Results for 'Yona Shahar-Levy'

947 found
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  1.  27
    Development and body memory.Yona Shahar-Levy - 2012 - In Sabine C. Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa & Cornelia Müller, Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement. John Benjamins. pp. 84--327.
  2. The responsibility of the psychopath revisited.Neil Levy - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.
    The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral (...)
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  3. Culpable ignorance and moral responsibility: A reply to FitzPatrick.Neil Levy - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):729-741.
  4. Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century.Neil Levy - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Neuroscience has dramatically increased understanding of how mental states and processes are realized by the brain, thus opening doors for treating the multitude of ways in which minds become dysfunctional. This book explores questions such as when is it permissible to alter a person's memories, influence personality traits or read minds? What can neuroscience tell us about free will, self-control, self-deception and the foundations of morality? The view of neuroethics offered here argues that many of our new powers to read (...)
  5. Moral significance of phenomenal consciousness.Neil Levy & Julian Savulescu - 2009 - Progress in Brain Research.
    Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...)
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  6. Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'.Neil Levy - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
    I develop an account of weakness of the will that is driven by experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology. I will argue that this account demonstrates that there is no such thing as weakness of the will: no psychological kind corresponds to it. Instead, weakness of the will ought to be understood as depletion of System II resources. Neither the explanatory purposes of psychology nor our practical purposes as agents are well-served by retaining the concept. I therefore suggest that (...)
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  7. Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...)
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  8. Analytic and continental philosophy: Explaining the differences.Neil Levy - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):284-304.
    A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy.I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious.I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches.This important opposition accounts for all (...)
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  9. Information in Biology: A Fictionalist Account.Arnon Levy - 2010 - Noûs 45 (4):640-657.
  10.  82
    Expectation-based syntactic comprehension.Roger Levy - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1126-1177.
  11. Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.
    Implicit attitudes are mental states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their considered beliefs. Implicit attitudes are usually held to be mere associations between representations. Recently, however, some philosophers have suggested that they are, or are very like, ordinary beliefs: they are apt to feature in properly inferential processing. This claim is important, in part because there is good reason to think that the vocabulary in which we make moral assessments of ourselves and (...)
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  12. What, and where, luck is: A response to Jennifer Lackey.Neil Levy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):489 – 497.
    In 'What Luck Is Not', Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of (...)
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  13. Nudges in a post-truth world.Neil Levy - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (8):495-500.
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  14. Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories.Neil Levy - 2007 - Episteme 4 (2):181-192.
    Abstract The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding (...)
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  15. Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data.Neil Levy - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):3-26.
  16. Autonomy and addiction.Neil Levy - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
    Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics University of Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia and.
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  17. Game Theory, Indirect Modeling, and the Origin of Morality.Arnon Levy - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):171-187.
  18. Downshifting and meaning in life.Neil Levy - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):176–189.
    So-called downshifters seek more meaningful lives by decreasing the amount of time they devote to work, leaving more time for the valuable goods of friendship, family and personal development. But though these are indeed meaning-conferring activities, they do not have the right structure to count as superlatively meaningful. Only in work – of a certain kind – can superlative meaning be found. It is by active engagements in projects, which are activities of the right structure, dedicated to the achievement of (...)
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  19. Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.Neil Levy - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):149-156.
    According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately (...)
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  20.  81
    Going beyond the evidence.Neil Levy - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):19 – 21.
  21.  97
    The effect of word predictability on reading time is logarithmic.Nathaniel J. Smith & Roger Levy - 2013 - Cognition 128 (3):302-319.
  22. Are You Morally Modified?: The Moral Effects of Widely Used Pharmaceuticals.Neil Levy, Thomas Douglas, Guy Kahane, Sylvia Terbeck, Philip J. Cowen, Miles Hewstone & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (2):111-125.
