de ces dimensions est due à la manière plus ou moins intégrale dont l'être humain s'engage dans cette présence. I. En effet, l'engagement peut se limiter à la connaissance contemplative, c.-à-d., la connaissance qui ne passe pas aux actes. L'appareil imaginaire qui sert de symbole pour exprimer cette conscience d'autrui et du (...) monde, est emprunté aux gestes peu engagés des mains et des bras, au mouvement horizontal des yeux, le reste du corps étant plus ou moins impassible. Cette manière d'être présent constitue la dimension horizontale de la largeur, dimension qui correspond avec la largeur du corps, des bras étendus, de l'horizon. L'engagement devient plus intégral quand je fais l'effort de redresser mon corps, quand je me lève pour me mettre au travail et pour surmonter les difficultés qu'implique toute réalisation technique : ici, la présence au monde n'est plus seulement connaissance elle devient, dans et par le travail, emploi des moyens et maîtrise du monde. Par cette présence plus engagée et plus complexe, la conscience constitue une seconde dimension, celle de la hauteur qui vient s'ajouter à la largeur. L'effort que je dois faire pour acquérir ou créer une valeur est comparé avec l'effort à réaliser quand je redresse mon corps ; on compare la valeur du travail et l'effort de se lever. La quantité d'argent qui représente la valeur du travail ou d'un objet est un salaire ou un prix qui „monte” ; il permet de „monter” sur l'échelle sociale, de „subordonner” autrui. Cependant, l'être de la contemplation et de l'emploi des moyens est tel que ceux-ci ne trouvent pas leur sens en eux-mêmes ; ils renvoient à la présence qui entraîne la complexité totale de la personne humaine, au sens que l'homme cherche par la totalité de son engagement. L'attention à la vie, l'inclination vers le bien qui nous attire constitue une troisième dimension, celle du lointain. Le geste du corps qui représente cette attention est la marche en avant ; il est entamé par la „conversion”, le geste de l'homme qui détourne la face de ce qu'il déteste, pour la diriger vers ce qui l'attire il se prolonge dans le rapprochement, le mouvement qui fait disparaître les distances. II. La réflexion sur la structure respective des ces dimensions peut nous aider à mieux entrevoir le sens et la structure du langage humain. En effet, celui-ci est un comportement, un ensemble structuré de mouvements corporels : les modifications du visage, les mouvements du bras, la ligne des attitudes corporelles sont les gestes par lesquels l'intériorité, la transcendance ou l'intentionalité de l'homme se fait être-avecautrui. Le langage n'est pas seulement moyen de communication ; il est encore accès à l'intériorité et à la transcendance d'autrui. On devient homme en apprenant à structurer les mouvements corporels qui constituent le langage. III. Ceci ne veut pas dire qu'en analysant le langage on explore la totalité de l'être humain. La vie elle-même, dans laquelle les dimensions corporelles trouvent leur origine et à la laquelle elles doivent leur constitution, ne parvient jamais à exprimer dans le langage la totalité de ce qu'elle est. Mais dans l'analogie croissante des concepts et des gestes, attestée par l'histoire de la langue et de la culture humaine, elle montre une tendance constante à l'intériorisation et à la transcendance. (shrink)

"Publication posthume, le Court traité sur l'amour est en quelque sorte la clef d'une vie consacrée à la philosophie. Il développe une philosophie de l'amour, cette réalité la plus importante, la plus puissante, la plus admirable de la condition humaine. L'amour y est articulé selon deux principes fondamentaux, son mouvement ("comment dois-je aimer?") et son objet intentionnel ("qui dois-je aimer?"). Ainsi, il est sortie de soi vers l'autre et, en tant que telle, déploiement de la spontanéité et de la liberté. (...) De même, il vise un autre, saisi et reconnu dans son altérité et son unicité. Ces dimensions seront déclinées selon différentes modalités. Le fondement et le paradigme sont l'amour en Dieu, de Dieu et pour Dieu. L'amour humain est toutefois le véritable sujet du traité : amour du prochain et amour fraternel, ainsi que les deux sommets complémentaires que sont l'amour conjugal et l'amour paternel et filial. Or, à la fin, si l'amour existe bien selon ces différents modes, dans la mesure même où il est liberté qui vise un être dans son altérité, chaque amour se révèle comme à chaque fois unique et singulier."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Première parution dans Intermédialités — Intermediality, Rythmer, n° 16, Automne 2010, p. 185-206. — URI : id.erudit.org/iderudit/1001962ar — DOI : 10.7202/1001962ar. Nous remercions Lucie Bourassa de nous avoir donné l'autorisation pour cette nouvelle mise en ligne. Résumé : Cet article propose un rapprochement et une confrontation entre la notion de rythme d'Henri Meschonnic et celle d'articulation de Wilhelm von Humboldt. Ces notions présentent plusieurs parentés, bien - Linguistique et théorie du langage – Nouvel article.

Pour Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), la philosophie s'occupe de trois questions fondamentales, qui correspondent aux trois intérêts principaux de la raison humaine : "Que puis-je savoir?" ; "Que dois-je faire?" ; "Que m'est-il permis d'espérer?" En montrant que notre connaissance est limitée à une expérience de type sensible, Kant semble ruiner la métaphysique comme science du suprasensible, tournée vers les objets qui ne tombent pas sous les sens (Dieu, l'âme, la liberté, la question des limites du monde, par exemple). Or, rien (...) ne serait plus injuste que de voir en Kant le fossoyeur de la métaphysique. Si cette discipline n'est pas possible sur le plan théorique, montre-t-il, elle est en revanche possible (et même nécessaire) sur le plan "pratique". Cela veut dire que l'usage de certains énoncés métaphysiques nous permet seul de mener à bien certaines opérations dirigées vers des buts rationnels. En critiquant et en réformant la métaphysique, Kant en consacre le renouveau. Il inaugure une métaphysique d'un style bien particulier, que nous nommons la métaphysique du "comme si." C'est à élucider le statut et la fonction de cette métaphysique nouvelle que ce livre est consacré. (shrink)

Erratum to: Int J Semiot Law DOI 10.1007/s11196-014-9376-7Dans la publication originale de cet article, l’auteur n’a pas cité le titre correct de la thèse de philosophie de Stefan Goltzberg.A la dernière phrase du premier paragraphe, il ne faut pas lire «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulé Théorie et histoire de la philosophie du droit, philosophie du droit de Chaïm Perelman, de Theodor Viehweg, de Roscoe Pound» mais bien «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulée Théorie bidimensionnelle de (...) l’argumentation. Définition, Présomption, Argument A fortiori». (shrink)

