There are at least three kinds of structure we find in Islamic socio-cultural phenomena. First is the binary oppositional structure, which has two kinds of variations : hierarchical and non-hierarchical. Second is the threefold structure which has three kinds of variations, the hierarchical, the non-hierarchical and the triangle, third is the fivefold structure. Those structures are neither material nor spiritual. They are above the material, the behavioral, as well as the spiritual phenomena, but they are manifested, expressed in material, behavioral (...) and spiritual phenomena. They are thus the transcendental structures in Islam. Are those structures universal? Can we find them in other religions? To answer these questions we need to analyze data from other religions. (shrink)

In a world fraught with violence in its macabre form, it is essential to have a broad and clear understanding of the principle of non-violence (ahimsa), its various nuances, its potential and limitations. Covering a span of wisdom literature on the Indian ethos from the times of the Upanishads to the works of modern seers like Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo, the author presents the notions of non-violence and violence along a finely graduated scale instead of going into sharp polarities. (...) While making a clear distinction between gross physical violence and the subtle play of violence in words, thoughts and ideas, the paper goes on to offer a critique of modern technology and nuclear proliferation for perpetrating violence on nature and fellow human beings in the name of progress and development. While expressing his admiration for the Gandhian principle of non-violence, the author advocates practical idealism that admits violence with caution but without hatred for the purpose of general welfare (lokasamgraha), along the lines of the messages of Krishna in the Gita. This is of practical necessity till such time as the world has been awakened to a heightened level of spiritual consciousness. (shrink)

It has been widely proposed that the Jain logical methods of linguistic analysis collectively known as anekāntavāda (manypointedness) are an extension of the Jain ethical imperative of ahiṃsā (non-harm) into philosophy as a form of intellectual tolerance and relativity--described by several scholars as "intellectual ahiṃsā"--whose genealogy and development over the past sixty-five years are given in detail. It is shown how Jains used anekāntavāda to expose the relative truth of non-Jain metaphysics, while arguing that only Jain metaphysics, which alone is (...) based on the omniscience (kevala-jñāna) of the Jina, contains absolute truth (samyag-jñāna). Examples are given of Jain intolerance of others, based on nonphilosophical literacy and historical evidence, before returning to the issue of Jain tolerance for and curiosity about non-Jain philosophical positions, in an attempt to ground future discussions of Jain tolerance and intolerance on a fuller range of Jain data and not on ideological formulations inadequately grounded in historical analysis. (shrink)

As Avatar: The Last Airbender concludes, Aang faces an ethical challenge. Philosopher Terrance McConnell notes that many people think of ethical dilemmas as occurring when a person “regards herself as having moral reasons to do each of two actions, but doing both actions is not possible”. Air Nomads live a quasi‐monastic life of non‐attachment, peace, and freedom. Aang, as an Air Nomad, is generally portrayed as deeply compassionate, even as he struggles with having to grow up in wartime. In contrast (...) to Sublime Ahimsic Practice, Avataric philosophy pulls its inspiration from a different source. Aang's dilemma seems to be genuine: his Avataric duties and Air Nomadic beliefs prescribe non‐negotiable obligations that pull in different directions. Sublime Ahimsic Practice aims to remind us that we are all worthy of being treated like we are worth giving a chance. (shrink)

(Gandhi Marg 15:1 [April-June, 1993], pp. 24-36) Individuality is and is not even as each drop in the ocean is an individual and is not. It is not because apart from the ocean it has no existence. It is because the ocean has no existence if the drop has not, i.e., has no individuality. They are beautifully interdependent. And if this is true of the physical law, how much more so of the spiritual world!

The often heard (and justified) lament that academics do not adequately communicate their ideas to the broader general public has been particularly applicable to those theorists, like scholars of nonviolence, who work on the pressing moral issues facing our world. This work, ultimately the result of co-editor Predgrag Cicovacki’s deep and abiding interest in Jainism, does much to counter such impressions. Comprised of two volumes and forty-six chapters, Nonviolence as A Way of Life brings together insights from a notable international (...) array of fifty-four writers on peace and nonviolence. These writers, who represent 12 countries and 5 continents, have their contributions formally segmented into three parts—history, theory, and practice--even though considerable overlap on these matters is understandably present. The various commentaries are ultimately (albeit loosely) tied together by their discussing issues of nonviolence explicitly under the rubric of the ancient Jain notion of ahimsa. (shrink)

