Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.

If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.

The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform (...) intellectually virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominems conclude that we should not believe what a speaker says solely on her say-so. (shrink)

Christopher Johnson has put forward in this journal the view that ad hominem reasoning may be more generally reasonable than is allowed by writers such as myself, basing his view on virtue epistemology. I review his account, as well as the standard account, of ad hominem reasoning, and show how the standard account would handle the cases he sketches in defense of his own view. I then give four criticisms of his view generally: the problems of virtue conflict, (...) vagueness, conflation of speech acts, and self-defeating counsel. I then discuss four reasons why the standard account is superior: it better fits legal reality, the account of other fallacies, psychological science, and political reality. (shrink)

This article outlines criteria for the evaluation of the argumentum ad hominem (argument against the person, or personal attack in argument) that is traditionally a part of the curriculum in informal logic. The argument is shown to be a kind of criticism which works by shifting the burden of proof in dialogue through citing a pragmatic inconsistency in an arguer's position. Several specific cases of ad hominem argumentation which pose interesting problems in analyzing this type of criticism are studied.

This paper looks into the known evidence on the origins of the type of argument called the circumstantial ad hominemargument in modern logic textbooks, and introduces some new evidence. This new evidence comes primarily from recent historical work by Jaap Mansfeld and Jonathan Barnes citing many cases where philosophers in the ancient world were attacked on the grounds that their personal actions failed to be consistent with their philosophical teachings. On the total body of evidence, two hypotheses about the roots (...) of the circumstantial ad hominem are considered. One is that it came from Aristotle through Locke. The other is that it may have had separate roots in these ancient philosophical writings that criticized philosophers for not practicing what they preached. (shrink)

Argumentation theorists are beginning to think of ad hominem arguments as generally legitimate. Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why ad hominems would are legitimate, when they are legitimate. But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad hominem arguments; a more straightforward evidentialist approach to argument appraisal is also committed to their legitimacy. I also argue (...) that virtue argumentation theory faces some important problems, and that whereas the virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology is well-motivated, that motivation does not carry over to virtue argumentation theory. (shrink)

What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several (...) fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad misericordiam. (shrink)

Ad hominem arguments argue that some opponent should not be heard and no argument of that opponent should be heard or considered. The opponent has generally pernicious views, false and harmful. Moreover he is diabolically clever at arguing for his views. Thus, the ad hominem argument is essentially a device by which non-intellectuals try to wrest control of a dialectical situation from intellectuals. Stifling intellectuals, disrupting the dialectical situation, is an unpleasant conclusion, but no fallacy has been shown in what (...) leads up to that conclusion. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 아리스토텔레스가 『니코마코스 윤리학』 3권 5장에서 초반부에 제시한 악덕의 자발성 논증을 고찰하는 것이다. 이 논증은 성격과 행동을 개념적으로 혼동했을 뿐만 아니라, 다른 곳에서 제시된 아리스토텔레스의 입장과 상충한다는 비판을 받았다. 이 논증에 선행하는 덕의 자발성 논증 또한 덕행의 자발성을 입증할 뿐인데 덕의 자발성을 결론으로 도출했다는 비판을 받았다. 우리는 이러한 비판에 맞서 우선 선행 논증에서 일종의 생략추론(enthymeme)이 사용되었고, 논증에서 생략된 전제는 3권 5장의 후속 논의에서 완전히 몰지각한 사람 외에 누구나 아는 것으로 간주된 것이라는 해석을 제안한다. 다음으로 우리는 악덕의 자발성 논증을 (...) 소크라테스를 겨냥한 대인 논증(ad-hominem argument)으로 재구성하길 시도한다. 특히, 위(僞)-플라톤의 대화편 『정의에 관하여』에서 소크라테스가 악덕의 비자발성을 옹호하면서 유덕하게 행동하는 것과 유덕한 것을 등치시킨 점에 주목할 것이다. 우리는 아리스토텔레스가 이 점을 자신의 대인 논증에서 이용했지만, 이 점을 스스로 인정할 필요가 없었고, 자신의 입장을 일관적으로 유지하길 바라는 이상, 그럴 수도 없었다고 주장한다. (shrink)