L'expression d'"anarchie des valeurs" prête à confusion. Elle peut en effet laisser entendre que dans la réflexion et la vie morale actuelles ne règne plus que confusion, chaos, donc anarchie entendue comme absence de principes organisateurs et structurants de la vie sociale et politique; elle peut aussi suggérer que notre situation éthique ne connaît plus elle-même de "moralité des mœurs"; elle pourrait également ouvrir la voie aux lamentations bien connues sur les malheurs des temps, la décadence morale et spirituelle, ritournelle (...) à peu près constante dans l'histoire de l'humanité, depuis la plus haute antiquité, comme de nombreux témoignages pourraient en fournir la preuve. Aussi dois-je préciser le but de cette conférence: il s'agit de proposer une réflexion philosophique sur les conséquences pour la morale, dans la théorie comme dans la pratique, de la vie dans des sociétés démocratiques pluralistes, ou encore de s'interroger sur la morale elle-même, affectée qu'elle est par la modernité, si l'on veut utiliser ce terme large et parfois flou pour désigner la situation culturelle originale que nous connaissons désormais dans notre histoire. En quoi la spécificité de nos sociétés affecte-t-elle la manière de comprendre et de vivre la morale ? en effet celle-ci ne reste pas au-dessus des évolutions sociales, économiques, politiques et culturelles, impassible et pérenne. Puisque la morale vise à contribuer à la vie bonne des hommes réellement existants, il lui faut bien les rejoindre dans leurs existences concrètes, et du coup elle est affectée par la question de savoir comment on peut mener une vie bonne, ici et maintenant, donc dans une situation neuve et très différente des moments historiques antérieures. Je vais donc tenter d'abord de caractériser notre situation en donnant un contenu à l'idée d'anarchie des valeurs, puis je m'interrogerai sur la place de la liberté morale en ce contexte, enfin j'indiquerai quelques conditions pour la vie morale ici et maintenant. (shrink)

Reconstruiremos a crítica de Olavo de Carvalho à modernidade, à ciência e aos intelectuais públicos, a partir da sua proposta (a) de um dualismo-maniqueísmo ontológico-antropológico sob a forma de autoexclusão de espírito e matéria enquanto representando o drama humano ante o universo e a eternidade, e (b) de uma perspectiva metodológica dinamizada como intuicionismo personalista, privatista, espiritualista e interiorizado, o qual, como postura anti-estrutural e antissistêmica, capacitaria cada indivíduo humano, independentemente de mediações institucionalistas, cientificistas e tecnicistas, a acessar diretamente a (...) Verdade absoluta e a compreender de si por si mesmo a objetividade do mundo e do homem. Em continuidade, explicitaremos exatamente essa correlação, feita por Olavo de Carvalho, entre modernidade, materialismo, ceticismo, relativismo e ideologia, que descamba para uma ciência positivista-perspectivista incapaz de produzir conhecimento objetivo e de gerar princípios e justificação racionais, para o horizonte da história como espaço do ceticismo e do relativismo, para o instrumento da política enquanto dinamizado por ideologias coletivistas e, finalmente, para a ação institucional-social intersubjetiva enquanto anulando o indivíduo. A modernidade como negação da ontoteologia e centralidade de materialismo, ceticismo, relativismo e ideologia, instaura os dois grandes macrossujeitos totalitários hodiernos, conforme Olavo de Carvalho: a academia e o partido de massas. Palavras-Chave: Olavo de Carvalho; Modernidade; Intelectuais Públicos; Materialismo; Ideologia. “Wise according to the flesh”: Olavo de Carvalho’s criticism to public intellectuals Abstract: We intend to reconstruct the Olavo de Carvalho’s criticism to modernity, science and public intellectuals, from his proposal of (a) a ontological-anthropological dualism-manichaeism as mutual exclusion between spirit and matter as representing the human drama before universe and eternity, as well as (b) through a methodological perspective streamlined as personalist, privatized, spiritualist and interiorized intuitionism, which, as an anti-structural and anti-systemic posture, would able each individual, independently of institutionalist, scientist and technicist mediations, to directly access the absolute Truth, and to comprehend from himself and by himself the objectivity of world and man. From this, we will explicit exactly this correlation, constructed by Olavo de Carvalho, of modernity, materialism, skepticism, relativism and ideology, which leads to a positivist-perspectivist science unable to produce objective knowledge and to generate rational principles and justification, to the horizon of history as sphere of skepticism and relativism, to the instrument of politics as streamlined by collectivist ideologies, and finally to the institutional-social intersubjective action as annulling the individual. Now, modernity as negation of ontotheology and the centrality of materialism, skepticism, relativism and ideology institutes the two main totalitarian macro-subjects of our time, according to Olavo de Carvalho: academy and mass party. Key-Words: Olavo de Carvalho; Modernity; Public Intellectuals; Materialism; Ideology. “Sabios según la carne”: la crítica de Olavo de Carvalho a los intelectuales públicos Resumen: Proponemos reconstruir la crítica de Olavo de Carvalho a la modernidad, la ciencia y los intelectuales públicos, a partir de su propuesta (a) de un dualismo-maniqueísmo ontológico-antropológico en forma de autoexclusión entre espíritu y materia como representación del drama humano ante el universo y la eternidad, así como (b) de una perspectiva metodológica dinamizada como intuicionismo personalista, privatista, espiritualista e interiorizado, que, como postura antiestructural y antisistémica, permitiría a cada individuo humano, independientemente de las mediaciones institucionalistas, científicas y técnicas, acceder directamente a la Verdad absoluta y comprender por sí mismo la objetividad del mundo y del hombre. En continuidad, trataremos de explicar exactamente esta correlación, hecha por Olavo de Carvalho, entre modernidad, materialismo, escepticismo, relativismo e ideología, que conduce a una ciencia positivista-perspectivista incapaz de producir conocimiento objetivo y generar principios y justificación racionales, para el horizonte de la historia como espacio de escepticismo y relativismo, para el instrumento de la política dinamizado por ideologías colectivistas y, finalmente, para la acción institucional-social intersubjetiva como anuladora del individuo. Ahora bien, la modernidad como negación de la ontoteología y centralidad del materialismo, el escepticismo, el relativismo y la ideología, establece los dos grandes macro-sujetos totalitarios de nuestro tiempo, según Olavo de Carvalho: la academia y el partido de masas. Palabras-Clave: Olavo de Carvalho; Modernidad; Intelectuales Públicos; Materialismo; Ideología. Data de registro: 03/12/2020 Data de aceite: 15/06/2022. (shrink)

