Wat is vrijheid? Vrij ben je pas als je beseft dat je brein weleens met jou aan de haal gaat. Vrij ben je als je de waarheid niet ontkent. En vrij ben je als er een overheid is die jouw vrijheid waarborgt. Aan vrijheid kleeft verantwoordelijkheid. Vrijheid wordt afgeremd door ons brein, bevorderd door de waarheid, versterkt door solidariteit, verzekerd door de democratie en mogelijk gemaakt door de ethiek.

De voorbije dertig jaar evolueerden we van een samenleving waarin het verschil tussen vrijheid en onvrijheid van fundamenteel belang was, naar een samenleving waarin het verschil tussen veilig en onveilig voorop staat. Het streven naar vrijheid verdeelde ons. Conservatieven en progressieven hebben verschillende opvattingen over wat echte vrijheid inhoudt. Vandaag verdeelt het streven naar veiligheid ons. We worden geenszins verenigd door onze angsten. Sommigen vrezen migratie, anderen kernenergie. Als we het over iets eens geraken, zoals de gevaren (...) van klimaatopwarming, blijken we diep verdeeld over de manier waarop we daarmee moeten omgaan."--Publisher information. (shrink)

De eigentijdse geschiedenis zwenkt naar twee kanten: het oprukken van McWorld, de triomf van commercie en marktbeheersing en de door haar gedreven stamvorming, die bestaande multi-ethnische eenheden dreigt te verpulveren. Jihad en McWorld hebben vele trekken gemeenschappelijk zoals afkeer van democratie en echte cultuur. Tussen consument en burger gaapt een diepe kloof. Alleen een verantwoordelijke samenleving kan als een buffer tussen overheid en privé-sector dienen en een halt toeroepen aan de overwoekering van McWorld. Van de jihad, die een bloedige politiek (...) van identiteit bedrijft, is geen enkel heil te verwachten. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Ph. Van Parijs argues that there is no contradiction between his real-libertarian legitimation of the highest feasible basic income and his pragmatic plea for a low basic income as an appropriate policy to reduce involuntary unemployment. However, he concedes that some logically possible consequences of the introduction of a basic income — such as a massive withdrawal of women from the labour market — might prompt him to reconsider the view that social justice reduces to „real freedom for all”.

This paper argues that the philosophical analysis of moral responsibility would benefit from focusing more on the social freedom of individuals. In a critique of Frankfurt, it is argued that an individual only is responsible for the consequences of her action if she had the opportunity not be responsible for them. The resulting theory of moral responsibility is applied to the analysis of collective decision processes, and in particular to political decision making. The main conclusion is that, though we do (...) not bear ‘absolute responsibility’ for all of the consequences of our actions, our moral and political responsibility is larger than often is assumed. (shrink)

In the last section of his Introduction to the Human Sciences Dilthey claims that from its very beginnings western metaphysics has been oriented towards a panlogistic goal that received its most adequate formulation in Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. According to Dilthey, this principle leaves little or no room for the sovereignity of the will and the personal freedom that man finds within his self-consciousness and lived experiences. In this paper we argue that Dilthey gives a rather one-sided and somewhat (...) distorted view not only of the goal of modern metaphysics, but also of the essence of human freedom. As a matter of fact the great metaphysicians of the 17th and 18th centuries considered the solution of the problem of human freedom the cornerstone of all metaphysics. However, unlike Dilthey, they sought to understand human freedom within the conceptual framework of grounds and reasons, thereby giving these notions a depth and a differentiation that are completely overlooked by Dilthey. (shrink)

Inleiding tot het gedachtegoed van de Amerikaanse filosoof.

Augustine's analysis and solution of the classical problem of free will and foreknowledge - as given in De libero arbitrio III 4-10 and De civitate Dei V 8-10 - stand out in their brevity and simplicity. His texts carry formulations which show an astonishing clarity not only in what they explicitly say, but also in what is implicitly said in them. Most recent discussions of Augustine's view, however, are unclear about this clarity, at least partly because they tend to a (...) deterministic position; they probably sense, unwillingly, that Augustine intends to rule that position out. In the discussions on the problem a dilemma seems to be unavoidable; one can only cling to one of its horns. Either God knows the future and then human volitions cannot be free , or the human will is free but then God cannot know its future volitions . In his analysis of this dilemma Augustine shows that both positions already presuppose an insight which cannot be taken for granted. The certainty of God's foreknowledge seems to entail that the object of his foreknowledge is necessary, but on close examination it does not. For it is sufficient to state: It is necessary that, if there is an object of God's foreknowledge, God knows it. Augustine's central sentences carefully formulate this kind of - implicative - necessity involved in prescience. Because of this 'necessity', he can consistently maintain that it is on the power of the will to sin or not to sin and yet, if a man will sin, God will know it, or if that man will not sin, God will know that. Thus the object of God's knowledge can be contingent, as in the case of future volitions, and still His foreknowledge can be certain. A deterministic interpretation of Augustine's analysis can be substantiated by the idea that God foreknows what the will itself will do, whereas his certainty is based on the supposition that the will is a natural cause of its volitions - just like the other causes in the cosmos. Although Augustine does not deal with this more specific aspect - he does not need to, because he showed that the certainty of God's knowledge can be guaranteed independent of the status of its object - we can conclude from his formulations that the will, as a cause of volitions, differs from a natural cause not only by producing them itself, but also by producing them in such a way that it can not-produce them. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences (...) and dispositions provide decisive reasons that can settle our doxastic states in such cases. (shrink)

