In this paper, I give an argument for the view that non-fact entities – such as physical objects, abstract objects, events and so on – can ground other entities. Roughly put, the argument is as follows: those who accept this view can provide a more plausible account of the grounds of identity facts than those who deny this view.

I propose a `stage theory’ of groups: a group is a fusion of group-stages, where a group-stage is a plurality of individuals at a world and a time. The stage theory consists of existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for groups.

Instances of the law of large numbers are used to model many different physical systems. In this paper, I argue for a particular interpretation, of those instances of that law, which appeals to typicality. As I argue, the content of that law, when used to model physical systems, is that the probability of an event typically—rather than probably—approximates the frequency with which that event occurs.

Book digitized by Google from the library of the University of Michigan and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

Roughly put, explanatory circles — if any exist — would be propositions such that (i) each explains the next, and (ii) the last explains the first. In this paper, I give two arguments for the view that there are explanatory circles. The first argument appeals to general relativistic worlds in which time is circular. The second argument appeals to special science theories that describe feedback loops. In addition, I show that three standard arguments against explanatory circles are unsuccessful.

I propose a metaphysical theory of mechanisms based on the notion of causation. In particular, I use causation to formulate existence, identity, and parthood conditions for mechanisms. These conditions provide a sound metaphysical basis for accounts of mechanistic explanation, mechanistic organization, and for more restrictive theories of mechanisms.

1. Bd. Erkenntnislehre.--2. Bd. Formale Logik.

Toute évaluation du réel, toute loi de la pensée ou de la connaissance doit justifier sa valeur devant le moi qui décide et qui évalue. La connaissance est liée à des déterminations a priori relatives aux objets à connaître, déterr minations qui justifient leur validité par la valeur et le sens de l’acte de connaître en général, ou bien comme seul organe de cet acte. Par la connaissance, à laquelle le moi se lie strictement et librement dans son propre intérêt, (...) est déterminée l’inclusion complète du moi lui-même et son origine dans la réalité avec tout ce qui est sens et a priori. (shrink)

In this study I would like to make an exposition of religious symbolism, as it is seen by the Romanian scholar, underlining the anthropological aspects of the problem, to the extent that his autobiographical writings allow us. Hermeneutics, as the science of norms that allow us to discover and interpret the authentic meaning, and the symbol, with its double “existential and cognitive” function which is present in every area of life or thought, justifies in a certain way the Eliadian homo (...) symbolicus. Man as a symbol is the title of a book designed by Mircea Eliade, but he never managed to write and publish it; even the book entitled Anthropocosmos, in which he wanted to present “the profound meaning and structural solidarity of all those symbols, rites, beliefs, in relation to the labyrinth, the mandala, the foundation of the city, etc.,” was not published. (shrink)

English summary: This collection includes letters to and from W. Dilthey between 1852-1882.