    A number of concerns have been raised about the possible future use of pharmaceuticals designed to enhance cognitive, affective, and motivational processes, particularly where the aim is to produce morally better decisions or behavior. In this article, we draw attention to what is arguably a more worrying possibility: that pharmaceuticals currently in widespread therapeutic use are already having unintended effects on these processes, and thus on moral decision making and morally significant behavior. We review current evidence on the moral effects (...)
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  23. Model Organisms are Not (Theoretical) Models.Arnon Levy & Adrian Currie - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):327-348.
    Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred to as ‘model organisms’, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms ‘model’ and ‘modelling’ also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka–Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. What is the relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We offer an account on which the two practices are shown to have different epistemic characters. (...)
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  24. Neuroethics: Ethics and the sciences of the mind.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):69-81.
    Neuroethics is a rapidly growing subfield, straddling applied ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of mind. It has clear affinities to bioethics, inasmuch as both are responses to new developments in science and technology, but its scope is far broader and more ambitious because neuroethics is as much concerned with how the sciences of the mind illuminate traditional philosophical questions as it is with questions concerning the permissibility of using technologies stemming from these sciences. In this article, I sketch the two (...)
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  25. Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content.Neil Levy - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):351-367.
    The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation (...)
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  26. Descriptive relativism: Assessing the evidence.Neil Levy - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2):165-177.
  27.  30
    Foreword: Derrida and SubStance.Michel Pierssens & Sydney Lévy - 2005 - Substance 34 (1):3-5.
  28. Addiction and Self-Control: Perspectives From Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience.Neil Levy (ed.) - 2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This book brings cutting edge neuroscience and psychology into dialogue with philosophical reflection to illuminate the loss of control experienced by addicts, and thereby cast light on ordinary agency and the way in which it sometimes goes wrong.
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  29. Addiction as a disorder of belief.Neil Levy - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):337-355.
    Addiction is almost universally held to be characterized by a loss of control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior. But the actions of addicts, even of those who seem to want to abstain from drugs, seem to be guided by reasons. In this paper, I argue that we can explain this fact, consistent with continuing to maintain that addiction involves a loss of control, by understanding addiction as involving an oscillation between conflicting judgments. I argue that the dysfunction of the mesolimbic (...)
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  30.  35
    (2 other versions)Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures.L. Lévy-Bruhl - 1910 - The Monist 20:479.
  31. Virtual child pornography: The eroticization of inequality.Neil Levy - 2002 - Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4):319-323.
    The United States Supreme Court hasrecently ruled that virtual child pornographyis protected free speech, partly on the groundsthat virtual pornography does not harm actualchildren. I review the evidence for thecontention that virtual pornography might harmchildren, and find that it is, at best,inconclusive. Saying that virtual childpornography does not harm actual children isnot to say that it is completely harmless,however. Child pornography, actual or virtual,necessarily eroticizes inequality; in a sexistsociety it therefore contributes to thesubordination of women.
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  32. Self-deception and moral responsibility.Neil Levy - 2004 - Ratio 17 (3):294-311.
    The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic (...)
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  33.  37
    Abstract knowledge versus direct experience in processing of binomial expressions.Emily Morgan & Roger Levy - 2016 - Cognition 157:384-402.
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  34. Obsessive–compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention.Neil Levy - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):3-16.
    An influential model holds that obsessive–compulsive disorder is caused by distinctive personality traits and belief biases. But a substantial number of sufferers do not manifest these traits. I propose a predictive coding account of the disorder, which explains both the symptoms and the cognitive traits. On this account, OCD centrally involves heightened and dysfunctionally focused attention to normally unattended sensory and motor representations. As these representations have contents that predict catastrophic outcomes, patients are disposed to engage in behaviors and mental (...)
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  35. Cognitive scientific challenges to morality.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):567 – 587.
    Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I (...)
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  36. Imaginative resistance and the moral/conventional distinction.Neil Levy - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.
    Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then (...)
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  37.  48
    Nudges to reason: not guilty.Neil Levy - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (10):723-723.
