Because sin is anything that turns our heart from God, sins are both voluntary and jnvoluntary. As a consequence, double effect can only be adequately understood in a Christian context in which it is recognized that, even when evil is not willed, our involvement in its causation can still mar our hearts. The acknowledgement of involuntary sins resituates double effect so that the traditional Christian concern with spiritual harm and healing can be maintained. In this way, one can overcome (...) the underdeveloped Western theological appreciation of double effect, which ignores the effect on the heart of causing evil. (shrink)

The United States has rejected climate reparations requests from other nations by claiming historical ignorance of the global effects of anthropogenic climate change. This objection to climate reparations, called the epistemic objection in this paper, appeals to a concept of fairness concerning moral responsibility which can be traced back to Aristotle's distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. However, on closer examination, the epistemic objection fails to fulfill Aristotle's criteria for excusable involuntary actions, and therefore the authors of this (...) paper conclude that claims of ignorance concerning climate change do not provide a substantial objection to climate reparation requests. (shrink)

The National Blood Policy in India relies heavily on voluntary blood donors, as they are usually assumed to be associated with low levels of transfusion-transmitted infections . In India, it is mandatory to test every unit of blood collected for hepatitis B, hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS, syphilis and malaria. Donors come to the blood bank with altruistic intentions. If donors test positive to any of the five infections, their blood is discarded. Although the blood policy advocates disclosure of TTI status, (...) donors are not, in practice, informed about their results. The onus is on the donor to contact the blood bank. Out of approximately 16 000 donations in the past 2 years, 438 tested positive for TTI, including 107 for HIV. Only 20% of the donors contacted the blood bank; none of them were HIV positive. Disclosure by blood banks of TTI status by telephone or mail has resulted in serious consequences for some donors. Health providers face an ethical dilemma, in the absence of proper mechanisms in place for disclosure of test results, regarding notification to donors who may test positive but remain ignorant of their TTI status. Given the high cost of neglecting to notify infected donors, the authors strongly recommend the use of rapid tests before collecting blood, instead of the current practice, which takes 3 h to obtain results, and disclosure of results directly to the donor by a counsellor, to avoid dropouts and to ensure confidentiality. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Significance of Voluntariness Ordinary and Philosophical Notions of Voluntariness Constraint and Compulsion Force and Contrariety in the NE Knowledge and Ignorance The Platonic Asymmetry Thesis Responsibility for Character References Further reading.

Some remarks in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nichomachean Ethics indicate that the voluntariness of actions is significantly related to compulsion and ignorance. According to a plausible interpretation, these remarks suggest that if an agent performs an action under compulsion or due to ignorance of some relevant facts, then she does so involuntarily. An objection to this interpretation with regard to compulsion is that an agent can voluntarily do what she is compelled to do. With regard to (...) class='Hi'>ignorance, one might object that it is necessary to clarify the proper range of relevant facts when considering whether an action performed out of ignorance is involuntary. In this paper, I develop two principles that align with the view that compulsion and ignorance are sufficient conditions for involuntary actions, while accommodating potential counterexamples and complications. (shrink)

In the context of perspectives drawn from philosophy of action and from Aristotle's natural philosophy, the chapter examines the ambiguity of the Aristotelian voluntary, its connections with censure and responsibility, its defensibility by excuse of force or ignorance, its bipolarity, its connection with character formation, and its implications, if any, for determinism.

Aristotle’s account of voluntariness (to hekousion) lacks a sufficiently precise positive definition of ‘voluntary’. This is a problem: in Aristotle’s ethics, voluntariness is an important and unifying joint between psychological (character) and practical matters (action). I contend that Aristotle implicitly defines voluntariness as positive causal relation to an agent’s desire, where one’s character is the state of one’s faculty of desire. Since desires always have particular ends (final causes), a voluntary action is one which originates in the agent’s (...) desire for that action’s end. Using this interpretation, I answer questions about ‘mixed’ actions, culpable ignorance, and non-voluntariness. Without this interpretation, these questions cannot be systematically answered. (shrink)

Recent writers on negligence and culpable ignorance have argued that there are two kinds of culpable ignorance: tracing cases, in which the agent’s ignorance traces back to some culpable act or omission of hers in the past that led to the current act, which therefore arguably inherits the culpability of that earlier failure; and non-tracing cases, in which there is no such earlier failure, so the agent’s current state of ignorance must be culpable in its own (...) right. An unusual but intriguing justification for blaming agents in non-tracing cases is provided by Attributionism, which holds that we are as blameworthy for our non-voluntary emotional reactions, spontaneous attitudes, and the ensuing patterns of awareness as we are for our voluntary actions. The Attributionist explanation for why some non-tracing cases involve culpability is an appealing one, even though it has limited scope. After providing a deeper account of why we should take the Attributionist position seriously, I use recent psychological research to argue for a new account of the conditions under which agents are culpable for straightforward instances of blameworthy acts. That account is extended to blameworthiness for non-voluntary responses. I conclude that even when the agent’s failure to notice arises from a nonvoluntary objectionable attitude, very few such cases are ones in which Attributionism implies that the agent is blameworthy for her act. (shrink)

Criticism of H.L.A. Hart's account of how the movements of a person during the performance of an act that is done by mistake or owing to ignorance are not uncontrolled or involuntary. movements.

§ . As a corollary to the proposition that all institutions must be subordinated to the law of equal freedom, we cannot choose but admit the right of the citizen to adopt a condition of voluntary outlawry. If every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man, then he is free to drop connection with the state - to relinquish its protection and to refuse paying toward its (...) support. It is self evident that in so behaving he in no way trenches upon the liberty of others, for his position is a passive one, and while passive he cannot become an aggressor. It is equally self evident that he cannot be compelled to continue one of a political corporation without a breach of the moral law, seeing that citizenship involves payment of taxes; and the taking away of a man's property against his will is an infringement of his rights. Government being simply an agent employed in common by a number of individuals to secure to them certain advantages, the very nature of the connection implies that it is for each to say whether he will employ such an agent or not. If anyone of them determines to ignore this mutual safety confederation, nothing can be said except that he loses all claim to its good offices and exposes himself to the danger of maltreatment - a thing he is quite at liberty to do if he likes. He cannot be coerced into political combination without a breach of the law of equal freedom; he can withdraw from it without committing any such breach, and he has therefore a right so to withdraw. (shrink)