Les cinq leçons dont se compose L'idée de la phénoménologie furent prononcées à l'Université de Göttingen, en avril-mai 1907. Husserl traversait alors une crise tant personnelle (le retard persistant à l'accès au statut de professeur ordinaire en philosophie) que théorique (aucune publication depuis les Recherches logiques de 1900-1901, mal comprises d'ailleurs par ses contemporains. D'où une nouvelle décision: " En premier lieu, je nomme le problème général que je me dois de résoudre pour moi, si je veux pouvoir me donner (...) le titre de philosophe. Je veux dire une critique de la raison (...). J'ai plus qu'assez goûté aux tourments de l'obscurité, du doute qui va et vient. Je dois parvenir à une intime assurance. Je sais bien qu'il s'agit là d'une grande, d'une très grande chose, je sais bien que de grands génies y ont échoué et, si je voulais me comparer à eux, je devrais me désespérer par avance. " (Journal, en date du 25 septembre 1906, Hua., I, p. VII-VIII). De cette crise, Husserl sortira en atteignant la certitude du Je transcendantal dégagé par la réduction phénoménologique. Mieux, de cette crise sortira la réduction phénoménologique elle-même. Du coup la phénoménologie deviendra, selon les mots mêmes de Husserl, d'une " psychologie descriptive ", une " phénoménologie transcendantale ". (shrink)

Cảm xúc là yếu tố cơ bản thúc đẩy con người đưa ra quyết định và xử lý thông tin. Sợ hãi là một trong những cảm xúc phổ biến nhất ảnh hưởng đến hành vi của nhà đầu tư cá nhân trên thị trường chứng khoán. Mặc dù nhiều nghiên cứu đã được thực hiện để khám phá tác động của nỗi sợ hãi đối với hiệu quả đầu tư và hành vi giao dịch của nhà đầu tư (...) cá nhân, nhưng vẫn còn rất ít thông tin về các yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến nỗi sợ hãi của nhà đầu tư cá nhân trong thời kỳ thị trường sụt giảm (hoặc những giai đoạn cực kỳ biến động). Vì thế, nghiên cứu này được thực hiện để tìm hiểu liệu các nguồn thông tin ảnh hưởng đến quyết định đầu tư của nhà đầu tư có ảnh hưởng đến sự sợ hãi của họ khi khủng hoảng xảy ra hay không. Nghiên cứu đã sử dụng phương pháp phân tích Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) trên bộ dữ liệu từ 1526 nhà đầu tư Trung Quốc và Việt Nam. Kết quả nghiên cứu chỉ ra rằng các nhà đầu tư tiếp cận các loại thông tin khác nhau khi đưa ra quyết định đầu tư sẽ ảnh hưởng đến tần suất phản ứng sợ hãi khác nhau. Cụ thể, các nhà đầu tư tham khảo thông tin từ chuyên gia hoặc tự phân tích khi đưa ra quyết định đầu tư ít bị đóng băng (biểu hiện của tâm lý sợ hãi) hơn trong thời kỳ thị trường sụt giảm. Ngược lại, những người đưa ra quyết định đầu tư dựa trên thông tin từ người quen hay bạn bè và trực giác sẽ bị đóng băng thường xuyên hơn. Kết quả nghiên cứu này giúp gợi ý nhà đầu tư cá nhân nên trang bị cho mình các kiến thức về tài chính cũng như tham khảo các ý kiến chuyên gia trên thị trường, hoặc những nguồn thông tin đáng tin cậy, khi đưa ra quyết định đầu tư. Bên cạnh đó, cơ quan quản lý thị trường cần có hoạt động phổ cập kiến thức về thị trường chứng khoán, hạn chế ảnh hưởng của các kênh thông tin không chính thống, và khuyến khích nhà đầu tư ít kinh nghiệm mua chứng chỉ quỹ của các quỹ đầu tư. (shrink)

