The article examines the compatibility of agonistic democracy and populism as well as their relationship to the idea of constitutionalism. The first part shows that Chantal Mouffe’s recent attempts to reconcile her normative approach of an agonistic pluralism with a populist style of politics are not fully convincing. Although there are undeniable commonalities between an agonistic and a populist understanding of politics – the appreciation of conflict, the rejection of moralistic and juridical modes of conflict resolution (...) etc. – the populist mode of the construction of the people (and the denunciation of political opponents as enemies of the people) risks impeding the transformation of antagonistic into agonistic modes of political contest. The tensions between agonism and populism are especially evident in matters of constitutionalism. This topic is examined in the second part of the article, which provides some ideas for reducing the normative and institutional blind spots of contemporary theories of agonistic democracy. It focuses on elementary principles for an agonistic concept of democratic constitutionalism that differs from the populist view of the relationship between politics and law, especially in respect of its interpretation of the concept of ‘resistibility’ of legal norms. (shrink)

Post-foundational politics and democracy -- Agonism and democracy -- A typology of agonistic democracy -- Agonistic democracy and the question of institutions -- Agonistic democracy and the limits of popular participation -- Populism, representation, and the popular will -- Political liberalism, contingency and agonistic pluralism -- Liberalism, agonism, and democracy.

This pioneering book delivers a systematic account of agonistic democracy, and a much-needed analysis of the core components of agonism: pluralism, tragedy, and the value of conflict. It also traces the history of these ideas, identifying the connections with republicanism and with Greek antiquity. Mark Wenman presents a critical appraisal of the leading contemporary proponents of agonism and, in a series of well-crafted and comprehensive discussions, brings these thinkers into debate with one another, as well as with the (...) post-structuralist and continental theorists who influence them. Wenman draws extensively on Hannah Arendt, and stresses the creative power of human action as augmentation and revolution. He also reworks Arendt's discussion of reflective judgement to present an alternative style of agonism, one where the democratic contest is linked to the emergence of a militant form of cosmopolitanism, and to prospects for historical change in the context of neoliberal globalisation. (shrink)

Agonism emerged three decades ago as an assault on the overemphasis in political theory on justice and consensus. It has now become the norm. But its character and relation to core values of democracy are not as unproblematic today as is often thought, an issue that becomes more pressing as contemporary politics increasingly seem locked into notions of unrelenting conflict between “friends” and “enemies.” This essay traces alternative ontological roots and ethical implications of agonism, distinguishing between “imperializing” and “tempered” (...) modes. The former, exemplified in the popular Schmitt-Mouffe formulation, is shown to be fundamentally flawed in its failure to conceive politics in a fashion that does not allow the dynamic of friend–enemy to imperially trump appeals to democratic norms. In a world of insurgent white nationalism in democratic polities, this is no small fault. “Tempered” agonists, such as William Connolly and Bonnie Honig, offer ontologies where democratic norms can gain traction. Despite the admirable qualities of these alternatives, their formulations are nevertheless not fully persuasive. The difficulty lies in their underarticulated accounts of equality. I suggest an alternative formulation of agonism that embraces a central role for the idea of the moral equality of voice, a value that resides in the seam between notions of difference, resistance, and conflict emphasized by agonists, on the one hand, and the idea of fairness emphasized by notions of democratic justice, on the other. (shrink)

Agonistic Democracy explores how theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy can inform institutional design in order to mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist societies. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Nietzsche, Schmitt, and Arendt, Marie Paxton outlines the importance of their themes of public contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency for contemporary agonistic thinkers. Paxton delineates three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy: David Owen's perfectionist agonism, Mouffe's adversarial agonism, and William Connolly and James Tully's inclusive agonism. (...) Paxton demonstrates how each is fundamental to enabling citizens to cultivate better virtues for themselves and society (Owen), motivating democratic engagement (Mouffe) and enhancing relations of respect and understanding between conflicting citizens (Connolly and Tully). Situated within the context of a deeply polarised post-Trump America and post-Brexit Britain, this book reveals the need to rethink our approach to conflict mediation through democratic institutions. Pulling together insights from experimental research with deliberative democratic innovations, Paxton explores how agonistic theory might be institutionalised further. Through discussing ways in which agonistic institutions might be developed to render democracy more virtuous, more engaging, and more inclusive, Agonistic Democracy provides a unique resource for students of contemporary political theory. (shrink)

