The absolute self-evidence of consciousness is due to the fact that the object of consciousness is present or immanent in it. We may therefore formulate the absolutely certain starting point of philosophy as follows: knowledge about an object immanent in consciousness is absolutely certain in so far as it is the actual testimony of the object about itself, and does not go beyond that which is present in consciousness. The criterion of the absolute certainty of such knowledge (...) is self evidence, i.e. the fact that it consists entirely of what is present in consciousness. To doubt such knowledge is absurd because it is not a copy of the object, it is not a symbol of it, but simply and directly contains the object itself as known. I designate the act of the immediate contemplation of objects by the term intuition. According to the epistemological theory which I began to work out in 1903 all our trustworthy knowledge is obtained by means of such immediate observation of objects as they are in themselves; I therefore call my theory of knowledge Intuitivism. (shrink)

There has long been theoretical confusion caused by the "gang of four" and the counterrevolutionary clique led by Lin Piao. They are responsible for the rampancy of metaphysics and idealism in handling the question of the criterion of truth. The "gang of four" gave the pragmatist outlook on truth wide publicity, spoke up for the usefulness of truth, negated the criterion of practice in the test of truth, and repudiated the absoluteness of the (...) class='Hi'>criterion of practice. The group also carried out absolutism, denied the development of human knowledge to the accompaniment of the development of practice, and negated the absoluteness of the criterion of practice. Therefore, a correct elucidation of the relativity and absoluteness of the criterion of practice is necessary for the elimination of the theoretical confusion caused by the "gang of four" and of its baneful effects. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought (...) is not just a mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

Thirteen essays on the treatment of a criterion for truth by such classical writers as Parmenides, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philo, Epicurius, the Stoics, Plotinus, and Ptolemy, whose neglected Greek work on the subject is included here, along with an annotated English translation. The price $LB12.50, has been estimated to US $24. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Miranda Barbosa, inspirado na filosofia aristotélico-tomista, tentou construir o edifício de uma lógica pura, a priori, sem fundamentação nem na gnosiologia nem na ontologia. Neste sentido, subordina as contribuições da lógica matemática, do existencialismo e da fenomenologia ao seu intento maior. Por isso o designamos como “o último clássico” da filosofia em Portugal.

The criterion of truth is the measure of the truthfulness and reliability of our knowledge. It is also the basis for determining the correctness of our concepts and how much our perceptions, ideas, and concepts accord with objective reality. Idealism holds to the idea that the criterion of truth does not involve the integration between theory as created by human intelligence and objective reality, but rather that the criterion of truth involves the "clarity and (...) correctness" of perception, viewpoints, and concepts by the subject. For instance, the Machists 1 think that the criterion of truth is experience, however, they neither interpret experience from a materialistic viewpoint, nor view experience as the result of humans interacting with nature as they reform it. The Machists view experience as a summary of perceptions and as the subjective experience of humans. In this sense, perception must be tested by perception itself. In attempting to escape the trap of solipsism , they proposed "collective experience" as the criterion of truth. According to such a view, anything that involves "common significance," that is, anything acknowledged by everyone, is the truth. Lenin exposed the absurdity of idealist theory by pointing out that by following the view of "socially formed experience" it is very easy to consider as normal the most absurd and farcical notions, such as ghosts, for such beliefs are also a form of human "experience." Religion also possesses a "common significance," for innumerable people believe in ghosts and miracles, etc. Nevertheless, religion does not become the truth because of this. The concept of the "criterion of truth" held by the Machists played a dominant role in modern bourgeois philosophy. Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, along with other reactionaries in philosophy all denied scientific criteria. They would rather that the masses remain ignorant of how to understand and determine the truth. (shrink)

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e., the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz., how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to (...) be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination. (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which (...) to discriminate between their impressions, which is a necessary condition for belief formation. I show that this argument fails because it misunderstands both the nature of criteria of truth and the epistemic consequences of suspending judgment concerning their existence. Thus, I clear the main philosophical obstacle preventing an interpretation of Pyrrhonism as consistent with possessing beliefs (associated most famously with Michael Frede). (shrink)