The reception of Avicenna by medieval Jewish readers presents an underappreciated enigma. Despite the philosophical and scientific stature of Avicenna, his philosophical writings were relatively little studied in Jewish milieus, be it in Arabic or in Hebrew. In particular, Avicenna's philosophical writings are not among the “Hebräische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters” – only very few of them were translated into Hebrew. As an author associated with a definite corpus of writings, Avicenna hardly existed in Jewish philosophy in Hebrew. Paradoxically, however, some (...) of Avicenna's most distinctive ideas were widely known and embraced by Jewish philosophers. This is the phenomenon that we dub Avicennian knowledge without Avicenna. In contrast with the philosophical treatises, Avicenna's medical writings were widely and intensively studied by Jews, especially in Hebrew, and remained influential until at least the seventeenth century. The present article presents a comprehensive picture of Avicenna's reception within medieval Jewish cultures in both Arabic and Hebrew and tries to explain the Jews’ complex attitude to Avicenna.La réception d'Avicenne par les érudits juifs médiévaux présente une énigme dont on n'a pas encore pris toute la mesure. Malgré la grande stature scientifique et philosophique d'Avicenne, ses écrits philosophiques ont été peu connus des savants juifs, que ce soit en arabe ou en hébreu. Ils n'ont guère fait partie des “Hebräische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters” – peu seulement ont été traduits en hébreu. En tant qu’auteur associé à un corpus de textes, Avicenne n'existe presque pas dans la philosophie juive en hébreu. Paradoxalement cependant, certaines des idées les plus caractéristiques d'Avicenne étaient bien connues et acceptées par des philosophes juifs. Nous appelons ce phénomène savoir avicennien sans Avicenne. Contrairement aux écrits philosophiques, les ouvrages médicaux d'Avicenne, eux, étaient lus et utilisés par les juifs, notamment en traductions hébraïques, et ce jusqu'au xviie siècle. Cet article présente un tableau général de la réception d'Avicenne, en arabe et en hébreu, dans les différentes cultures juives et il tente d'expliquer l'attitude complexe des savants juifs vis-à-vis d'Avicenne.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. AVICENNA AMONG MEDIEVAL JEWS THE RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL WRITINGS IN JEWISH CULTURES, EAST AND WESTVolume 22, Issue 2Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000033Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the complex relationships between falsafa and kalām. As regards the history of the latter, it has been generally agreed that al-Juwaynī played a decisive role at a moment when Avicennism became intrusive. It is mainly in his al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya that al-Juwaynī initiated a doctrinal and methodic evolution of Ashʿarism. One necessarily invokes here Ibn Rushd, who, by exposing the dogmas in their literal manifestation in his al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, actually sought to (...) operate a systematic refutation of the Ashʿarites' theses. It should be noted, however, that, despite his critical distance, Ibn Rushd nonetheless remained attentive to al-Juwaynī's evolutionary study. In this contribution, some aspects of the major issues in kalām will be examined: the existence of God and the argument of takhṣīṣ, His unicity and the argument of mumānaʿa, as well as human agency with the acknowledgement of man's capacity and its role. Albeit limited in scope, the essay attempts to make a more profound evaluation of al-Juwaynī's role at a crucial moment of the history of kalām in its specific development during which the Great Masters have not always been faithful to the classical tenets of their school, but also in its relations with falsafa and its influence on al-Juwaynī, and then and mainly on his disciple al-Ghazālī's theological thought.Le présent travail concerne les rapports complexes qui ont existé entre la falsafa et le kalām. Pour l'histoire propre de ce dernier, l'on s'accorde sur le rôle de premier ordre joué par al-Juwaynī à un moment décisif où l'avicennisme devenait envahissant. C'est surtout dans al-ʿAqīda al-niẓāmiyya qu'il fit évoluer l'ashʿarisme aussi bien dans la doctrine que dans la méthode. Le témoignage d'un faylasūf est ici invoqué. Ibn Rushd, en voulant exposer dans al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla les dogmes dans leur sens manifeste, a cherché à opérer une réfutation systématique des thèses ashʿarites. Ce faisant, il a été attentif au renouvellement opéré par al-Juwaynī. Tout en restant critique à son égard, il a trouvé chez lui un réconfort à sa polémique anti-ashʿarite. Sont évoqués ici certains aspects des questions majeures dans le kalām: l'existence de Dieu avec l'argument de takhṣīṣ, Son unicité avec l'argument de l'empêchement mutuel, et les actes humains avec l'affirmation de la capacité de l'homme et le rôle de celle-ci. Même si le travail présenté ici peut être continué et élargi, il cherche à avoir une appréciation plus exacte du rôle joué par ce grand maître de l'ashʿarisme à travers son petit traité, à une époque jugée cruciale dans l'histoire du kalām selon son développement propre au cours duquel les grands maîtres n'ont pas été toujours fidèles aux doctrines classiques de l'École, mais aussi dans ses rapports avec la falsafa et l'influence de celle-ci sur la pensée théologique d'al-Juwaynī et puis et surtout sur celle de son disciple al-Ghazālī.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.REGARDS D'IBN RUSHD SUR AL-JUWAYNĪ QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODEVolume 22, Issue 2Mokdad Arfa Mensia DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000021Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. REGARDS D'IBN RUSHD SUR AL-JUWAYNĪ QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODEVolume 22, Issue 2Mokdad Arfa Mensia DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000021Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. REGARDS D'IBN RUSHD SUR AL-JUWAYNĪ QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODEVolume 22, Issue 2Mokdad Arfa Mensia DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423912000021Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