To what extent can an agent be held responsible for what he does? According to Aristotle, we are answerable for our voluntary actions, the “voluntary” being “[1] that of which the origin is in oneself, [2] when one knows the particular factors that constitute the location of action.” This question, which was of paramount importance for Anscombe, led her to focus on the second, epistemic condition of responsibility. This chapter suggests that in fact, a large part of her (...) philosophy of action can be read as an effort to build a complex and subtle answer to the question what kind of knowledge an agent must have of his own action in order for him to be accountable for it (and/or for all or some of its consequences). In Intention, Anscombe shows that for his action to be intentional under some description, an agent must have a practical knowledge of it under this very description; that is why ignorance can sometimes be put forward as a ground for exoneration. But ignorance can also be blameworthy, when the agent could and should have known what he is ignorant of. Elucidating the possibility of voluntary ignorance brings into light a fundamental obligation to know which takes its meaning from, and has its roots in, Anscombe’s Thomist background. (shrink)

The rapid spread of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and its causative agent, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), has posed people with difficult ethical questions. Philosophically, one of the most interesting problems is whether or not there is a right to remain in ignorance about one's own HIV infection.Being informed about a positive HIV test result has caused many people anguish and led some to suicidal thoughts. On these grounds a prima facte right not to know could be (...) constructed. Paternalistic arguments have been put forward to refute the alleged right, but these arguments are invalid, as is shown in the paper.However, by a utilitarian argument it can be shown that the prima facie right to remain in ignorance is overridden by other people's rights not to be infected. With certain qualifications, even a non-voluntary testing programme for HIV is justifiable. (shrink)

The dichotomy made by Jankélévitch between excusing the ignorant and forgiving the wicked serves first as a key to analyzing Derrida's logic of forgiving the unforgivable. Fiasse shows Jankélévitch's influence on Derrida in spite of their opposite conclusions. The author highlights several limits in the literature on forgiveness caused by knowledge and wickedness being too strongly opposed to ignorance and excusing. She turns to Aristotle in order to emphasize the forgiveness of voluntary actions that are not necessarily ill-intended. (...) She insists on the role of apologies, the degree of personal commitment in the disapproval of the action, the harm done to the victim, the distinction between matters of slight and strong importance, the different kinds of ignorance and responsibility, and the crucial role of regret. (shrink)

Organizational citizenship behaviors have been the topic of much research attempting to understand the motivations, manifestations, and impacts of these behaviors on organizational development. However, studies have been based essentially on an anthropocentric and intra-organizational perspective that tends to ignore broader environmental issues. Due to the complexity of environmental issues and their human, informal, and preventive aspects, consideration of these issues requires voluntary and decentralized initiatives that draw on organizational citizenship behaviors. The role of these behaviors has been neglected, (...) or even ignored, in studies of environmental management, which have focused mainly on the explicit, formal, and prescriptive aspects of organizations. The aim of this article is to shed light on the pertinence of organizational citizenship behaviors in improving the efficacy and efficiency of environmental management. The article discusses how the principal dimensions of these behaviors can be applied to the environmental practices of organizations and underlines their importance in responding to essential challenges of environmental management, including the complexity of environmental issues, limitations of formal management systems, the need to consider tacit knowledge, the importance of helping relationships, and the promotion of␣social legitimacy among organizations. Measures to encourage eco-efficiency and establish a favorable context for the emergence of citizenship behaviors are also proposed. (shrink)

State policy in the field of law enforcement during the Khrushchev's period wasn't a stabile. The first wave of changes was associated with the abolition of some legislative acts of the Stalinist period, a significant softening of punitive line, narrowing of the scope of capital punishment, empowerment convicted people etc. On the one hand, these steps are partially rehabilitating the Soviet law enforcement. On the other hand, government actions were unreasoned and populist, designed for quick political effect. The next wave (...) of change was due to the spread of the idea of the gradual withering away of the state in terms of building a communist society. As a consequence of this ideology was the reduction of employees in the field of law enforcement and attracting a variety of civic organizations, labor groups and citizens to fulfill a variety of law enforcement functions (voluntary civil police, civil judges, civil assistant investigator, civilian prosecutors, civil lawyers, etc.). And finally, the soviet leadership made steps in the field of law enforcement toward stricter penalties for serious crimes, as well as expanding the scope of the death penalty. The country's leadership was actively intervened in the work of law enforcement. Communist Party took control the law enforcement agencies due to the appointment to senior positions along party lines and managing work of party members through the party cell. One of the major controversies of the time was mixing the steps to improve of law enforcement sphere (increased attention to the frames, structural changes, strengthening analytical work in the study of crime statistics), with a desire to demonstrate the advantages of the socialist way of life (which was manifested in the silencing of certain criminal manifestations, artificially lowering their significance by reducing the liability on them, outright ignoring problems and their causes, etc.). Contradictions were observed in the conduct of state punitive line too. On the one hand, it was a significant step up from the Stalinist penal system by expanding the rights of prisoners, procedural rules, which led to a softening of the repressive pressure on the population. On the other hand, the state retained its attitude to dissent; applying the new forms social exclusion of dissidents, for example, applying to them the impact of psychiatric measures. These moments hampered consolidation of the new format of normative behavior in the minds of ordinary citizens, and gave rise to "double standards", the imbalance between what is declared and what actually happened. (shrink)

Locke holds that the experience of voluntary action is the sole origin of the concept of causal power. What is it about this experience that compels Locke to draw this conclusion? I think this question should puzzle scholars a great deal more than it has. There are three existing interpretations of Locke’s position. The first explanation holds that Locke appeals to voluntary action because he takes this experience to reveal a necessary connection between volition and action; the second (...) holds that Locke is driven to this view by a prior commitment to the claim that mind is inherently active or that only mind is active; and the third holds that Locke takes reflection on the experience of voluntary action to reveal that in virtue of which volition brings about action. However, as I argue, these readings of Locke are inconsistent with the parsimony of his theory of causation and ignore the methodological demands of his empiricism. I submit that, according to Locke, the experience of acting voluntarily, or, equally, the feeling of bringing about change in the world, is a uniquely suitable origin in that its purely qualitative features mirror the characteristics that he deems essential to the concept of causal power. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that there is a way to make sense of blameworthiness for morally problematic actions even when there is no bad will behind such actions. I am particularly interested in cases where an agent acts in a biased way, and the explanation is socialization and false belief rather than bad will on the part of the agent. In such cases, I submit, we are pulled in two directions: on the one hand non-culpable ignorance is usually (...) an excuse, but in the case of acting in a biased way we feel some pull to find the agent blameworthy. I argue that agents are sometimes blameworthy, (where I really mean that they are blameworthy, and not just that it is permissible to reproach them), even if they do not have any bad will. I argue that although the paradigmatic account of blameworthiness is based on quality of will, we can and should be willing to allow that there are non-paradigmatic cases. I argue that the zone of responsibility can be extended to include acts that we are not fully in control of, and acts whose moral status we are non-culpably ignorant about at the time of acting. This extension of responsibility happens through a voluntary taking of responsibility. I argue that there are certain conditions under which we should take responsibility, and that when we do so, we genuinely are responsible. (shrink)