The thesis that social practice is the only criterion by which to judge truth has now become common sense in Marxist philosophy. However, the formulation of the thesis came as a result of the long period of exploration and struggle over the issue of the criterion of truth in the history of human knowledge. In Europe, the criterion has varied from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, through the capitalist philosophy of modern times, to Marxist (...) philosophy, according to the different philosophical lines and different viewpoints on truth. In a nutshell, in the Middle Ages, the criterion was the religious inquisition based on dogmas in the "Bible." In opposing the ecclesiastic theology of the Middle Ages, capitalist philosophers in modern times presented "judgment by rationality." On the issue of the criterion of truth, some of them stressed rationality, while others emphasized experience. Only when Marxist philosophy proposed judgment on the basis of social practice was the issue truly resolved scientifically. (shrink)

In 1845, while developing a new world view, Marx introduced practice as the criterion of truth: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."1 Whether a theory (...) correctly reflects the objectively existing objects with which it concerns itself, and whether it is the truth, cannot be determined within the sphere of thinking, or by means of theoretical argument, but only on the basis of testing in social practice. This is a basic principle and characteristic feature of Marxist philosophy. (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence (...) on ἐπιβολαί in later authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

During the recent discussions concerning the problem of the criterion of truth, some comrades have said: In real life we use a great many criteria to distinguish between true and false, such as the criterion for distinguishing between the fragrant flowers and the poison ivy [i.e., ideologically correct and incorrect], the criterion for distinguishing what is revolutionary from what is counterrevolutionary, the criterion for determining successors to manage the proletarian revolution, etc. Although these criteria are (...) derived from practice, in themselves they are not practice but things of the subjective realm. Do they function in reality as criteria to test truth? (shrink)

In his recent book, The Coherence Theory of Truth, Nicholas Rescher emphasizes the difference between the question of the criterion of truth and the question of the nature of truth. A particular position concerning the criterion of truth, he says, may leave open a variety of options on the question of the nature of truth. There have been several recent attempts to defend coherence theories of rational justification in which coherence is held to (...) be a criterion of truth, but the coherence theory of the nature of truth has been resisted because of the supposed metaphysical implications of such a position. In this paper I shall consider whether the coherence theory of justification can be adequately defended apart from a commitment to the coherence theory of truth. I shall argue that coherence as the criterion of truth does entail that coherence is the nature of truth, that the coherence theory of justification is correct, and that therefore the coherence theory of truth is correct. (shrink)

A survey of Bayle's skeptical arguments regarding Descartes' criterion of truth, which Bayle refers to as "evidence." Bayle's arguments for degrees of evidence, as well as for the necessity and sufficiency of possessing a high degree of evidence in order to form virtuous beliefs, are surveyed as well.

Many arguments are affected by context sensitivity, because they include sentences that have different truth conditions in different contexts. Therefore, it is natural to think that a general criterion for evaluating arguments must take context sensitivity into account. One way to give substance to that thought is provided by the definition of validity offered by David Kaplan within his theory of indexicals. However, the route indicated by Kaplan is hindered by a problem whose importance is often underestimated. This (...) paper explores a different route, and outlines a definition of validity that does not run into that problem. Its moral is that Kaplan's definition is not the only plausible definition. This is not to say that the definition outlined is the only plausible definition or that it is correct in some absolute sense. There might be equally important problems with it that the paper does not take into account. But until such problems are found and brought up, the departure from Kaplan's route remains a viable option. (shrink)