HOME . ABOUT US . CONTACT US HELP . PUBLISH WITH US . LIBRARIANS Search in or Explore Browse Publications A-Z Browse Subjects A-Z Advanced Search University of Cambridge SIGN IN Register | Why Register? | Sign Out | Got a Voucher? prev abstract next Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes A Devout Catholic? Knowledge of The Mental Thought and Language Descartes as A Natural Philosopher Substance Dualism Notes Two Approaches to Reading the Historical Descartes Author: Desmond M. Clarke (...) DOI: 10.1080/09608780902986680 Publication Frequency: 5 issues per year Published in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Issue 3 June 2009 , pages 601 - 616 John Cottingham: Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 40.00 (hb.). ISBN 978-0-19-922697-9 John Cottingham, in a new collection of essays, asks the question: 'what exactly did Descartes himself chiefly take himself to be doing?' (254). 1 While the question is relatively clear, and while it acknowledges implicitly that Descartes was probably doing a range of different things, the answer that is apparently proposed here emerges only on reading the whole collection. Cottingham distinguishes in Chapter 1 - which is a new, synoptic overview of what is discussed in the other chapters, all of which were previously published - between two approaches to reading Descartes. One is to see him as 'a dummy on which to drape various suspect doctrines (such as “Cartesian dualism”)' (3), which contemporary analytic philosophers have shown to be radically mistaken. Another approach is adopted by historians of ideas 'who make it their life's work to pay meticulous scholarly attention to the philosophical works of past ages' (3). Cottingham does not explicitly criticize either of these approaches, but he hints at situating his own as some kind of Aristotelian middle course between the two. Since the two reference points are dangerously close to straw men or what Cottingham calls 'extreme positions', the proposed middle way may simply combine elements of two approaches, each of which is entirely legitimate. I return to this question at the conclusion. In fact, many of these essays were intended to show (rightly!) that Descartes never held the philosophical positions that are often attributed to him. The interpretation of Karol Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II, provides a good example of how mistaken one can be: The Cogito ergo sum radically changed the way of doing philosophy … After Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought: all that is being- the created world, and even the Creator, is situated within the ambit of the Cogito, as contents of human consciousness. Philosophy is concerned with beings as contained in consciousness, and not as existing independently of it. (257) The only way to address such a caricature is to refer back to what Descartes actually wrote. Cottingham does precisely that, often quoting the original Latin or French texts. However, having shown successfully, by a close reading of the texts, that Descartes did not hold many of the views that are attributed to him, it still remains to say what Descartes did hold or teach about various philosophical problems that retain their perennial interest for us. This is how the question arises, intermittently, about what Descartes thought he was 'chiefly' doing, or what was his primary objective, in the course of an intellectual career that spanned three decades. However, the apparently legitimate desire to bring Descartes' intellectual endeavours into sharp focus may be frustrated by the evidence. His life and work manifestly lack the coherence or unity of purpose that one finds, for example, among many of his French or Dutch contemporaries. It is comparatively easy to 'read' the life of Gisbertus Voetius as that of an unwavering Calvinist theologian, to see Antoine Arnauld as a staunch and consistent theological defender of Port Royal, and even to interpret the obviously fragmentary contents of Pascal's unpublished notebooks (subsequently, the Penses) as an extended search for authentic religious faith, in opposition to what he perceived as the corruption of ecclesial structures. In contrast, Descartes' life reveals features that are difficult to integrate into a coherent pattern. He lived and published during a critical juncture in the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Although baptized into the Catholic Church soon after his birth in the Loire district of France, he chose to live most of his life in the aggressively Calvinist United Provinces, in which other religious practices were officially (though often ineffectively) banned. Descartes may have adopted the motto from Ovid, at least early in his career: 'bene vixit qui bene latuit' (he lives well who conceals himself well), and he seems genuinely to have wished to avoid theological controversies. However, he engaged in very public controversies with so many of his contemporaries - including Hobbes, Gassendi, the French Jesuits (collectively) and Father Dinet (in particular), Voetius and the University of Utrecht, Regius, Fermat, Roberval, Revius and other theologians at Leiden - that one might conclude that his claimed preference for a quiet life was a disingenuous mask. 2 Descartes published four books during his lifetime, and wrote at least one other that he had intended to publish. The latter was his first major composition, Le Monde, which he suppressed when he heard about Galileo's condemnation by Rome in 1633. This was followed, in 1637, by Descartes' first book (also written in French), which he tried to publish anonymously by withholding his name from the title page: the Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, & chercher la verit dans les sciences. Plus la dioptrique, les meteors, et la geometrie, qui sont des essais de cete methode. Four years later Descartes published the first edition (in Latin) of Meditationes de prima philosophia, in quibus Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrator, which also included six sets of objections and replies. The Principia philosophiae appeared (in Latin) in Amsterdam in 1644, and was followed five years later by Les Passions de l'Ame (in French). 3 In parallel with these publications, Descartes carried on a very extensive correspondence over a thirty-year period (in both Latin and French), and preserved copies or drafts of his letters with a view to future publication. Given the range and variety of his interests, and the sheer volume of writings, published or otherwise, that have survived from his pen, one may be tempted to engage in a comparative evaluation, as Cottingham does, by selecting one of Descartes' books as his primary contribution to philosophy. Cottingham claims that the Meditations was Descartes''masterpiece' (44), 'the definitive statement of Descartes's philosophy' (45) and the 'definitive statement of his metaphysics' (68). He also describes the Meditations more narrowly as 'his metaphysical masterpiece' (259, 303) and, more broadly, as 'his philosophical masterpiece' (289), and he lists it with the Discours as one of Descartes' two 'masterworks' (280). The Principia offers some competition in this comparative judgement when it is described as 'the canonical presentation of his metaphysical views' (114), while 'the construction of a moral system … was the crowning aim of his philosophy' (231). Having pitched repeatedly for the Meditations as Descartes' primary text, Cottingham claims that its author was 'a devout Catholic' (215), that he was 'a devoutly religious philosopher' (256), and that he could not free himself 'from the influence of the long years of theological study he had dutifully completed at La Flche' (62). Accordingly, the Meditations should be read as 'in essence a work of theodicy' (220); 'what has pride of place in the construction of his philosophical system is … an appeal to God … the nature and existence of the Deity is something that lies at the very heart of his entire philosophical system' (255). Without quite saying so, there are hints here that Descartes was a devout Christian whose primary intellectual contribution was to write a work of metaphysics, in which God is central and in the course of which the author alternates between proving God's existence and contemplating God - the latter a seventeenth-century version of Bonaventure's Journey of the Soul to God. 'Descartes's attraction to a contemplative mode of philosophizing' (305) is reflected, in the Meditations, in 'the language of the soul's coming to rest in adoring contemplation of the light' (306). Cottingham also accepts the overwhelming evidence from Descartes' correspondence that he 'devoted most of his career not to metaphysics but to science' (108), although he quibbles elsewhere with those who adopt the shorthand term 'science' to describe part of what was called 'natural philosophy' in the seventeenth century (282). He also refers to the '(notoriously lame) argument for the essential incorporeality of the thinking self' in one of Descartes' masterworks (60), and he describes the 'strange, seemingly isolated world of his metaphysical meditations' (139), with its 'creaking ontology' (147), when read in isolation from the rest of his work as a natural philosopher. How should we read him, then, in the twenty-first century? A Devout Catholic? That Descartes was a devout Catholic is possible, unlikely and undecidable. He seems not to have studied theology at all while at school at La Flche, although he completed the pre-theology college cycle in the company of Jesuit students who then continued their studies in theology. Descartes consistently attempted to avoid public entanglement with religious and theological controversies, and said so frequently. 4 Given the alignments that prevailed at the time, both in France. (shrink)

Qual o sentido da vida? Por que aqui estamos? Será destino? Será escolha? Neste livro, Mario Sergio Cortella e Leandro Karnal, dois dos maiores pensadores contemporâneos no Brasil, se encontram para refletir sobre essas questões que há séculos fascinam e intrigam a humanidade. A ciência, a filosofia, a religião e a arte têm oferecido algumas possibilidades de resposta que os autores discutem aqui. Afinal, pode ser aterrador imaginar que não há um destino, algo que explique a nossa existência. Por outro (...) lado, a ausência de sentido nos deixa livres para ser e viver conforme desejarmos - embora isso implique também responsabilidade. Mas somos mesmo livres? Seja escolha ou destino, seja a vida um drama que vamos tecendo ou uma tragédia anunciada, fato é que estamos sempre a procurar algum propósito que torne a existência mais significativa. Mas o que explica que algumas pessoas tenham mais sucesso do que outras no que fazem? Seria dom, vocação ou resultado de um esforço? Como os autores apontam, talvez a vida seja menos inspiração e mais transpiração. (shrink)

