Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 319-342, Spring 2022.

Nolan, Malachy J When Japanese forces invaded New Guinea during the Second World War, there was a large missionary presence in the territory that had been built up in the preceding fifty years. The territory was previously a German possession but had been administered as a trust territory of Australia under a League of Nations mandate after the First World War. Geographically, it consisted of the northern part of the eastern half of the New Guinea mainland; the large (...) islands of New Britain and New Ireland, which lay to the north-east; and the Bougainville portion of the Solomon Islands, further to the east. There were missionaries from both Protestant and Catholic Churches and, because of history, many of these were of German background. (shrink)

In First-World-War Britain, women's ambition to perform noncombatant duties for the military faced considerable public opposition. Nevertheless, by late 1916 up to 10,000 members of the female volunteer corps were working for the army, laying the foundation for some 90,000 auxiliaries of the official Women's Services, who filled support positions in the armed forces in the second half of the war. This essay focuses on the public debate in which the volunteers overcame their critics to understand how they obtained (...) sufficient popular consent for their martial work. I explain the process in terms of shifting hegemonic understandings of space. As critics' arguments in the debate indicate, the gender attribution of war participation was organized and represented spatially, assigning men to the warlike “front” as warriors and women to the peaceful “home” as civilians. To redefine the meaning of these gendered wartime spaces, women volunteers deployed rival spatial discourses and practices in their campaign for martial employment. The essay explores the progress of these competing definitions through feminist and spatial theories, including gender performativity, discursively constructed and constructive spaces, and heterotopias. I argue that the upheaval caused by the war in gender and spatial norms undermined absolute conceptualizations of space with dichotomous binary areas on which critics drew for their arguments and reinforced more recent, relative spatialities, including the cultural construction of militarized heterotopic sites in between and paralleling both “home” and “front” for soldiers in training or recovery. The volunteers' efforts to gain access to military employment both contributed to and were supported by this shift. Heterotopic sites offered ideal discursive locations for constructing the new gender role of auxiliary soldiering through the performance of martial training and work, and competing spatial definitions provided arguments through which they could justify their activities to both critics and supporters. (shrink)

During the Second World War, more than 60,000 Jewish members of the American, British and French armed forces became prisoners of war in Germany. Against all expectations, these prisoners were treated in accordance with the 1929 Geneva Convention, and the majority made it home alive. This article seeks to explain this most astonishing circumstance. It begins by collating the references to the experiences of Western Jewish POWs from the historical literature to provide a hitherto-unseen overview of their treatment in (...) captivity. It then asks what made their protection from persecution possible. To this end, it explores Germany’s wider motivations for its selective application of the Geneva Convention and highlights the role that military identity played in making its application seem necessary for all POWs from the Western front, including Jewish POWs. (shrink)

The roles of small and great books, and passionate yet well-considered writings in the general education of a “college” or “university” trained teacher are questions which should be turned back upon the historian as teacher and writer. Where resides the historian's classroom? Who are the students and how do teachers come to be? What subject matter should be used to prod and provoke an often dormant humanity awake? Professor Marc Bloch's work, his passion for history's rôles and its voices from (...) the past speaking to the present, had a Renaissance in the cauldron of World War II. Bloch's commitment to teaching and writing history, teaching about the forceful, or surprising and shocking, “presences” of history's supposed past-tense experiences, remains seminal to the historian's craft. Bloch's own voice from the past was forged in an intensity of present-time experience. Reflection was searing experience. Memory was “now” and remembrance was an accident of preservation for futures then unknown. These futures need to know of the experiences of former, fragile, personal and generational memories if the very same futures were to be lived more surely and securely. Marc Bloch's The Historian's Craft, remains a vindication of the human-centred, purposive roles of history in a general education. Moreover, this general education can now be said to cover the broad sweep of “secondary schooling” experiences. This sweep of schooling and post-schooling experiences is beginning, however tentatively and problematically, to extend itself into worlds of work, the futures of work and the academic futures or courses of higher education: the arena of tertiary and university education. In a not dissimilar fashion but in an even more intense spirit, Bloch's work, L’étrange défaite, examines the explosion and implosion of France and, in effect, Western Europe in the years, months and days leading up to the German offensive in the West of 10 May 1940. Bloch recognized that education and the failures to harness intellect, true intellectual freedom and innovative teaching weighed heavily upon the disastrous course of events in 1940. Professor Bloch's texts can serve two complementary purposes. First, his works, Strange Defeat and The Historian's Craft remain as significant, contemporary records of personal thoughts, argumentative methodologies, and recollections of world-shattering events. They constitute, quite literally, an historian's craft in action. Second, Bloch's texts can serve an equally valuable role where the writer seeks to take his reader through and beyond the immediate historical question, methodology or series of unravelling events into an intellectual duel which stands upon the historian's engagement with worlds, past and present. Questions and actions, makings and doings matter in this world. Understanding is not only a prime responsibility of the historian; it is a duty which might well prove dangerous. Given the above observations, this essay will seek to emphasize that world history and the teaching of broad histories of humanity recognizes few, if any, borders which seek to block or hold at bay the presentation of the “passport” known as understanding. Teaching history is much more than teaching civics or recognizing civilizational variety and its barbarous opposites. Teaching history is an act, however imperfect, of recognizing ourselves in time. My brother “schoolmasters”—when it came to the point, you did, for the most part, put up a magnificent fight. It was your goodwill which managed to create in many a sleepy secondary school, in many universities—prisoners of the worse routines the only form of education of which, perhaps, we can feel genuinely proud. I only hope that a day will come, and come soon, a day of glory and of happiness for France, when, liberated from the enemy, and freer than ever in our intellectual life, we may meet again for the mutual discussion of ideas. And when that happens, do you not think that, having learned from an experience so dearly purchased, you will find much to alter in the things you were teaching only a few years back? Strange Defeat, 142).1 What was at stake was a geological upheaval of thought …2. (shrink)

