“The political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor.” With these words, Marx described the Paris Commune of 1871. It “was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short term […] a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time.” The political tradition of the Commune was inherited by the Russian soviets and inspired Lenin, who explained (...) the role of those governing bodies as a “reversion to primitive democracy.” Arthur Rosenberg, professor of Ancient History at Berlin University, tried in his book Democracy and Class Struggle in the Ancient World to offer historical ground for the ideas developed by Lenin in State and Revolution and compared ancient Athenian democracy to the contemporary German and Russian councils. During the 1920s, as a communist leader and MP, Rosenberg, recalling his ideas on Athenian democracy, criticized the political degeneration of the Russian workers’ State. He stressed how Soviet Russia, in limiting the power of the councils, had suppressed the governing body of socialist direct democracy. In his work Workers’ Councils, Dutch revolutionary Anton Pannekoek renewed Rosenberg’s criticism at the end of World War II, returning to the image of ancient democratic Athens as a forerunner of the socialist councils. (shrink)

Summary The politeia established in Athens in 317 after a covenant between Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum was variously described by ancient authors as a tyranny, an oligarchy, and a democracy. Even among modern scholars there is no agreement about its definition. A close study of the architecture of the so-called regime of Demetrius and a comparison with the almost contemporary constitution of Cyrene, imposed on the African town by Ptolemaeus I, lead us to characterize it as a mixed constitution, (...) which balanced elements from the three principal types of political organisation. This experiment had a strong impact on the Hellenistic and Roman political traditions, as testified by Cicero, who recalled Demetrius as the last great Athenian lawgiver and inventor of the blended constitution. (shrink)

Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about (...) the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics. We will propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory-motor and more abstract concepts. Central to this picture are the neural theory of language and the theory of cogs, according to which, brain structures in the sensory-motor regions are exploited to characterise the so-called “abstract” concepts that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and general inference patterns. (shrink)

My initial scope will be limited: starting from a neurobiological standpoint, I will analyse how actions are possibly represented and understood. The main aim of my arguments will be to show that, far from being exclusively dependent upon mentalistic/linguistic abilities, the capacity for understanding others as intentional agents is deeply grounded in the relational nature of action. Action is relational, and the relation holds both between the agent and the object target of the action , as between the agent of (...) the action and his/her observer . Agency constitutes a key issue for the understanding of intersubjectivity and for explaining how individuals can interpret their social world. This account of intersubjectivity, founded on the empirical findings of neuroscientific investigation, will be discussed and put in relation with a classical tenet of phenomenology: empathy. I will provide an 'enlarged' account of empathy that will be defined by means of a new conceptual tool: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Simulation theories of social cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear what simulation means and how it works. The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Over the last years this approach has been hotly debated and alternative accounts have been proposed. We discuss these accounts and argue that they fail to capture the uniqueness of embodied simulation (ES). ES theory provides a unitary account of basic (...) social cognition, demonstrating that people e their own mental states or processes represented with a bodily format in functionally attributing them to others. (shrink)

A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One (...) possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to “theory theory‘, mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to “simulation theory‘, other people’s mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one’s own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory. (shrink)

Game has a central role in Nespolo’s art. Irony and caricature are the main stylistic features decisive for his film. Nespolo’s experimental cinema absorbs the avant-gardist idea of film as a creative game stricty related with life, the analytical approach toward visual image typical of Bauhaus’ searches and the autonomy of “cinematographic eye” as a linguistic expression. Nespolo’s film produced between 1966 and 1977 can be grouped in four series: first, explorations and analysis of cinematographic image; second, surrealistic and bizarre (...) theatre; third, film about avant-gardist searches of artists in Turin during the 60s; fourth, eccentric narratives in film of the 70s, definable as very representative of Nespolo’s cinema. (shrink)

In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.