This essay will examine Gandhian ahimsa in its inseparability from truth. In this context, it will take issue with those who have argued that Gandhian ahimsa was either (entirely or in part) drawn from Tolstoy or (entirely or in part) from the anekantavada of the Jains; arguing that while Gandhi was influenced by both these sources, his ahimsa was drawn (in his own admission) from an altogether different source, i.e. from the metaphysics and ethics of the Bhagavad (...) Gita. Even if one were to disregard for the moment the differences between Gandhi and the other interpreters of the Gita (specially from those who were his contemporaries), Gandhi’s drawing of ahimsa as non-violence and a non-passionate universal love from the context of the war between cousins in the Gita might seem surprising. Gandhi’s contemporaries like Tilak and Sri Aurobindo (among others) had argued that the Gita had justified the exception to the law of harmlessness for the sake of duty and suggested that the aim of the Gita was to undertake a critique of the ethical and confirm it’s subordination to the political. Gandhi however had argued (to the contrary) that the metaphysics of oneness in the Gita brought out in the vision of Sri Krishna’s divine form recommended both desireless action and absolute ahimsa; given that to harm anyone or anything in the universe was, quite literally, to harm oneself. (shrink)

Those seeking to lead a spiritual life may become curious as to what is ahimsa (non violence), and inspired to practice it. But understanding how to live in non violence is not as simple as it seems, and practicing no violence in daily life can quickly become bewildering. To someone just beginning to cultivate non-violence, daily interactions might even begin to feel like the very definition of conflict! In the book “Non-Violence”, Gnani Purush (embodiment of Self knowledge) Dada Bhagwan (...) offers key understanding on how to define ahimsa (non violence) and how to avoid kashaya (internal self harm). Dadashri explains that kashaya is at the root of self harming, unhealthy relationships, and violence. Here, he teaches how to live in peace, offering profound knowledge of non violent communication, conflict resolution skills, and conflict management strategies. His spiritual teaching on how to resolve conflict - or to avoid it altogether - is offered in the context of common and everyday relationship challenges. For anyone with the intent to practice non-violence - whether wondering how to deal with negative people and difficult people, how to handle conflict, or seeking skills to face internal struggle amidst life problems - this book will prove an invaluable resource. (shrink)

In this age of environmental crisis, Jainism is regarded worldwide as one of the first religions to have developed an environmental ethic, based on its practice of ahiṃsā. This article attempts to critically engage with the concept of ahiṃsā in its recently evolving forms—from a religious concept to its current portrayal as an environmental ethic. By explaining how ahiṃsā becomes the central concept of Jainism, tying together its ethics, theology, and ecology, this article establishes that the current global portrayal of (...) ahiṃsā by Jains, more than being driven by environmental concerns, is directed toward attaining liberation through reducing karmic impressions on souls. The article discerns the differences between Jain practice of ahiṃsā and ahiṃsā as an environmental ethos; it argues that to recognize ahiṃsā as an environmental ethic a broader reconceptualization is required beyond the way it is currently conceptualized in Jainism. (shrink)

“Violence” and “nonviolence” are, increasingly, misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā—used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for rereading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically, making it harder to convincingly characterize (...) people and actions as “nonviolent.” New terminology could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and, thereby, prevent misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: ego-detachment, universal love, and seeking truth by experiment. -/- NOTE: An extended, unpublished version, with additional arguments and evidence, is also available on PhilPapers as "The Primacy of Intention and the Duty to Truth: A Gandhi-Inspired Argument for Retranslating Hiṃsā and Ahiṃsā, with Connections to History, Ethics, and Civil Resistance". (shrink)

The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable (...) through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically. The expanded scope of “violence” reflects greater consciousness of the various forms that serious harm can take, but also makes it harder to convincingly characterize people and actions as “nonviolent.” New translations could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and thereby prevent some misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: detachment from the ego, learning to love universally, and seeking truth by experiment. (shrink)