Background Voluntary post-mortem donation to science (PDS) is the most appropriate source for body dissection in medical education and training, and highly useful for biomedical research. In Mexico, unclaimed bodies are no longer a legal source, but PDS is legally possible, although scarcely facilitated, and mostly ignored by the general population. Therefore, we aimed to evaluate the attitude and willingness for PDS and to identify a sociodemographic profile of people with willingness toward PDS. Methods A validated on-line survey was (...) distributed by the convenience method via the social networks of a Catholicism-inspired, private university in northern Mexico. Frequency analyses of all variables and coded free comments were complemented with association studies. Results Although the responder cohort (n = 143) was too small and biased to be representative of the university community (n = 13,500), willingness to post-mortem organ donation was 90.7% and to PDS 70.7%. In this cohort, PDS willingness had the strongest association with mature age (> 40 years old; P, 0.0008). Among young adults, willingness to PDS was the lowest among volunteers from technical and business schools and the highest among those from the social sciences (P, 0.009). Respondents from the social sciences were also the most consistent between attitude and behavior with respect to organ donation. A free comment option revealed respondents were interested in the unusual taboo topic. Conclusions A small, but sufficiently large proportion expressed willingness toward PDS. In our university cohort, which was biased in higher education and altruism, mature age and social interest were associated with PDS willingness. (shrink)

The voluntary shift of responsibility from the producer to the consumer is one feature of self-design activities. Past research emphasizes the economic gains of such customer co-creation. However, the psychological mechanism underlying customer co-creation behavior is still not fully understood. Notably, the goal-driven self-congruence nature of customer co-creation is mostly ignored in the co-creation literature. The objective of this research is to firstly develop a conceptual understanding of how co-creation literature can be related to the self-congruence theory. Furthermore, this (...) study also extends the original self-congruence theory by arguing the differential role of actual and ideal self-congruence on the relationship between self-congruence and customers’ willingness to participate in the co-creation process. Two laboratory experiments were conducted to examine whether self-congruence plays a prominent role in motivating customers to participate in the self-design process. Specifically, both the actual self-congruence and ideal self-congruence are positively related to customers’ willingness to participate in the self-design process is hypothesized. Moreover, it is expected that product styles and different consumption situations may strengthen the relationship between actual/ideal self-congruence and customers’ willingness to participate in the self-design process. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Voluntary Choice (Proairesis) Conclusion References Further reading.

ABSTRACT Apathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision‐making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than after (...) its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a ‘voluntary decision’to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrational. (shrink)

Aristotle's Ethics develops a complex theory of the qualities which make for a good human being and for several decades there has been intense discussion about whether Aristotle's theory of voluntariness, outlined in the Ethics, actually delineates what modern thinkers would recognize as a theory of moral responsibility. Javier Echeñique presents a novel account of Aristotle's discussion of voluntariness in the Ethics, arguing - against the interpretation by Arthur Adkins and that inspired by Peter Strawson - that he developed an (...) original and compelling theory of moral responsibility and that this theory has contributed in important ways to our understanding of coercion, ignorance and violence. His study will be valuable for a wide range of readers interested in Aristotle and in ancient ethics more broadly. (shrink)

This article has as its aim to research on the Thomistic concepts of voluntary (voluntarium), involuntary (involuntarium) and mixed actions, with the purpose of putting into question the debate around this last category of actions. Building up the definitions of being voluntary or involuntary, Saint Thomas Aquinas works on the Aristotelian definitions adding the aspect of existing a will oriented by reason, keeping an intellectualist background in the actions. For Aquinas, in order that an action be voluntary (...) many causes come together, although the will must be its principle. On the contrary, there is the concept of being involuntary, that is defined just by those acts done by ignorance or violence (physical coercion). Here it is possible to realize the difference between both definitions, which will become more visible when we elaborate the Thomistic understanding around the mixed actions. The mixed actions put together aspects of the voluntary and involuntary ones in one action, which can be characterized more as voluntary if the will is taken as the principle of the human acting. Nonetheless, as we will show, Thomas Aquinas works with two concepts of mixed actions, one in his Commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics, and the other in his Summa Theologiae. Therefore, we will take as primary bibliography the Thomistic works and, as an interpretative support, the most recent works by the experts. (shrink)

In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that (...) violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed ;-.ithout any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. (shrink)

:This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree. (...) Consequently, I contend, by asserting that freedom is a matter of degree, that Persson and Savulescu have not undermined my arguments favoring voluntary moral enhancement. In addition, I add three further arguments against compulsory moral bioenhancement. (shrink)

The restructured globalized economy has provided women with employment opportunities. Globalisation has also meant a shift towards self-regulation of multinationals as part of the restructuring of the world economy that increases among others things, flexible employment practices, worsening of labour conditions and lower wages for many women workers around the world. In this context, as part of the global trend emphasising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the 1980s, one important development has been the growth of voluntary Corporate Codes of (...) Conduct to improve labour conditions. This article reviews from a feminist interdisciplinary perspective the broad academic literature on women workers, covering the more classical debate on women workers in the industrialization process and entering into women workers in the global supply chains and women workers and corporate codes of conduct. The main argument is that this research on women workers is crucial to frame the issues of business ethics and in particular CSR and Codes of Conduct in the context of women in the global political economy. When this crucial knowledge is ignored, then the ethical policies of the companies also ignore the real situation of the women workers at the bottom of their supply chains. (shrink)