The difficulty with democracy is always how to define the demos—the people. Can we think of democracy in a different way? My starting point is to ask what it would mean to take kratos (power) rather than demos as the starting point of the thinking of democracy. I will argue that this is consistent with Solon’s first democratic constitution and that it leads to a thinking of democracy in terms of agonism. Maybe such a conception of (...) agonistic democracy will allow us to conceptualize as well as actualize a political space not predetermined by the “fickle multitude” that can be manipulated and is pray to the forces of populism. (shrink)

This book explores the implications of agonistic democratic theory for political practice. Fuat Gürsözlü argues that at a time when political parties exacerbate political division, political protesters are characterized as looters and terrorists, and extreme partisanship and authoritarian tendencies are on the rise, the agonistic approach offers a much-needed rethinking of political practice to critically understand challenges to democracy and envision more democratic, inclusive, and peaceful alternatives. Inspired by Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory and drawing on insights (...) of other prominent agonistic scholars, Gürsözlü offers a distinctive approach that develops the connections between the agonistic approach and political practice. His main claim is that approaching democratic politics from an agonistic perspective changes the way we understand the nature of democratic society, the place of political protest in democracy, the nature of adversarial engagement, and the democratic function of political parties. The book also advances an account of agonistic peace that is best fitted to the pluralistic and inherently conflictual nature of democratic societies. This book should be of interest to anyone working in the field of contemporary political theory, political philosophy, peace studies, and philosophy of peace. (shrink)

This article examines whether the subject of Nietzschean agonistic democracy is the ‘Sovereign Individual’. David Owen argues that the ideal community based on Nietzsche's philosophy is the agonistic democracy. According to him, agonistic democratic society based on Nietzsche is a community in which citizens strive to have their values recognized as the most outstanding values. He argues that for this community to be established and maintained, subjects must have two abilities: (1) honoring one’s commitments as (...) autonomous beings (2) self-mastery which means critical evaluation of those who commit. And then, Owen argues that the subject with all the relevant abilities is the Sovereign Individual presented in 『On the Genealogy of Morality』. Against Owen’s arguemnt, I will stress the following three. First, there are many difficulties in considering the Sovereign Individual as an autonomous being. Second, the Sovereign Individual is not someone who actually possesses the ability to master himself, as represented by critical evaluation, but is only someone who deludes himself that he has it. Third, since the sovereign individual is not the ideal subject that Nietzsche positively evaluates, it is difficult to accept him as a subject of Nietzsche’s ideal community, a Nietzschean agonistic society. After analyzing Owen's discussion of the Sovereign Individual, I will examine 『On the Genealogy of Morality』 in which the Sovereign Individual appears and show that his reading is wrong. (shrink)

본 논문은 니체에 기반한 경합적 민주주의 모델이 샹탈 무페 모델의 합리적 대안이 될 수 있는지 검토한다. 경합적 민주주의 이론은 칼 슈미트 또는 니체를 사상적 원천으로 지닌다. 한국에서 자주 논의되는 무페가 슈미트의 철학에 기반하여 자신 고유의 경합적 민주주의 모델을 구성한다. 그러나 슈미트에 근거를 두는 그녀 모델은 다음 네 비판에 취약하다. 첫째, 정당한 상대방과 적에 대한 구분이 모호하다. 둘째, 적대의 존재론적 근본성과 적대 아닌 경합을 동시에 주장하는 것은 논리적으로 비일관적이다. 셋째, 그녀가 말하는 경합은 자기 보존이라는 텔로스에 갇혀 있어 실질적으로 다원적 세계를 포착하지 (...) 못한다. 넷째, 경합 유지 수단에 관한 이론적 요소가 없고, 경합을 유지할 수 있는 갈등의 정도에 대한 설명도 없다. 무페와 달리 코널리와 오웬을 비롯한 니체주의자들은 니체에 기반하여 경합적 민주주의 모델을 구축한다. 필자는 니체의 텍스트와 니체주의자들의 논의를 분석 및 재구성한 후, 니체주의적 모델이 앞서 언급한 무페 모델의 한계들을 다소간 극복할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

