Results for 'We-intentions'

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  1.  28
    We-intentions and immunity to error through misidentification.Björn Petersson - 2024 - Analysis 84 (4):758-766.
    When I intend to J, I may be wrong about what I intend but not about who intends it. In this sense, action intentions appear immune to error. A standard explanation of this immunity is that the subject of the intention is not represented in the content of the intention in the first place. When I think that we intend to J, it seems obvious that I can misjudge who ‘we’ are. This may seem to indicate that the ‘we’ (...)
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  2.  94
    We-Intentions and Social Action.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1985 - Analyse & Kritik 7 (1):26-43.
    In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indispensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general (...)
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  3.  91
    We-intentions, free-riding, and being in reserve.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (1):25 - 52.
    A person can intend to achieve his own personal aims and ends, but he can also intend to promote the goals of his groups or collectives. In many cases of collective action these two types of intention will coincide, but they need not, and when they clash, collective action dilemmas, like free-riderism, will emerge. In this paper we discuss and analyze a central kind of group-intentions termed we-intentions, and distinguish between absolute and conditional we-intentions. The analyses of (...)
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  4. We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted (...)
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  5. Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements.Stefanie Dach - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4415-4439.
    My paper is concerned with the relation between ought-statements and intentions in Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy. According to an entrenched view in Sellars scholarship, Sellars considers ought-statements as expressions of we-intentions. The aim of my paper is to question this reading and to propose an alternative. According to this alternative reading of Sellars, ought-statements are metalinguistic statements about the implication relations between intentions. I show that the entrenched understanding faces many unacknowledged problems and generates incompatibilities with Sellars’s commitments (...)
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  6. We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
  7.  27
    Intentional Social Action and We-Intentions.Marvin Belzer - 1986 - Analyse & Kritik 8 (1):86-95.
    In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of “we-intention” plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela’s concept of “we-intention”. Tuomela’s introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative (...)
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  8. We-Intentions and How One Reports Them.Kyle Ferguson - 2023 - In Jeremy Randel Koons & Ronald Loeffler, Ethics, practical reasoning, agency: Wilfrid Sellars's practical philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 37–61.
    In this chapter, Kyle Ferguson argues for an individualist account of Sellarsian we-intentions. According to the individualist account, we-intentions’ intersubjective form renders them shareable rather than requiring that they be shared. Contrary to collectivist accounts, one may we-intend independently of whether and without presupposing that one's community shares one's we-intentions. After providing textual support, Ferguson proposes and implements a strategy of reportorial ascent, which strengthens the case for the individualist account. Reportorial ascent involves reflecting on the sentences (...)
     
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  9.  80
    There are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended (...)
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  10. Subject, Mode and Content in We-Intentions.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and Mind 2.
  11. Gathering the godless: intentional "communities" and ritualizing ordinary life. Section Three.Cultural Production : Learning to Be Cool, or Making Due & What We Do - 2015 - In Anthony B. Pinn, Humanism: essays on race, religion and cultural production. London: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
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  12.  25
    Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Human Act.Can Laurens Löwe - 2021 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a novel account of Aquinas's theory of the human act. It argues that Aquinas takes a human act to be a composite of two power-exercises, where one relates to the other as form to matter. The formal component is an act of the will, and the material component is a power-exercise caused by the will, which Aquinas refers to as the 'commanded act.' The book also argues that Aquinas conceptualizes the act of free choice as a hylomorphic (...)
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  13.  82
    Sellars’ Theory of We-Intentions and Gilbert’s Theory of Joint Commitment: A critical notice of Jeremy R. Koons, The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars.Ronald Loeffler - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):114-127.
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 114-127.
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  14.  34
    Osservazioni per una fenomenologia delle "we-intention": conoscenza pubblica e azione collettiva.Roberto Miraglia - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 39:171-187.
    1. Premessa Nel filone di studi che prende il nome di “ontologia sociale” l’espressione “intenzionalità collettiva”, o “we-intention”, si riferisce agli stati soggettivi indicati dall’uso (appropriato) della prima persona plurale – ad esempio “noi vogliamo x”, “noi facciamo y”, “noi crediamo z” ecc. Come è noto, tutta la ricostruzione teorica che John Searle, il punto di riferimento di questa letteratura, propone della realtà socio-politica si basa su tre nozioni principali, di cui una è prop...
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  15. Why we may not find intentions in the brain.Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager - 2014 - Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in (...)
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  16. Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez Blanco, Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-30.
    If you injure me, it matters morally whether it was an accident or you did it intentionally, and whether you did it because you thought it would be fun. I take it that any ethical theory will have to include some explanation of why this is. There are two dominant views in the current debate about the moral significance of an agent’s intentions: The one is that the intention with which someone acts at least sometimes determines whether what she (...)
     
