The present paper discusses the claim that value-free science is impossible. After applauding the observation of Colombo et al. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7: 743–763, that this is at least to a considerable extent a psychological question, and should therefore be studied using the methods of psychological science, the studies performed by these authors were examined and unfortunately found seriously wanting in various respects. Beyond the merits or demerits of that particular piece of work, the discussion lead to a (...) conclusion likely relevant to the entire discussion about the alleged impossibility of value-free science: Showing the impossibility of value-free science would entail at least a) defining what the term science is intended to cover, b) providing high level evidence that few if any scientists in the relevant area are immune to non-epistemic influences, c) that these influences meaningfully bias the results of science, d) that there is no way to correct for these influences, and e) explain why – unlike epistemic appraisal in science – the epistemic appraisal of this argument can be trusted. (shrink)

The present article critiques standard attempts to make philosophy appear relevant to the scientific study of well-being, drawing examples in particular from works that argue for fundamental differences between different forms of wellbeing (by Besser-Jones, Kristjánsson, and Kraut, for example), and claims concerning the supposedly inherent normativity of wellbeing research (e.g., Prinzing, Alexandrova, and Nussbaum). Specifically, it is argued that philosophers in at least some relevant cases fail to apply what is often claimed to be among their core competences: conceptual (...) rigor—not only in dealing with the psychological construct of flow, but also in relation to apparently philosophical concepts such as normativity, objectivity, or eudaimonia. Furthermore, the uncritical use of so-called thought experiments in philosophy is shown to be inappropriate for the scientific study of wellbeing. As an alternative to such philosophy-as-usual, proper attention to other philosophical traditions is argued to be promising. In particular, the philosophy of ZhuangZi (a contemporary of Aristotle and one of the most important figures in Chinese intellectual history) appears to concord well with today’s psychological knowledge, and to contain valuable ideas for the future development of positive psychology. (shrink)

Background: A number of meta-analyses of mindfulness have been performed, but few distinguished between different facets of mindfulness, despite it being known that facets of mindfulness behave differently in different populations; and most studied the outcome of interventions, which tend to involve additional ingredients besides mindfulness. Furthermore, there has recently been some concern regarding possible publication bias in mindfulness research. -/- Objective: Systematic review and meta-analysis of the relationship of different facets of mindfulness with various outcomes, taking into account possible (...) moderators, and controlling for publication bias using a method appropriate given the substantial heterogeneity present. -/- Methods: Random effects meta-analysis with a number of robustness checks and estimation of the possible impact of publication bias on the results. Included are all studies that report correlations of outcomes with all five FFMQ facets, in English, French, German, or Spanish. -/- Study Registration: PROSPERO International prospective register of systematic reviews ID=CRD42016041863. -/- Results: For the designated primary measure (SWLS) estimated correlations were: 0.15 [0.07, 0.22] for the Observing facet, 0.31 [0.27, 0.36] for Describing, 0.35 [0.31, 0.38] for Acting-with-Awareness, 0.30 [0.10, 0.47] for Non-judging and 0.28 [0.18, 0.37] for Non-reacting. Grouping all desirable outcomes together, Describing has the highest zero-order (though not partial) correlation; Non-judging the highest effect on avoiding undesirable outcomes. Results seem to be reasonably robust even to severe publication bias. (shrink)

This paper examines cave environments as unique spaces of knowledge production and shows how visualizations of natural cavities in maps came to be powerful tools in scientific reasoning. Faced with the challenge of limited vision, mapmakers combined empiricism and imagination in an experimental setting and developed specific translation strategies to deal with the uncertain origin of underground objects and the shifting boundaries between the known and the unknown. By deconstructing this type of cartographic representation, which has barely been studied, this (...) paper furnishes surprising insights into the scholarly practices and tools used to deal with this considerable epistemic uncertainty and to signal credibility and trust to potential users. The array of maps used for this study includes both archival and published sources, depicting caves in Europe, America and Siberia. (shrink)

The relationship between science and philosophy is contentious. Quine saw philosophy as continuous with science (broadly understood), but many philosophers see a dichotomy between them. The present paper discusses cases where the relevance of certain scientific findings has been denied (related to Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox and to the appeal of skeptical arguments) or overlooked (one argument related to the frame problem of artificial intelligence and Nagel’s “bat” argument). The results caution against overly quick dismissal of the import of science on (...) philosophical questions, whether the latter be of a more theoretical or practical nature. (shrink)