While education for democracy has been heavily influenced by the deliberative perspective on democracy, a recent turn towards an agonistic perspective on democracy places a great deal of faith in the role of political emotion and conflict. Educational scholars have mostly interpreted agonism in relation to the emotional and conflictual experiences that occur within school. Some scholars draw general pedagogical insights from this perspective, while others use it to propose conflictual approaches to classroom discussions. Overestimating, however, (...) the extent to which experiences of agonism within school applies to politically experienced agonisms beyond the school, is problematic. Such overestimations undermine the core political insights of agonistic theory, concerning the democratic potential of radical collective movements. Agonistic theory acknowledges the psychological need among disgruntled citizens for radical alternatives enabling them to oppose and rearticulate the established power dynamics in society. The purpose of agonistic democracy is to enable rearticulations of hegemony through the institutions of representative democracy, rather than as opposed to them. Important for this paper, however, is the argument that such rearticulations depend on the rhetorical force of collective movements. Emphasizing that we cannot assume the presence of such movements in everyday school life, the paper revisits the following question: What are the didactical implications of an agonistic perspective on democracy? The democratic potential of collective movements is not easily captured through experiences within the pedagogical context alone, but proposals are made as to how this potential can be grasped in other ways. (shrink)

Agonistic democrats have enriched debates on the political challenge of pluralism by raising awareness for the depth of disagreements and the political potentials of conflict. However, they have so far failed to explore the shape of institutional settings that are conducive to agonism and show how the agonistic stance may, in a very practical sense, strengthen democracies’ capacity to deal with pluralism and conflict. This article argues that this ‘institutional deficit’ of agonistic democracy can be overcome. (...) It develops an approach that reads theories of agonistic democracy as accounts of conflict regulation and uses principles of agonistic politics as measures for a critical assessment of institutional design. A discussion of a test case that is prominent in the recent literature on democratic innovations for pluralist societies—mini-publics—demonstrates that the principles of agonistic conflict regulation as developed by Mouffe, Connolly and Tully provide the basis for both a critique of certain institutions and a development of alternative designs. (shrink)

How is political change possible when even the most radical revolutions only reproduce sovereign power? Via the analysis of the contradictory meanings of stasis, Vardoulakis argues that the opportunity for political change is located in the agonistic relation between sovereignty and democracy and thus demands a radical rethinking.

Political realism points out that politics is to create and sustain a legitimate order in a context of persistent disagreement, with the possible surge of conflicts, and where political power inevitably uses coercion. Political realists contend that modus vivendi is a contingent political arrangement at the level of the political constitution that allows diverse groups of people to coexist peacefully. Proposals of modus vivendi do not say enough about how to manage disagreements and conflicts. In this paper, I argue that (...) proposals of agonistic democracy supply this lack. I contend that agonistic democracy proposals share the premises of political realism and contribute to the sustainment of a liberal modus vivendi. (shrink)