This paper is ultimately about the nature of argumentation in general and about the nature of practical argumentation in particular. (Practical argumentation is the form of argumentation which aims at answering the question: ‘What is to be done?’) The approach adopted here is an indirect one. I analyze one traditional form of argumentive fallacyargumentum ad hominem and try to show that in some argumentative situations it is an intuitively legitimate move. These intuitions can be explained if (...) we accept that practical argumentation is also governed by the general rules of practical rationality. (shrink)

Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument (...) appraisal, but to gain insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer. (shrink)

Abstract Jeffrey Koperski claims in Zygon (2008) that critics of Intelligent Design engage in fallacious ad hominem attacks on ID proponents and that this is a “bad way” to engage them. I show that Koperski has made several errors in his evaluation of the ID critics. He does not distinguish legitimate, relevant ad hominem arguments from fallacious ad hominem attacks. He conflates (or equates) the logical use of valid with the colloquial use of valid. Moreover, Koperski doesn't take seriously the (...) legitimate concerns of the ID critics, and in doing so, commits the straw man fallacy. In the end, I show that no one disagrees with the criticism of improper use of fallacies as methods of evaluation. But what constitutes proper, relevant evaluation of the ID theorists and their motivation is a matter of dispute. And sometimes attacking a person as a method of evaluation is justified, and thus is not fallacious. The definition of ad hominem arguments as either a “good way” or a “bad way” rests on justification, which I argue ID opponents have. The basis for these good objections relies on the motivation many Christians have to share their faith with non-Christians, which they call the “great commission.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The ad hominem appears to be the simplest fallacy form—one criticizes speakers instead of their statements or arguments. It is regularly taken to be a fallacy of irrelevance, in that who is speaking does not bear on the truth of what is said. But three puzzles attend this analysis. (1) Given that the fallacy is simple and seemingly obvious, how could it be effective in practice? (2) Are there not cases when who is speaking is relevant? How do we (...) sort those cases from those where it is irrelevant? (3) Isn’t there another level to the ad hominem, one where we observe it, know it is a bad argumentative move, and make inferences about the argumentative circumstances and arguers in light of it? Accusing another of committing the ad hominem, on this line of thought, has broader implications about the reasoner and their reasons. This article is an attempt to tell a coherent story of the ad hominem that makes sense of these three puzzles and shows how the observed preponderance of the argument form should trouble us as reasoners. (shrink)

Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable? Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He carries (...) his analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test. (shrink)

An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad (...) hominem fallacies seem effective, even when the irrelevance is recognized. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or (...) tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that (...) such circumstantial ad hominem arguments are construed as rebuttals to appeals (administrative) authority (of expertise), or so I argue. (shrink)

Metaphors are emotionally engaging, influenc-ing the evaluation of arguments. The paper empirically in-vestigates whether metaphors in the premise can lead the evaluator to judge an ad hominem argument as sound when the arguer instead committed a fallacy. The results show that ad hominem arguments with conventional and positive metaphors are more persuasive compared to those with novel and negative metaphors. Arguments with conventional metaphors are also perceived as more am-biguous, but less convincing, and emotionally appealing. Additionally, participants believe in the (...) conclusion more when the premise contains a positive rather than a nega-tive metaphor, which instead helps the evaluator detect the fallacy. Résumé: Les métaphores sont émotionnellement engag-eantes et ainsi influencent l’évaluation des arguments. L'article étudie empiriquement si les métaphores em-ployées dans la prémisse peuvent amener l'évaluateur à juger un argument ad hominem comme solide bien que ce sophisme soit commis. Les résultats montrent que les ar-guments ad hominem utilisant des métaphores conven-tionnelles et positives sont plus convaincants que ceux utilisant des métaphores nouvelles et négatives. Les argu-ments utilisant des métaphores conventionnelles sont également perçus comme plus ambigus, mais moins con-vaincants et émotionnellement attrayants. De plus, les participants croient davantage à la conclusion lorsque la prémisse contient une métaphore positive plutôt que néga-tive, ce qui aide plutôt l'évaluateur à détecter le sophisme. (shrink)

