The philosophy of Descartes is the classical example of a Philosophy as a System intending to found itself on an absolute point of view or to come from an absolute starting point. However, the Cogito being regarded by Descartes as the first principle, actually is neither a first nor a definite nor a sufficient principle, leading to further conclusions. Above all Descartes himself, thus becoming the first Anti-Cartesian, compromises this so-called first and greatest evidence by stating that God ist the (...) most evident principle, from which everything has to be deduced. The myth of clarity conceals the true, uncertain and inquiring Descartes. (shrink)

It is therefore most appropriate that Yoga and Indian philosophy be given equal attention both in the context of academic research and in the framework of ...

In a recent paper, Tim Henning argues that the result that we should save the greatest number in rescue cases can be established on procedural grounds without making use of the aggregation of interests. He first argues that we ought to respect the affected persons' equal claims to have a say in the rescue decision and that this can only be achieved by the majority rule, which consists in giving each affected person an equal vote. Then he argues for the (...) second claim that if everyone votes in their self-interest, then the greatest number will be saved. I present a class of cases in which the second claim fails. This establishes that even if self-interested voting is assumed, the majority rule does not always lead to the greatest number being saved. (shrink)

Temporal loops in which two agents are involved in a circle of reactive attitudes create a puzzle concerning who harms whom. I argue that this puzzle, which has been developed by Stephen Kearns in a recent paper in this journal, should be solved by accepting that the situation involves normative indeterminacy. A supervaluationist treatment of this indeterminacy allows us to maintain that the normative supervenes on the non-normative and that the involved agents are in normatively symmetric situations. It further allows (...) to maintain that it is determinately the case that one agent wrongs the other just in case the latter does not wrong the former. I conclude by tentatively arguing that the indeterminacy involved should not be understood as semantic and that the puzzle provides us with a novel case of indeterminacy in reality. (shrink)

Ich erörtere die beiden folgenden Thesen:1. Der technisch-wissenschaftliche Fortschrift ist als Ganzes nicht zu steuern, und zwar gerade dann nicht, wenn er eine Zivilisation wie die unsere westliche total durchdringt. Die Nichtplanbarkett des Gesamtprozesses ist seine wichtigste Rahmenbedingung. Man hat aber einen ideologischen Begriff von Rationalität, wenn man den Entwicklungszug des 'Fortschrifts' deshalb als 'irrational' bezeichnen würde.2. Die Akzeptierung des Umstands, daß der technisch-wissenschaftliche Fortschritt nicht planbar ist, ist einer der augenfälligsten Preise, die wir für die Erhaltung der liberalen Demokratie (...) bei uns zu zahlen haben. (shrink)

This paper discusses a puzzle raised by Sharon Berry, published in Analysis. The question in the background of this puzzle is how we should deal with seemingly plausible possibility judgements that commit us to counterfactual truths that find no basis in reality. Three answers to this question and their corresponding solutions to the puzzle will be discussed. The last answer provides a way to make sense of the claim that it is in some cases indeterminate whether a proposition is possible (...) and offers an account of indeterminate modal status. (shrink)