Husserl’s phenomenology aims to obtain knowledge about the essential structure of consciousness and its various subtypes, and how different types of objects appear in consciousness. On a classic reading, such knowledge requires adequate evidence and apodictic evidence, which are absolutely certain or infallible. However, a trend has emerged to question this classic reading and to embrace a radically fallibilist reading of Husserl’s theory of evidence instead. A core component of this reading is that adequate evidence and apodictic evidence are either (...) non-actual, or, even if they exist, are fallible. This paper aims to resist this radical fallibilist reading and reaffirm the classic reading. In this paper, I criticize two main arguments for the radical fallibilist reading. I also examine frequently cited texts that seem to strongly favor the fallibilist reading and show that they do not serve the intended purpose. I further show that although Husserl later has refined his earlier theory of evidence, he never reversed his earlier basic position. For Husserl, adequate evidence and apodictic evidence can be difficult to achieve. However, they can be sometimes achieved in immanent perception and eidetic analysis; when achieved, they are infallible. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper reconstructs and defends a Husserlian transcendental conception of intentionality. Initially, naturalistic conception of intentionality seems attractive, however, a naturalistic understanding conceals the true meaning of the puzzle and the nature of intentionality. Following Kant and primarily Husserl, this paper tries to determine the conditions a transcendental conception of intentionality must satisfy in order to be qualified as “transcendental”. Additionally, following Husserl, this paper argues that the alternative transcendental conception is not only possible, hence plausible; but also necessary, in (...) the sense that a thorough understanding of intentionality can only be achieved if a transcendental conception is adopted. (shrink)