Metaphors are emotionally engaging, influenc-ing the evaluation of arguments. The paper empirically in-vestigates whether metaphors in the premise can lead the evaluator to judge an ad hominem argument as sound when the arguer instead committed a fallacy. The results show that ad hominem arguments with conventional and positive metaphors are more persuasive compared to those with novel and negative metaphors. Arguments with conventional metaphors are also perceived as more am-biguous, but less convincing, and emotionally appealing. Additionally, participants believe in the (...) conclusion more when the premise contains a positive rather than a nega-tive metaphor, which instead helps the evaluator detect the fallacy. Résumé: Les métaphores sont émotionnellement engag-eantes et ainsi influencent l’évaluation des arguments. L'article étudie empiriquement si les métaphores em-ployées dans la prémisse peuvent amener l'évaluateur à juger un argument ad hominem comme solide bien que ce sophisme soit commis. Les résultats montrent que les ar-guments ad hominem utilisant des métaphores conven-tionnelles et positives sont plus convaincants que ceux utilisant des métaphores nouvelles et négatives. Les argu-ments utilisant des métaphores conventionnelles sont également perçus comme plus ambigus, mais moins con-vaincants et émotionnellement attrayants. De plus, les participants croient davantage à la conclusion lorsque la prémisse contient une métaphore positive plutôt que néga-tive, ce qui aide plutôt l'évaluateur à détecter le sophisme. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 101-115 [Access article in PDF] Case Study of the Use of a Circumstantial Ad Hominem in Political Argumentation Douglas Walton In the 1860s, Northern newspapers attacked Lincoln's policies by attacking his character, using the terms drunk, baboon, too slow, foolish, and dishonest. Steadily on the increase in political argumentation since then, the argumentum ad hominem has been carefully refined as an instrument (...) of "oppo tactics" and "going negative" by the public relations experts who now craft political campaigns at the national level. It has been so prominently used in the major political campaigns, debates, and advertisements of the past few years that there has even been a reaction against it--a feeling that we have gone too far in this direction and that some kind of restraint is needed. 1 But there has been no evidence of such restraint in the argumentation used in recent campaigns. Perhaps what might be helpful is a better understanding on the part of voters and campaigners of how to evaluate ad hominem arguments critically.How does the ad hominem argument really work as a way of molding public opinion, why is it so often so effective, and how can it be defended against? How can it be evaluated as a clearly identifiable type of argument, by some kind of objective standards, in a way that can be applied to particular cases? These appear to be tough questions, but recent research has made some not inconsiderable progress toward answering them.The purpose of this article is to present a new case study of a type of argument commonly used in political discourse, a case study that makes use of the dialectical normative framework for identifying and evaluating personal attack (ad hominem) arguments that is developed in a series of works by Henry W. Johnstone Jr. (1952); Alan Brinton (1985, 1995); Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984, 1995); Erik C. W. Krabbe and Douglas N. Walton (1993), Walton (1989, chap. 6; 1998); and van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans et al. (1996). This particular case, although typical of so many ad hominem arguments currently [End Page 101] in use in political discourse, has some special features that turn out to be quite interesting not only in showing how the dialectical framework applies to cases, but also in advancing our knowledge of how the ad hominem type of argument works in political argumentation in a democratic system for which the media reportage of events is a big factor in influencing voting. 1. Framework for analysis and evaluation Although the argumentum ad hominem, or personal attack argument, has been traditionally treated as a fallacy in logic, recent research in argumentation (as cited above) shows that, in many cases,--including cases in political argumentation--ad hominem arguments, as used in conversational arguments, are not fallacious. Research has shown that, while some personal attack arguments can definitely be judged fallacious, many others are quite reasonable (when evaluated in the appropriate context), while still others should be evaluated as weak (insufficiently supported) but not fallacious. As shown in this case study, the real function of an ad hominem argument (when properly used) is to attack an arguer's credibility in order to criticize the argument she advocates.Before going any further, it is necessary to define some terminology brought to use in the research cited above. An ad hominem argument is the use of personal attack in a dialogue exchange between two parties, where the one party attacks the character of the other party as bad, in some respect, and then uses this attack as a basis for criticizing the other party's argument. An argument is fallacious if it is a special baptizable (Johnson 1987) type of argument that is used by one party in a dialogue exchange in such a way that it blocks or interferes with the collaborative realization of the goal of the type of dialogue in which the two participants are supposed to be engaged (Walton 1995). Thus, there is a difference between a weak... (shrink)

Many of us read Peter Singer ’ s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer ’ s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (...) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ ad hominem reply ” to students ’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness / unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: ad hominem: tu quoque. An ad hominem: tu quoque argument is often seen in political debate. As Walton stresses: “The primary case of the tu quoque type of ad hominem retort occurs when an ad hominem reply is used to respond to an ad hominem attack”. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: tu quoque has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the (...) ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the use of proponent's ad hominem, and respondent's ad hominem. (shrink)

Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as they (...) do between rational people. When we understand rationality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which recognize these limitations and provide for the complexity of our thinking, ad hominem considerations can sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments. (shrink)

The situationally disqualifying ad hominem attack is an argumentative move in critical dialogue whereby one participant points out certain features in his adversary's personal situation that are claimed to make it inappropriate for this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain criticisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem argumentation are discussed as well and compared with the situationally (...) disqualifying type. The socalled Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger of unconditionally condoning ad hominem arguments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstantial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem arguments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious. (shrink)

A self-fulfilling fallacy (SFF) is a fallacious argument whose conclusion is that the very fallacy employed is an invalid or otherwise illegitimate inferential procedure. This paper discusses three different ways in which SFF’s might serve to justify their conclusions. SFF’s might have probative value as honest and straightforward arguments, they might serve to justify the premise of a meta-argument or, following a point made by Roy Sorensen, they might provide a non-inferential basis for accepting their conclusion. The paper concludes with (...) an assessment of the relative merits of these proposals. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, ad hominem: circumstantial. The circumstantial variety of the ad hominem argument is distinct from the direct form in that instead of directly attacking the character of the arguer, one draws attention to an inconsistency in the personal circumstances of the proponent (his/her commitments) and the content of his/her argument/position as a way to question his/her sincerity or credibility. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: (...) circumstantial has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una explicación de la legitimidad de ciertos argumentos ad hominem acudiendo a la epistemología de las virtudes. La tesis central es que hay argumentos ad hominem que son aceptables si se conciben como argumentos inductivos cuya fuerza está determinada por una apelación justa a los vicios epistémicos del interlocutor. Se argumenta que algunos argumentos ad hominem abusivos son aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes epistémicas confiabilistas por parte (...) del interlocutor. Así mismo, algunos argumentos ad hominem circunstanciales serían aceptables si descansan en un señalamiento justo de la carencia de virtudes responabilistas por parte del interlocutor. El artículo también expone cómo otros intentos de reivindicación de los argumentos ad hominem adolecen de algunos problemas. (shrink)

A dialogue-based analysis of informal fallacies does not provide a fully adequate explanation of our intuitions about what is wrong with ad baculum and of when it is admissible and when it is not. The dialogue-based analysis explains well why mild, benign threats can be legitimate in some situations, such as cooperative bargaining and negotiation, but does not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of threats to coerce and to intimidate. I propose an alternative deriving partly (...) from virtue theory in ethics and epistemology and partly from Kantian principles of respect for persons as ends-in-themselves. I examine some specific kinds of social relations, e.g., parent-child and partner relationships, and ask what kinds of threats are permissible in these relationships and especially what is wrong with the objectionable threats. My explanation is framed in terms of the good character and contributing virtues of the ideal parent or partner on the one hand, and the bad character and contributing vices of the abusive parent or violent partner on the other. This analysis puts the discussion of theats in the context of virtue theory, of human flourishing, and of the kind of social relations it is best to have. In general, what's wrong with argumentum ad baculum should be explained in terms of the intentions, purposes, and character of threateners, and the differences in intentions and purposes for which threats are made. The characters of those who make the threats will provide the criteria for distinguishing benign and malicious threats. (shrink)

The fallacies, as traditionally conceived, are wrong ways of reasoning that nevertheless appear attractive to us. Recently, however, Woods (2013) has argued that they don’t merit such a title, and that what we take to be fallacies are instead largely virtuous forms of reasoning. This reformation of the fallacies forms part of Woods’ larger project to naturalize logic. In this paper I will look to his analysis of the argumentum ad hominem as a case study for the prospects of this (...) project. I will argue that the empirical literature on implicit bias presents a difficulty for the reformation of the ad hominem as cognitively virtuous. Cases where implicit bias influences our assessment of the truth or claim or argument are instances of ad hominem reasoning, and these qualify as fallacious on Woods’ own definition. (shrink)

Bayesian probability has recently been proposed as a normative theory of argumentation. In this article, we provide a Bayesian formalisation of the ad Hitlerum argument, as a special case of the ad hominem argument. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that people's evaluation of the argument is sensitive to probabilistic factors deemed relevant on a Bayesian formalisation. Moreover, we provide the first parameter-free quantitative evidence in favour of the Bayesian approach to argumentation. Quantitative Bayesian prescriptions were derived from participants' (...) stated subjective probabilities (Experiments 1 and 2), as well as from frequency information explicitly provided in the experiment (Experiment 3). Participants' stated evaluations of the convincingness of the argument were well matched to these prescriptions. (shrink)