De concert avec ses fonctions politiques - et cela sur vingt ans -, Montaigne rédigea ses Essais que l'on considère trop souvent comme séparés de ses responsabilités publiques aujourd'hui reléguées à l'arrière plan de sa carrière d'écrivain. Nous voudrions arguer que ses Essais sont indissociables de sa vie publique. Certes, les préoccupations littéraires et politiques de Montaigne changent avec son temps, mais ce qui fonde la forme de l'essai - à savoir un discours profondément inscrit dans le présent - ne (...) permet pas d'établir une différence théorique entre le privé et le public puisque les deux sont pratiquement inséparables quand ils sont réduits à leur unité la plus stricte qui se rapporte essentiellement au quotidien, car dans l'immédiat du vécu, le privé et le public sont pratiquement indissociables. Si une philosophie se dégage indubitablement des Essais, elle a peut-être plus à voir avec la manipulation constante effectuée par Montaigne entre le particulier (vie privée) et l'universel (vie publique) que sur le contenu de tel précepte moral ou dogme des écoles antiques. La temporalité de l'écriture et celle des événements ne sont pas en synchronie dans les Essais et Montaigne joue constamment sur cette image d'un livre privé (hors de toute temporalité historique) alors que les Essais sont conçus comme un objet lui permettant précisément l'accès à la vie publique. Cette philosophie du quotidien et du temps présent qui ressort des Essais ne saurait mettre à l'écart les considérations publiques et historiques qui rythment toujours l'écriture d'une vie bien particulière. Paralelamente a suas funções políticas - e isso em 20 anos - Montaigne escreveu seus Ensaios frequentemente considerados como separados de suas responsabilidades públicas, atualmente relegadas a um segundo plano em relação à sua carreira de escritor. Gostaríamos de argumentar que seus ensaios são inseparáveis ​​de sua vida pública. Certamente, as preocupações literárias e políticas de Montaigne mudam com o seu tempo, mas o que funda a forma do ensaio - a saber, um discurso profundamente inscrito no presente - não permite estabelecer uma diferença teórica entre público e privado, uma vez que os dois são praticamente inseparáveis ​​quando reduzidos à sua unidade mais estrita, a qual se relaciona principalmente com a vida cotidiana, porque no imediato do vivido, o privado e o público são praticamente indissociáveis. Se uma filosofia emerge, sem dúvida, dos Ensaios, ela talvez tenha mais a ver com a manipulação constante realizada por Montaigne entre o particular (vida privada) e o universal (vida pública) do que com o conteúdo de algum preceito moral ou dogma das escolas antigas. A temporalidade da escrita e a dos eventos não estão em sincronia nos Ensaios e Montaigne opera constantemente sobre a imagem de um livro privado (fora de toda temporalidade histórica), enquanto os Ensaios são concebidos como um objeto, permitindo-lhe precisamente o acesso à vida pública. Essa filosofia do cotidiano e do tempo presente que promana dos Ensaios não afasta as considerações públicas e históricas que sempre dão ritmo à escrita de uma vida muito particular. (shrink)

Post-pandemic: Triple Agenda for a New RealityPós-pandemia: tripla agenda para uma nova realidadeNew fields for applying bioethics have emerged out of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic, but many bioethical challenges remain; so, it is necessary to reflect on the reality that human beings will have to live after that. This reflection builds on a triple agenda: challenges, warnings, and guidance. The challenge agenda deals with upcoming scientific and biotechnological developments, adjustments to work and study, sustainable development reorientation, and changes in businesses and (...) entertainment companies. These challenges could be summarized as development paradigm shifts. The warning agenda includes the management of wild species, mistrust in political leaders, unsupportive and criminal human behavior, information overabundance, the emulation of pharmaceutical industries, and the determining factors of the culture of death. These warnings could be condensed in the importance of promoting the culture of life. The guidance agenda comprises a series of principles such as the human person’s dignity, the common good, the preferential option for the poor, the universal allocation of goods, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the care for our common home. This guidance points to a fundamental and existential environmental transformation. All these changes will be possible because of human resilience, professionalism, and social solidarity, shaping an actual comprehensive human development project.Para citar este editorial / To reference this editorial / Para citar este editorialGamboa Bernal GA. Pospandemia: triple agenda para una nueva realidad. Pers Bioet. 2020;24:127-135. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.2.1Publicado: 27/11/2020. (shrink)