Russia took the advantage of the contribution of the Armenian armed organizations in order to possess Istanbul, straits around it, Eastern Anatolia, to weaken Turkey, to be strengthen in the Southern Caucasus, organized the rebellion of the Armenians living in Turkey against the government. Russian ruling circles put forward the Armenian matter in order to take advantage of them. Armenians involved in the war to create their own government by obtaining the territory including Van, Bitlis, Tigranakert, Erzurum, Kharberd and Sebastya, (...) as well as Cilicia from Turkey, to solve their Armenian problem. But in fact, Russia, France and England tried to blow to Turkey pretending to try for building an independent Armenian government. The grade of contribution of Armenian military units in the First World War can be characterized as following: 1. Creating the Armenian volunteer units. 2. Establishing the regular battalions and infantry regiments and forming the national corpuses. The organizations of Hnchak and Dashnaksutyun actively participated in creating the Armenian volunteer units. Dashnaks mobilized 40 000 people to destroy the Turkish people. They established tens of khumbas. The Armenian volunteer units were commanded by Andranic Ozanyan, Dro, Amazasp, Keri, Checho, Vardan and others terrorists. Armenian volunteer units which were supposed to move in 4 directions, should act in the directions where the Armenian people were densely populated. These 4 Armenian volunteer units fight against Turks in all important combat operations from Sarigamish to Erzurum. The same time Russian army and Armenians triggered the rebellion of the local population against the Turkish government. 50000 of Armenians were fighting in French, England and USA armies. The Eastern legion of Armenians was established in French army on November 1916. On November 15, 1918, the Eastern Legion was named Armenian legion. The number of the Armenians in the legion riched to 4000. In the beginning of 1916, there was an announcement about subordination of the military detachments to army and establishment of infantry regiments based on that. Establishment of the separate Armenian corpus started at the end of December 1917. In 1917, 8 Armenian shooter regiments were established. From the mentioned 8 regiments two Armenian shooter divisions, the special Armenian division of Andranic, 3 infantry brigades of western Armenians in the Southern Caucasus region, some guerrilla troops in Erevan, Igdir guerrilla infantry and rider regiments, Zeytun regiment in Tbilisi were established. At present, Armenia often raises false claims such as the "Armenian genocide" in the parliaments of the world, trying to confirm this lie. This research proves that Armenians betrayed the Ottoman state during the First World War and also committed Turkish genocides. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper considers some aspects of the reception and development of contemporary mathematics in Spain during the first half of the twentieth century, more specifically between 1910 and 1950. It analyzes the possible influence of scientists’ mobility in the adoption of newer views or theories. A short overview of key points of the social and scientific background in nineteenth-century Spain locates the expounded facts in an appropriate context. Three leading threads are followed. First is the consideration of the mobility of (...) some Spanish mathematicians during a period including World War I and World War II – when Spain was a theoretically neutral country – and the Spanish Civil War. Second, the emergence and socio-political behavior of a dominant mathematical group gathered around Julio Rey Pastor between 1915 and 1936 is also accounted for, as well as its continuity after the Civil War into the 1940s. Third, attention is paid to the migration or interior exile of a number of mathematicians as a consequence of the Civil War. The paper is organized around nine Tables containing information on mobility of mathematicians, doctorates awarded in the mathematical sciences, and mathematical production in Spain during this period, accompanied by statistical résumés and comments on interesting entries. The main conclusions drawn are: 1) a number of integrants of the Rey group, himself included, officially traveled to Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland – usually after having obtained doctorates and fixed positions – imported mathematical knowledge into Spain; 2) the group also managed to dominate the mathematical panorama from both the scientific and the sociological viewpoint; 3) social usages in Spanish mathematical affairs established in Spain in the years prior to the Civil War present a clear continuity under the Franco regime once the war was over. (shrink)

Heikki Patomäki is Professor of World Politics (Global Political Economy) at the University of Helsinki.1 In Part 1 of this interview (Patomäki and Morgan 2023) he discussed his work and career up...

Your founders were men of vision. They built for the future. Dr. Birkbeck, Lord Brougham, Francis Place, and the rest—they must sometimes have wondered what this London would be—and England, Europe, the world—a hundred years or so after their time. When, on December 2, 1823, they opened the doors of the London Mechanics Institution, destined to grow, through many vicissitudes, to become the renowned College in which we meet to-day, they may well have let their imagination guess what might (...) be the changes and developments in which this enterprise of theirs, according to its measure and scope, might play a part. That was a time when modern science was in its brilliant youth; when the movement for popular education was beginning to take hold, opening great prospects for the future; when, after twenty years of war, the British nation was gathering its forces for a sustained effort to remedy the great social evils that afflicted it, while in the political field, the powerful campaign was beginning that was destined to win victory in the Great Reform Bill of 1832. We may be sure that those men, of the sort—as a present-day poet writes: “Who watch the world with pity and pride And warm to all mankind,” that those men would have had visions, hopes, expectations, an assurance even, that in later days a wiser and better instructed people, having established full political liberty, would have used their power to cure those social evils; with the help of a developed science, would have got rid of poverty; clasping hands with other free peoples, would have established securely the reign of peace, and so made possible an age of high material prosperity and brilliant intellectual splendour. (shrink)

The Cold War has affected the communities around the world. Malaysia was no exception in being affected by the turmoil the international world, particularly after the World War 2, due to ideological conflicts. Based on the domino theory, the ups and downs of particular country in terms of its, strong ideology, brings about network impacts to each country in the world. Thus, a freedom of Malaya and the establishment of Malaysia came from the history of Cold (...) War which influenced the international scene. The establishment of Malaysia is seen as a mechanism to stop the influence of communism. The involvement leaders from Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak as well as Brunei Darussalam in the agenda to ‘build’ Malaysia with the approval from democratic countries showed a very strong cooperation that communism was a threat. This contributed to the creation of a new and bigger country. The wise Malaysian leaders in negotiating and being united in facing the global threats at that time, has shown that Malaysia’s ‘project’ in stopping the communist theory which is also known domino theory, was successfully carried out and maintained till today. Therefore, Malaysia as a case study, on how a country was ‘built’ on the basis of stopping the spread of communism in saving the Southeast Asia from falling into the hands of communists, is unique and its effectiveness should be studied. (shrink)

Ethical research conduct is a cornerstone of research practice particularly when research participants include vulnerable populations. This study mapped the extent of reporting ethical research practices in studies conducted among refugees and war-affected populations in the Arab World, and assessed variations by time, country of study, and study characteristics. An electronic search of eight databases resulted in 5668 unique records published between 2000 and 2013. Scoping review yielded 164 eligible articles for analyses. Ethical research practices, including obtaining institutional approval, (...) access to the community/research site, and informed consent/assent from the research participants, were reported in 48.2, 54.9, and 53.7% of the publications, respectively. Institutional approval was significantly more likely to be reported when the research was biomedical in nature compared to public health and social, when the study employed quantitative compared to qualitative or mixed methodologies, and when the journal required a statement on ethical declarations. Institutional approval was least likely to be reported in papers that were sole-authored, when these did not mention a funding source, or when published in national journals. Similar results were obtained for access to the community site and for seeking informed consent/assent from study participants. The responsibility of inadequacies in adherence to ethical research conduct in crisis settings is born by a multitude of stakeholders including funding agencies, institutional research boards, researchers and international relief organizations involved in research, as well as journal editors, all of whom need to play a more proactive role for enhancing the practice of ethical research conduct in conflict settings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zen War StoriesSteven HeineZen War Stories. By Brian Daizen Victoria. London and New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003. Pp. xviii + 268. Hardcover $124.95. Paper $34.95.Brian Daizen Victoria's Zen War Stories, following his highly acclaimed but also highly provocative Zen at War (Weatherhill, 1997), continues his withering attack on the embracing of wartime ideology by leading Zen masters and practitioners in Japan. Victoria seeks to show that the attitude characteristic (...) of numerous examples of prominent Zen monks and scholars was not simply a matter of benignly resisting, or even passively accepting, the rhetoric of Imperial Way Buddhism by clergy who were under pressure and powerless to stand up to the authorities. Nor was it an example of innocently recognizing historical and ideological affinities between Zen monastic discipline and military training.On the contrary, the Zen masters discussed here eagerly and enthusiastically endorsed some of the most excessive and reprehensible aspects of imperial ideology in the name of a corrupted vision of spiritual realization as a tool to spread the doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. They also used Zen wedded to hyper-nationalism and imperialism as a tool to misread the historical records of their own tradition and to help transport Japanese supremacy to China and Korea, while refusing to acknowledge or repent for their actions with the defeat of Japan. This outlook also infected numerous politicians and military figures, who turned to Buddhism as a way of explaining away or masking their roles leading up to, as well as during and after, World War II.In part 1 of Zen War Stories Victoria documents several masters who have become icons in the West for their apparent adherence to a Zen tradition linked with an ability to address contemporary culture. After showing in chapter 4 that Ōmori [End Page 345] Sōgen, praised for his prowess in swordsmanship and other arts, had a fascistic, "Mr. Hyde" side as manifested in the founding in 1932 of the Kinnō Ishin Dōmei (League for Loyalty to the Emperor and the Restoration), Victoria turns to the case of Yasutani Haku'un. In chapter 5, "Zen Master Dōgen Goes to War," we find that Yasutani, known as the teacher of Philip Kapleau and the inspiration for The Three Pillars of Zen, wanted to smash all universities for being traitors. He was a fanatical militarist who "transformed the life and thought of Zen Master Dōgen (1200-1253), the thirteenth-century founder of the Sōtō Zen sect in Japan, into a propaganda tool for Japanese militarism" (p. 68).In particular, Yasutani tried to argue that Dōgen's famed pilgrimage to Song China in 1223 was triggered not by a longing for the Buddhist Dharma but by a disgust with the new shogunate and an infatuation with preserving the Imperial House. According to Victoria, Yasutani's corrupted spirituality did not end with a support for militarism. He was also even more "ethnic chauvinist, sexist, and anti-Semitic" (p. 68) than his teacher Harada Daiun Sōgaku, whose "most memorable wartime quote is: '[If ordered to] march: tramp, tramp, or shoot: bang, bang. This is the manifestation of the highest Wisdom [of enlightenment]"' (pp. 66-67).After discussing in chapter 7, "Zen 'Selflessness' in Japanese Militarism," how Zen's historical relation to the samurai was misinterpreted to support the imperial ideology concerning the acceptance of death by D. T. Suzuki and other prominent representatives of Zen, including former Eiheiji temple abbot Kumazawa Taizen, part 2 takes up examples of the involvement with Buddhist thought by military and political leaders. While this section is less devastating as a critique of Zen than of Japanese Buddhism and society in general, Victoria explains in chapter 10, "Buddhism-The Last Refuge of War Criminals," how easily the moral basis of religion can be distorted and subverted. For example, as recollected by Buddhist studies scholar Hanayama Shinshō, seven Class A war criminals who had been condemned to death continued, while on death row, to cling hypocritically to Buddhism to find some feeling of solace. For instance, Hirota Kōki never abandoned his attachment to Zen and the warrior class and... (shrink)

