Dejstvo, da smo bili navajeni misliti stroje, ki ne mislijo, tiste, ki nadomeščajo človekovo fizično delo, in da se šele zdaj srečujemo s stroji, ki domnevno nadomeščajo človekovo mišljenje, še ne pomeni, da je to smer razvoja stroja ali genealogija idej o stroju. Psihoanaliza nas napeljuje k temu, da bi rekli, da je zgodovino stroja mogoče pisati le skupaj z zgodovino nezavednega, medtem ko nam študije antične oralnosti razkrivajo njihovo zapletenost, ki predhodi tehnologiji pisane besede. To pomeni, da se stroj (...) pojavi pred preprostim orodjem, kar kaže na možnost mišljenja genealogije stroja, ki se mora nujno prepletati z genealogijo mišljenja in spomina. Če sledimo tej misli, bi se navsezadnje morali popraviti in reči, da ideja stroja, ki misli, vendarle ni sodoben pojav. (shrink)

Rousseau and Nietzsche are philosophers between whom it is difficult to establish a dialogue that arises directly from their works, and yet there are connections between their philosophies, or in Nietzsche’s terms, perspectives, which open up a common issue: the question of evaluation. But to what does evaluation refer, to what value, or to the value of what does it refer? We want to show that it is an evaluation of the present in which thought takes place, which returns as (...) memory of both the continuity of the trace and its interruptions. Memory, however, returns either as ressentiment and a will to revenge, that is, memory’s own negation of itself, because it is never adequate, or as an affirmation of what is remembered and what returns in memory, including discontinuities. In response to this problem, Rousseau invents his proto-concept of the heart, which appears in more or less conceptual form in both his autobiographical and political-theoretical works, without Rousseau ever granting it a place in his philosophy. We argue that the heart acquires its conceptuality only when we recognise it as a central and plastic principle of his thought, corresponding structurally to Nietzsche’s will to power. Deleuze describes the latter as a plastic principle of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the principle of evaluating and re-evaluating values, and the principle of evaluating what can and must recur in thought. (shrink)

The fact that we were used to thinking non-thinking machines, the ones supplementing human physical labor, and that we are only now encountering machines that supposedly supplement human thinking, does not mean that this is either the direction in the evolution of the machine or the genealogy of ideas about the machine. Psychoanalysis tempts us to say that the history of the machine could only be written together with the history of the unconscious, while studies of ancient orality reveal to (...) us the intricacy of the oral technicity predating the technology of the written word. This means that the machine predates a simple tool, and highlights the possibility of thinking a genealogy of the machine, which must necessarily entangle with the genealogy of thought and memory. Following this line of thought, we should correct ourselves by saying that the idea of a machine that thinks is not a contemporary occurrence after all. (shrink)