    I am to grateful to Geoff Keeling for his perceptive response1 to my paper.2 In this brief reply, I will argue that he does not succeed in his goal of showing that nudges to reason do not respect autonomy. At most, he establishes only that such nudges may threaten autonomy when used in certain ways and in certain circumstances. As I will show, this is not a conclusion that should give us grounds for particular concerns about nudges. Before turning to (...)
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  38. Addiction, autonomy and ego-depletion: A response to Bennett Foddy and Julian Savulescu.Neil Levy - 2005 - Bioethics 20 (1):16–20.
  39. Introducing neuroethics.Neil Levy - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (1):1-8.
  40. The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson, The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.
    In this chapter, we argue for three theses: (1) we lack the power to form beliefs at will (i.e., directly); at very least, we lack the power to form at will beliefs of the kind that proponents of doxastic voluntarism have in mind; but (2) we possess a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons; and (3) these propensities—once we come to know we have them—entail that we have obligations similar to those we would have were doxastic voluntarism true. Specifically, (...)
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  41.  47
    National and statist responsibility.Jacob T. Levy - 2008 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (4):485-499.
    In this article, part of a symposium on David Miller's Global Justice and National Responsibility, I first focus on an area of disagreement: Miller‘s attempt to attribute to nations responsibility that I think ought to be generally attributed to states. I then sketch a theory that disregards nations more or less completely, and yet issues in a two-level theory like Miller‘s, sanctioning important differences between intrastate and interstate distribution. It is only like Miller‘s, because the distinction between states and nations (...)
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  42. A will of one's own: Consciousness, control, and character.Neil Levy & Tim Bayne - 2004 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.
  43. Libet's impossible demand.Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
    Abstract : Libet’s famous experiments, showing that apparently we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it, have widely been taken to show that there is no such thing as free will. If we are not conscious of the formation of our intentions, many people think, we do not exercise the right kind of control over them. I argue that the claim this view presupposes, that only consciously initiated actions could be free, places a (...)
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  44.  39
    Social Movements as Catalysts for Corporate Social Innovation: Environmental Activism and the Adoption of Green Information Systems.Abhijit Chaudhury, David L. Levy, Pratyush Bharati & Edward J. Carberry - 2019 - Business and Society 58 (5):1083-1127.
    Although the literature on social innovation has focused primarily on social enterprises, social innovation has long occurred within mainstream corporations. Drawing upon recent scholarship on social movements and institutional complexity, we analyze how movements foster corporate social innovation (CSI). Our context is the adoption of green information systems (“green IS”), which are information systems employed to transform organizations and society into more sustainable entities. We trace the historical emergence of green IS as a corporate response to increasing demands for sustainability (...)
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  45. Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.
    To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most (...)
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  46. Teaching on the Internet: Transactional Writing Instruction on the World Wide Web.Webster Newbold, Eric Johson & Matthew Levy - 2001 - Kairos: A Journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy 8.
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  47.  25
    Unsung Hero; The Late Nagao Ryūzō ConversationsUnsung Hero; The Late Nagao Ryuzo Conversations.E. H. S., Howard S. Levy & Ryooji Sasaki - 1968 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 88 (2):386.
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  48. Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck.Neil Levy - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):127-139.
    The puzzle of resultant moral luck arises when we are disposed to think that an agent who caused a harm deserves to be blamed more than an otherwise identical agent who did not. One popular perspective on resultant moral luck explains our dispositions to produce different judgments with regard to the agents who feature in these cases as a product not of what they genuinely deserve but of our epistemic situation. On this account, there is no genuine resultant moral luck; (...)
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  49. The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  50. Reconsidering cochlear implants: The lessons of Martha's vineyard.Neil Levy - 2002 - Bioethics 16 (2):134–153.
    I distinguish and assess three separate arguments utilized by the opponents of cochlear implants: that treating deafness as a medical condition is inappropriate since it is not a disability; that so treating it sends a message to the Deaf that they are of lesser worth; and that the use of such implants would signal the end of Deaf culture. I give some qualified support to the first and second claim, but find that the principal weight of the argument must be (...)
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