This article uncovers an internal tension within theories of agonistic democracy. On the one hand, as radical pluralists, agonistic democrats want to institute a ‘symmetrical’ political scene where different identities can struggle on an equally legitimate basis. On the other hand, they often normatively prioritize the struggles of oppressed groups against domination. In response, this article proposes to collapse any strict distinction between pluralism and social relations of domination. The result is a move from agonistic to (...) insurgent democracy, where insurgent struggles against domination give the central impetus to any democracy. To do so, it turns to the writings of Étienne Balibar, who argues that most, if not all, symmetrical political conflict is built on asymmetrical forms of domination or oppression. This leads us to develop an account of democratic conflict that is incessantly asymmetrical. Finally, this article suggests an alternative way of rescuing the political principle of pluralism cherished by agonistic democrats. Balibar’s writings on the ‘ideology of the dominated’ show that every insurgent struggle expresses itself ideologically, which harbours the risk of obscuring other forms of domination. Therefore, democracy is not only kept alive by insurgent movements, it requires that the latter democratize themselves by maintaining a permanent openness to alternative calls against domination or oppression. (shrink)

The diagnosis of a new geological epoch, The ‘Anthropocene’, has implications far beyond geological science. If human activity has disrupted the planet, then this diagnosis potentially disrupts socio-political conventions. This article assesses the implications the Anthropocene has for democratic politics, by delineating three challenges: challenges of knowledge, time and boundary. In contrast to the claim that democratic institutions are unable to adequately respond to these challenges, I suggest that they might be strengthened through an engagement with them. Following an ‘ (...) class='Hi'>agonistic’ understanding of politics, I argue that the contestation instigated by the challenges of the Anthropocene is key to democratic renewal. Just as democracy in the Anthropocene can be enhanced through an agonistic approach, agonistic theory can be enriched through an engagement with the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The three social practices – democracy, philosophy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They can be described as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to care for one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by (...) the ancient Greek term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a respectful, peaceful and productive way. Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices is deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic social practices and enable our existence to proceed in a more free, pro-social and enriching way. (shrink)

This paper considers what concept of accommodation is necessary to identify and address discrimination, disadvantages and disparities in such a way that the plurality of religious people with their beliefs, values and practices may be justly accommodated in healthcare. It evaluates threats to the possibility of such accommodation pertaining by considering what beliefs and practices might increase the risk of unjust discrimination against and disadvantage for religious people, whether as individuals or as groups; and the risk of disparities between the (...) care provided to religious people. The claim is that there is an important cluster of risks that are political in kind and emergent within philosophical bioethics. While not amounting (yet) to a trend, they are sufficiently threatening to a just civic life for patients and healthcare staff as to warrant scrutiny. After an Introductory Section 1, Section 2 evaluates a criticism of ‘accommodation’ and the apparently additional health-related requirements that those of religious faith demand, when compared with other people. It does so by comparing Lori Beaman's idea of agonism with that of a distinct and somewhat complementary approach in Jonathan Chaplin's political philosophy, before examining the role of established religion in setting the conditions for the accommodation of religion and belief in healthcare. Section 3 examines risks to such accommodation by engaging critically with three health-related instantiations of political philosophy that differ radically from both Beaman and Chaplin. A concluding Section 4 focusses on appropriate modes of communicating about religious and other beliefs in healthcare. (shrink)

One of the main reasons that liberal democratic societies are not ill-prepared to confront the present challenge presented by disaffection with democratic institutions, is that the type of political theory currently in vogue is dominated by an individualistic, universalistic, and rationalistic framework. This erases the dimension of the political and impedes envisaging in an adequate manner the nature of a pluralistic democratic public sphere. This paper examines the most recent paradigm of liberal democracy: 'deliberative democracy', in order to (...) bring to the fore its shortcomings. Then, the authos puts forward some element for the elaboration of an alternative model that she proposes to call 'agonistic pluralism'. (shrink)

