This project has been supported by the Australian Government through the Australian Research Council (project number CS170100008); the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science; and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. ACOLA collaborates with the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences and the New Zealand Royal Society Te Apārangi to deliver the interdisciplinary Horizon Scanning reports to government. The aims of the project which produced this report are: 1. Examine the transformative role that artificial intelligence may play in (...) different sectors of the economy, including the opportunities, risks and challenges that advancement presents. 2. Examine the ethical, legal and social considerations and frameworks required to enable and support broad development and uptake of artificial intelligence. 3. Assess the future education, skills and infrastructure requirements to manage workforce transition and support thriving and internationally competitive artificial intelligence industries. (shrink)

Can we ever know that something—some state of affairs, or some action taken or contemplated—is evil or wrong, or is it always at best a matter of opinion? It is curious that analytic philosophers, despite their preoccupation with the issue of scepticism and their many discussions of sceptical doubts, have given so little attention to this question. If we look, for example, at Professor Ayer's recent volume The Problem of Knowledge , which consists in effect of a prolonged consideration of (...) various sceptical arguments, we find no reference to the problem of scepticism in moral matters; and this is the more surprising when we reflect that an explicit comparison between this sort of scepticism and scepticism about knowledge generally had been made in a celebrated essay by an earlier philosopher which is now widely thought to have broken fresh ground both in ethics and in theory of knowledge. I refer, of course, to H. A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?” contributed to Mind in 1912. There Prichard claimed to know that something was his duty, in a particular instance, as surely as he knew that seven times four are twenty-eight; in each case, he said, the knowledge is immediate and underivative. To think the contrary was, he argued, to embark on a hopeless quest; for if you cannot claim to know something until you produce criteria for knowing, you can be asked in turn what makes you think the criteria valid, and this will generate a vicious infinite regress. This is not in principle unlike the argument put forward by linguistic philosophers that, unless we allow that the word “know” is properly used in certain paradigm cases, which we take as in order without further questioning, it will lose all application. The interesting thing about Prichard is that he thought the argument applied to morals as readily as to the topics covered by traditional theory of knowledge. But here, as I say, he has not been explicitly followed by his successors. (shrink)

This present Doctoral Thesis deals with David Bohm's reflection on the Act of Thinking vs. Thinking, and its impacts that would affect freedom for creativity, or, on the contrary, would run into arbitrariness and fragmentation, especially in scientific knowledge. For that, we combined some of his works, written in the period of his maturity. In the weaving of our text, following the line of Bohm, we resort to the use of metaphors and analogies, in order to explore not only the (...) “awakening of his creativity”, through the contexts to which he was involved, but also his repertoire, their lenses to understand the world involved and explained. In addition, we analyze how their affective bonds would have contributed to their particular way of making themselves: as a physicist and free thinker. Although he was a scholar born in the last century, we will see how other researchers, even today, seem to share the "same" act of thinking, which in a way, even if implied, continues to extend its influence to many. (shrink)

It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderedness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the$\Pi ^1_1$reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of$\Pi ^1_1$sound extensions of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$in this ordering. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any$\Pi (...) ^1_1$sound extension of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$. We prove that for any$\Pi ^1_1$sound theoryTextending$\mathsf {ACA}_0^+$, the reflection rank ofTequals the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal ofT. We also prove that the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal of$\alpha $iterated$\Pi ^1_1$reflection is$\varepsilon _\alpha $. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward well-foundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. (shrink)

Explores how republican political thought can make a constructive and distinctive contribution to our understanding of democracy and the challenges it faces.

Since its origin in the early 20th century, the modern synthesis theory of evolution has grown to represent the orthodox view on the process of organic evolution. It is a powerful and successful theory. Its defining features include the prominence it accords to genes in the explanation of development and inheritance, and the role of natural selection as the cause of adaptation. Since the advent of the 21st century, however, the modern synthesis has been subject to repeated and sustained challenges. (...) In the last two decades, evolutionary biology has witnessed unprecedented growth in the understanding of those processes that underwrite the development of organisms and the inheritance of characters. The empirical advances usher in challenges to the conceptual foundations of evolutionary theory. Many current commentators charge that the new biology of the 21st century calls for a revision, extension, or wholesale rejection of the modern synthesis theory of evolution. Defenders of the modern synthesis maintain that the theory can accommodate the exciting new advances in biology, without forfeiting its central precepts. The original essays collected in this volume—by evolutionary biologists, philosophers of science, and historians of biology—survey and assess the various challenges to the modern synthesis arising from the new biology of the 21st century. Taken together, the essays cover a spectrum of views, from those that contend that the modern synthesis can rise to the challenges of the new biology, with little or no revision required, to those that call for the abandonment of the modern synthesis. (shrink)

The first in a series of 4 articles, this article provides an overview of the concepts and methods developed by a team of researchers concerned with preventing harm and promoting ethical discourse in the helping professions. In this article we introduce conceptual, research, analytical, and action frameworks employed to promote the centrality of ethical discourse in mental health practice. We employ recursive processes whereby knowledge gained from case studies refines our emerging conceptual model of applied ethics. Our participatory conceptual framework (...) differs markedly from the restrictive model typically used in applied ethics. Our research relies on lived experiences of ethics, while our analytical framework draws attention to the multiple levels and contexts in which ethical dilemmas take place. Finally, our action framework is designed to collaborate with research participants and practitioners in making use of our data and interpretations. We demonstrate how the various frameworks inform each other in an integrative fashion. The article sets the stage for 2 case studies presented in subsequent articles. (shrink)