Vittorio Cotesta's Eurasian Visions of the World traces the origin of the images of the world typical of the Graeco-Roman, Ancient Chinese and Medieval Islamic civilisations. Each of them had its own peculiar way of understanding the universe, life, death, society, power, humanity and its destiny. The comparative analysis carried out here suggests that they all shared a common human aspiration despite their differences: human being is unique; differences are details which enrich its image. Today, the traditions derived from (...) these civilisations are often in competition and conflict. Reference to a common vision of humanity as a shared universal entity should lead, instead, to a quest for understanding and dialogue. (shrink)

The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...) in a way that exhibits certain invariances, which in turn are functionally significant. A challenge for empirical research is to determine which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process. What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and the representational deep structure of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results, we focus on the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it turns out, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence now clearly shows how the brain actually codes movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be interpreted as an internal representation of the intentionality relation itself. We try to show how such a more complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as the building block for social cognition and a for more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well. The motor system may therefore play a decisive role in understanding how the functional ontology of the human brain could be gradually extended into the subjective and social domains. (shrink)

abstract Much of the literature on torture in recent years takes the position of denouncing the barbarity of torture, while allowing for exceptions to this veto in extreme circumstances. The ticking‐bomb argument, where a terrorist is tortured in order to extract information of a primed bomb located in a civilian area, is often invoked as one of those extreme circumstances where torture becomes justified. As the War on Terrorism intensifies, the ticking‐bomb argument has become the dominant line of reasoning used (...) by both academics and policy advisers to justify a legalized, state‐sponsored program of torture. This paper argues for the unconditional refutation of any attempt to justify torture, without exceptions. We argue against the consequentialist reasoning of the ticking‐bomb argument not from a deontological position, but on consequentialist grounds. Empirical evidence suggests that the institutionalization of torture practices creates serious problems. Torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low‐cost life saver, while its long‐term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions. (shrink)

Dante's Commedia compels readers to confront the mystery of their existence, to seek understanding of their relationship to the living conscious reality from which all possible experience arises. By pursuing these lines of inquiry, says Vittorio Montemaggi, readers can reach an ultimate reality that Dante calls love. Montemaggi offers a detailed theological reading of the Commedia, examining the theme of human interaction, both as it is represented in the poem-the narrator Dante's interaction with other characters-and by the relationship between (...) author and reader. In doing so, he locates a Dante we may not be used to imagining, a man aware both of the spiritual power of his work, and of his profound, essential vulnerability and moral failing. Montemaggi shows that, for this Dante, truth emerges only through human limitation and failure, and not in spite of it.Applying this interpretive framework to a reflection on the methodology of scholarship itself, Montemaggi offers a vision of what the academy could be-not individual scholars in competition with others, but a community that seeks to foster the understanding that can arise through interaction, vulnerability, and love. His vision constitutes a benign challenge to some of the ethos and practices of the modern academy, while simultaneously reflecting on the dynamics of one of the most inspiring and influential texts ever written about the relationship between humanity and divinity. (shrink)

This article takes the first steps towards a new approach in applied philosophy, in the hope to encourage an idea of philosophy as a more empirical subject. Part I will provide an overview of the nature and scope of applied philosophy, followed in Part II by a critical evaluation of the “top-down” methodology still popular with many applied philosophers. Part III will then describe the basic axioms of “empirical philosophy,” explaining how the empirical approach differs from the top-down approach. Part (...) IV will provide a reply to the standard criticism regarding the proposed marriage between empirical research and philosophy. Part V will test the validity of “empirical philosophy” on practical terms. (shrink)

According to many actualist theories of modality, possible worlds should be identified with maximal and consistent sets of actually existing propositions called "world-stories". A set of propositions is said to be maximal if and only if for every (actually existing) proposition P , either P or its negation belongs to the set. In my talk, I will claim that this conception of maximality is problematic in case what has to be represented by a world-story is the possible non existence of (...) an actual individual. A representation of the possible non existence of an actual individual is either a representation that "encodes" the explicit information that the individual does not exist or a representation that does not contain any information about the individual in question. The former case corresponds to a world-story A that contains a proposition according to which a certain actually existing object, say O, does not exist, the latter case to a world-story B that simply does not contain any proposition about O. I will claim, however, that the first way is not good for the actualist (had A been the true world-story, something directly about a possible individual would have been true) while the second conflicts with the standard notion of maximality given above. In order to fix this problem, I will first propose to characterize the notion of "actual object that would have existed, had a certain set of propositions been true". I will then recursively define an alternative conception of maximality ("local maximality") that can be applied to world-stories aiming to represent, in an actualist acceptable way, the possible non-existence of an actual object. (shrink)