The 1991 war against Iraq was one of the first televised events of the global village in which the entire world watched a military spectacle unfold via global TV satellite networks.1 In retrospect, the Bush administration and the Pentagon carried out one of the most successful public relations campaigns in the history of modern politics in its use of the media to mobilize support for the war. The mainstream media in the United States and elsewhere tended to be a (...) compliant vehicle for the government strategy to manipulate the public, imperiling democracy which requires informed citizens, checks and balances against excessive government power, and a free and vigorous critical media (see Kellner 1990 and 1992). Indeed, if the media do not adequately inform citizens, provide a check against excessive government power and corruption, and adequately debate the key issues of the day, democracy is undermined. M oreover, the U.S. media, especially CNN, completely dominated global coverage of the event. CNN had cameras and reporters in Baghdad throughout the war, a large crew in Israel, and live coverage of all U.S. military and government press conferences. Thus its images, discourses, and material tended to shape global coverage of the event. This meant that the Bush administration and Pentagon was able to control the flow of images and discourses and thus to manage the TV spectacle of the Gulf War.2 In this chapter, I first discuss the production of the text of the "crisis in the Gulf" and then "the Gulf war." This will involve analysis of disinformation and propaganda campaigns by the Bush administration, the Pentagon, and their allies, as well as dissection of the constraints produced by the so-called pool system. I also indicate how the political economy of the media in the United States facilitated the manufacturing of consent for U.S. government policies. Then I analyze the meanings embedded in the text of the war against Iraq and the reception of the text/event by the audience.. (shrink)

For over eight hundred years, philosophers—men and women—who called themselves Cynics, literally "dogs" in their language, roamed the streets and byways of the Hellenistic world, teaching strange ideas and practicing a bizarre way of life. Among them, the most important and distinctive was Diogenes of Sinope, who became the archetype of Classical Cynicism. In this comprehensive, thoroughly researched, and engaging book, philosopher Luis E. Navia undertakes the task of reconstructing Diogenes' life and extracting from him lessons that are valuable (...) in our time. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a biographical sketch of Diogenes constructed on the basis of ancient testimonies. In Chapter 2, the practice of Cynicism, as exemplified by Diogenes, is elucidated. This "war against the world," as Navia describes it, especially the rhetoric of Cynicism, was the primary medium used by the Cynics to convey their message. Chapter 3 clarifies the roots and basis of the Cynic metamorphosis, that is, the process by which Diogenes transformed himself into a dog. This process involves complex psychological, sociological, and philosophical factors, chief among which was Socrates' influence on Diogenes through the agency of Antisthenes. Chapter 4 reconstructs the philosophy of Diogenes by identifying twelve principles of his thought. In Chapter 5, the influence of Diogenes is discussed. Navia emphasizes the vast difference between Diogenes' ideas and style of life on the one hand and, on the other, what is nowadays called cynicism. The book provides abundant references to ancient testimonies and modern scholarship. It includes an extensively annotated translation of Diogenes Laertius's biography of Diogenes and a comprehensive bibliography. (shrink)

The World Health Organisation declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on 11th March 2020, recognising that the underlying SARS-CoV-2 has caused the greatest global crisis since World War II. In this chapter, we present a framework to evaluate whether and to what extent the use of digital systems that track and/or trace potentially infected individuals is not only legal but also ethical.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A NOTE ON THE RELATION OF PACIFISM AND JUST-WAR THEORY: IS THERE A THOMISTIC CONVERGENCE? 1 GABRIEL PALMER-FERNANDEZ Youngstown State University Youngstown, Ohio FOR CENTURIES, the moral analysis of war began with a consideration of a set of principles which together form the doctrine of the just-war and with a rejection of pacifism. However, several recent studies by Catholic moralists argue that pacifism and just-war theory have much in (...) common and converge in at least one morally important way-namely, they share a presumption against violence. In this note I want to consider whether or not classical just-war theory gives us reason to accept this claim. I will give evidence against it, and suggest that the "original just-war question," as James Turner Johnson calls it, does not begin with aprohibitive presumption or some equivalent constraint on action. If we are to speak of a presumption in classical just-war theory, it is that justice be done for the sake of the common good. Up to very recent times, those Christian denominations which Ernst Troeltsch called the "church-type" (Lutheran, Anglican, Calvinist, and Roman Catholic) upheld a " two-tiered " or "double" morality. A "vocational" pacifism was required of clerical ranks, and the individual Christian was obligated to take up arms for the sake of the common good. For example, prior to the Second Vatican Council, Roman Catholic teaching on war rejected conscientious objection to all war (i.e., pacifism) as an option for Catholics. Manuals of moral theology prior to Vatican 1 I wish to acknowledge the very helpful and detailed comments provided by Richard B. Miller to an earlier version of this paper. 247 248 GABRIEL PALMER-FERNANDEZ II did prohibit the soldier from fighting in an unjust war and made room for subjective doubt about the justice of a particular war. But the consensus among Catholic theologians was both wide and deep. Pacifism for individual Christians did not have any moral-theological justification. It was, in fact, a grave moral error. In spite of this, Vatican II called for a " completely fresh reappraisal of war." 2 The policy of obliterating whole cities enacted during World War II, coupled with the development of nuclear and other indiscriminate weapons of destruction (e.g., incapacitating gases, biological weapons, etc.) and the instability of superpower relations, created an unprecedented condition for which traditional teachings on war seemed woefully inadequate, if not morally dangerous. A new, more far-reaching perspective was needed. And this was to allow for individuals the pacifist option as a second and complementary moral doctrine alongside traditional teaching on war.3 As the American Catholic bishops said in their pastoral letter on war and peace : 2 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, in A. Flannery, 0.P., ed., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Collegeville, Minn. : Liturgical Press, 1975), par. 80. 3 This development in contemporary Roman Catholic teaching on war and peace has been challenged with considerable force by George Weigel in what has become one of the most controversial studies on the subject. In Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Weigel advances several arguments which are meant to correct what he insists is a failure among Catholic ethicists in the U.S. to develop their tradition, and, indeed, an abandonment of their heritage. " At the level of moral theory," Weigel maintains, "the two classic positions [just-war theory and pacifism] are not reconcilable. The attempt to merge them... tends to corrupt both traditions. Pacifists end up making judgments on military strategy and tactics, and just-war theorists are held accountable to arguments they previously declined to accept.... The net result is to bifurcate morality and politics, and to abandon attempts to apply the tradition of reason to the limit case of the use of armed force in the defense of values-which is precisely the result Murray most feared in his strictures against moralism" (251). For David Hollenbach's rebuttal, see his review essay, "War and Peace in American Catholic Thought: A Heritage Abandoned? " Theological Studies 48 (1987) : 711-727... (shrink)