English summary: Kant described phenomenology as that which comes from us, and that which comes to us, a duality that leads towards the theological horizon. Kant opened a field of inquiry that historical phenomenology, born with Husserl and Heidegger, repeated. As with any repetition, criticisms of this do exist, but the dominant theme of its call is there, as well as the question: which voice do we hear? There are many shapes for this call, but each time there is the (...) law and the summons to be, the summons to change your life. Just as there is perhaps God. French description: La phenomenologie n'a pas a inventer les phenomenes - sinon comme on dit inventer un tresor - mais a les faire voir, ou entendre. Kant s'y emploie a sa maniere lorsqu'il fait entendre le ton de voix lie a l'imperatif categorique, celui d'une voix d'airain. C'est la reconduire la pensee a l'eclat d'un fait premier ou puiser ensuite ses ressources: il y a la loi. Kant le decrit comme un appel, a defaut de tout a fait le nommer ainsi, l'interpretant ensuite tout a la fois comme ce qui vient de nous (comme si le sujet ethique se donnait a lui-meme la loi) et ce qui vient a nous (comme si ce meme sujet repondait a la loi venue de Dieu). Prendre au serieux cette dualite suppose que le chantier kantien de l'ethique ouvre alors sur un horizon theologique. Kant ouvre un chantier que la phenomenologie historique, celle qui nait avec Husserl et Heidegger, repete. Comme toute vraie repetition, celle-ci ne va pas sans critique ni deplacement (Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, Jonas), mais le motif de l'appel est bel et bien la. Nous avons ete appeles - la trace laissee en nous par cet appel est trop forte pour que le moindre doute puisse encore s'elever a son propos, mais la question vient aussitot: quelle voix s'est fait entendre? Quel appel nous surprend et nous souleve? Appel de l'etre (Martin Heidegger), appel de l'Autre (Emmanuel Levinas) ou appel de la vie (Michel Henry)? Nous avons ete appeles, affectes, blesses - ce qui brise la vie lui appartient encore, mais qu'est-ce donc qui la brise et la releve? Multiples sont les figures de l'appel, mais a chaque fois il y a la loi et cette injonction d'etre - cette injonction silencieuse a laquelle le poete aura donne son exacte formule: Tu dois changer ta vie (Rilke). Comme il y a peut-etre Dieu. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present a new witness of Averroes' reception in the Muslim world, in the years that immediately followed his death. Indeed Abū al-Ḥağğāğ al-Miklātī is an Ašʿarite theologian, who was born in Fez. He is the author of a Quintessence of the Intellects in Response to Philosophers on the Science of Principles in which he aims at refuting the Peripatetic philosophers in their own field, using their own weapons. This article will first attempt to (...) draw the portrait of this atypical theologian. It will then focus on showing that al-Miklātī – although he never mentions his name – is a reader of Averroes and in particular, of his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, of which he makes various and unexpected uses. A close look at these uses will enable us to better define the nature of al-Miklātī's work. More importantly, this article will try to prove that al-Miklātī provides us with a key passage of Averroes' lost treatise On the Prime Mover. At the heart of the Rushdian criticism of Avicenna's “metaphysical” proof, this passage should throw new light on Averroes' precise understanding of this proof.L'objectif de cet article est de présenter un nouveau témoin de la réception d'Averroès dans le monde musulman, dans les années qui suivirent immédiatement sa mort. En effet, Abū al-Ḥağğāğ al-Miklātī est un théologien ašʿarite, né à Fès. Il est l'auteur d'une Quintessence des intellects en vue de répondre aux philosophes en matière de science des fondements, où il entreprend de réfuter les philosophes – les Péripatéticiens en premier lieu – sur leur terrain et avec leurs propres armes. Cet article cherchera dans un premier temps à dresser le profil de ce théologien atypique. Il s'attachera ensuite à montrer qu'al-Miklātī – bien qu'il ne mentionne pas une seule fois son nom – est un lecteur d'Averroès et en particulier de son Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, dont il fait des usages variés et inattendus. L'examen de ces usages permettra de mieux définir le statut de l'œuvre d'al-Miklātī. Enfin, et surtout, cet article tentera de prouver qu'al-Miklātī nous fournit un passage clé d'un traité perdu d'Averroès: le Traité sur le Premier Moteur. Au cœur de la critique rushdienne de la preuve “métaphysique” d'Avicenne, ce passage devrait apporter un éclairage nouveau à la compréhension qu'Averroès pouvait avoir de cette preuve.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.AL-MIKLĀTĪ, A TWELFTH CENTURY AŠʿARITE READER OF AVERROESVolume 22, Issue 2Yamina Adouhane DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742391200001XYour Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. AL-MIKLĀTĪ, A TWELFTH CENTURY AŠʿARITE READER OF AVERROESVolume 22, Issue 2Yamina Adouhane DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742391200001XAvailable formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. AL-MIKLĀTĪ, A TWELFTH CENTURY AŠʿARITE READER OF AVERROESVolume 22, Issue 2Yamina Adouhane DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742391200001XAvailable formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

La Philosophie de la Technique compte des centaoines de titres a l'etranger mais reste balbutiante en France. Or la technique constitue bien le milieu universel dans lequel desormais nous naissons, vivons et mourrons. Il n'est pas sur que cette technique englobante, qui innerve notre temps et notre espace, puisse encore etre consideree comme un ensemble d'outils au service de l'Homme et comme une science appliquee. L'Homme suivant toutes ses dimensions, est mis en question par la technique contemporaine. La science est (...) si essentiellement enchevetree a la technique, qui est operation (action et manipulation), qu'il n'y a plus de science pure, c'est-a-dire neutre et innocente. Voila pourquoi la Philosophie de la Technique rencontre la problematique ethique non de l'exterieur mais necessairement et essentiellement. Que dois-je faire? depend fondamentalement de ce que j'ai la capacite de faire. La technique, qui a radicalement modifie la nature et le champ du pouvoir-faire humain, individuel et collectif, exige du meme coup que la question ethique soit fondamentalement reconsideree. Ethique et Technique n'intervient donc pas comme un chapitre quelconque de la Philosophie de la Technique, mais peut-etre bien comme le coeur meme de ce nouveau champ de reflexion. (shrink)

La paradójica Revolución francesa sigue siendo objeto de estudio y fascinación en nuestra época, y mucho más ahora, en estos tiempos de aguas revueltas en la política, de populismos a diestra y siniestra, de confusiones ideológicas e ignorancias y olvidos de la más elemental cultura democrática, así como de los entramados históricos que nos han costado nuestras libertades. Por eso, se agradece que el profesor Francisco Javier Espinosa Antón haya traducido y editado con mimo una excelente antología de textos de (...) uno de los personajes más emblemáticos -aunque menos conocido- de aquel proceso revolucionario, Anacharsis Cloots, defensor de una República universal y comprometido con la Revolución, pero que acabaría siendo guillotinado en 1794, engullido por el terror de Robespierre. ¿Cuáles fueron los avatares en su vida que lo llevaron al ardor revolucionario? En realidad, se llamaba Joannes Baptista Cloots, barón de Gnadenthal, nacido en 1755 en el castillo del mismo nombre y propiedad de su familia, de estirpe holandesa y católica, dedicada a las fianzas e instalada en Prusia. Eligió el nombre de Anacharsis, por ser el de un filósofo escita que conoció la república ateniense y defendió el ideal de la unificación de Grecia, Escitia y Oriente, allá por el siglo VI a.c. Ese mismo impulso republicano y universalista será el motor de todos los discursos de Cloots. Culto, cosmopolita, estuvo presente en París inmediatamente después de la toma de la Bastilla, y en la capital francesa vivió intensamente aquellos turbulentos años. El hecho concreto que marcó su entrada en la escena política fue el siguiente: el 19 de junio de 1790 accedió a la Asamblea nacional encabezando un grupo de 36 extranjeros, y sus palabras fueron: "Venimos de Europa, venimos de Asia, venimos de América. Somos la Humanidad". El discurso de Cloots causó una viva impresión y fue bautizado como "el orador del género humano". En 1792 obtuvo la nacionalidad francesa, al igual que Paine, Bentham o Washington. A continuación fue elegido diputado de la Convención y se publicó su obra más destacada, La República universal. Sus discursos enardecidos, de lenguaje 568 Pilar Benito Olalla Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 22, nº 43. Primer semestre de 2020. Pp. 567-570. ISSN 1575-6823 e-ISSN 2340-2199 https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2020.i43.28 directo y pegados a la más viva actualidad, tenían un amplio eco en sus conciudadanos. Pero las disensiones e intrigas dentro del grupo jacobino al cual pertenecía se convirtieron en una trampa mortal. Y la sombra alargada del paranoico Robespierre tendió sus redes para acusarlo de "ser barón, alemán y rico, traidor y conspirador contra la República", como muy bien nos cuenta el profesor Espinosa Antón. Un juicio injusto condujo derecho al patíbulo a este jacobino prusiano, galófilo y ateo. (shrink)