Background: Experiencing moral distress is traumatic for nurses. Ignoring moral distress can lead to job dissatisfaction, improper handling in the care of patients, or even leaving the job. Thus, it is crucial to use valid and reliable instruments to measure moral distress. Objective: The purpose of this study was to determine the reliability and the validity of the Persian version of the Moral Distress Scale–Revised among a sample of Iranian nurses. Research design: In this methodological study, 310 nurses were recruited (...) from all hospitals affiliated with the Qazvin University of Medical Sciences from February 2014 to April 2015. Data were collected using a demographic questionnaire and the Moral Distress Scale–Revised. The construct validity of the Moral Distress Scale–Revised was evaluated using principal component analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. Internal consistency reliability was assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Regional Committee of Medical Research Ethics. The ethical principles of voluntary participation, anonymity, and confidentiality were considered. Findings: The construct validity of the scale showed four factors with eigenvalues greater than one. The model had a good fit ( χ2(162) = 307.561, χ2/ df = 1.899, goodness-of-fit index =.904, comparative fit index =.927, incremental fit index =.929, and root mean square error of approximation (90% confidence interval) =.049 (.040–.057)) with all factor loadings greater than.5 and statistically significant. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were.853,.686,.685, and.711for the four factors. Moreover, the model structure was invariant across different income groups. Discussion and conclusion: The Persian version of the Moral Distress Scale–Revised demonstrated suitable validity and reliability among nurses. The factor analysis also revealed that the Moral Distress Scale–Revised has a multidimensional structure. Regarding the proper psychometric characteristics, the validated scale can be used to further research about moral distress in this population. (shrink)

This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, (...) in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis. (shrink)

Objectives: The aim of this study is to find and compare the current situation between common people and healthcare providers’ preferences for a good death in the context of Chinese culture. Methods: A cross-sectional anonymous questionnaire survey covering 190 ordinary Chinese people and 323 healthcare providers was conducted. An inventory of the good death was translated and the subjects were surveyed about their attitude toward it. Ethical considerations: Permission to conduct the study was granted by department chiefs, nurse managers and (...) the participants themselves. The participants were informed that they took part on a voluntary and anonymous basis, that they could withdraw at any time, that they had the right to ignore questions they did not wish to answer, and that whatever they chose to do would not jeopardize their employment conditions. Results: The attributes that were perceived as important by major respondents for a good death were maintaining hope and pleasure, good relationship with medical staff, good relationship with family, independence, environment comfort, being respected as an individual, preparation for death, physical and psychological comfort, dying in a favorite place, and not being a burden to others. And some relatively less important characteristics were life completion, receiving enough treatment, natural death, controlling over the future, unawareness of death, pride and beauty, feeling that one’s life is worth living, and religious and spiritual comfort. We also found that healthcare providers were more likely than general out-patients to perceive “physical and psychological comfort,” “dying in a favorite place,” “good relationship with medical staff,” and “natural death” as important for a good death. Conclusion: This study offers healthcare providers in China a fundamental understanding of the normal expectations of the general public for a good death. It is believed that these findings in our study are valuable to improve palliative care in China. We compared the attitudes of Chinese and Westerners and found some differences, which suggested that cultural difference should be an important consideration to achieve a good death in China. We also found that healthcare providers see good death differently from general public, indicating that the criteria for good death warrant further study. (shrink)

Introduction: Moral responsibility and Aristotle's concerns -- 1. Moral responsibility and moral character -- 2. Voluntariness, praiseworthiness, and character -- 3. The dialectical inquiry into voluntariness -- 4. Force, compulsion, and the internal origin of action --5. Responsibility for character: its scope and significance --6. Moral agency and the origination of action -- App. I. Varieties of knowledge and ignorance -- App. II. "Up to us" and the internal origin.

Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research (...) on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view. (shrink)

That a science of human conduct is possible, that what any man may do even in moments of the most sober and careful reflection can be understood and explained, has seemed to many a philosopher to cast doubt upon our common view that any human action can ever be said to be truly free. This book, first published in 1961, into crucially important issues that are often ignored in the familiar arguments for and against the possibility of free action. These (...) issues are brought to light and examined in some detail. (shrink)