Max Scheler’s contribution to the early development of phenomenology is second to only Edmund Husserl’s. What perhaps distinguishes Scheler’s early contribution is his willingness to examine phenomenologically social and political phenomena. Not only did this early trajectory lead him to develop a non-formal value theory, but it also enabled him to engage directly in the political problems of his time. Like many of his contemporary intellectuals, Scheler was an adamantsupporter of German aggression during the onset of World War I, (...) and he wrote many works during this time demonstrating the value and justification of the war. In only a few years’ time, Scheler’s position on the value of war shifted dramatically and he began to defend a position of peace and pacifism. The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify the early themes and influences in phenomenology that prepared Scheler for his analysis of war and peace; and (2) to illustratehow Scheler’s analysis offers the possibility of concretising the present experience of war and the possibility of peace. (shrink)

The first part of this paper discusses five sets of forces that have had a major influence on world agriculture in the post-World War II period. These include (1) high rates of population growth in the developing countries; (2) a steady increase in economic integration world-wide, driven by technological breakthroughs in the communication and transportation sectors; (3) major realignments in the values of national currencies; (4) growing distortions in economic policies in both the industrialized and developing countries; (...) and (5) growing diffusion of new production technology from the industrialized to the developing countries.The second part reviews the changing role of international development assistance in support of agriculture in light of these historical forces. Such assistance successively stressed the development of extension services, food aid, institutional development of higher level education institutions, the development of research capacity, and rural development.A look to the future is the subject of the third part of the paper. This includes a discussion of the difficulties in sustaining U.S. foreign assistance, especially when that nation is letting its own economic house fall into such disarray. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:January 25, 2012 (9:31 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3102\russell 31,2 064 red.wpd 1 See Russell’s exposure of this derogatory contraction of “Viet Nam Cong San” (“Vietnamese Communists”) in his War Crimes in Vietnam (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 45n. On the importance of language, cf. the legendary remark of Russell’s correspondent, Mohammad Ali: “I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet Cong.… No Viet Cong ever called me nigger.” Russell attempted (...) to enlist Ali on behalf of the iwct (see the ra for their letters of 8 April, 18, 31 May, 11 Sept., 17 Oct., 15 Nov. and 16 Dec. 1967). russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 31 (winter 2011–12): 167–87 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 ibliographies, rchival nventories, ndexes A SECONDARY BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL: LONDON, STOCKHOLM AND ROSKILDE Stefan Andersson [email protected] i.wintroduction T he International War Crimes Tribunal (iwct) on the United States’ warfare in Vietnam was founded in 1966 through the moral outrage of the British philosopher and political activist Bertrand Russell, his private secretary Ralph Schoenman, Ken Coates, Chris Farley and other people connected to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. They wanted to inform the world about the us government’s attempts to convince the Vietnamese population (who were mainly peasants) that capitalism is a better political-economical system than communism, by killing as many “Vietcong”1 and unarmed seniors, women and children as possible with regular carpet bombing, cluster and phosphorus bombs, napalm, Agent Orange and other illegal weaponry, and oTering the survivors pleasant lodgingsinwired-inhamlets far away from their homes and the graves of their ancestors. This charm oTensive went on for more than ten years, and although three times as many bombs fell on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as were dropped during the whole Second World War, surprisingly enough the Vietnamese were not to be converted. In the 1960s this macabre spectacle could be watched on television all over the world, but very few protested against it. Until 1968 the majority of American January 25, 2012 (9:31 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3102\russell 31,2 064 red.wpd 168 stefan andersson 2 See Norman Mailer’s Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, the Novel as History (New York, New American Library, 1968). He met up with Noam Chomsky, “a slim sharp-featured man with an ascetic expression, and an air of gentle but absolute moral integrity” (p. 180). Both were arrested and spent a night in prison together. 3 See Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 348. See also Natalie Atkin, “From Margin to Mainstream: American Peace Movements, 1950s– 1970s”, in issue “Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the usa since 1945”, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen, no. 32 (2004): 175–92. 4 See May 1970: Birth of the Antiwar University (New York: PathWnder P., 1971). 5 The so-called “Chicago conspiracy trials” or “Chicago 7 trials” that followed, when sevendefendants—AbbieHoTman,JerryRubin,DavidDellinger,TomHayden,Rennie Davis, John Froines and Lee Weiner—were charged with conspiracy and inciting to riot, showed that the us government was not going to tolerate such “unpatriotic” and “criminal ” behaviour. See James Tracy, Direct Action: Radical PaciWsm from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1996), pp. 145–51. 6 See Mark Kurlansky, 1968: the Year That Rocked the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), and David Caute, 1968: the Year of the Barricades (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), pp. 3, 7–8, 12z–13. 7 Fredrik Logevall, “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963–1964”, PaciWc Historical Review 61 (1992): 69–102. citizens were for the war, although some earlier, well-attended rallies against it, like the 1967 march on the Pentagon in late October,2 might have made some think diTerently. sds (Students for a Democratic Society)3 and other antiwar organizations never became the united force that could challenge the government ’s reliance on what Nixon called the “silent majority”. It was not until the us attacked Cambodia... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 179 THE EARLY “IRON CURTAIN” Michael D. Stevenson Schulich School of Business, York U. / Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. Toronto, on m3j 1p3 / Hamilton, on l8s 4l6, Canada [email protected] Patrick Wright. Iron Curtain: from Stage to Cold War. Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2007. Pp. xvii, 488. isbn 978-0-19-923150-8. £18.99 (hb); £12.99 (pb). In his famous Westminster College (...) address on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill Wred one of the opening salvos of the Cold War by proclaiming that from “Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain” had been lowered across Europe. Patrick Wright’s intriguing and provocative book does not examine the phrase “iron curtain” in its popular Cold War context. Instead, he maintains that many characteristics of this metaphor, “including the pronounced sense of theatricality it would bring to international politics, were inherited from the period before the Second World War” (p. 18). Wright divides Iron Curtain into two primary chronological sections, the Wrst covering the period from 1914 to 1920. An iron curtain originally referred to the steel safety screen that descended in English theatres, beginning in the lateeighteenth century, to separate the audience from the often catastrophic Wres that broke out on the stage. The phrase entered the lexicon of international relations in January 1915 when British author and paciWst Violet Page (writing under the pseudonym Vernon Lee) published an article lamenting that “War’s cruelties and recriminations, War’s monstrous iron curtain” (p. 80) had alienated European nations such as England and Germany sharing a common cultural heritage. But the barrier quickly moved east in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution and “took the form not just of exaggerated political rhetoric, but of an economic blockade enforced by naval power” (p. 171), as the Allies sought to contain the infection of Bolshevism. Wright devotes most attention in this section to documenting the 1920 visit to Russia by the British delegation jointly sponsored by the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, which sought to penetrate the dense fog of Allied anti-Bolshevik propaganda and validate the delegation members’ own preconceived views about the nascent socialist utopia in Russia. British delegates witnessed images both of progress carefully stagemanaged by their hosts and of terrible economic dislocation and poverty caused by the Allied blockade and the civil war, which allowed the majority of them to return home to lavish praise on the Soviet experiment that would, in their minds, inevitably fulWl its potential once the Bolshevik government became stable. February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 180 Reviews 1 “The Future of Europe”, European AVairsz 1, no. 1 (April 1949): 3. The second section of Wright’s book examines Western reports of life behind the iron curtain between 1920 and 1939. Here, the author focuses heavily on the theatrical nature of Soviet attempts to create modern-day Potemkin villages that werez—zwith a limited number of exceptionsz—zaccepted as reality by an endless parade of left-wing visitors. A second British Trades Union Congress delegation in 1924, for example, received a dramatically embellished picture of Soviet economic progress that included a train journey past a long-abandoned factory belching smoke created by burning wet straw frantically provided by Russian peasants; the resulting report of the delegation “repeatedly collapsed into the most abject conformity with the Soviet view of reality” (p. 245). The most tragic examples of Western visitors’ blindness to the truth occurred during the 1930s famine deliberately induced by Stalin, and Wright exposes a wide cast of characters who adopted a blinkered view of conditions in the ussr. Among intellectuals, Wright documents the 1931 visit of George Bernard Shaw, who cavalierly dismissed reports of widespread food shortages while dining sumptuously in Moscow’s Hotel Metropole. Among journalists, Wright develops the case of Walter Duranty, the New York Timesz correspondent who knuckled under to demands of Soviet censors to produce sanitized accounts denying or ignoring the famine in order to protect his privileged place in that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion, the Globalization of War, and Restorative JusticeNathan TierneyAs the pace of globalization increases, the world's religions find themselves in a perilous dilemma that they have yet to resolve in either practical or conceptual terms. On the one hand, the globalization of markets exerts a powerful pressure toward consumerist and materialist values, which undermine and undercut religious perspectives and sensibilities. On the other hand, the globalization of war (...) heightens the intensity of these religious perspectives and sensibilities, and distorts them in the direction of violence and religious extremism. This dilemma plays itself out in different ways in the developed and developing world, but, as the term "globalization" indicates, it is a problem for all of us. Governments, in developing countries especially, often find themselves forced to choose between one horn of the dilemma or the other, with often disastrous results as they take one or the other side in a "West versus the rest" scenario. In the long run, the only viable solution is one that addresses both horns of the dilemma at the same time, and this is possible only if, in turn, religions themselves become truly global. This will require a large-scale and focused cooperative effort in which the religions of the world actively and jointly engage with both problems, working with governments, NGOs, religious communities, and interfaith groups to harmonize religious life with economics and to promote a culture of peace and justice.Because "globalization" is a familiar term in relation to markets, I'll begin by clarifying what I mean by the globalization of war. There are two main aspects to this phenomenon. First, the term refers to a specific transformation in the nature, purposes, and conditions of warfare brought about by the forces of globalization. By globalization I mean the growing trend of the world's cultural, economic, and political forces to bypass national borders and operate on a world scale. This process creates new possibilities for both integration and conflict. When that conflict passes beyond the possibility of diplomatic negotiation, we have the conditions for globalized war. Globalized war is not necessarily world war. It can be relatively local in its sphere of combat; for example, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was a collective response to a worldwide threat of terrorism. What makes it a globalized war, as distinct from international war, is the global nature of the forces that produced it and [End Page 79] are affected by it. Globalized war in this sense has come only lately onto the scene, but its scale and impact is likely to grow in the coming century.The second aspect of the globalization of war is the tendency of conflict to mutate beyond the interests and concerns of nation-states and be taken up by broader civilizational units, even if they were not originally a response to global pressures. The most likely trajectory for this mutation has been well described by Samuel P. Huntington in his influential article "The Clash of Civilizations" (1993) and his book-length treatment of the same subject (1997). Huntington argues that the fault lines of conflict will not be primarily ideological or economic but cultural, where "cultural" is to be understood at its broadest level—the level of civilizations. He divides the world into seven or eight competing civilizations: Western, Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. Societies sharing cultural affinities will cooperate with one another, and the attempt by the West to universalize its dominant version of consumer capitalism and liberal democracy will be resisted in an increasingly determined way—eventually to the point of outright war: "the next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations."1In Huntington's analysis, then, the globalization of war refers to a coming clash of civilizations. He believes that religion will play a central role in this clash as the focal point of civilizations: "Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture tradition and, most important, religion."2 While Western civilization has experienced several decades of decline and decay, in both its cultural unity and its sense of identity, other civilizations have grown both in economic terms and... (shrink)