One of the basic issues of modern times is how to construct a nonviolent and peaceful society and achieve the goal of a one-world community that lives in peace and harmony. Islam and Mahatma Gandhi’s approaches, in this regard, are remarkable. Both share same aims about common ethical concepts such as nonviolent, compassion for all creation, freedom,justice, patience and tolerance. There are remarkable similarities between the ideas of Gandhi and teachings of Islam, particularly in the concepts of peace and nonviolence (...) are concerned. This article, thus, mentions about the concepts of peace and nonviolence (ahimsa) as propounded by them. It handles attributes of ahimsa and satyagraha such as “loving sinners and even your enemy”, “having no intention to harm others”, “rest on God”, “consistency of word and action”, which are held forth by Gandhi. Furthermore, this article deals with similarities of Gandhi’s teachings with “ehsan” (benevolence), “tavakol (trust in God), “al-niyyat” (intent) and “an-nasrha”(sincerity) in Islamic thought. (shrink)

Contemporary Indian identification with Hindu traditions (whether more narrowly or broadly conceived) among champions of animal protection often invokes the well-known concept of ahiṁṣā—nonviolence, as the moral basis for the position against violence toward non-human animals. To foster a more informed comprehension of this notion, this paper sets out the complex character of religious practice as presented in the Hindu scripture Bhagavad-gītā, to explore how its tenets might meaningfully apply to the practice of animal experimentation.

Normative ethics concerns the practical resolution of questions about the right and the good. Applied ethics concerns the case-based resolution of questions of the right and the good. In this module, we look at the implications of the radical Virtue Theory of Jainism for practical questions, such as life decisions, occupations, and diet –-- questions of normative and applied ethics. The Jain position is that the self is defined by virtue, and hence action (karma) is derivative and not essential to (...) the self. This entails an ethics of ahiṃsā, as action in conformity to the virtues of the self. As only action can harm, the virtue of the individual is beyond harm and hence action in accordance with this virtue is nonharmful. I consider how this impacts questions of guilt and responsibility. Unlike Buddhists who treat states of the world as the outcomes that justify actions, Jains treat the virtue of the self as the guiding outcome of ethical deliberation. It is the ultimate good. In the fourth section, I review a classic disagreement between Jains and Buddhists. This highlights a difference: while Buddhists regard virtue to be a consequence to be maximised, the Jains reject this. Virtue is our essence, and the authentic life reflects our virtue. (shrink)

When it comes to contentious conversations, the call for civility is commonplace. Rarely do we hear a call for nonviolence in communication. This is unfortunate, since nonviolence is a better standard than civility (a standard I critiqued in part one of this three-part series). Part of the problem is that a framework for communicative nonviolence has not (to my knowledge) been fully developed. Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi, the “father of nonviolence,” is widely known for nonviolence, but primarily in the realm of (...) noncommunicative action. However, there is a natural line of development in that direction from elements in his thought: Gandhi derives his commitment to nonviolence ("ahimsa" in Sanskrit) from his "law of Truth," which directs us to follow “Truth in thought, Truth in speech, and Truth in action." Inspired by Gandhi among others, Marshall B. Rosenberg developed what he termed "Nonviolent Communication" (NVC). Valuable though NVC is, it is most applicable to particular conversational contexts. It is but one part of a broader nonviolent framework, which I’ll call "ahimsic communication" (AC) to distinguish it from NVC. In this second installment of the series, I develop a framework for AC. (shrink)

This essay explores how the principles of ahimsa and reverence for life provide a foundation for animal welfare in the thought of Mohandas Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer, respectively. This exploration unfolds through a consideration of the contextual background of both thinkers, the scope of life to which they apply their respective principles, and both the ethical ramifications and limitations of this application. Within this common framework, the author delineates the striking commonalities and the significant disparities between Gandhi and Schweitzer. (...) This comparison opens a common space within which ecologically-minded Hindus and Christians can dialogue, augmenting each other's positions by drawing on respected thinkers in their traditions. It also provides an opportunity, within the tensions highlighted at the intersection of Gandhi and Schweitzer's thought, to further construct a foundation for animal welfare in contemporary discussions. (shrink)