Typicality is routinely invoked in everyday contexts: bobcats are typically short-tailed; people are typically less than seven feet tall. Typicality is invoked in scientific contexts as well: typical gases expand; typical quantum systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour. And typicality facts like these support many explanations, both quotidian and scientific. But what is it for something to be typical? And how do typicality facts explain? In this paper, I propose a general theory of typicality. I analyse the notion of a typical property. (...) I provide a formalism for typicality explanations, and I give an account of why typicality explanations are explanatory. Along the way, I show how typicality facts explain a variety of phenomena, from everyday phenomena to the statistical mechanical behaviour of gases. Finally, I argue that typicality is not the same thing as probability. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaft. 2. Aufl.--Bd. 2. Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation.--Bd. 3. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes.--Bd. 4. Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels und andere Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus.--Bd. 5-6. Die Geistige Welt.--Bd. 7. Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften.--Bd. 8. Weltanschauungslehre.--Bd. 9. Pädagogik.--Bd. 10. System der Ethik.--Bd. 11. Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewussteins.--Bd. 12. Zur preussischen Geschichte.

This volume provides Dilthey's most mature and best formulation of his Critique of Historical Reason. It begins with three "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," in which Dilthey refashions Husserlian concepts to describe the basic structures of consciousness relevant to historical understanding. The volume next presents the major 1910 work The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences. Here Dilthey considers the degree to which carriers of history--individuals, cultures, institutions, and communities--can be articulated as productive systems (...) capable of generating value and meaning and of realizing purposes. Hegel's idea of objective spirit is reconceived in a more empirical form to designate the medium of commonality in which historical beings are immersed. Any universal claims about history need to be framed within the specific productive systems analyzed by the various human sciences. Dilthey's drafts for the Continuation of the Formation contain extensive discussions of the categories most important for our knowledge of historical life: meaning, value, purpose, time, and development. He also examines the contributions of autobiography to historical understanding and of biography to scientific history. The finest summary of Dilthey's views on hermeneutics can be found in "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life." Here, Dilthey differentiates understanding relative to three kinds of manifestations of life. After giving his analysis of elementary understanding, he examines the role of induction in higher understanding and interpretation, and the relevance of transposition and re-experiencing for grasping individuality. (shrink)

I. bd. Allgemeine logik und erkenntnistheorie.- II. bd. Logik der exakten wissenschaften.- III. bd. Logik der geisteswissenschaften.

Freiheit und Verantwortung?! Zum Jubiläumsjahr des Thesenanschlags zuWittenberg versammelt dieses Buch 95 prägnante Thesen für unsere Zeit.Thesen zu Gesellschaft und Familie, zum Sozialwesen, zu Wissenschaftund Bildung, zu Migration, Kunst und Literatur, zur Religion – und auch zu»Freiheit und Verantwortung« heute. Martin Luther schrieb, dass derMensch einerseits »ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemandem untertan« und andererseits »ein dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermannuntertan« sei. In diesem Spannungsfeld, auf heute bezogen, bewegensich die Beiträge, die sich an die Reformation anlehnen können, (...) aber nichtmüssen. (shrink)

1. Grundgestalt, Bewegung, Stufung.--[Beilage]: Musik-Beispiele.

"Ich habe dem ausserordentlichen Manne, dessen Andenken diese Schrift gilt, nach seinem letzten Willen einen Grabstein gesetzt, auf dem Nichts zu lesen ist als sein Name. Das Ubrige sollte die Nachwelt schon wissen. Auch vertreten seine Werke den Biographen besser als die anderer beruhmten Gelehrten. Nur als Schriftsteller betrat er die offentliche Laufbahn; angstlich vermied er, seitdem sein Geist zum vollen Bewusstsein erwacht war, jede Beruhrung mit dem Tun der Menschen, und sein eignes sollte nicht in Betracht kommen gegen den (...) bleibenden Gehalt seines Daseins; sein Denken; aber uber alle Gebiete des Lebens erstreckt sich dieses und verrat vielfach den personlichen Anteil des Autors. Deshalb wollte er nicht, dass die ausseren Zuge seines Lebens zu seinem Gedachtnisse ins Einzelne hinein verfolgt wurden, und doch bedarf die kurze Grabschrift in den Augen seiner Zeit eines Kommentars, den er selbst uber sich nicht schreiben konnte." [...] Das vorliegende Werk von Wilhelm Gwinner ist ein Blick auf das Leben Schopenhauers, seinen Charakter und seine Lehre aus dem personlichem Umgang dargestellt. Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder zugangig gemacht. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein unveranderter Nachdruck der historischen Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1862.". (shrink)

English summary: This collection includes letters to and from W. Dilthey between 1852-1882.