War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940, is not as broad as its title might suggest. Timothy Moy does indeed propose a broad thesis, that institutional culture plays a large, though seldom acknowledged, role in technological innovation. But he addresses only two very particular case studies of military innovation between the world wars. The longer reviews the Army Air Force's development of the technology for precision bombing; the shorter examines the U.S. Marine Corps's development of the technology (...) for amphibious assault. What primarily shaped these innovations were, in Moy's view, the particular cultures of the air force and marines and their internal politics rather than the more commonly cited technical or industrial imperatives.The book is divided into two parts, each of four chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion . As we might expect of a study derived from a Berkeley history of science dissertation, War Machines rests on a reasonably solid research base. The two stories are told separately, however, and differ significantly in both structure and documentation. Part 1, “Precision Bombing,” alternates chapters on doctrine and technology. Chapters 2 and 4 follow the air force adoption of strategic bombing as a mission to win independence from the army. Judging by the endnotes, both chapters rest chiefly on secondary sources and are less analytical than assertive. Chapters 3 and 5 trace the air force effort to find the bombsights and bombers that its self‐chosen mission required. These chapters offer a more extensively documented and persuasive narrative than those on doctrine, although the two are not very well integrated. Part 2, “Amphibious Landing,” in contrast, integrates doctrine, training, and technology in a single narrative. It begins with the marines adopting advanced base defense and amphibious warfare to define missions that would sustain institutional independence, then follows the interaction of doctrinal evolution, training exercises, and technological development. These chapters are based much more heavily on archival research than those in Part 1.Moy is a fine writer, but he sometimes lapses into phrasemaking at the expense of explanation. Referring to the air force as a “high‐tech” organization, for instance, he claims that “the airmen's institutional self‐image as futuristic and gallant knights of the sky shaped the vision of strategic bombing they articulated and embraced. Daylight bombing grew out of this high‐tech culture” . How bombing squares with a “knights of the sky” self‐image he never explains. Nor does he ever fully address the specifics of one of his major categories, high‐tech versus low‐tech innovation. This becomes all the more troublesome when he extends the distinction by characterizing the air force as high tech, the marines as low tech. Quite apart from the anachronistic usage, this contrast tends to become more label than analysis.However well chosen Moy's cases, two seems a slender base to sustain his thesis. One feature of his argument that I find particularly problematic is the almost complete absence of internal opposition. Neither airmen nor marines spoke with one voice about the choice of a single mission to define their service. Moy mentions the advocates of pursuit aviation only in passing, for instance, and is completely silent about any dissidence among marines. This places him in the company of a long line of historians and social scientists who have studied controversies over military innovation exclusively from the viewpoint of those perceived to be on the winning side. In his conclusion Moy does briefly discuss the alternatives each service might have chosen; but however well done, it is too little and too late. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 256 - 278 Rabbi Abraham Isaac Ha-Cohen Kook’s essay “The War” is a text of immense importance with respect to the development of ideological militaristic writing in religious Zionism. The essay was first published in the book _Orot me-Ofel_, edited by R. Kook’s son, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook. In this study, I wish to distinguish the views presented in the notebooks and collected writings of R. Kook from his position as set forth in (...) the edited essay, which bears the stamp of the editor’s interpretation. Nine of the essay’s ten passages were written during World War I, and only the first passage, which bears the theological-militant stamp, does not appear in the collections of manuscripts from which the essay was constructed. My aim is to trace how R. Zvi Yehudah edited the essay and to explore the important influence of this passage. (shrink)