The fallacies approach to argument evaluation can exacerbate problems it aims to address when it comes to social bias, perpetuating social injustice. A diagnosis that an argument commits a fallacy may flag the irrelevance of stereotypical characterizations to the line of reasoning without directly challenging the stereotypes. This becomes most apparent when personal bias is part of the subject matter under discussion, in ethotic argument, including ad hominem and ad verecundiam, which may be recognized as fallacious without addressing whether the (...) ethotic presumptions are true. Yap (2013; 2015) makes this case for ad hominem and the pragma-dialectical understanding of fallacies, expanded here to show related patterns in some other fallacies, and employing the argument schemes understanding of fallacies. Adding critical questions increases the ways reasoners can dismiss arguments as fallacious, and could include directly addressing bias, but if an argument fails on a different critical question, that may yet allow the bias to pass. The fallacies approach is a form of meta-debate and techniques of meta-debate need to address the ubiquity of social bias, not convey them as specialized problems. The view that the fallacies approach to argument evaluation can provide neutrality is dangerously false. Arguers thus should avoid using fallacies for argument evaluation where social stereotypes or schemas might be involved, especially when the subject matter relates closely to social justice. (shrink)

The main finding of a comprehensive empirical research project on the intersubjective acceptability of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules (Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2009) is that ordinary language users judge discussion moves that are considered fallacious from an argumentation-theoretical perspective as unreasonable. In light of this finding it is remarkable that in everyday argumentative discourse fallacies occur regularly and seem many times not to be noticed by the participants in the discourse. This also goes for the abusive argumentum ad (...) hominem. While abusive ad hominem attacks are judged to be very unreasonable discussion moves when the unreasonableness of clear cases of this fallacy is rated in experiments, in real life this fallacy remains undetected more often than not. In this paper it is argued that this paradox can be explained by analysing abusive ad hominem attacks as a mode of strategic manoeuvring which takes on a reasonable appearance in real life situations when it mimics, as it often does, legitimate critical reactions to authority argumentation. The hypothesis that abusive fallacies are seen as less unreasonable when they are presented as if they are critical questions pertaining to the argument scheme for authority argumentation than when they are clear cases was tested systematically in two experiments. The results of these experiments confirmed the hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility (...) function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value. (shrink)

Andrew Aberdein recently explored whether Aristotle held a (proto-)virtue argumentation theory, which would evaluate a good argument in terms of whether the arguers engaged virtuously. Aberdein admits, however, that connections between virtue, character, and argumentation are scarce within Aristotle's works. Accordingly, here Cassie Finley approaches this question from a different angle, comparing Aristotle's concepts of dialectic and rhetoric with virtue theories of argumentation. She argues that the essential features of dialectic and rhetoric are in (...) tension with the defining characteristics of virtue argumentation theories. However, this tension raises a deeper methodological tension within virtue argumentation theories regarding their “intuitive” conception of arguments. Finley outlines a more viable route forward for virtue argumentation theorists, one that dissolves this tension through reframing their project as a virtue dialogue theory. This shift toward dialogue would help to assuage the main objections to virtue argumentation theories regarding adversariality, incompleteness, and vulnerability to ad hominems. At the same time, developing toward a virtue dialogue theory better aligns with the intuitive sense of engaging well with others that defines the virtue argumentation project, and it also more fruitfully sets up the project to encourage future scholarship connecting virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and philosophy of education. (shrink)

Christopher Johnson argued in 'Reconsidering the Ad Hominem' that, in certain exceptional cases, appealing to ad hominem considerations is logically justifiable. My argument is that ad hominem considerations are no different than other evidential considerations. The evidential links may be strong, weak or nonexistent but there is nothing special in itself about considering ad hominem factors when weighing evidence. Like all the informal fallacies, simply because a claim has the signature of being 'ad hominem' does not make it irrelevant. The (...) apparent originality of Johnson's point lies in equivocating 'ad hominem fallacy' with 'ad hominem considerations'.It is not looking to personal characteristics or situations that in itself is illogical. It is when those features have no evidential link to the point at hand. (shrink)