In a letter to William Molyneux John Locke states that in reviewing his chapter 'Of Power' for the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he noticed that he had made one mistake which, now corrected, has put him "into a new view of things" which will clarify his account of human freedom. Locke says the mistake was putting “things for actions” on p.123 of the first edition, a page on which the word 'things' does not appear (The Correspondence (...) of John Locke. E.S. de Beer, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), Vol.4, no.1643, 15 July, 1693.) It is the aim of this paper to (1) elucidate where the correction occurs, (2) give an analysis of why the correction is needed, and (3) give an explanation of why Locke believed replacing 'things' with 'actions' was an important change. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's (...) argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is ‘border sensitive’ and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians. (shrink)

Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence (...) relations in a weak background second-order logic. We show that this predicative Fregean theory interprets second-order Peano arithmetic. (shrink)

Recently among analytic political philosophers there has been a considerable revival of interest in the normative evaluation of the market and of economic processes more generally. While not rejecting markets in toto , philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson and Amartya Sen have raised questions about the proper range of the market, explored the role of normative considerations in economic decision-making and raised doubts about the view that normative constraints are never legitimately placed on economic activity. In this article I experience (...) the relevance to such explorations of the economic casuistry of the medieval schoolmen. Key Words: Just Price • medieval philosophy • usury • distributive justice • Aquinas. (shrink)

The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion.

The question I want to discuss is that of the sense and respects in which morality is strictly a matter for the individual. To hear some people talk you would think that it is wholly so. Not only do I have to make my own moral decisions; I have in a way to make them on my own terms, in so far as the rules I take to govern my actions are rules I have freely accepted, or at the least (...) not positively repudiated. In law I can be bound by statutes which I regard as abhorrent or even of whose content I am ignorant ; that a similar situation should obtain in morals is commonly treated as absurd. If I see nothing wrong with a certain practice, such as premarital sex or drug-taking, I can’t be brought morally to book for indulging in it. Morals is not solely a matter of personal taste, for the nature of moral judgment is such that the moral agent legislates not just for himself but for all who are similarly situated; equally, however, it is not something which can be externally enforced. There are no objective moral principles, plain for all to see, against which to measure moral error, and though there is fairly widespread agreement among the respectable that some forms of conduct are morally admirable and others morally deplorable, we are under no obligation to respect these “conventions.” A man’s only true obligation here is to follow his conscience and thus do what he takes to be right, in the light of the best information about the situation he can get. (shrink)

Au cours des années 1970 (qui furent, dans plusieurs pays, celles de la libéralisation de Vavortement), la question du statut de Vembryon humain fut surtout débattue en termes de libertés individuelles : droit des femmes à disposer d'elles-mêmes, vs. ‘droit à la vie' du fœtus caché dans le corps de sa mère. Dans les années 1980, avec l'application des techniques de procréation ‘artificielle' au traitement de la stérilité humaine, l'accent est mis sur une responsabilité collective à l'égard de l'embryon séparé, (...) conçu en éprouvette, mis au congélateur, convoité par la recherche lorsqu'il n'est pas rendu à un utérus maternel. « Il est urgent de déterminer le degré de sa protection juridique », dit l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe (Recommandation 1046, 1986). Mais il n'existe pas de consensus sur les fondements philosophiques d'une telle protection. Le but du présent article n'est pas d'ajouter une thèse de plus à une littérature internationale déjà considérable, mais de situer les positions et arguments en présence, pour éclairer un débat qui touche, entre autres, aux sources du respect dû à la personne humaine. The European Parliament has recently expressed the view that human embryos and fetuses are endowed with human dignity, and that a definition of the degree to which they should be protected by law is urgently needed (Recommendation 1046, 1986). There is however no consensus on the philosophical grounds for such a protection, or on the degree to which embryos and fetuses should be treated as persons. This paper contrasts the biological (natural) and ethical (cultural) criteria of person hood and their underlying ontologies, examines the arguments in favor of taking a pragmatic line rather trying to decide when human beings become persons, and suggests that the pragmatic attitude in fact implies a developmental ontology. (shrink)

The Anthem Companion to Hannah Arendt offers a unique collection of essays on one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers. Consisting of a substantial introduction and nine chapters, the companion encompasses Arendt's major works -- The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, Eichmann in Jerusalem, On Revolution and The Life of the Mind -- and most salient arguments. The volume also examines Arendt's intellectual relationships with Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, David Riesman and other sociologists. Although written principally for students new (...) to Arendt's work, The Anthem Companion to Hannah Arendt is weighty enough to engage the avid Arendt scholar. (shrink)

This paper addresses how states improve their responsiveness to violence against women in developing countries with little political will and few resources to do so. One key to engendering justice and improving responsiveness is building specialized institutions within the state that facilitate the implementation of laws addressing violence against women. Why and how do states engage in institution-building to protect marginalized populations in these contexts? I propose that developing countries are more likely to create and maintain specialized institutions when domestic (...) and international political and legal frameworks make the state more vulnerable to women’s demands, and when civil society coordinates with the state and/or international organizations to take advantage of this political opportunity. This coordination brings necessary pressure and resources that would be difficult, if not impossible, to deliver otherwise. This inter-institutional coordination is necessary for building and maintaining new state institutions and programs that help to monitor the implementation of laws, develop public policies, provide services for victims, and improve responsiveness of the justice system. This fills an important lacuna in the literature, which focuses on women’s state institutions as an important catalyst for responsiveness to violence against women, but does not explain how these institutions are initially constructed. (shrink)