Background: People with progressive cancer experience that their bodies change due to disease and/or treatment. The body is integral to the unity of the human being, a unity that must be perceived as whole if dignity shall be experienced. Relatives are in touch with the suffering bodies of their dear ones, physically, socially, mentally, and existentially, and thus the relatives’ experiences of the bodies of their dear ones might yield insight into the concept of dignity. Aim: The aim of this (...) study is to explore relatives’ experiences of the patients’ bodily changes from a perspective of dignity. Research design and method: A total of 12 relatives from a hospice in Norway were interviewed. Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics inspired the interpretation. Ethical considerations: The principles of voluntariness, confidentiality, withdrawal, and anonymity were respected during the whole research process. The Norwegian Social Science Data Services approved the study. Results and conclusion: The conversations about the body were conversations about ambivalent or paradoxical matters that shed light on the concept of dignity. The results show that the relatives got in touch with elements that otherwise would have remained tacit and unspoken, and which gave glimpses of a deeper truth, which might reveal the core of dignity. Furthermore, the relatives’ confirmation of the ambivalence might be understood as a strong ethical obligation to treat the other with dignity. The confirmation may also reveal the relatives’ unselfish love of the other, which can be understood as the core of ethics and ethos. Finally, the results reveal the relatives’ limited insight into their dear ones’ bodily changes, and we discuss the challenges of truly seeing the other. Body knowledge and the relationship between body and dignity as phenomena cannot be ignored and needs more attention and articulation in clinical nursing practice and in nursing research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 299-301 [Access article in PDF] Reading Minkowski with Husserl Bernard Pachoud Eugene Minkowski is generally regarded as one of the main figures of the phenomenological strand of psychiatry in France. However, it is striking that, as a phenomenologist, he very rarely mentions Husserl or Heidegger in his texts. Nor, for that matter, does he use their concepts or rely on their descriptions (except (...) in a few texts entirely devoted to the presentation of the philosophical roots of phenomenology). Actually, the philosopher he most often refers to, and whose concepts he borrows, is Bergson, who is not a phenomenologist. But although Minkowski's framework is not phenomenological in the philosophical sense of the term, his clinical descriptions are certainly based on a genuinely phenomenological approach—in the sense that they deal with the subjective experience of patients and the way in which their experience determines their behavior. It is all the more striking to notice just how much his descriptions of abnormal experiences echo certain Husserlian studies that he seems to ignore. I will focus on some common points between Minkowski's clinical descriptions and Husserlian studies that Minkowski could not, in fact, have known at the time of writing this article (at least in their complete form, since they were developed after 1923).The present text, "A Contribution to the Study of Autism: The Interrogative Attitude," is a typical example of Minkowski's clinical descriptions and theoretical interests. The interrogative attitude of the patient Paul C. is considered by Minkowski to be one of the "schizophrenic attitudes," expressing what he calls "loss of contact with reality," a phenomenon held to be characteristic of schizophrenia. These attitudes are quite simply the modalities of schizophrenic "autism" in Bleuler's sense of the latter term. Minkowski (1925) distinguishes the attitudes of withdrawal that have an affective coloring (morbid daydreaming, sulking, and regrets) from those that are purely intellectual (morbid rationalism, the interrogative attitude, the morbid hypertrophy of geometric and static factors). What gives a pathological cast to Paul C.'s systematically interrogative attitude is that it expresses (following Minkowski's clinical description) the patient's inability to engage in action or to establish any practical relationship with reality. This interrogative attitude can be considered a way to take some initiative and thereby avoid complete passivity, but it is a deficient mode of "position taking" since there is no engagement in real action.This emphasis on disorder of action has a modern sound, for it echoes theoretical hypotheses regarding schizophrenia developed by contemporary neuroscientists (Frith 1992). It also echoes the Husserlian studies of perception, in which the feeling of reality largely depends on the strong connection between perception and voluntary movement (action), kinesthetic sensations playing here a key role (Husserl 1989). There are also some remarkable convergences [End Page 299] with Husserl's studies of the active and passive dimensions of consciousness, to be considered next. Husserl's Studies of the Activity and Passivity of Consciousness The main claim of transcendental phenomenology is that our experience completely depends on what Husserl calls the synthetic activity of consciousness. Everything that we become aware of is constituted by the activity of the mind. In texts written between 1918 and 1926 and gathered together under the title, "Analysis of Passive Synthesis," Husserl (1966) distinguishes different degrees of the activity of consciousness, depending on whether or not the ego has the initiative. Mainly, two kinds of activity are described, one depending on the subject (the ego) and requiring his initiative, the other occurring, so to say, in an anonymous, automatic way, elicited by the object, and labeled for this reason "passive synthesis." In other words, when experience relies on synthetic activity, Husserl distinguishes synthetic acts initiated by the ego (the genuine acts) from those that occur in consciousness in an automatic, passive way. Accordingly, the activity of consciousness turns out never to be a pure activity; it always occurs against a background of passivity. Most often, the act is a response to prior stimulation given passively, and it is through this act that the "I" discovers itself as a... (shrink)

In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather (...) than simply to regulate the type and degree of force that may be used to obtain compliance from a victim, the point of reference must be the individual complainant, as a person who makes choices, not social norms or objective tests based on the ordinary person. To determine whether consent is voluntary, attention must be directed to the presence or absence of factors that had a coercive impact on the individual complainant, a specific person with a collection of social, cultural, and psychological experiences, needs, fears, values, and priorities. Individuals have the right to exercise self-determination in accordance with their own values and perceptions, not those of a mythical victim. Accordingly, Vandervort argues that the prosecution may show either refusal, the absence of affirmative voluntary agreement (including passivity or the absence of consent due to unconsciousness), or circumstances that invalidate any apparent consent. Any of these prove the absence of consent for the purposes of establishing the actus reus of sexual assault. -/- The definition of consent as the affirmative communication of voluntary agreement is also shown to have a variety of implications for the interpretation and application of the law of sexual assault and the handling of evidentiary issues at trial in sexual assault cases. Key among these is the pivotal significance of the legal definition of consent as a tool to bar availability of the defence of “mistaken belief in consent.” Vandervort argues that in many cases the defence of “mistaken belief in consent” is based on ignorance of the law of consent, mistake about the legal definition of consent, or a failure to appreciate the legal significance of facts that are well-known, and not on a mistaken belief in an erroneous set of facts. The broad proposition asserted here is that a statutory criminal law is enforceable only if all defences based directly or indirectly on belief in the validity of extra-legal norms that authorize infringement of rights protected by the criminal law are barred. This proposition and the characterization of some mistakes about consent as legal, not factual, are also shown to be useful to exclude rape-myths and stereotypical assumptions---the stuff of which “social” definitions of consent have long been constructed---from the decision-making process at trial. -/- . (shrink)

Fifty-nine years ago, Dr Leo Alexander published his now famous report on medicine under the Nazis. In his report he describes the two major crimes of German physicians. The participation of physicians in euthanasia and genocide and the horrible experiments performed on concentration camp prisoners in the name of science. In response to this gross violation of human rights by physicians, the Nuremberg military tribunal, which investigated and prosecuted the perpetrators of the Nazi war crimes, established ten principles of ethical (...) conduct in medical research in 1949. Foremost among them was the need for voluntary consent of the human subject and that the experiment be conducted to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering. Notwithstanding all these important efforts and impressive achievements in understanding the ethical failings of Nazi physicians, the bioethical community has almost completely ignored the moral challenges facing the victims of the atrocities. These dilemmas and their responses have continued relevance for modern medicine. (shrink)

According to Michael Barnwell, Aquinas’s explanation of the first cause of moral evil is inadequate. Against Barnwell’s criticisms, this article defends Aquinas, according to whom the first cause of moral evil is the failure to consider the moral rule. According to Barnwell, the ignorance found within Aquinas’s explanation must remove moral responsibility; Barnwell also points out that the failure to consider the moral rule does not explain the sinfulness of the action. Underlying Barnwell’s criticisms are certain presuppositions and oversights. (...) First, he fails to distinguish between explaining how a sinful choice is possible (Aquinas’s concern) and what makes the choice to be sinful (part of Barnwell’s concern). Second, he supposes that an awareness of one’s own ignorance must include detailed awareness of the content of that ignorance. Finally, he supposes that an initial causal defect can be voluntary only when there is full knowledge concerning it. (shrink)