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism : Connolly, Mouffe and Tully with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation (...) of Vittgenstein to the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. U tekstu se razmatraju stanovista Konolija, Mufove i Tjulija u pogledu statusa i prirode pojmova u politickom diskursu, kao i posledice ovih konceptualnih pretpostavki na shvatanje demokratije. Sva tri autora isticu esencijalnu spornost politickih pojmova, paradoksalnosti liberalne demokratije i neophodnost revidiranja standardnih racionalno-konsenzusnih teorija demokratije. Takodje, sva tri autora preuzimaju specificno tumacenje Vitgenstajna u pravcu politicke teorije u cijem su sredistu svakodnevne kontingentne prakse politike, kao i disenzus oko njihovog razumevanja i vrednovanja. Autor brani stav da esencijalna spornost pojmova ne podrazumeva agonizam i negiranje znacaja pravila i pokusava da ukaze na tacke nelegitimog prelaza od antiesencijalizma ka nekonsenzusnosti pravila. Takodje, u tekstu se ukazuje na nedostatke radikalne-disenzusne koncepcije demokratije i drustvene integracije. (shrink)

The agonistic vs. epistemic dichotomy is fairly widespread in contemporary democratic theory and is endorsed by scholars as outstanding as Luis Felipe Miguel, Chantal Mouffe, and Nadia Urbinati. According to them, the idea that democratic deliberation can work as a rational exchange of arguments that aims at truth is incompatible with the recognition of conflict as a central feature of politics. In other words, the epistemic approach is bound to obliterate the agonistic and conflictive dimension of democracy. (...) This article takes this dichotomized way of thinking to task by reconstructing the association between democracy and compromise made by John Stuart Mill, John Morley, and Hans Kelsen. It concludes that the conceptualization of democracy as compromise offers an alternative to the agonistic vs. epistemic divide that disconcerts a significant part of political philosophy today. (shrink)

This paper assesses the claim that an agonistic model of democracy could foster greater accommodation of citizens' social, cultural and ethical differences than mainstream liberal theories. I address arguments in favor of agonistic conceptions of politics by a diverse group of democratic theorists, ranging from republican theorists - Hannah Arendt and Benjamin Barber - to postmodern democrats concerned with questions of identity and difference, such as William Connolly and Bonnie Honig. Neither Arendt's democratic agonism nor Barber's republican-inflected (...) account of strong democracy purports to include citizens' group-based cultural identities, and so cannot further the claim that agonistic politics is more inclusive of cultural and social differences. Postmodern agonistic democrats such as Connolly and Honig rely upon Arendt's account of the relationship between agonism and pluralism, and wrongly assume that her view of politics is compatible with formal respect and recognition for citizens' cultural group identities. While agonistic democracy helpfully directs us to attend to the importance of moral and political disagreement, I argue that the stronger claim that an agonistic model of democracy could more readily include culturally diverse citizens is simply unfounded. By contrast, recent liberal variants of agonistic democracy that conceive of legal and political institutions as tools for recognizing and mediating citizens' moral and cultural differences may suggest ways to deepen our democratic practices in plural societies. Key Words: agonism • agonistic democracy • Hannah Arendt • citizenship • cultural minorities • pluralism • republican theory. (shrink)

