Frente a las más recientes interpretaciones del Timeo platónico, que procuran reducir el papel de la necesidad o anánke hasta volverlo casi irrelevante en la economía de la génesis del universo, defenderé aquí el carácter decisivo de su presencia en la composición del mundo, su relativa autonomía re..

At Tm. 47e, Timaeus steps back from his discussion of what came about through noûs and turns toward an account of what came about through anankê. Broadie, 2012, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, sketches out two routes for the interpretation of this ‘new beginning.’ The ‘metaphysical’ approach uses perceptibles qua imitations of intelligibles in order to glimpse the intelligibles (just as we look at our reflection in a mirror in order to view ourselves). The ‘cosmological’ reading assumes we use (...) the perceptible part of the cosmos in order to come to know the entire cosmos. Broadie openly favors the cosmological reading for understanding the Timeaus as a whole. However, she confines its utility to the Timaeus and does not recommend it for other dialogues. I use Broadie’s ‘cosmological reading’ to better understand what Plato distinguishes as anankê in his second beginning. This sets the stage for my argument that Broadie’s cosmological reading is a promising means for understanding the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms. By making some comparisons to Sophist (251c–256a), I show that a refined understanding of anankê in the second beginning of the Timaeus clarifies what Plato thinks is involved in coming to know a Form. I argue that a close look at what was available to the Demiurge for cosmic creation by means of noûs yields three distinct ways in which his construction of the cosmos was limited by anankê. Clarifying these three ways in which anankê operates shows that the Demiurge’s manipulation of the foundational elements yields a perceptible world that brings out some potential relationships among Forms while suppressing others. In particular, the Demiurge’s geometricization of the elements leads him to make compromises concerning how Forms can combine in the Receptacle. These choices produce nomological relationships among the Forms with respect to where they can overlap in the Receptacle. This produces the law-like and reliable, but unnecessary, behavior of the perceptible world. I argue that our understanding of these limitations and their translation into where the Receptacle can partake in more than one Form simultaneously, figures importantly in the estimating the potential for human knowledge of the Forms. I question the use of ‘necessity’ as a translation for ‘anankê’ in the Timaeus. (shrink)

This paper examines Herodotus¿ use of words of the ananke family in order to determine which external or internal constraints the historian represents as affecting the causality of events. M. Ostwald¿s Anangke in Thucydides (1988) provides a foundation for examining the more restricted application of these terms in Herodotus (85 occurrences vs. 161 in Thucydides). In Herodotus, divine necessity (absent in Thucydides) refers to the predictable results of human wrongdoings more often than to a force constraining human choices. This represents (...) an especially ambiguous Herodotean category, however, and is expressed by a wider range of terms than those with ananke -stems. The analysis of natural ananke yields more clear-cut results. (1) In Herodotus (and not in Thucydides) ananke often qualifies an aggressive compulsion applied by a personal agent. (2) Victims of this despotic ananke are partially excused, but those who resist it earn Herodotus¿ praise. (3) Most importantly, Herodotus (unlike Thucydides) never in turn applies ananke words to circumstances that motivate imperialistic actions, especially starting a war. (4) Whereas in Thucydides agents are ¿compelled¿ to act also by fear and other internal impulses, the only psychological factor to which Herodotus applies ananke words (and this time mostly in a positive sense) is moral obligation. Herodotus¿ concept of ananke is moralistic, and consistent with his unwillingness to justify imperialism, his practice of assigning responsibility, and his high regard for nomos, on the one hand, and freedom on the other. The narrator¿s involvement in these principles is reflected in Herodotus¿ use of ananke terms in self-referential statements of the type ¿I am compelled/not compelled to say x.¿ These statements represent the narrator as the opposite of an imperial subject and analogous to the most admirable of his characters on the receiving end of compulsion. He is a free agent, who disregards political pressure and is exclusively compelled by the rules that apply to him as researcher and truthful recorder. (shrink)