The debate following Berlin's famous lecture Two Concepts of Liberty circled around the opposition between negative and positive liberty. Berlin delivered his lecture during the period of the Cold War. Therefore it not only provoked a very technical debate within analytic philosophy on the concept of liberty but also contained an important butdebatable political message: those who endorse positive liberty should be conscious of the fact that the logic of positive liberty leads, if not necessarily at least easily to despotism, (...) paternalism and even totalitarianism. It is no unimportant question then to ask whether no conception of political society can be developed which, without denying pluralism and negative liberty, would show that virtue and law are part of freedom, that freedom entails the exercise of certain actions without this leading up to the imposition of one conception of the good. In this article there is shown in what sense the republican or neo-roman vision of civil liberty can fulfil this requirement. The analysis of the different components of the republican conception of freedom shows that republicanism distinguishes itself from liberalism not so much by the defence of different institutions but by a different legitimation of them which ultimately has its origin in taking serious the proper finality of political society, in taking serious, as the Ancients did, the political and not only social nature of man. (shrink)

Democracy, freedom of speech, and science The On Liberty arguments of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor are still strong arguments for an unrestricted freedom of speech. For them, freedom of speech is closely linked to the idea of truth-finding, and truth-finding is crucial for a democratic society like ours and the development of its participants. In short, without freedom of speech, the tyranny of the majority looms. However, it is also reasonable to restrict freedom of action if expressions cause (...) pain to democratic citizens. Since the question whether expressions, including speech, cause pain requires a scientific study of psychological pain, the issue of democratic freedom of speech is intimately linked to, and even depends on scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Freedom and slavery. Hegel on habit This article is an introduction to the Dutch translation of Hegel’s analysis of habit in paragraphs 409–410 of the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, which is published in this issue. The analysis of habit is placed in context through a discussion of the preceding paragraphs, which describe how human consciousness detaches itself from its immersion in nature and consider the relation between habit and madness. This is followed by a discussion of the ambiguous nature of (...) habit, which according to Hegel is both necessary for thinking and freedom but at the same time leads us to act mechanically and without thinking and thus turns us into slaves of habit. The final section argues that the problematic, ‘enslaving’ aspect of habit is not a passing phase that is overcome at higher levels of development, as Hegel sometimes seems to suggest. Both Hegel’s theory of ethical life and the modern state as ‘second nature’ as well as the ‘pure thought’ of philosophy remain rooted in habit and can therefore not be detached from the dark side of habit, which threatens the rationality and integrity of modern ethical life and philosophy. (shrink)

Een kleine politieke filosofie Moeten rokers vrij gelaten worden te roken in de horeca, of mag de staat hun dat verbieden? Is Laura Dekker vrij op zeilreis te gaan, of had de staat haar thuis moeten houden? Zijn allochtonen vrij hun eigen cultuur te behouden of moeten zij juist integreren? En zijn wij vrij om onze welvaart te vergroten ook als dat het klimaat grote schade toebrengt? Nadat onze vrijheid in de jaren zestig en zeventig enorm is toegenomen, beleven (...) we nu een periode waarin die vrijheid wordt herijkt. Het streven dat burgers vrij moeten zijn hun leven naar eigen goeddunken in te richten botst nu met de roep om 'grenzen aan de vrijheid'. Deze strijd om de vrijheid vormt het hart van vele controversiële politieke kwesties die het afgelopen decennium het publieke debat beheersten. In Het huis van de vrijheid bespreekt Rutger Claassen deze kwesties met een filosofische blik. Hij neemt stelling tegen eenzijdige opvattingen van vrijheid en verdedigt haar als het ideaal van de autonome burger. Dat ideaal vraagt er echter wel om vrijheid in samenhang te zien met andere politieke idealen, zoals welzijn, veiligheid, gelijkheid, democratie en gemeenschap. Claassen laat zien dat het vrijheidsideaal - ondanks alle kritiek - onmisbaar is, maar hij schetst ook hoe het komt dat het zo gemakkelijk voor totaal verschillende politieke programma's kan worden misbruikt. (shrink)

Dit boek is een uitnodiging tot en een inleiding in het filosofisch bedrijf. Filosofie begint met het inzicht dat er zoiets bestaat als een domme vraag. Die is er in twee varianten: de vraag is dom omdat er geen antwoord op kan worden gegeven of omdat ze verkeerd is gesteld. Uiteindelijk gaat filosofie over het basale onderscheid tussen domm een interessante waarheden. Zij keert zich, eventueel op een don quichoteske wijze, tegen domheid. Als filosoof krijg je de waarheid die je (...) verdient. Die waarheid vloeit voort uit de problemen die je stelt en ontwikkelt en uit de waarde van je inzichten. Wie domme vragen stelt, moet geen diepgaande en subtiele waarheden verwachten: clichés en triviale inzichten zijn de oogst. Tegen deze achtergrond gaat Roland Breeur in op de verhouding tussen tijd en bewustzijn, leven en geschiedenis, vrijheid en verbeelding. Hij schept op basis van gedachten van Nietzsche, Proust, Sartre en Deleuze een context om filosofisch over deze thema's na te denken. (shrink)