This dissertation develops a conception of reasonableness that can adequately respond to agonistic critiques of this concept. As an aspect of practical reason, reasonableness refers to the moral capacity of citizens to cooperate politically, especially in pluralistic societies. More specifically, the principles or rules of political association governing society ought to be acceptable to all reasonable members of that society. This relates, furthermore, to the idea of justification: the acceptability of fundamental political principles refers to their justifiability. Justification, in (...) turn, requires ideas of public reason and political deliberation: political deliberation, for example, facilitates the ability of citizens to determine what political principles are justifiable. The explication of justifiability in terms of universal acceptability (acceptable to all reasonable persons, for example) is indicative of a central concern of proponents of reasonableness (and public reason), namely, that politics at least at a fundamental level ought to be governed by consensus. However, this conception of reasonableness has been the target of critique by agonistic theories of democracy. These theorists deny that politics ought to be governed by such a consensus. Most importantly, this orientation toward consensus ignores, or at least underestimates, the antagonistic and hegemonic nature of the political. That is, the consensus orientation of proponents of reasonableness and public reason suggests that society can be given a non-hegemonic and rational foundation. This goal, in turn, leads to the suppression or exclusion of dissensus. Nonetheless, this dissertation affirms the importance of reasonableness to democratic theory and identifies an implicit commitment to reasonableness within agonistic democratic theory. This commitment is evident, for example, in the claim that that political participants must adhere to the basic principles and institutions of liberal democracy. Given this implicit commitment, this dissertation will formulate a middle ground between prominent proponents of reasonableness and their agonistic critics. The primary goal will be to construct an agonistic conception of reasonableness, or reasonable agonism, in light of agonistic critiques of this concept. The agonistic conception of reasonableness developed in this dissertation is understood primarily in terms of the deliberative relationships citizens form and maintain. This opposes accounts of reasonableness and justification that privilege the universal acceptability of political principles and related idealizations of practical reason (understood in terms of its capacity for determining universally acceptable reasons). The defining feature of an agonistic conception of reasonableness is not the universal acceptability of political principles or of the reasons offered in political deliberation, but rather the maintenance of adversarial deliberative relationships. This approach to reasonableness does not require a consensus orientation and it is more sensitive to the antagonistic nature of the political. That is, political participants are able to adhere (at one level) to a particular, partisan conception of justice, as long as (at another level) they remain committed to maintaining deliberative relationships with their political rivals. In this way, an agonistic conception of reasonableness combines the best features of reasonableness and agonism, while addressing the shortcomings involved in theories of both concepts. Additionally, this account of reasonableness has a related critical function, namely, the contestation of prevailing normative orders that can be viewed as illegitimate or unjustifiable by those excluded from such orders. (shrink)

This book investigates the relationship between liberal democracies and ontology, that is, philosophical claims about the constitution of agents and the social world. Many philosophers argue that ontology needs to be avoided in political and legal philosophy. In fact, political liberalism, a highly influential paradigm founded by the philosopher John Rawls, makes the avoidance of ontology a core ambition of its 'political, non-metaphysical' programme. In contrast to political liberalism, this book argues that attending to ontological disputes is essential to political (...) and legal philosophy. Illuminating, criticising and developing ontological arguments does not only enhance our understanding of justice, but also highlights key features of democratic citizenship. The argument is built up by bringing together three traditions of thought that have so far not been confronted with one another: political liberalism, the work of Michel Foucault, and the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Donald Winnicott. The book also investigates more concrete implications of ontological disputes by drawing on several case studies: a Dutch political-legal debate about greeting rituals; an American conflict about the legalisation of religious freedom; and the struggles for resilience of two American social movement groups. (shrink)

Would democratic theory in its empirical and normative guises be in a better position without the theory of the deliberative public sphere? In this paper I explore recent theories of agonistic democracy that have answered this question in the affirmative. I question their assertionthat the theory of the public sphere should be abandoned in favor of a model of democratic politics based on political contestation. Furthermore, I explore one of the fundamental assumptionsat work in the debate about the (...) theory of the public sphere’s status, namely the assumed opposition between consensus and contestation. Questioning the rigid nature of the opposition, I go on to argue that the deliberative theory of the public sphere actually facilitates the development of the agonistic approach to democratic theory and practice. Key Words: agonistic democracy • deliberative democracy • democratic theory • Habermas • theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

This article considers how reconciliation might be understood as a democratic undertaking. It does so by examining the implications of the debate between theorists of ‘deliberative’ and ‘agonistic’ democracy for the practice of democracy in divided societies. I argue that, in taking consensus as a regulative idea, deliberative democracy tends to conflate moral and political community thereby representing conflict as already communal. In contrast, an agonistic theory of democracy provides a critical perspective from which (...) to discern what is at stake in the politics of reconciliation since it understands community as a contingent achievement of political action. As such, an agonistic account of democracy suggests the possibility of retrieving the concept of reconciliation from a statesanctioned project of nation-building for a democratic politics centred on the possibilities of self-determination and solidarity among citizens divided by a history of state violence. Key Words: agonism • deliberation • democracy • reconciliation • transitional justice. (shrink)