In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes that there is always a gap between ‘A is f and g’ and (...) ‘ I am f and g’ ; , that a complete description of the world offered without recourse to indexicals will fail to account for the contingent truth that I am one of the persons described; and , that an account of conscious perspectives on the world must take into account what it means for an apparently arbitrary one of these perspectives to be mine . Engaging with contemporary positions on the first person, embodiment, psychological continuity, and other ongoing arguments, Madell contends that there can be no such thing as a criterion of personal identity through time, that no bodily or psychological continuity approach to the issue can succeed, and that personal identity through time must be absolute, not a matter of degree. Madell’s view that the nature of the self is substantively different from that of objects in the world will generate significant discussion and debate among philosophers of mind. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this thesis I focus on F. H. Bradley's theory of judgment and his doctrine of predication. My goal is to present an account of Bradley's views which pays special attention to his belief that all logical predication must necessarily fail to accomplish what it sets out to do. All assertion , we are told, attempts to state truth, whole and complete; but, in the end, it must fall short. All judgment, Bradley claims, must contain an element of untruth (...) or falsity. And the outcome of this theory of predication is a doctrine of "degrees of truth". No truth is understood as entirely true or entirely false; rather, each has a position in a hierarchy of truths with some being truer than others when measured against the theoretical criterion of absolute knowledge. ;But, this is not to be understood as a sceptical doctrine. I argue that Bradley's doctrine of predicative failure should be seen as the only means by which radical scepticism in the theory of knowledge can be avoided. If we were capable of possessing truths which are whole and complete unto themselves then there would exist no legitimate basis upon which the inferential development of thought could expand beyond a self-enclosed circle. ;In this essay I also examine a persisting historical problem. It is my claim that Bradley's theory should be understood as a continuation of and development within the British neo-Kantian tradition. Bradley's association with this tradition has sometimes been questioned based on scattered statements found in the 1883 edition of the Principles of Logic. Collectively these statements have been referred to as the doctrine of "floating ideas". However, I maintain that the doctrine of floating ideas must be distinguished from the theory of predicative failure . I argue that the two theories should in no way be identified and that certain misinterpretations of Bradley's position have resulted from confusing these two incompatible views. (shrink)

While evidence-based medicine (EBM) is often accused on relying on a paradigm of 'absolute truth', it is in fact highly consistent with Karl Popper's criterion of demarcation through falsification. Even more relevant, the first three steps of the EBM process are closely patterned on Popper's evolutionary approach of objective knowledge: (1) recognition of a problem; (2) generation of solutions; and (3) selection of the best solution. This places the step 1 of the EBM process (building an answerable (...) question) in a pivotal position for the understanding of the whole process, and underscores a few aspects which are often overlooked in EBM courses. First in this step internal evidence (including personal expertise) must be appraised and integrated in the problem. Second, issues of applicability of the possible solution should be anticipated. Third, and possibly more important, the goal of the intervention should be set at this stage (typically by choosing the outcome in a PICO question). Depending whether or not goals depend on the goals of others, and whether they concern others' voluntary behaviour, goals may be classified as self-serving, moral, altruistic or moralistic. Thus, delicate ethical questions must be addressed at this stage, which means that patient preferences and values must be carefully sought, so that empathy, counselling and narrative medicine must be mastered to be able to formulate correctly an answerable question. The need to modify the current description of the EBM process to increase the recognition of implicit assumptions and increase the consistency of this model is discussed. (shrink)

An analysis of Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of the power of judgment that shows it enables morality as well as cognition.

Although the so-called "pragmatic" test of truth--the idea that the truth of a statement is a function of its predictive value--is usually credited to william james, we possess a version of this truth-test from the third-century b c in the philosophy of carneades of cyrene, the head of the skeptical "middle academy". like james, carneades denied the existence of absolute truth, in the sense of a truth which no further experience could change, offering instead (...) a criterion of probability, the highest form of which is "the probable and tested". (shrink)