This study sets out the main points in Leonardo Polo’s theory of moral development, which systematically articulates goods, norms, and virtues. To make them easier to understand, each point has been compared with Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which is well known to specialists and radically different to it. We have chosen three aspects of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development to highlight the uniqueness of Polo’s theory: a) Kohlberg does not account for the specificity of voluntary acts, particularly the (...) act of deciding; b) The options that solve Kohlberg’s dilemmas are isolated from potential prior and subsequent decisions, so his moral development ignores any internal biographical storyline to the decisions themselves; and c) The Kohlbergian morality is an ethics of justice and duty, thereby relegating the friendship, which to Polo is the culmination of ethics, to a morally irrelevant level. (shrink)

Many of us have experienced a peculiar feeling of freedom, of the world being open before us. This is the feeling that is captured by phrases like “the freedom of the open road” and “free spirits,” and, to quote Phillip Larkin, “free bloody birds” going “down the long slide / To happiness, endlessly.” This feeling is associated with the ideas that my life could go in many different directions and that there is a vast range of things that I could (...) become. It arises in concert with a wide range of human experiences, including experiences of artistic creation, play, fun, and resistance to authority. This freedom of openness and spontaneity, which I call spontaneous freedom, is central to our ordinary talk about freedom. Yet it is a phenomenon largely ignored in discussions of freedom in contemporary moral philosophy. This is because moral philosophers are primarily concerned to identify the sort of freedom that is a prerequisite for moral responsibility, and so focus on deliberate, voluntary action rooted in rational choice. When moral philosophers do discuss spontaneous freedom, it is often to disparage it as, in the words of Harry Frankfurt, the freedom of “the wanton” whose liberty is merely that of “anarchic impulsive behavior.” My dissertation develops a theory of spontaneous freedom and of the role it does and should play in our lives, including our moral and political lives. I argue that, to do full justice to the human aspiration for freedom, moral and political theory must recognize the value of spontaneity. Through a study of characters from stories and films by Virginia Woolf, Saki, Akira Kurosawa, and Aman Sethi, I develop a phenomenological account of the nature of spontaneous freedom. I argue that we experience spontaneous freedom when we experience our actions as arising out of ourselves but not fixed in advance either by the decisions of other agents or by our own preexisting commitments or plans. I further argue that spontaneous freedom is valuable because it allows for the distinctive pleasure of feeling that one’s life is unforetold and that one is among the sources of novelty in the world, a feeling that is central to artistic creativity. It also affords solace from the anxiety associated with the inevitability of death. As with many experiences, like falling in love or seeing an alpine lake, experiences of spontaneous freedom are most valuable when they are veridical. But even the subjective experience of spontaneous freedom, I suggest, activates our awareness of and openness to possibility. Achieving this awareness, at least on occasion, is valuable because it provides us with a sense of our own psychological potential and sharpens a skill that contributes to practical deliberation. My claim that spontaneous freedom is valuable conflicts with a popular account of the self. According to that account—endorsed by a number of moral philosophers but most famously associated with Christine Korsgaard—the ideal self is one that is well-ordered, actively constituted through rational deliberation. Such integrity theories of the self are attractive because they provide an account of agency according to which ideal moral agents invariably endorse their own actions and beliefs. Integrity theories view freedom as involving rational, deliberative control of one’s actions. But I argue that integrity theories forbid well-constituted moral agents to seek out experiences of spontaneous freedom: such agents must act in a manner that they antecedently and reflectively endorse, while spontaneous freedom requires acting in a manner not antecedently fixed by one’s own decisions. Insofar as spontaneous freedom is a kind of freedom that we do and should value, my account exerts pressure on this standard view of agency and the self. My account of spontaneous freedom also has important political implications. One version of liberal theory holds that the only sort of political freedom worth having is the freedom of each individual to effectively exercise choice compatibly with every other individual doing likewise. On this picture, I have all of the freedom that I could want if I am able to choose autonomously and act in accordance with my choices. But I argue that a community that secures this liberal variety of freedom does not yet provide its members with all the freedom for which people rightly yearn. When public and private institutions arrange our circumstances in ways that make the courses of our lives predictable, our own choices about how to act may be largely settled by the plans and decisions of other agents. This in turn makes it difficult for us to regard our futures as open in the way that is characteristic of experiences of spontaneous freedom. States should promote spontaneous freedom by providing the material and social preconditions for us to feel that our lives could head in radically different and unanticipated directions. (shrink)