In this article I argue that there are grounds for considering agonistic democracy and participatory democracy complementarity in order to institutionalize agonism which has thus far lacked an elaborate articulation of its institutional dimension. The two democratic theories share a commitment toward widening the scope of the political as a way of inclusion of citizens and their subsequent political subjectivation and empowerment. Furthermore, there are authors on both sides who think democracy does not need foundations. (...) class='Hi'>Agonistic participation and contestation, on the one hand, and the broadening and strengthening of various sectors of political participation, on the other, both open up new possibilities for critique and change, but also create new risks. Building on a redefinition of agonisitic participation, I aim to attenuate an objection that agonism is normatively weak in terms of lacking resources to motivate citizens and justify their critique of practices of domination and oppression. The article concludes that we need to embrace agonistic participation as a means towards the development of democratic political judgement, as there are no other guarantees, i.e. secure foundations, for our ability to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic agon. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the work of the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga is an important resource for contemporary democratic theory because his employment of the concept of play illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of agonistic thought. I employ a reading of Huizinga to explore three central problems of contemporary agonism: the distinction between antagonism and agonism; the representative or expressive character of the agon; and the shaping and limiting of the space of the agon by the (...) materials with which we play democratic games. Reading Huizinga reveals the importance of a consideration of the social relations and material conditions that shape the playful features of democratic contestation. But it also warns against the idealization of democratic contestation and the contesting subject that occurs in contemporary agonistic thought as a result of privileging the autonomy and priority of play and extruding it from the wider economy of agonism. (shrink)

For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberative democracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This essay considers how deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the author makes the case for a power-sharing state with attenuated (...) sovereignty and a more engaged deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally. (shrink)

It is Chantal Mouffe’s contention that the central weakness of consensus-driven forms of liberalism, such as John Rawls’ political liberalism and Jurgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy, is that they refuse to acknowledge conflict and pluralism, especially at the level of the ontological. Their defence for doing so is that conflict and pluralism are the result of attempts to incorporate unreasonable and irrational claims into the public political sphere. In this context, unreasonable and irrational claims are those that cannot be translated (...) into universalizable terms. However, for Mouffe, it is this intentional exclusionary act itself that is detrimental to a well- functioning democratic polity. It is only through the inclusion of a diverse body of subject positions that a democratic polity can be said to be truly representative of the polity, and therefore constitute a functioning and inclusive democracy. -/- This paper will examine Mouffe’s account of agonistic pluralism. In doing so, it will demonstrate that instead of being a source of instability within the democratic discourse and therefore relegated into the private non-political sphere, passions and values that are constitutive of these subject positions ought to be incorporated into the public political sphere. Mouffe’s rationale for doing so is that it is precisely through their incorporation that citizens will retain their allegiance to the democratic polity. However, as part of this examination, this paper will also draw attention to an under-developed aspect of Mouffe’s account of agonistic democracy, specifically problems regarding both participation and exclusion. Whilst Mouffe does provide a robust counterpoint to both Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative democracy, it is my contention that she fails to explain adequately what it is that persuades participants to act democratically and adhere to the requirements of agonal respect, nor what should happen when the ethico- political principles of liberty and equality are not accepted. (shrink)

Political conflict in our society is inevitable, and the results are often far from negative. How then should we deal with the intractable differences arising from complex modern culture? Developing her groundbreaking political philosophy of agnostics--the search for a radical and plural democracy--Chantal Mouffe examines international relations, strategies for radical politics, the future of Europe and the politics of artistic practices. She shows that in many circumstances where no alternatives seem possible, agonistics offers a new road map for change. (...) Engaging with cosmopolitanism, post-operaism, and theories of multiple modernities she argues in favor of a multipolar world with a real cultural and political pluralism. -- Publisher's website. (shrink)

I argue that a distinction between three autoimmunities is implied in Derrida’s _Rogues_. These are the autoimmunities of democracy as a regime of power, of democracy to come and of sovereignty. I extrapolate the relations between three different autoimmunities using the figure of the internal enemy in order to argue for an agonistic conception of democracy.

