Widely recognized as the finest definition of existentialist Philosophy, this book introduced existentialism to America in 1958. Barrett discusses the views of 19th and 20th century existentialists Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre and interprets the impact of their thinking on literature, art, and philosophy.

Traces the development of philosophical thought from the seventeenth century to today, and explores why questions of the soul figure so little in the minds of present-day technocratic intellectuals.

Widely recognized as the finest definition of existentialist philosophy ever written, this book introduced existentialism to America in 1958. Barrett speaks eloquently and directly to concerns of the 1990s: a period when the irrational and the absurd are no better integrated than before and when humankind is in even greater danger of destroying its existence without ever understanding the meaning of its existence. Irrational Man begins by discussing the roots of existentialism in the art and thinking of Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, (...) Baudelaire, Blake, Dostoevski, Tolstoy, Hemingway, Picasso, Joyce, and Beckett. The heart of the book explains the views of the foremost existentialists—Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. The result is a marvelously lucid definition of existentialism and a brilliant interpretation of its impact. (shrink)

Much recent work on moral responsibility and on distributive justice has addressed the concept of luck. Very little attention has been given to the relation of luck to rationality. How does luck bear on our choices? Can beliefs about luck lead to unwise decisions? These questions have particular relevance for understanding gambling behaviour, and for public policy on gambling. In this paper I argue that no one is reliably lucky, and that projecting luck can undermine rational decision-making. I give various (...) examples to show the conceptual connection between luck and unpredictability. I present an a posteriori conception of projectibility, and argue that because lucky events are rationally unexpected, regularity statements about luck fail to satisfy the conditions of projectibility. I reject the claim that ‘lucky’ is a dispositional term, and thus projectible, on the ground that a dispositional interpretation leads to contradiction. I then defend my claim that luck is not projectible against three objections. I conclude with some thoughts about rational responses to luck, using gambling as an illustration. (shrink)

We now know that the epitomes prefixed to the plays of Euripides in the medieval manuscripts were written not for this purpose but as part of a complete collection of Euripidean epitomes, arranged alphabetically by initial,and intended presumably to make the subject-matter of the plays available to persons unable or unwilling to read the plays themselves. The first direct proof of the existence of this collection came with the publication in 1933 of a fragment containing Rhesos, Rhadamanthys, Skyrioi ; we (...) now have parts of it in three other papyri as well, and may reasonably suppose that P. Oxy. 420 is also from the same work. (shrink)

We now know that the epitomes prefixed to the plays of Euripides in the medieval manuscripts were written not for this purpose but as part of a complete collection of Euripidean epitomes, arranged alphabetically by initial,and intended presumably to make the subject-matter of the plays available to persons unable or unwilling to read the plays themselves. The first direct proof of the existence of this collection came with the publication in 1933 of a fragment containing Rhesos, Rhadamanthys, Skyrioi ; we (...) now have parts of it in three other papyri as well , and may reasonably suppose that P. Oxy. 420 is also from the same work. (shrink)