The first half of the paper consists of a philosophical reflection upon a historical exchange. I discuss Buber’s famous letter, and another letter by J. L. Magnes, to Mahatma Gandhi, both challenging the universality of the principle of ahiṃsā. I also touch on Buber’s interest and acquaintance with Indian philosophy, as an instance of dialogue de-facto across cultures. Gandhi never answered these letters, but his grandson and philosopher extraordinaire Ramchandra Gandhi ›answers‹ Buber, not on the letter but about the ideal (...) of dialogue at large, and the interconnection of dialogue and ahiṃsā. The second half of the paper focuses on the work of Daya Krishna, another ›philosopher of dialogue.‹ from within Daya Krishna’s vast philosophical corpus, I underscore one of his last projects, in which he sketches the outlines of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty,« contrary to common and traditional ways of perceiving the concept of knowledge. I argue that the pramāṇa, means and measure of knowledge, in the intriguing case of »knowledge without certainty,« depicted by Daya Krishna as open-ended, dynamic, constantly evolving, is inevitably dialogue, and I aim to disclose the meaning and salience of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s oeuvre. However, not just the content, but also the form, or the ›how,‹ matters in my paper. I use different materials across genres and disciplines to rethink, in dialogue with Buber and Daya Krishna, the possibilities and impossibilities of dialogue. These ›materials‹ include Milan Kundera and Richard Rorty, Krishna and Arjuna, Vrinda Dalmiya who works with the notion of care as bridging between epistemology and ethics, Wes Anderson on seeing through the eyes of the other, and Ben Okri on hospitality in the realm of ideas. As author of the present paper I am moderating an imagined a multi-vocal dialogue between these ›participants‹ on dialogue as concept, as craft and especially, as a great necessity in the world in which we live. (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine some of the key concepts of Jaina religion from an environmental perspective. The paper focuses on Jain’s parasparopagraho jīvānām or interconnectedness. The common concerns between Jainism and environmentalism constituted in a mutual sensitivity towards living beings, a recognition of the interconnectedness of life forms and a programme to augment awareness to respect and protect living systems. The paper will also investigate how ahiṃsā or non-violence is understood in the Jain community (...) and also how this concept bears a positive influence in maintaining ecological balance. The paper aims to show that the practice of non-violence is limited not only to actions but extends to words and thoughts. In this process, I attempt to show the development of “intellectual ahiṃsā” where non-violence is rooted in Jain anekāntavāda that is in the tolerance of other religions, thoughts and believes. The Jain’s radical egalitarianism does away with the charges of anthropocentricism labelled against it. In fact, the Jain virtue ethics, compassion and tolerance are instrumental in creating an environment that was conducive to peaceful and productive multi-sectarian interaction both in society and ecology. (shrink)

Ahiṃsā or non-violence. is a key concept which permeates Indian ethics. In this book the author compares, for the first time, the different meanings of ahiṃsā in Jainism, Buddhism and Vedism.

이 연구는 사회적 변화와 종교적 논쟁의 상호 관련성에 초점을 두고 베다 종교의 이단과 불교의 외도 관념을 하나의 맥락에서 설명하고자 시도하고 있다. 기원전 6세기에 인도는 정치, 경제, 사회 전반에 걸친 대변화를 경험한다. 종교적으로는 기존 베다 전통의 브라만교와 새롭게 등장한 비-베다 전통의 사상가들의 대립으로 특징을 이루고 있다. 후자는 베다 희생제식을 거부했으며 카스트 신분제에 대해 부정적인 입장이었다. 그들의 사상이 북인도 지역에서 급속하게 확산되자 브라만교의 입법자들이 이를 위협으로 인식하고 그들의 사상을 이단으로 규정하면서 인도 종교의 이단 논쟁이 시작되었다. 당시 비-베다 전통의 사상가들 중에서 고따마 붓다(Gotama (...) Buddha)는 기존의 브라만교와 비-베다적 사상이 지닌 문제를 직시하였다. 그는 아힝사(ahiṃsa: 불살생)와 아낫따(anatta: 무아)의 교리로 브라만교와 대립하였고, 인간 행위의 중요성과 인과를 무시하는 사상가들에 대해 비판하였으며, 팔정도 교리를 통해 종교의 윤리를 강조하였다. 결과적으로, 인도에서 동시대에 치열하게 진행된 이단과 외도 논쟁은 종교의 윤리 문제에 대한 중요성을 인식하는 계기가 되었으며, 이후 인도 종교사에서 윤리는 정통과 이단 논쟁의 중요한 기준으로 제시된다. (shrink)