The importance of speech acts for analyzing and evaluating argumentation in cases where it is suspected that the ad baculum fallacy has been committed is demonstrated in this paper by using a typical textbook example of this fallacy. It is shown how the argument in the example can be analyzed and evaluated using the devices of Gricean implicature and indirect speech acts. It is shown how these two devices can be applied to extrapolate the evidence furnished by the text (...) and dialectical context of the example. (shrink)

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in (...) which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which (...) one can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life. On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it. (shrink)

Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice. Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if (...) there is some sense of argumentation where an argument is truth-propagating and not put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines, most often because the arguer’s goal is only. From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character. (shrink)

This article aims tt providing some conceptual tools for dealing adequately with relevance in argumentative discourse. For this purpose, argumentative relevance is defined as a functional interactional relation between certain elements in the discourse. In addition to the distinction between interpretive and evaluative relevance that can be traced in the literature, analytic relevance is introduced as an intermediary concept. In order to classify the various problems of relevance arising in interpreting, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, a taxonomy is proposed in (...) which the concept of relevance is differentiated along three co-ordinate dimensions: object, domain and aspect. With the help of this taxonomy, it can be shown that the problems of evaluative relevance with which the standard approach to fallacies cannot satisfactory deal can be more systematically approached within a pragma-dialectical framework. This is demonstrated for the argumentum and hominem, which is erroneously treated as a homogenous type of relevance fallacy in logico-centric analyses, so that cases where this is not justified must be treated as ad hoc exceptions. (shrink)

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. (...) Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy. (shrink)

This book brings together in one place David Hitchcock’s most significant published articles on reasoning and argument. In seven new chapters he updates his thinking in the light of subsequent scholarship. Collectively, the papers articulate a distinctive position in the philosophy of argumentation. Among other things, the author:• develops an account of “material consequence” that permits evaluation of inferences without problematic postulation of unstated premises.• updates his recursive definition of argument that accommodates chaining and embedding of arguments and allows (...) any type of illocutionary act to be a conclusion. • advances a general theory of relevance.• provides comprehensive frameworks for evaluating inferences in reasoning by analogy, means-end reasoning, and appeals to considerations or criteria.• argues that none of the forms of arguing ad hominem is a fallacy.• describes proven methods of teaching critical thinking effectively. (shrink)

This paper, based on research in a forthcoming monograph, Commitment in Dialogue, undertaken jointly with Erik Krabbe, explains several informal fallacies as shifts from one type of dialogue to another. The normative framework is that of a dialogue where two parties reason together, incurring and retracting commitments to various propositions as the dialogue continues. The fallacies studied include the ad hominem, the slippery slope, and many questions.

Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to argumentation. Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. A first attempt is made at a survey of argumentational virtues, and finally it is argued that the dialectical nature of argumentation makes it particularly suited for virtue theoretic analysis.

In this paper it is shown is that although poisoning the well has generally been treated as a species of ad hominem fallacy, when you try to analyze the fallacy using ad hominem schemes, even by supplementing with related schemes like argument from position to know, the analysis ultimately fails. The main argument of the paper is taken up with proving this negative claim by applying these schemes to examples of arguments associated with the fallacy of poisoning the well. Although (...) there is a positive finding in this quest, in that poisoning the well is shown to be based on and associated with these forms of argument in interesting ways, the paper in the end is led to the conclusion that the fallacy is irreducibly dialectical. Poisoning the well is thus analyzed as a tactic to silence an opponent violating her right to put forward arguments on an issue both parties have agreed to discuss at the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. It is concluded that it is a special form of strategic attack used by one party in the argumentation stage of a critical discussion to improperly shut down the capability of the other party for putting forward arguments of the kind needed to properly move the discussion forward. (shrink)

Walton gives a clear method for analyzing and evaluating cases of ad hominem arguments found in everyday argumentation.

In this paper, I contend that evidence-focused strategies of science communication may be complemented by possibly more effective rhetorical arguments in current public debates on vaccines. I analyse the case of direct science communication - that is, communication of evidence - and show that it is difficult to effectively communicate evidential standards of science in the presence of well-equipped anti-science movements. Instead, I argue that effective rhetorical tools involve ad hominem strategies, that is, arguments involving claims of expertise. I provide (...) a rationale, and sketch a methodology, for using ad hominem arguments in science communication. (shrink)