The concept of presentism has been at the center of current discussions in the historical discipline. Among the efforts to define presentism, we face radically different approaches. On the one hand, we have scholars that see it as ‘a cardinal sin’ or as a vice, while on the other, there are many who recognize in it something that is unavoidable and should be understood and welcomed. In this article, we explore and discuss these contrasting positions and argue for three central (...) virtues that presentism can bring to our understanding of the past. Through the analysis of narratives surrounding World War II and the founding of the United States, we argue that presentism: 1. allows history to be critical by motivating present reviews to established–mostly western-centric– accounts; 2. allows us to create new perspectives about the past by strategically using the tools of our present and finally, 3. welcomes pluralism rather than a single historical truth. These points allow us to defend a view of the past that is not static, fixed, and forever closed, but instead, see it as a place of debate, dispute, and constant renewal. (shrink)

The latest volume in the splendid critical edition of the Opera philosophica et theologica of William of Ockham in progress at the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University under the general editorship of Gedeon Gál, O.F.M. The project itself is something of a phenomenon in the area of critical editions of medieval Latin texts in terms of the rapidity at which quality volumes are produced at remarkably reasonable costs. Since 1967 five quarto volumes, totaling some three thousand four hundred pages, (...) have appeared. Three of these contain the first portion of Ockham’s most important theological work, the Ordinatio of his "commentary" on book 1 of the Sentences. The final portion is scheduled to appear early in 1979 as volume 4 of the Opera theologica. Volume 1 of the philosophical opera contains the monumental Summa Logicae, and volume 3 will also appear this year, thus completing with the present volume the edition of the most important of Ockham’s logical works. Editors are also assigned and are already at work on the other major non-political writings, notably the Quodlibet and commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. Since the Opera politica Guillelmi de Ockham were published in three octavo volumes by the University of Manchester Press, we may expect to have very shortly substantially all the works of the Venerable Inceptor, thanks to the exceptional industry of a team of highly qualified researchers as well as substantial grants by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the De Rance Corporation. Two of the editors of individual works in the present volume are deceased. Father Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., who came to the Franciscan Institute from Germany before the outbreak of World War II, first conceived of and began work on the critical edition. His text of the Tractatus de praedestinatione was first published in 1945 in Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 2 and was subsequently translated into English by M. M. Adams and N. Kretzmann in 1969. It differs little in Brown’s revision, which adds variants from the Bruges MS, unavailable to Boehner because of the war. The other posthumous edition is that of E. A. Moody. This too appeared in the aforesaid Text Series as No. 14. The present text is identical with the earlier version, but observations and suggested alternate readings by the general editor are added in footnotes. The thirty-two pages of introduction contains a wealth of information. To mention but two items: One concerns the probable reason why Ockham only incepted in theology but never served as regent master. This apparently had little or nothing to do with Lutterall’s opposition, as Chancellor of the University, to Ockham’s views and his summons later to the papal court at Avignon. It stemmed rather from the Franciscan custom of promoting those bachelors who had completed their magisterial studies to regent master on the basis of seniority. At his time a junior like Ockham could expect a wait of eight to ten years. It was during this period, beginning probably in 1321 that he began his lectures on logic, probably at the Franciscan house of studies in London where he later composed the Summa Logicae and his exposition of Aristotle’s Physics, before the summer of 1324 when he went to Avignon. Another item is the effective refutation of the authenticity views of Prantl and Anneliese Maier of the Expositiones and their relationship to the spurious and derivative Notabilia. As a final comment, we note that this second volume of the Opera philosophica contains all the works of Ockham edited by Marcus de Benevento under the title Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super artem veterem edita per Ven. Inceptorem Guilielmum de Occham, [[sic]] cum quaestionibus Alberti Parvi de Saxonia.—A.B.W. (shrink)

It had been recognized for some time that with new technology, the industrial powers would probably lose their virtual monopoly of violence, retaining only an enormous preponderance. Well before 9/11, technical studies had concluded that “a well-planned operation to smuggle WMD into the United States would have at least a 90 percent probability of success—much higher than ICBM delivery even in the absence of [National Missile Defense].†That has become “America’s Achilles Heel,†a study with that title concluded several years (...) ago. Surely the dangers were evident after the 1993 attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, which came close to succeeding along with much more ambitious plans, and might have killed tens of thousands of people with better planning, the WTC building engineers reported.2.. (shrink)

After Second World War public and political decision makers wished to correct the apparent negative consequences of science and technology. This resulted in a call for ethical responsibility in science and technology and a new generation of environmental regimes aimed at controlling or managing the consequences of human interaction with the environment. The claim of this paper is that the Precautionary Principle can be understood as a combination of these trends. The Precautionary Principle is presented and discussed in detail. (...) In particular it is specified a) when the Principle is to be used, b) what measures follow from the decision to use it, and c) who is to be consulted in democratic decisions of the use of the Principle. (shrink)

The following paper presents a proposal of a theoretical foundation for an application of distributed cognition in overcoming post-war traumas and related social conflicts. The distributed cognition theory states that the cognitive system is a structure distributed between internal-mental and external-objective social world representations across time and space. The basic issue of dialogue in distributed cognition is that distribution as information dissemination in each cognitive component functions in a systemic integrity. The presented perspective of overcoming traumas and war conflicts (...) through dialogue refers to the following aspects of human activity: 1 - the perception of an environment as a construct of own life path and self-image; 2 - active creation of a desired world, life space and desired self; 3 - agentic cognitive mapping of an environment as a real, virtual and potential life space; 4 - a way of elastic control over an environment through discovering objectively present environmental affordances; 5 - achieving agency through discovering possibilities for action rather than barriers; 6 - making the cognitive system more flexible through a change in style of thinking to a constant state of openness to new meanings and values. (shrink)