The first in-depth engagement with and close reading of Anankè, this essay focuses on how Cixous's novel plays with and rewrites psychoanalytic concepts and practices. The critical elaboration of her own ‘cixanalysis’ in this fiction-as-becoming and journey, which reinvents psychoanalysis as it gives free creative rein to woman's desire instead of pathologizing it, unfolds in six related studies: on ‘conduct’, ‘habit’, staging, transference and/as translation, the interpretation of interpretation, and the shift from drive to drift in Cixous's fictional liberation of (...) woman from destiny and destination. (shrink)

Alrededor del «año cero» de la era cristiana se cruzaron en la cosmopolita ciudad de Alejandría (Alexandria ad Aegiptum) las ideas de Necesidad (ananké), de tradición griega, y de Dios Creador, de tradición hebrea. Aquí tuvo lugar lo que consideramos «la primera gran revolución filosófica» sobre el modelo socrático platónico y que configuró una matriz para desarrollar la filosofía que llega hasta nuestra época: no se comienza por la opinión (doxa), sino por el Libro, lugar de la revelación de (...) Dios, que, a lo largo de los siglos, se irá sustituyendo por otro tipo de libros: constituciones, declaraciones de Derechos Humanos, historia, literatura patriótica, etc.; la riqueza desbordante del Libro se despliega a través del Logos en sus múltiples dimensiones (de especial relevancia es la figura de la Trinidad); un Logos mediador entre el Libro y la totalidad del Mundo y de las cosas. (shrink)

At first glance, this is an entirely unremarkable kind of sentence. It is easy to find naturally occuring exponents. Its meaning is also clear: taking the A train is a necessary condition for going to Harlem. Hence the term “anankastic conditional”, Ananke being the Greek protogonos of inevitability, compulsion and necessity.

The principle that a moving body must continue to move unless something stops it was not known to Aristotle nor even unconsciously assumed by him. The effect of this ignorance upon his philosophy was discussed in C.Q. 1939, p. 129 f. It forbade him to conceive of a mechanist theory in the nineteenth-century sense. It enabled him to hold, what must seem self-contradictory to us, that all events have definable causes without there being a universal nexus of causes and effects (...) . And it compelled him to believe that nature could not be orderly unless guided by a purposive force. Therefore he attacked those scientists who had thought that the world could be explained in terms of the compulsions and interactions of natural stuffs—a principle which they vaguely called Necessity, Ananke. In attacking their doctrine A. cannot have thought he was attacking the mechanistic determinism which modern critics have detected in their words: for he could not even conceive of such an idea. There is an a fortiori case for arguing that his predecessors cannot have conceived of it either. But it is always possible that A. misunderstood them. And there is still Epicurus to consider. (shrink)

This essay investigates the concluding myth of Plato’s Republic, as well as the section on anankē and the chōra in the Timaeus, to demonstrate that the maternal figure of Necessity (Anankē), appearing in the myth of Er as the ground of logos, serves as a fecund site for an engagement with the question of sexual difference in Plato’s works. Feminist thinkers have long noted that the image of the originary, powerful mother in ancient myth works as an ambivalent surface for (...) the projection of masculine desires and anxieties, fantasies and transferential projections. In this essay, I draw on both Platonic and feminist scholarship to examine the imaginal architectonics of the scene of Necessity in the myth of Er. By comparing this maternal figuration of anankē with its appearance in the Timaeus alongside the errant, maternal chōra, I argue that the conclusion of the Republic invites a feminist mythmaking that can generatively engage debates around language and sexual difference in the works of Plato. (shrink)