We study by means of a laboratory experiment the role of individuals’ empathy in the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game. Our main purpose is to analyze the impact of the ability to empathize on participants’ behavior when asked to choose between two specific types of product: a cheaper conventional good and a more expensive one which, however, produces a positive externality for the other participants. We consider three manipulations: a) a redistribution mechanism where the expensive product is subsidized by the buyers of the (...) cheaper one; b) a framed version of the game where the expensive good is described as produced by a socially responsible company; c) a treatment where information about other participants’ behavior are made public. We find that all the manipulations increase the rate of contribution to the public good with respect to the baseline treatment and that the effects are stronger among participants who show higher levels of empathy. (shrink)

We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modeled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. (...) Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it. (shrink)

The extraordinary overall textual situation of Parmenides’ B1,1-3, due to complex, variegate and polymorphous causes, entailed and still entails diverse sorts of problematic issues so to constitute a true labyrinth of philological, hermeneutical and theoretical instances interwoven each other in almost inextricable way. In this analysis, a first substantial knot of philological type resulted necessary to a preliminary discrimination for making sure the textual reconstruction in order to argue then its most literarily clear and specifiable meaning. In this way it (...) was also possible to make sure its semantic and theoretical relevancies. This research leaded to outline and, hopefully, to demonstrate no textual corruption and following misunderstanding happened before sec. XIII, namely corresponding to the lecture present in the first available manuscript, the so-called cod. N, universally excluded and entirely misevaluated, even discarded; instead it is not only the principle, but the unique reliable codex. The detailed analyse including the autoptic exam is the result of enlightening the absolute goodness of this version and the reasons both philological and hermeneutical comparations, which allow to achieve its complete textual rehabilitation and so to grasp its real conceptual content. (shrink)

In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of (...) affordance and the spatiality of the body we show that both have to be construed in terms of the varying range of our power for action. Finally, we posit that the motor roots of our bodily self-awareness shed new light on both the common ground for and the distinguishing criterium between self and other. The properties of the mirror mechanism indicate that the same action possibilities constituting our bodily self also allow us to make sense of other bodily selves inasmuch as their action possibilities can be mapped onto our own ones. Our proposal may pave the way towards a general deconstruction of the different layers at the core of our full-fledged sense of self and others. (shrink)

The current debate on why colonialism is wrong overlooks what is arguably the most discernible aspect of this particular historical injustice: its exreme violence. Through a critical analysis of the recent contributions by Lea Ypi, Margaret Moore and Laura Valentini, this article argues that the violence inflicted on the victims and survivors of colonialism reveals far more about the nature of this historical injustice than generally assumed. It is the arbitrary nature of the power relations between colonizers and the colonized (...) which is at the heart of the injustice of colonization, and violence was the way arbitrariness and domination was cemented. The example of colonialism in the Caribbean during the 16th and 17th centuries is used to expose the full extent of this historical injustice. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se expondrá la relación que existe entre los mecanismos de constitución subjetiva en la concepción de ideología de Althusser y la teoría lacaniana del estadio del espejo y su función en la formación del yo. Concretamente, se resaltará la operación de representación unitaria del yo en el plano imaginario y su traslado a la función de la ideología relativa a la constitución de individuos en sujetos. Para esto, se realizará un recorrido introductorio de la argumentación que (...) Althusser exhibe en _Ideología y aparatos ideológicos del Estado_ hasta llegar al punto nodal del tratamiento de la ideología y su rol en la reproducción de las condiciones de producción, esto, a través de su función de producción de subjetividades autoidentificadas. En este punto, se introducirá, junto con otras reflexiones asociadas, el texto de Lacan _El estadio del espejo como formador de la función del yo [je] tal como se nos revela en la experiencia analítica_ para dar cuenta de la transformación que ejerce en el infante la incorporación de su imagen especular exterior en los procesos identificatorios. Con estos antecedentes, se argumentará que la teoría lacaniana de la función especular ejerce un rol de fundamentación sobre el análisis althusseriano de la ideología, debido a que aporta el pivote conceptual que permite pensar la principal operación de la ideología: la constitución de sujetos. _Palabras clave:_ Ideología – Sujeto – Espejo – Lacan – Althusser. (shrink)