Embryonic Stem Cell Research raises ethical issues. In the process of research, embryos may be destroyed and, to some, such an act entails the ‘killing of human life’. Past studies have sought the views of scientists and the general public on the ethics of ESCR. This study, however, explores multi-faith ethical viewpoints, in particular, those of Buddhists, Hindus and Catholics in Malaysia, on ESCR. Responses were gathered via semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. Three main ethical quandaries emerged from the data: sanctity of (...) life, do no harm, and ‘intention’ of the research. Concerns regarding the sanctity of life are directed at particular research protocols which interfere with religious notions of human ensoulment and early consciousness. The principle of ‘do no harm’ which is closely related to ahimsa prohibits all acts of violence. Responses obtained indicate that respondents either discourage research that inflicts harm on living entities or allow ESCR with reservations. ‘Intention’ of the research seems to be an interesting and viable rationale that would permit ESCR for the Buddhists and Hindus. Research that is intended for the purpose of alleviating human suffering is seen as being ethical. This study also notes that Catholics oppose ESCR on the basis of the inviolability of human life. (shrink)

The influence of Christianity on Western moral philosophy is unmistakable. The enlightenment certainly made a difference. But Reason replaced God, morality retained its universality and became secular. The dharma tradition is firmly grounded in practical reality, and while universality has a place in it, its focus is on particularity and contextual specificity. Gandhi was firmly rooted in the Indian tradition and derived his inspiration primarily from the Gita. Some of the central Gandhian ideas on morality are: truth, ahimsa, satyagraha, (...) sacrifice, and the virtues free of any instrumentality. Gandhi also believed that animals are a significant part of the domain of morality. Although animals may not perhaps have language, they certainly have an inner life which makes them unmistakably the proper subject of moral attention. (shrink)

Two fundamental problems in all thought can be identified: One, life and world affirmation and second, life and world negation. Indian approach is characterized as the second and hence it is claimed that moral problems have not been persistently pursued and successfully tackled in India. Points like the advaita concept of liberation, law of karma, the system of social stratification, stages of life and duties associated with them are picked up to show that theIndian system is ethically bankrupt. But along (...) with the science of salvation, the science of statecraft (arthasastra) and four objectives of human life are emphasized. The two functions of knowledge namely, theoretical and practical (arthaparicchiti and phalaprapti) referring to fact and value are recognized and it is held that knowledge of facts lead to the pursuit of values. Value is taken as the ‘object of desire’. The concept of svadharma and ahimsa are basic to it. The ‘ought of ethics’ (Dharma) is foundational to all Indian thought. A comprehensive value system consisting of spiritual, moral, material and social values and the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values are recognized. Contemporary ethical issues relating to human rights and women, suicide, abortion and the host of problems thrown open by science and biotechnology find proper place in it. (shrink)

The paper considers how Mahatma Gandhi?s Law of Ahimsa (or non-violence) can be reconciled with the necessity of violence; some of the strategies that Gandhi adopts in response to this problem are critically examined. Gandhi was willing to use (outward) violence as an expedience (in the sense of necessity), but he was opposed to using non-violence as an expedience. There are two versions of Gandhi?s doctrine. He makes a distinction between outward violence and inner violence. Both versions grant that (...) outward violence is often necessary and must be administered with compassion. On the more demanding version, outward version is never justified, not even when it is necessary; it is at best excused or pardoned. On the less demanding version, outward violence under certain conditions is justified. (shrink)

This paper has been extracted from a book manuscript that attempts to interpret Gandhi’s ethics of nonviolence ahimsa) in terms of virtue theory. The first section addresses the issue of virtue theory’s relationship to consequentialism and concludes that there is no way to avoid the fact that the virtues developed because of their consequences. Therefore, I will join Gandhi’s virtue ethics with P. J. Ivanhoe’s character consequentialism. Particularly significant in distinguishing utilitarianism from virtue theory is the relationship of means (...) to ends. Character consequentialism will insist that moral ends are always internally related to the virtues as means. In the second section I will explicate the distinction between enabling and substantive virtues, discuss the enabling virtues of self-control, patience, and courage, and conclude that the virtue of nonviolence forms an alliance with these enabling virtues. (shrink)