How does Plotinus interpret the chora in Plato’s Timaeus? For him, Timaeus 48e‑52d deals with matter (hyle). The identification of chora with hyle goes back to Aristotle’s Physics IV.2. Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s chora as matter was echoed by Theophrastus and the Stoics and prevailed in Middle‑Platonist, neo‑Pythagorean and early Christian authors. In addition to the identification of chora with hyle, the ancient interpreters of the Timaeus conflated hyle with Plato’s ananke (Tim. 47e‑48a). Plato himself distinguishes between chora and ananke. (...) The latter denotes everything that appears in the “receptacle” prior to the ordering of the world by the demiurge, while chora is another name for the receptacle itself. In Plato, the receptacle accounts for the fact both that there are transient images of intelligible beings and that these images appear to occupy a place, i.e. that they are spatially extended. This is why the receptacle is given its alternative name “ground” (chora) and why it is also called “place” (topos) and “seat” (hedra). Although the receptacle itself cannot be spatially extended in the same way as that which appears “in it”, it is the cause of spatial extension. For Plotinus, two characteristics of matter are of primary importance : lack of size and impassibility. In the treatise II.4.[12].2‑5, he highlights the former, and in III.6[26].7‑19 he elaborates on the latter, while commenting once again on the former. In III.6[26].7‑19, he argues that this conception of matter is in line with how Plato conceives of it in the Timaeus. The “receptacle” cannot be acted upon (paschein) nor can it possess any size (megethos). Only the images of true beings “in” it can. In doing so, however, they make matter appear to “stretch out” alongside themselves. But this is not actually the case, because matter itself has no extension. On one point, however, Plotinus’ account differs from Plato’s. According to Plotinus, not only does matter not possess size, but it is not the cause of size either. The size of the appearances derives from the formulas (logoi) of which these appearances are images. Each formula encompasses within itself the measure of the size that its image will assume : the formula of horse encompasses the size of a particular horse, the formula of human being the size of a particular human being. Plotinus describes in more detail how a formula, in unfolding out of the soul, “stretches out”, thus acquiring size. He also makes a comparison between this process and the way in which formulas in the human soul display images of themselves in our image‑making faculty. He characterises this process as a motion starting from the formula and resulting in its “division” (merismos). This is what makes the image of the formula extended, i.e. divided partes extra partes, when it appears against the invisible background of matter. Since matter neither possesses size nor is the cause of it, it can be called “ground” (chora), “place” (topos) or “seat” (hedra) only in an improper way. (shrink)

De entre los héroes sofócleos, la figura de Neoptólemo sobresale por su particular dificultad para comprometerse de manera definitiva con un curso de acción. El joven acepta llevar a cabo un engaño pergeñado por Odiseo para obtener el arco infalible de Filoctetes, quien vive hace diez años abandonado en la isla desierta de Lemnos. Pero una vez avanzada la treta, cuando se aproxima realmente al objetivo, de pronto se ve asaltado por una duda que le impide seguir adelante, de manera (...) tal que se desdibuja su posición de agente capaz de concretar el plan. Neoptólemo termina por confesar al solitario isleño el motivo fraudulento de su presencia, y, excusándose, aduce estar gobernado por una “necesidad” (v.923: anánke). En este trabajo presentaré, en primer lugar, las condiciones de emergencia y las características del plan ideado por el ingenioso rey de Ítaca; en segundo lugar, una explicación de la indecisión de Neoptólemo a partir de la particular relación entre su discurso y la realidad que pretende referir; en tercer lugar, me centraré en las derivas ontológicas del conflicto central de la obra y, finalmente, avanzaré sobre los corolarios prácticos que se siguen de lo laborado en los puntos anteriores. (shrink)

Contents: Acknowledgements. Preface. CHAPTER ONE: OLDCOMB AND NEWCOMB. 1. In the King Comb's Chamber of Game. 2. The Newcombian Predicaments. CHAPTER TWO: ANANKE. 1. Fatalism: What It Is Not? 2. Fatalism: What Is It? 3. Fatalism and a priori Arguments. 4. Fatalism and ‘Internal' Experience. 5. Determinism, Indeterminism and Fatalism. 6. Transientism, Eternism and Fatalism. 7. Fatalism: What It Does Not Imply? CHAPTER THREE: FATED FREEDOM. 1. More on Libertarianism. 2. On the Deterministic Concept of Freedom. 3. Moral Self and (...) Responsibility in the Light of Probabilism. 4. Fated Freedom. CHAPTER FOUR: THE VIRUS OF FATALISM. 1. Fatalism and Problems of Cognition. 2. The Virus of Fatalism: Why Mostly Harmless? (shrink)