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  17. Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.
    Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if (...)
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  18. How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions.Berent Enç - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent Enc provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will find (...)
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  19. Why we reason: intention-alignment and the genesis of human rationality.Andy Norman - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (5):685-704.
    Why do humans reason? Many animals draw inferences, but reasoning—the tendency to produce and respond to reason-giving performances—is biologically unusual, and demands evolutionary explanation. Mercier and Sperber advance our understanding of reason’s adaptive function with their argumentative theory of reason. On this account, the “function of reason is argumentative… to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.” ATR, they argue, helps to explain several well-known cognitive biases. In this paper, I develop a neighboring hypothesis called the intention alignment model and (...)
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  20.  57
    When we speak of intentions.Philip N. Hineline - 2003 - In Kennon A. Lattal, Behavior Theory and Philosophy. Springer. pp. 203--221.
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  21. Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
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  22.  15
    Do We-Experiences Require an Intentional Object? On the Nature of Reflective Communities.Sebastian Luft - 2018 - In Sebastian Luft & Ruth Hagengruber, Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology: We-Experiences, Communal Life, and Joint Action. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 129-143.
    What does it mean to be a community and to be in a community? Can this social phenomenon be analogized to an individual person with her interwoven opinions, wants, and desires? Or is a community a phenomenon sui generis that requires its own methods and tools for research? Concretely: What does it mean that a community may achieve certain acts? And what about the intentional object of such an act, which has also been referred to as “social act”? These questions (...)
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  23. Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.
    Many of the things we do in the course of a day we don't do intentionally: blushing, sneezing, breathing, blinking, smiling—to name but a few. But we also do act intentionally, and often when we do we act for reasons. Whether we always act for reasons when we act intentionally is controversial. But at least the converse is generally accepted: when we act for reasons we always act intentionally. Necessarily, it seems. In this paper, I argue that acting intentionally is (...)
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  24. Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily (...)
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  25.  60
    How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions[REVIEW]Jing Zhu - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):277-282.
  26. How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions.Jesus H. Aguilar - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):548-550.
  27. On Whether we Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly (...)
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  28.  78
    Do We Decide Intentionally?E. J. Coffman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):822-827.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.
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  29.  10
    Intention and ‘Absicht’.Margit Gaffal - 2017 - In Jesús Padilla Gálvez & Margit Gaffal, Intentionality and Action. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 103-122.
    If we ascribe someone an intention we presuppose that his actions are directed towards a goal. The origin of the word “intention” is derived from the Latin word “tendere” which means “to strain” or “tense” (a muscle) and together with the prefix “in” the word denotes someone’s “focusing on” or “being directed at an object”. If someone intends to do something one is directed towards an ob-jective. Whereas intention is a set of coordinated acts as part of an overall en-deavour (...)
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  30. Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values.John Broome - 2001 - In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein, Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 98--120.
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  31. Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?Serena Marchesi, Davide Ghiglino, Francesca Ciardo, Jairo Perez-Osorio, Ebru Baykara & Agnieszka Wykowska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
  32. We will do it: An analysis of group-intentions.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277.
  33. How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem.Robert W. Lurz & Carla Krachun - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):449-481.
    A persistent methodological problem in primate social cognition research has been how to determine experimentally whether primates represent the internal goals of other agents or just the external goals of their actions. This is an instance of Daniel Povinelli’s more general challenge that no experimental protocol currently used in the field is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. We argue that current methods used to test for internal-goal attribution in primates do not solve Povinelli’s problem. (...)
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  34. Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is (...)
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  35.  8
    Correction to: Do We-Experiences Require an Intentional Object? On the Nature of Reflective Communities.Sebastian Luft - 2018 - In Sebastian Luft & Ruth Hagengruber, Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology: We-Experiences, Communal Life, and Joint Action. Cham: Springer Verlag.
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  36.  36
    Another look at intentions: A response to Raphael van Riel’s “On how we perceive the social world”.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):553-555.
  37. Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Sara Konrath - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and characterological dispositions (...)
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  38. Intentional action and "in order to".Eric Wiland - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the experiments Knobe (...)
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  39. How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action☆.Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on (...)
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  40.  35
    There is No Such Thing as Social Science: In Defence of Peter Winch. [REVIEW]Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read & Wes Sharrock - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):795-797.
    This provocative, engaging and important book marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Peter Winch's seminal The Idea of a Social Science. The authors – the first two philosophers, the third a sociologist – have worked together in various permutations before. No-one familiar with their previous publications will be surprised that the dominant voice throughout is Wittgenstein's – that is, Wittgenstein as read ‘resolutely’ by ‘new Wittgensteinians’. They have three principal aims: first, to read Winch's own work in an (...)
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  41.  10
    I and We: Does Identity Explain Undergraduates’ Ethical Intentions?María J. Mendez, David A. Vollrath & Lowell Ritter - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics Education 15:75-98.
    Concerns about business ethics have led many business schools to integrate ethics into the curriculum, with mixed results (May, Luth, & Schwoerer 2014, Wang & Calvano 2015, Waples, Antes, Murphy, Connelly & Mumford 2009). This paper seeks to improve our understanding of business students’ ethics by looking into their identity, a cognitive lens by which students see themselves and interpret their environment (Triandis 1989) and that can be relatively malleable to priming and socializing processes (Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx 2011, Ybarra (...)
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  42. Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with (...)
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  43. Group intentions as equilibria.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and (...)
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  44. Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if (...)
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  45. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  46.  46
    Right Intention and the Ends of War.Duncan Purves & Ryan Jenkins - 2016 - Journal of Military Ethics 15 (1):18-35.
    ABSTRACTThe jus ad bellum criterion of right intention is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it (...)
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  47.  50
    Collective Intentional Activities and the Law.Rodrigo Sanchez Brigido - 2009 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2):305-324.
    We ascribe the performance of intentional actions to groups. We claim, for instance, that the orchestra is playing a symphony, that a gang has robbed a bank, and so on. But what is a collective intentional action? Most accounts suggest that, for there to be a collective intentional action, at least two necessary conditions should be met. First, participants must act in accordance with, and because of, the intentions that the group perform a certain action. Second, there must be (...)
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  48. Intentional Action and Knowledge-Centred Theories of Control.J. Adam Carter & Joshua Shepherd - 2022 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...)
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  49. The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.
    When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience (...)
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  50. Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that (...)
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