Augustine’s insights into the will and its free decision have long been a focus of controversy since his lifetime. Nonetheless, in modern scholarship, little effort has been made to clarify the actual function of the will as a psychological force in the life of mind. It has often been taken for granted that the will is an independent faculty which underlies our moral responsibility by its free choice. Accordingly, much ink has been spilled over issues such as necessity and freedom, (...) grace and free will, sin and evil will etc. This philosophical inquiry distinguishes itself from its antecedents by adopting a psychological focus on the function of the will. It attempts to explicate why uoluntas, and not other psychological activities, is the locus of moral responsibility in Augustine’s philosophical psychology. The work is thus split into two parts, each consisting of four chapters: the first part devoted to the will’s operation as a psychological dynamism, and the second to the traditional consideration of the will as a moral faculty. In the first part, the dissertation systematically investigates the psychological phenomenon of the will in its relationship to other psychological activities, from irrational affection to intellectual cognition. This phenomenological approach starts with Augustine’s unusual conception of concupiscentia carnis in his debates with Julian of Eclanum. According to Augustine’s philosophical interpretation of this biblical term, concupiscentia carnis as an uncontrollable tendency defines the essential infirmity of the will and forms the starting-point of further affective expressions of the soul. Then, the analysis advances to the role of the will in the formation of affection. It reveals the implicit approval that is entailed in the unvoluntary pre-volitional movements of the soul. This explains the superficial discrepancy between Augustine’s accounts of affection as can be found in Books IX and XIV of De ciuitate Dei. This general account of Augustine’s theory of emotion is followed by an in-depth examination of the feeling of shame so as to display the will’s actual contribution in a reflective affection. Augustine convincingly proves that shame reflects the powerlessness of the will in confrontation with concupiscentia carnis as well as the will’s effort to regain its dignity. To complete the foray into Augustine’s philosophy of the soul, his reflections on intellect and will in the process of moral decision are called into question. By reconsidering Augustine’s account of his own conversion and his reflections on our journey to the happy life, my analyses show that neither intellectualitic nor voluntaristic interpretations do justice to his understanding of moral decision. The voluntaristic interpretation overlooks the intellectual perspective of happy life and Augustine’s emphasis on the necessity of a knowledge of the good for our moral behaviour. On the other hand, the intellectualistic account unjustly ignores Augustine’s insights into the severe destructiveness of the failure of the will and the dilemma of two wills at war. To summarize, the phenomenological approach in Part I reveals the omnipresent feature of the will in mental life. The implications of this psychological feature of the will are twofold. It indicates the independence of the will as well as the limitations of the will by its actual conditions. The second part of this work investigates the moral significance of Augustine’s psychological insights into the function of the will. What bridges the gap between uoluntas as a psychological power and uoluntas as a moral faculty is Augustine’s most controversial conception of freedom. The dissertation first scrutinizes Augustine’s arguments for the independence of the will as reconstructed and assumed in the first part. By metaphysical arguments, Augustine reveals that nothing external, neither inferior nor superior being, can force the will to attain a particular disposition. For this cannot happen in a world governed by the divine order. In his analyses of the phenomenon of two contradictory wills, Augustine shows that the will is conditioned but not compelled by other internal forces. However, this merely represents the negative aspect of the will’s freedom, or libertas a coactione. At the same time, the positive aspect of Augustinian uoluntas has frequently been misinterpreted as a faculty of choice, or libertas indifferentiae. A careful reading shows that the free decision of the will is essentially a capacity to pursue one’s own happiness. In accord with this eudemonistic emphasis, the genuine freedom is the freedom to will and to accomplish the good, which alone guarantees the happy life. This original interpretation of freedom offers powerful support to Augustine’s account of moral agency. One is not only held responsible for his voluntary evildoings which he could have avoided, but also for the necessary conditions of life, i.e., ignorantia and difficultas as effects of original sin. For as argued earlier, even the presence of concupiscentia carnis as the inherent infirmity of the will contains the least assent of the will. This assent establishes the moral agency in evil willing. To account for our agency in the good will, the dissertation addresses the problem of compatibility between divine grace and freedom of will. My analysis shows that Augustine’s rigid position in the last years of his life is also philosophically defensible. An internal function of the grace upon the faculty of the will will not destroy its freedom to attain its own disposition. This philosophical analysis concludes by highlightling the close affiliation between the will and the self in Augustinian uoluntas. “I know nothing I could call my own if the will by which I’m willing or unwilling is not my own.”. By consent or dissent of the will, we identify ourselves with mental images, affective movements, practical reasoning and other psychological activities, either implicitly or explicitly. Augustine’s realistic conceptions of the will and its conditioned freedom provide a subtle and rich picture of human nature, which is still relevant to our own theoretical reflections on the self. 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By "actions" I shall here mean "complete" actions, that is, behaviors which are voluntary and purposive in that they are initiated or chosen and controlled by their agents who knowingly perform them with a view to some purpose which constitutes their reason for acting; this purpose may be either the action itself or some outcome of the action. In contrast to these stand "incomplete" actions which are at most only partially controlled by their agents, in that such behaviors occur (...) at least in part from one or more of the following kinds of causes: direct compulsion by someone or something external to the agent; causes internal to the agent, such as reflexes, ignorance, or disease, which decisively contribute, in ways beyond his control, to the occurrence of the action; indirect compulsion whereby the agent's choice to perform the action is forced by someone else's coercion. (shrink)

Miller analyzes the relationship between consent and autonomy by offering three pictures. For autonomy, Miller distinguishes between procedural, substantive, and weak substantive autonomy. The corresponding views of consent are what Miller has termed as consensual minimalism, consensual idealism, and consensual realism. The requirements of sexual consent under consensual minimalism are a voluntary informed agreement. However, feminist critiques reveal the inadequacies of this simple position. Consensual idealism, which corresponds with substantive autonomy, offers a robust picture where consent and autonomy must (...) be based on non-oppression. However, this view is considered too ideal and it ignores context. Weak substantive autonomy takes into account the context in the sexual domain. Correspondingly, consensual realism takes into account the context and still fulfills the requirements of consent. (shrink)

There are several primary questions which can lead to asking about the religious urgency related to the mankind’s life. “Is it available for a man to escape from the existence of religion?” “Why does a man need a religion? Why should Islam be born as a religion?” These questions are answered by M. Quraish Shihab based on his commentary. He stated that to have a belief for a man is a nature. While the reason that brings Islam as a fitrah (...) religion is, it is a belief which was brought by the last prophet: Muhammad. The focus of this research is ‘how is the authenticity of the Islamic concept as the fitrah religion according to M. Quraish Shihab?’ This study aimed to analyze the perspective of M. Quraish Shihab as a fitrah religion based on the Qur’an, which points out to take any information about the authenticity of the concept of Islam as a fitrah religion. This research implements library research which applied hermeneutics method. The theory of Fazlur Rahman is used here, which strengthens to the double movement theory on tracking either the authenticity of the message or moral ideal as what outlined in Tafsir Al-Mishbah. Based on the research, it is concluded that the authentic meaning of the concept of Islam as a fitrah religion according to the Quraish Shihab is an exclusive belief and a positive behavior. All prophets are Muslims, but all humans alive after Prophet Muhammad should embrace Islam as part of their submission form to Allah by voluntary and peaceful ways. Non-Muslims should be persuasively introduced to Islam. Because do not embrace Islam not only ignoring fitrah but also denying Muhammad as the last prophet. Nevertheless, M. Quraish Shihab considers it’s important for Muslims to respect other religions in order to maintain social justice by living in peace, mutual understanding and cooperation without sacrificing their faith. (shrink)