Volume 1: The ancient to premodern world, 3000 BCE-1815 CE -- Volume 2: The modern world, 1815-present.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ralegh and the Punic WarsCharles G. Salas“For he doth not feign, that rehearseth probabilities as bare conjectures....”Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the WorldThe Secret HistoryIn 1603 Sir Walter Ralegh was judged guilty of treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London to await execution. The wait was a long one —execution did not take place until 1618—giving this artful courtier, warrior, poet, and poseur time to script new (...) roles for himself. The most memorable of these was historian, and the stage on which he performed was the entire world. Universal history had been a time-honored genre in England, but never had there been so remarkable a performance by a native son as Ralegh’s The History of the World (1614). In five books Ralegh offered to king and country his interpretation of events from Creation to 168 bc. Book V, last and lengthiest of the entire work, deals in large part with the struggle between Rome and Carthage. The story of that struggle is Ralegh’s most mature historical writing and the most revealing of himself, for when he gave up his plan to carry his history into modern times, the Punic Wars became the context for things about the present that he was loath to leave unsaid.Despite its length (about a million words) and premature ending, the History was an enormous success with a public eager to possess the meaning of it all. Oliver Cromwell particularly liked the way it followed “the strange windings and turnings of Providence”; 1 no doubt he found Ralegh’s emphasis upon the Providential control of events reassuring. For Ralegh claimed to show how “kings and kingdoms have flourished and fallen, and for what virtue and piety God made prosperous, and for what vice and deformity he made wretched both the one and the other.” 2 In fact what Ralegh showcased [End Page 195] were the acts of a vengeful, Old Testament God more concerned with punishing monarchical sins than with making monarchs prosperous, and the History was temporarily suppressed by James for being “too saucy in censoring princes.” 3If the king did not like what he saw in the History, the king’s critics did; and Ralegh, never a friend to Puritan or republican in his lifetime, became a hero to both as a pious author and victim of Stuart tyranny. Those sympathetic to the Stuarts, like Alexander Ross, Chaplain to Charles I, saw Ralegh rather differently; but the popularity of the man and his History could not be denied. Ross himself profited from that popularity by doing both an abridgment and a continuation of the History as well as Som Animadversions and Observations upon Sir Walter Raleigh’s Historie of the World. Wherein his mistakes are noted, and som doubtful passages cleered (1653). Many of these animadversions were directed at Ralegh’s treatment of the Punic Wars. Ross recognized that “mistakes” and “doubtful passages” there formed a pattern: “Sir Walter cannot look upon the Roman Glorie with but a squint eye”(8), he complained. But did he also recognize the reason for that squint eye, that Ralegh kept one eye on the past and the other on the present? That many of those “doubtful passages” were in fact strategic elements in a campaign (based on parallels) against Rome, against James, and against James’s ministry? Had this been obvious to Ross, he still would not have said so. Writing under Cromwell, he could no more afford to complain explicitly about abuse of James than Ralegh, writing under James, could afford to make the abuse explicit.Parallels—implicit or imagined—are part and parcel of Ralegh’s providentialism. In brief: God controls events, God does not change, events do not change. This is not to say that Ralegh believed that God’s control was transparent, that God couldn’t change, or that free will did not exist. Ralegh did not solve the great problems of theology. 4 What he is sure about is that the same sins continue to be punished just as they have always been: “So also hath God punished the same and the like sins in all after-times, and... (shrink)

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine constitutes a poignant reminder of the enduring relevance and potential devastation associated with nuclear weapons. For decades, the possibility of such catastrophic conflict has not seemed so imminent as in the current world affairs. -/- This contribution presents a comprehensive analysis of nuclear strategy for the 21st century. By examining the evolving geostrategic landscape the talk illuminates key concepts such as nuclear posture, credible deterrence, first & second strike capabilities, flexible response, EMP , variable (...) yield, counterforce & countervalue, limited war and escalation dominance, thereby providing a nuanced understanding of the delicate balance of power in the nuclear arena in modern conflicts. Furthermore, it concentrates on the era that started with the war in Ukraine, offering insights into how recent geopolitical developments influence nuclear doctrines. -/- Through conceivable real-world scenarios, we gain perspective on the multifaceted challenges posed by newer technologies and potential escalation dynamics involving global nuclear actors. -/- Such scenarios include: -/- 1. A non-weaponised or sub-critical test within Russia to intimidate opponents into understanding Russia’s resolve and capabilities. Prior norms have restricted testing since 2000, apart from North Korea. In case of a full surface test, Russia could detonate in uninhabited areas within its own vast territory with minimal fallout. While clarifying military strength, demonstrations risk hardening resistance without incentivising surrender. -/- 2. Coercive atomic threat to compel Ukraine or its supporters to make concessions. By leveraging the spectre of nuclear warfare, Russia could expect to achieve its objectives through intimidation and fear. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable, as it may provoke a strong international response and further galvanise support for Ukraine. -/- 3. Demonstration detonation over/under the Black Sea to signal resolve without targeting Ukraine itself; possibly amidst negotiations to gain diplomatic leverage, whilst limiting human casualties to zero or causing a mild, non-destructive tsunami. -/- 4. Ukraine could decide to launch a pre-emptive strike on Russian nuclear facilities or weapons, fearing an imminent attack. Such an action would have a high risk of failure and might even provoke a nuclear retaliation from Russia. It could also lead to a broader conflict, as neighbouring countries might feel compelled to intervene. -/- 5. Limited tactical strike against Ukrainian military or infrastructure to weaken capacity and morale. Russia’s 2000+ non-strategic arsenal could target positions using short-range missiles with 0.3 – 5 kiloton yields. Objectives like crippling Kharkiv defences might create no-go zones hindering advances. However, Ukraine might maintain drone and cyber offensive capabilities regardless. -/- 6. Electromagnetic Pulse attack designed to disable critical infrastructure in Ukraine and NATO countries without radioactive fallout. This aims to hinder the war effort and economy without provoking the same conventional military response as a blast. However, an EMP attack affecting NATO shall still be considered an act of war warranting retaliation. -/- 7. A weapon could be deployed accidentally or without proper authorisation. This could occur due to a technical malfunction, miscommunication, human error, or the actions of rogue elements. The consequences of such an event could be catastrophic, leading to a rapid escalation of the conflict and potentially triggering a global crisis. -/- 8. Sub-strategic offensive targeting NATO in the European theatre, so as to fracture allied resolve, against arms routes in Poland, Baltic stockpiles, British naval bases, American troop concentrations in Germany etc. Putin may perceive defeat or deposition as an existential threat, viewing such an option as self-preservation despite adverse consequences. -/- . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:War and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity by Stanley HauerwasStephen M. VantasselWar and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity STANLEY HAUERWAS Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011. 188 pp. $19.99Stanley Hauerwas continues his prodigious publishing schedule with a book exploring the complex idea of war and the formation of American identity. In his introduction, Hauerwas makes three claims: (1) (...) war has been abolished in Christ; (2) Christians, and likely others, do not recognize how war has taken on religious trappings and become a false liturgy; and (3) the church in its localized placement should embody—and not simply proclaim—an alternative to war. Hauerwas seems to assume the first point since he avoids discussing how war has been abolished in Christ and instead focuses on the second and third points.The book is divided into three sections. Part 1, “America and War,” surveys how Christian terms such as “sacrifice” and “redemption” were interwoven into the nation’s understanding of war. War, Hauerwas argues, has been elevated to an essential component of American identity. He notes that some have argued that war is necessary for democracy to be sustained and flourish since it unites Americans and defends our wealth. Hauerwas decries how Christians, and Protestants in particular, have allowed non-Christian ideas (i.e., notions of America’s use of war) to enter the church. In chapter 3, Hauerwas turns arguments in favor of just war theory on their head by stating that it is not as realistic as claimed. [End Page 243]Part 2, “The Liturgy of War,” engages the moral justification for war. Hauerwas disputes the notion that it is easy to morally separate the violence of war from other forms of violence (44). Although openly admitting his inability to provide an adequate definition of war, Hauerwas continues to believe that war should be abolished. He decries the idea that war-making is virtuous and a proper source for giving society its story and meaning.Part 3, “The Ecclesial Difference,” attempts to outline how the local church can embody principles of nonviolence and thereby show the world another way of living. The local church is critical to Hauerwas’s view because he questions the value of universal notions of justice. Justice, he argues, is identified and understood in the concrete display of a people (114). It is in the church’s diversity that it can model for the world how unity can be maintained without the use of violence.Hauerwas’s insights into the insidious ways war can be baptized in Christian thought and practice should cause all Christians to pause and consider how their allegiance to Christ might have been blurred by an improper allegiance to the state. His use of contemporary scholarship is thought provoking and raises serious questions regarding notions of justice, the Church, and how we understand and frame the use of violence. He rightly exhorts Christians not to make peace with the status quo because we have a down payment on the next age in our possession now. But I think Hauerwas’s suggestion that war is abolished is either an expression of an overrealized eschatology or moral supersessionism. Likewise, I would suggest that America’s use of the language of “sacrifice” and “higher purpose” in discussions about war is not just an attempt to harness the power of religious language but an attempt to moderate the glorification and triumphalism of war. One would only need to compare how America discusses war with that of the ancient Assyria or Egypt to understand the difference. In the end, I suspect readers will find Hauerwas’s arguments to be more evocative than demonstrative. [End Page 244]Stephen M. VantasselKing’s Evangelical Divinity SchoolCopyright © 2014 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The Introduction outlines, in a concise way, the history of the Lvov-Warsaw School – a most unique Polish school of worldwide renown, which pioneered trends combining philosophy, logic, mathematics and language. The author accepts that the beginnings of the School fall on the year 1895, when its founder Kazimierz Twardowski, a disciple of Franz Brentano, came to Lvov on his mission to organize a scientific circle. Soon, among the characteristic features of the School was its serious approach towards philosophical studies (...) and teaching of philosophy, dealing with philosophy and propagation of it as an intellectual and moral mission, passion for clarity and precision, as well as exchange of thoughts, and cooperation with representatives of other disciplines.The genesis is followed by a chronological presentation of the development of the School in the successive years. The author mentions all the key representatives of the School (among others, Ajdukiewicz, Lesniewski, Łukasiewicz,Tarski), accompanying the names with short descriptions of their achievements. The development of the School after Poland’s regaining independence in 1918 meant part of the members moving from Lvov to Warsaw, thus providing the other segment to the name – Warsaw School of Logic. The author dwells longer on the activity of the School during the Interwar period – the time of its greatest prosperity, which ended along with the outbreak of World War 2. Attempts made after the War to recreate the spirit of the School are also outlined and the names of followers are listed accordingly. The presentation ends with some concluding remarks on the contribution of the School to contemporary developments in the fields of philosophy, mathematical logic or computer science in Poland. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two parts: in part one I give some examples from a study of how patient or client perspectives on treatment and life with cancer are “discovered”, addressed, included and shaped within cancer research and treatment after World War 2. In this first part I draw on analyses from my Ph.D. thesis about the concept of quality of life and psycho-social research on cancer, in which I focused on the development and interrelationships between (1) welfare (...) state forms of governance, (2) the practice of cancer treatment and its relation to research, and (3) client’s relations to treatment regimes and a life with cancer. I argue that the client’s perspective is represented in medical practice in many different, and often problematic, ways. A core problem is that this perspective is often represented from a third-person point of view, not from a direct first-person point of view. I find a number of reasons for this. The lack of first-person involvement is not isolated to medical practice but is also obvious in psycho-social practice that evolves in the relation to medical treatment and research in the last part of this century. The conflict around this is reflected in psychological theories about illness and disease that are formulated in this period. In the second part of the article I discuss the directions in which psychological theory has to develop in order to contribute to the recognition and involvement of first-person perspectives in medical treatment and research. The aim of this discussion is not limited to understanding how we as subjects handle everyday life with biological changes of bodily function. (shrink)