The following article compares the notion of the absolute in the work of Georg Cantor and in Alain Badiou’s third volume of Being and Event: The Immanence of Truths and proposes an interpretation of mathematical concepts used in the book. By describing the absolute as a universe or a place in line with the mathematical theory of large cardinals, Badiou avoided some of the paradoxes related to Cantor’s notion of the “absolutely infinite” or the set of all that (...) is thinkable in mathematics W: namely the idea that W would be a potential infinity. The article provides an elucidation of the putative criticism of the statement “mathematics is ontology” which Badiou presented at the conference Thinking the Infinite in Prague. It emphasizes the role that philosophical decision plays in the construction of Badiou’s system of mathematical ontology and portrays the relationship between philosophy and mathematics on the basis of an inductive not deductive reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islamic Aesthetics: An IntroductionSulejman BostoIslamic Aesthetics: An Introduction. By Oliver Leaman. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pp. 216. Hardcover £55.00. Paper £16.99.IIf Islamic Aesthetics: An Introduction by Oliver Leaman falls into your hands,1 you may well find it hard to curb your curiosity and resist the challenge, given that "Islamic [End Page 502] topics" are so much in the forefront these days, especially in relation to global politics, but (...) no less in the widely diverse cultural, theological, philosophical, sociological, and other fields of strictly academic interest. With this conjuncture—along with the inflationary interest of the market in everyday politics and journalism, which is shaped by the crisis that has engulfed the world and the globalization of discord, by ideological conflicts and clashing worldviews, by the economic and political struggle for dominance and power, and by the simplifications resorted to by the media culture of today as it promotes a new type of instant, fast-generated, and easily digested knowledge—issues are frequently vulgarized, reducing serious, unresolved questions of understanding cultures and civilizations to the superficial discourse of stereotypes and prejudices and their manipulation in and by everyday politics.The counter or alternative to this conjuncture and its mundane political motives, which are highly diverse and often marked by opposing interests, ought to be an entirely new cognitive and hermeneutic strategy designed, with regard to the sociocultural and spiritual sciences falling within the term humaniora, both to ensure academic objectivity and methodological dependability and to further a nonviolent hermeneutic openness to the Other—the existential, social, and historical connections and interactions between individuals, societies, cultures, knowledge, belief, and so forth—in which our human lives run their course. This hermeneutic need, however, is not convertible with the new and mutually contradictory developments in globalization—to the extent that globalization means not merely interconnection and political, technological, and economic standardization, but also a leveling down designed to obliterate difference and lead to bland uniformity. To the contrary, this hermeneutic does not mean aspiring to eradicate differences, but rather necessarily involves a dialectic of recognition based on the premise of a nonviolent will for understanding and entente. What is needed, in fact, is a new culture of mutual recognition, for which neither mere spontaneous sympathy for today's much-vaunted "dialogue" nor the moralistic incantations by which public discourse pays lip service to it will be sufficient. Such a culture demands the ability critically to reassess established orders of knowledge, a critique of prevailing clichés and stereotypes, and a positive, systematic knowledge of and familiarity with the material being presented and discussed. In other words, a culture of recognition inevitably presupposes a culture of knowledge, from which alone one may expect cognition, exchange, understanding, and concord.Clearly, knowledge acquired in the domain of historical, cultural, spiritual, or humanist studies, the domain of the social sciences, is not of the same nature as the positivism and objectivism of the natural sciences, nor does it share the latter's universality, since matters concerning our past existence and our creations and inventions, with their historical mutability and temporal nature, their historical, social, or cultural relativity, are resistant to absolute objectivization and reduction to the cognitive norm of unambiguity. If the hermeneutic task, in its encounter with the current historical material of human thought and formation, is faced with the dangers of an adverse, relativistic infinity in which everything is convertible with [End Page 503] everything else, then, in the absence of a uniform criterion of truth and knowledge and its purposes, one must conclude that "unity of sense" or "unity of meaning" is impossible. Despite this danger, the hermeneutic experience—with, as its basis, the unity of experience of understanding to be found in the postulate of human historicality and finitude, which suggests to us the bond between us in the open human "communication through historical time"—invokes the indispensable openness and free flow of the most diverse human expressions, works, and meaningful acts, in which people in their diverse historical groupings and circumstances, social environments and differing experiences, and languages and cultures meet in the same historical, existential play—the transformation of primal chaos into... (shrink)