As behavioural economics reveals, human decision-making deviates from neoclassical assumptions about human behaviour and people (often) fail to make the ‘right’ welfare-enhancing choice. The purpose of Sunstein and Thaler’s concept of ‘nudge’ is to improve individual welfare. To provide normative justification, they argue that the only relevant normative criterion is whether the individual is ‘better off as judged by themselves’, so that the direction in which people are to be nudged is defined by their own preferences. In light of behavioural (...) findings, however, people’s choices do not provide a sound basis for eliciting preferences and thus for assessing welfare. In this paper, I aim to challenge Sunstein and Thaler’s normative view, arguing that it is unreasonable to rely on conventional welfare economics, particularly considering the given context. Sunstein and Thaler depend on an approach of ‘preference purification’ which assumes informed, latent, and true preferences: As a result they face crucial methodological, epistemological, and practical objections, and cannot show how their approach enhances individual welfare. By building on the concepts of R. Sugden and C. Schubert, I develop an alternative normative framework for behavioural public policy, based on a contractualist perspective in which people may consent to collective choice rules in order to align future behaviour with values, to achieve particular goals or to preserve personal integrity. Individual consent and citizens’ participation and deliberation are crucial to this approach. This contractualist approach may provide a normative justification for behavioural public policy, and help to reconcile behavioural and normative economics. (shrink)

New technologies not only contribute greatly to society and the economy; they also involve fundamental societal shifts, challenging our values and ideas about ourselves and the world. With a view to aligning technological change and innovation with ethical values, the concept of responsible innovation advocates the inclusion of a variety of stakeholders, in particular from society. In shifting moral responsibility towards the producers of innovations, responsible innovation rejects the standard normative economic view that the ethical evaluation of innovations is a (...) matter of individual consumers’ market-based choices. However, in this article we argue that responsible innovation should not abandon all normative consideration of the individual outright, to which end we present an alternative normative economic approach based on preference learning. We show how this approach can provide an enhanced understanding of responsible innovation by clarifying the redistribution of moral responsibility and casting individuals in the normative role of co-innovators, rather than mere consumers. We argue that responsible innovation should enable individuals to form preferences and evaluate innovations, so as to align innovation with ethical demands. Finally, we show how our proposed approach can be put into practice in so-called laboratories in real-world contexts, using methods from the field of design. In short, drawing on normative economics, this article aims to establish a new understanding of responsible innovation that is conceptually sound and can form the basis for novel innovation practices. (shrink)

Author's introduction -- 1. In the Qur'an, God exalted reveals how deliverance follows suffering and ordeals -- 2. What tradition relates of deliverance following desolation: and how one may be rescued from sore adversity and tribulation -- 3. Presages bringing tidings of delivery to those saved from trials by speech, prayer, or entreaty -- Notes -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Further reading -- Index of Qur'anic quotations -- Index of prophetic Hadith -- Index of poems -- General index.

In October 2019, the Belgian government announced the opening of an asylum center in a former retirement home, leading to civic and political protest that escalated into arson. We examine the construction of the events before, on, and after the arson by analyzing 135 articles from Flemish newspapers, the public broadcaster’s news website, and alternative media between October 25 and November 30, 2019 using qualitative content analysis. Our analysis emphasizes journalists’ role as gatekeepers, deciding which actors get access and legitimation (...) in media coverage. Focus is on the dynamic process of how events become discursively constructed through the interventions of journalists and their sources attempting to gain primary definer status. Our analysis confirms that institutional sources remain more likely to achieve primary definer status in legacy news media. Alternative media perform similar discursive interventions as legacy news media but utilize them to provide access and legitimacy to different actors and standpoints. In the first days of news coverage, in particular, the narratives developed in right-leaning alternative media seemed to spread in legacy news media. In the following days, governmental actors and experts, through their interventions in legacy news media, were able to steer the discourse in a different direction. (shrink)

The negative co‐variation of life‐history traits such as fecundity and lifespan across species suggests the existence of ubiquitous trade‐offs. Mechanistically, trade‐offs result from the need to differentially allocate limited resources to traits like reproduction versus self‐maintenance, with selection favoring the evolution of optimal allocation mechanism. Here I discuss the physiological (endocrine) mechanisms that underlie optimal allocation rules and how such rules evolve. The hormone testosterone may mediate life‐history trade‐offs due to its pleiotropic actions in male vertebrates. Conservation in the actions (...) of testosterone in vertebrates has prompted the ‘evolutionary constraint hypothesis,’ which assumes that testosterone signaling mechanisms and male traits evolve as a unit. This hypothesis implies that the actions of testosterone are similar across sexes and species, and only the levels of circulating testosterone concentrations change during evolution. In contrast, the ‘evolutionary potential hypothesis’ proposes that testosterone signaling mechanisms and male traits evolve independently. In the latter scenario, the linkage between hormone and traits itself can be shaped by selection, leading to variation in trade‐off functions. I will review recent case studies supporting the evolutionary potential hypothesis and suggest micro‐evolutionary experiments to unravel the mechanistic basis of life‐history evolution. BioEssays 29: 133–144, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

We live in an increasingly globalizing world, in which countries are closely linked by international trade and investment ties. Cross-cultural comparative studies of national values and ethics have attracted growing research interest in recent years, because shared practices, values and ethical standards depend on shared beliefs. However, the findings of such studies have been unable to reach a consensus on the impact of culture on ethics-related attitudes and behavior. Empirically, many "cross–cultural" differences reported by previous studies might actually stem from (...) cross-national differences. In order to partially fill this gap, this study advocates an analytical framework that isolates the role of cultural and national differences in order to test their relationship to individual level variables. Within this framework, we test competing hypotheses based on both cultural and national contexts by comparing groups of Chinese and American respondents together with a "bridging group" of Chinese Chinese-Americans. Theoretically, this contextual approach helps resolve the debate on the role of culture, by showing that culture plays a far more important role in shaping value orientations than the national background. Specifically, the two ethnic Chinese groups had many cultural values in common, and differed significantly from the Caucasian group. Implications are discussed. (shrink)