This paper examines how British war veterans fold together war time and post war experiences in practices of remembering and reconciliation. We examine these practices as networks of association between British ex-servicemen (veterans) and the people, places and circumstances associated with their experiences as prisoners in Japan during WW2. We focus on the experience of World War 2 British ex-servicemen (veterans) who were prisoners of war in Far East. During their period of captivity they worked to build Thai-Burma Railway (...) before transfer to a copper mine in Japan. Some 50 years later they participated in a "reconciliation trip" to Japan. We discuss two related issues. First, how and in what ways are the post war lives and war time experiences of these veterans gathered up in the emergent collectivity of such practices? In other words in what ways do these practices emerge and sustain themselves as a process of collection and dispersion of circulating reference in networks of association between people places and things. Second, we examine how accounts of redemption (claims to the consequences of experience as being other than you would expect them to be) create the basis for emergent forms of agency and settlement in expanding networks of remembering and reconciliation. (shrink)

Concerns of intellectual property infringement in China slow the dissemination of clean technology (Cleantech) innovation that could help bring the pace of global warming under control. We use the U.S. post‐World War 2 policy decisions with respect to Japan and Europe (the Marshall Plan) to show how this problem can be addressed. To help Japan become a western style democracy and stem the tide of communism, the U.S. transferred much of its extant intellectual property to Japan with a promise (...) to open US markets to Japanese goods. The United States did not require Japan to open its markets to U.S. goods. As a result, Japan became a staunch U.S. political ally in Asia, but also a serious economic competitor to the United States. While the Marshall Plan deployed different resources, the political outcomes were similar to Japan: Western Europe was a bulwark against communism. As global warming has become a major strategic issue, we argue that a comparable IPR initiative is required for China. This is not just a matter of doing the right thing as members of global commons, but is also matter of national security. We propose that by facilitating and managing the flow and sharing of U.S., EU, and Japanese Cleantech intellectual property with China—through a Cleantech Marshall Plan—a positive strategic relationship may be built while helping to bring global warming under control. (shrink)

For the inaugural Workshop on Philosophy & Engineering (WPE-2007), this abstract asks why engineers are turning now to philosophy. Upon reflection, philosophy and engineering are very different occupations, and engineering has rarely turned to philosophy in the long history of the systematic design and production of complex artifacts. After briefly examining events since World War 2, the extended abstract carries over Kuhn's explanation of the rise of philosophy of science during the intellectual tumult of relativity and quantum physics in (...) the opening moments of the 20th century to the case of engineering in the early moments of the 21st century. Specifically, the paper argues that the crisis of the rapid pace of technological change, reflected in the centripetal forces of the O's (bio, nano, and info) may help explain increased interest in a philosophy of engineering at this time. The abstract concludes by citing a number of ways that philosophy may help clarify what otherwise might be confusing times. (shrink)

The following extracts come from a memoir of philosophical life between the wars and after, written in the 1970s by the Anglo-Scottish philosopher Louis Arnaud Reid (1895–1986).2 Today Reid is best known for his writings on aesthetics, and as the holder of the foundation chair in the philosophy of education at the University of London. Reid will also be familiar to those who have read A.J. Ayer's account of Ayer's appointment to the chair of philosophy at London, for Reid was (...) the candidate strongly preferred by the philosophers on the selection committee.3 Reid regretted the rise of logical positivism in the later 1930s because it introduced a break with the earlier world of humane philosophical discourse.In these extracts, edited by his grandson, Reid begins by giving a sense of the breadth of topics covered in philosophical conferences in the 1920s, before sketching some of the characters involved. He mentions of course a number of figures still familiar to us, from Moore to Russell to Wittgenstein, but tries more generally to give an impression of a philosophical world which is now largely lost. These are themes he continues elsewhere in the book, where he discusses the people he knew at Edinburgh, Aberystwyth, Liverpool, Newcastle and London. (shrink)