Este ensayo tiene como propósito la interpretación del pasaje 37d5-7 del Timeo de Platón, en el cual se dice que el tiempo es una imagen móvil eónica del aión que permanece en lo uno y que marcha según el número. La tesis central es que el tiempo es entendido por Platón desde la dimensión del lenguaje (lógos) y la dimensión de la necesidad (anánké), que se entrecruzan en el tiempo. Para ello se discuten brevemente estos conceptos, así como la manera (...) en que ambos participan en la determinación de aquello que llamamos tiempo. También se trata de pensar un concepto de aión como vida que esté libre de la connotación de eternidad introducida por la tradición cristiana. Se quiere además mostrar como los conceptos de lógos y anánké, de lenguaje y necesidad, son los conceptos que subyacen a toda su filosofía. (shrink)

The article is based on the postmodern understanding about the collapse of grand narratives (Lyotard). One of the most significant grand narratives is the narrative about unidirectionality and irreversibility of development. Part of the roots of this narrative can be found in the ancient Greek idea of the inevitability of fate, Ananke, seen primarily as a necessity. In parallel to the ancient Greek thought, however, philosophical ideas in Ancient India and China were also developed. Therefore, the ideas of karma in (...) Ancient India and the related idea of svadharma, as well as the Chinese ideas of min, the will of Heaven, and of dao, the path as a reservoir of possibilities, are presented in comparative terms. The aim by highlighting these various options is to reveal the possibilities for different readings of the contemporary situation. (shrink)

Since Stalbaum’s 1838 translation revived interest in Plato’s Timaeus, commentators have tended to bracket the discourse on Necessity, reading it as either mythical or mystical. This essay offers an interpretation of Necessity that is also an assertion of its importance for understanding the philosophically important conception of chora-space found therein. Beginning with throwing ourselves back into the Presocratic milieu, I examine what remains of Presocratic notions of kreon and ananke (necessity) in order to move forward a more robust interpretation of (...) the discourse on Necessity and chora-space. (shrink)

One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and historical periods, giving the (...) notion that there are two types of ethical point of view that have assumed shapes during history. These points of view are mutually exclusive on the one hand, and on the other, they both stand as axiomatic standpoints of morality throughout history. The dialectical relationship between the two formulates the moral discourse throughout history. (shrink)

Following the structuring hints given by Plato in his Timaeus you find, that the dialogue – actually Timaeus' lecture – falls in two parts, not in three as Cornford, Brisson and others suggest. The main division follows the two invocations of the gods (27c, 48d). The first part presents the world in its noetic form, poetically described as the work of the demiurg. Timaeus opens this part giving first his premises in the form of an introduction, which lead his presentation. (...) At the end of this part he remarks that the given premises are not enough for his aim, to explain the nature of man. Therefore he adds other guiding principles for the second part in form of a second introduction like in the first part. We need a third principle beside the real beings (the ideas) and the things we perceive. He names it chora and the new form of "`causation"' ananke, necessity. These supplementary principles anable Timaeus to describe the world under our everyday conditions, they mediate the noetic world with the world of our senses. Here is the point we can see a surprising parallel in Kant's work. The Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft correspond to the first part of the Timaeus, because here Kant exposes too the metyphysical foundation of the sciences. Later, in his last years he remarks, that there is a gap between these metaphysical principles and the physics (say of Newton or other). He seeks for a mediating principle and finds it in the "Äther" or "Wärmestoff." Kant was no more able to bring his idea to an end, we only have a lot of variating attempts, named by editors Opus postumum. But the aim of them is clear – and near by the aim that Plato aimed at – to mediate the noetic structure of the world with our everyday world. And this is evidently equivalent with the second introduction in the Timaeus. -/- Here some pages of the book-version: Erwin Sonderegger, Zur Funktion der Chora in Platons Timaios und des Äthers in Kants Übergangsschrift, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2015. ISBN 978-3-8260-5837-0. Für allfällige Zitierungen bitte ich nur die gedruckte Ausgabe zu verwenden. Danke. (shrink)