Involuntary autobiographical memories are spontaneously arising memories of personal events, whereas voluntary memories are retrieved strategically. Voluntary remembering has been studied in numerous experiments while involuntary remembering has been largely ignored. It is generally assumed that voluntary recall is the standard way of remembering, whereas involuntary recall is the exception. However, little is known about the actual frequency of these two types of remembering in daily life. Here, 48 Danish undergraduates recorded their involuntary versus voluntary autobiographical (...) memories during a day using a mechanical counter. Involuntary memories were reported three times as frequently as voluntary memories. Compared to voluntary memories, they were associated less with problem solving and social sharing and more with day dreaming, periods of boredom, no reasons for remembering and predominantly came to mind during unfocused attention. The findings suggest that involuntary recall is a typical way of accessing the personal past. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to rescue the holist position on corporate agency (CA) from indignities heaped upon it by friends and enemies alike. Two general criticisms strike at the core of the position: the charge of ‘material failures’ (that the corporate agent lacks a proper material presence) and the charge of illusion (that the intentionality of the corporate agent consists in the intentionality of the members). Both attack the holist position on metaphysical grounds, logically prior to any claims (...) of agency; if these charges cannot be answered then much of the CA literature collapses.The article begins by outlining the criticisms and a holist account of corporate agents that incorporates and transcends earlier offerings on corporate agency from French, List and Pettit, and others. It then addresses the charge of material failures, demonstrating that the holist corporate agent is a material entity (nothing ‘ghostly,’) and arguing that neither its scattered nature nor its dependency on voluntary participation undermines that status. It closes by addressing the charge of illusion, demonstrating that the common charge of double-counting member intentionality is false. Both charges arise from the same misreading of the holist position, which ignores the metaphysics of the corporate agent. (shrink)

After an initial, highly difficult question on the metaphysics of the bad, Aquinas turns his attention to bad action, and then very quickly turns to focus on the sort of bad actions most relevant to theology: voluntary bad action. At this point we are squarely in the moral domain, and so we might as well speak of bad actions as sins. In question 2, Aquinas takes up questions regarding the character of sin, assessing the way in which intentions, actions, (...) objects, and circumstances contribute to the moral status of an action, and exploring questions about omissions and neutral actions. In question 3, he takes up the causes of sin, distinguishing among temptation, ignorance, weakness, and malice. Questions 4–5 turn to original sin; question 6 contains his most extensive and sophisticated treatment of free will; question 7 discusses venial sins ; questions 8–15 discuss the seven deadly sins ; finally, question 16 rounds out the volume with a fascinating discussion of the psychology of devils, and their relationship to us. (shrink)

Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two complementary networks—an “extrinsic” one which deals with the external environment, and an “intrinsic” one which largely overlaps with the “default mode” system, and deals with internally oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an external cue, and were required to either follow an external instruction or to ignore it and follow a (...) class='Hi'>voluntary decision process . Our results show that a well defined component of the intrinsic system—the right inferior parietal cortex—was preferentially activated during the “free-will” condition. Importantly, this activity was significantly higher than the base-line resting state. The results support a self-related role for the intrinsic system and provide clear evidence for both hemispheric and regional specialization in the human intrinsic system. (shrink)

Resources for Feminist Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 44-45, 1985 In this brief article, written in 1984 and published the following year, Lucinda Vandervort sets out a comprehensive agenda for enforcement of sexual assault laws in Canada. Those familiar with her subsequent writing are aware that the legal implications of the distinction between the “social” and “legal” definitions of sexual assault, identified here as crucial for interpretation and implementation of the law of sexual assault, are analyzed at length in (...) “Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea” (1986), published at (1987-88) 2(2) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 233 309. In that article the author argued that most mistakes about consent are not mistakes about a “fact” that may sometimes negative mens rea, but are actually mistakes about the law that afford accused no excuse under either Canadian common law or statutory criminal law. She argued further that consent must be interpreted as “voluntary agreement” and must be affirmatively and unequivocally communicated in order to operate as an effective waiver of a person’s legal right to be free from interference with his or her bodily integrity. That article was a central reference point in the consultations leading to the 1992 amendments to the sexual assault provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code and in some key decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in sexual assault cases in the 1990’s. As a result of a gradual transformation of theoretical analysis of the law of mens rea and consent in Canada, culpable awareness is now understood by many jurists and criminal law theorists quite differently than it was twenty-five years ago. As Vandervort acknowledged in her 1984 Agenda for Action, however, clarity in legal theory and legal doctrine is no guarantee of how sexual assault laws will operate in practice. Theory and practice, doctrine and its implementation, often diverge. This phenomenon is still seen in some decisions taken at the trial, pre-trial, and pre-charge stages in sexual assault cases. Police, prosecutors, and many trial judges, like accused, may often be influenced by traditional attitudes about sexual consent and mistaken about the law of consent. Accordingly, in her recent work Vandervort re-visits and re-examines the exercise of discretion by police, prosecutors, and the judiciary. An example is her 2009 article “Legal Subversion of the Criminal Justice Process? Judicial, Prosecutorial and Police Discretion in R. v. Edmondson, Kindrat and Brown” in Sexual Assault Law, Practice & Activism in a Post-Jane Doe Era, edited by Elizabeth Sheehy (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012). In this and some of her other recent work, the distinctions between social and legal norms and questions of fact and law, previously analyzed with the objective of clarifying the law, are used to control the effects of social ignorance and partiality in the handling of sexual assault complaints by decision-makers in the criminal justice system at trial and pre-trial. Lucinda Vandervort’s published and unpublished legal and philosophical writings on sexual assault and sexual assault law illustrate the development of a socio-legal scholar’s “Agenda for Action” into a principled, pragmatic, open-ended exercise in “institutional design.” Across two centuries, from the revolutionary era of the 18th century to the present, other radical egalitarians would recognize both the impetus for the project and many features of the political and cultural resistance to it. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por objetivo a compreensão da ação em Aristóteles. Para este fim será utilizado o livro III da Ética a Nicômaco, passando antes por uma breve definição da virtude, tal como aparece no livro II, a qual, pode-se dizer ser o bem para a ação, na medida em que é aquilo que se deve alcançar com ela. No campo específico da ação será visto como ela pode ser distinguida entre voluntária, involuntária e não-voluntária. Neste espectro insere-se igualmente a (...) discussão sobre o que significa agir por e na ignorância. Além disso, se abordará também a questão relacionada à deliberação e à escolha.: This study aims to understand the action in Aristotle. For this purpose, we will use the book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, after doing a brief definition of virtue, as it appears in the Book II, which can be said to be the good for the action, as that is what should be reached by her. In the specific field of action, it will be seen how she can be distinguished between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary. This spectrum is also part of the discussion about what it means to act by and in the ignorance. In addition, the study will also address the issue related to deliberation and choice. Keywords: Deliberation, Choice, Action, Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)