En este artículo, busco exponer la relación que tiene la situación de confinamiento en la que nos encontramos, Internet y las múltiples consecuencias que puede tener la producción masificada de datos en diversos ámbitos de nuestra experiencia social. Esto implica problematizar el estatus que tiene Internet en nuestra vida cotidiana, cómo su arquitectura permite articularlo como dispositivo de poder y vigilancia, en que medida opera cómo fuente ilimitada de información de diversa índole y las posibles consecuencias que tiene esta extracción (...) en dimensiones tanto políticas como económicas en nuestra sociedad contemporánea. (shrink)

Among the Althusserian writings of the 1980s, the authors focus their attention on the most significant one, “The Underground Current of Materialism of Encounter”, which deals mainly with the theme of encounter - rather than those of emptiness or nothingness, considered as secondary by the authors. In this perspective, it is paradoxically the work of Darwin which becomes a crucial reference, helping a Marxist theory of History to emancipate itself from any teleological paradigm.

This chapter addresses the notion of embodied simulation (ES), trying to show that a new understanding of intersubjectivity can benefit from a bottom‐up study and characterization of the nonpropositional and non meta‐representational aspects of social cognition. The chapter introduces some recent developments of ES in relation to language, proposing that ES instantiates a form of paradigmatic knowledge. For decades the main goal of the neurophysiological investigation of the cortical motor system was uniquely focused on the study of elementary physical features (...) of movement such as force, direction, and amplitude. A further element of novelty about the cognitive properties of the cortical motor system concerns its role in perception, since one can now know that many motor neurons are endowed with sensory properties. Mirror neurons (MNs) boosted a renewed interest in simulation theories and also suggested an embodied approach to simulation. (shrink)

The idea of social injustice is pivotal to much contemporary moral and political philosophy. Starting from a comprehensive and engaging account of the idea of social injustice, this book covers a whole range of issues, including distributive justice, exploitation, torture, moral motivations, democratic theory, voting behavior, and market socialism.

Crucial in Girard's Mimetic Theory is the notion of mimetic desire, viewed as appropriative mimicry, the main source of aggressiveness and violence characterizing our species. The intrinsic value of the objects of our desire is not as relevant as the fact that the very same objects are the targets of others' desire. One could in principle object against such apparently negative and one-sided view of mankind, in general, and of mimesis, in particular. However, such argument would misrepresent Girard's thought. Girard (...) himself acknowledged that mimetic desire is also good in itself, because is at the basis of love, and even more importantly because it's the opening out of oneself. Starting from the notion of desire as openness to others I will discuss from a neuroscientific perspective the implications for social cognition of mimesis against the background of Girard's Mimetic Theory, an ideal starting framework to foster a multidisciplinary approach to the study of human intersubjectivity. It will be posited that a different, not mutually exclusive, account of mimesis leads to social identification henceforth to sociality. Mimesis is neither good or bad, but has the potentials to lead not only to mimetic violence but also to the most creative aspects of human cognition. Results of empirical research in neuroscience and developmental psychology show that such account of mimesis finds solid supporting evidence. It will be concluded that a thorough and biologically plausible account of human intersubjectivity requires the integration of both sides of mimesis. (shrink)

The present contribution is mainly intended to illustrate how some recent discoveries in the field of neurosciences have revolutionized our ideas about perception, action and cognition, and how these new neuro-scientific perspectives can shed light on the human relationship to art and aesthetics, in the frame of an approach known as "experimental aesthetics". Experimental aesthetics addresses the problem of artistic images by investigating the brain-body physiological correlates of the aesthetic experience and human creativity, providing a perspective that is complementary, and (...) not in opposition, to the humanistic one on the arts and the aesthetic. (shrink)