The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a burgeoning literature on freedom that has set out to reconfigure this idea in response to the critique of the autonomous subject. The paper has three main objectives. It engages critically with this new field of theory by exploring two divergent strands of thought: a recast form of liberal autonomy and agonistic freedom as envisioned by M. Foucault, C. Castoriadis and certain other authors. Second, it seeks to bring out the merits (...) of the agonistic view by situating it in the problematic of freedom that developed after the critique. Agonistic freedom attends more fully to social inhibitions and unconscious determinations; it grapples more effectively with internalized limits; and it gives more play to the creative powers of action, which carry liberating effects. The argument offers, finally, a reply to the much-iterated polemic against agonistic self-invention, which charges it with amoral and antidemocratic implications. In effect, this ethos of freedom displays virtues that can facilitate democratic interaction and reinforce commitment to democratic egalitarianism. The entire discussion ties in with debates around agonistic democracy and helps to construe democratic freedom in a way that enables social contestation, pluralization, and solidarity. (shrink)

The classic pejorative designation of populism currently coexists with its recent vindication. From certain left-wing political and intellectual circles, the revival of this category is part of a strategy aimed at bringing together unsatisfied demands in an emancipatory key. In line with Ernesto Laclau's theory, one of the paradigmatic examples of this tendency is Chantal Mouffe's left-populist proposal. Different critical approaches object that, in the eagerness to deepen and to radicalise democracy, these impulses often challenge its limits and flirt (...) with political logics that could completely blur them. Thus, the feasibility of this emancipatory strategy seems to be tied to the ever-problematic compatibility between populism and democracy, especially to its possible normative and institutional modulations. This article will argue that the populist conception projected by Mouffe is relatively autonomous from Laclau's, and that, unlike Laclau's, it has its own prospects of agonism and civicrepublicanism that can make room for the institutional dimension and the normativity constitutive of the liberal democratic order. (shrink)

This article addresses two questions: How should a ‘practical political theory’ approach the ideological struggle between advocates of critical social justice and defenders of free speech? And, what does this conflict tell us about the deficits of one particular tradition of practical political theory — namely, agonistic democracy? The paper’s purpose, then, is to illuminate a concrete contemporary phenomenon through the lens of agonistic theory and, conversely, to use this struggle as an impetus to carve out and (...) address weaknesses in the theory of agonism.I defend an ‘agonistic approach’ to the struggle against two alternatives — first, the claim that there is, conceptually, no ‘real’ conflict between social justice and free speech, and second, the strategy to ‘take sides’ in the conflict. By taking seriously the agonistic core idea that struggle and conflict can be valuable and productive expressions of plurality and inclusivity, I argue that this struggle should be approached as an agonistic conflict — as the welcome and important expression of a diversity of views on central social, moral and political questions.I also show, however, how retaining the focus on the real-life struggle between advocates of critical social justice and free-speech sheds light on the inconsistencies of much agonistic thought. In particular, I will criticize those agonists who limit their conception of the ‘agon’ to respectful struggles, and those who see the agon merely as a tool of emancipation for oppressed groups. Against these visions of agonism, I develop an anti-perfectionist, yet radical, account of agonism with the potential to serve as a guide in complex social and political conflicts. (shrink)

Jacques Rancière’s conception of equality as an axiomatic presupposition of the political is important, because it bypasses the tradition which defines equality in terms of Aristotle’s conception of geometric equality. In this paper, I show that Rancière’s theory both espouses a monism, according to which inequality implies equality, and relies on a concept of the free will, which is incompatible with monism. I highlight this tension by bringing Rancière’s theory into conversation with the great monist of the philosophical tradition, Baruch (...) Spinoza. (shrink)