The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as to whether p in so far as one takes the truth of p to be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth of p to be certain, one is (...) no longer able to genuinely wonder whether p is true; third, to ask the question whether p is to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging that p we commit ourselves to p’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy (...) because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts. (shrink)

Wright claims that “the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference”. In this paper I follow Wright’s recommendation, but I consider a different epistemology of logic, namely anti-exceptionalism. Anti-exceptionalism’s main contention is that logic is not a priori, and that the choice between rival logics should be based on abductive criteria such as simplicity, adequacy to the data, strength, fruitfulness, and consistency. This paper’s goal is to lay down the foundations for (...) an application of the anti-exceptionalist methodology to abstraction principles. In Sect. 1 I outline my strategy. I show that anti-exceptionalism has a bearing on the so-called Bad Company problem (Sect. 2), and explore some versions of anti-exceptionalism about abstraction (Sect. 3). I then consider new criteria for choosing between rival abstraction principles, and, in particular, between consistent revisions of Frege’s Basic Law V (Sect. 4). I finally consider how the abstractionist can compare between competing criteria (Sect. 5), and argue that anti-exceptionalists should be pluralists about abstraction (Sect. 6). (shrink)

According to constitutivism, we can justify the authority of aims and norms on the ground that they are inescapable. Constitutivist views divide between ambitious and modest ones. According to ambitious constitutivism, the inescapability of aims grounds their unconditional authority, whereas according to modest constitutivism, the inescapability of aims only grounds their conditional authority. Either way, both forms of constitutivism share the assumption that inescapability grounds authority, which in turn presupposes that at the foundation of normativity we find aims and norms (...) that can be evaluated as having or lacking authority. In this paper I shall defend a form of constitutivism that rejects this assumption. According to this view, which I shall call Hinge Constitutivism, at the foundation of epistemic normativity we find an aim, the truth-aim, that is altogether beyond the evaluation in terms of the ordinary notion of authority. Moreover, I shall argue that to aim at truth is a condition of possibility for justifying the authority of any other aims or norms. In this sense, to aim at truth is a hinge of deliberation. (shrink)

Contemporary views of truth-directedness endorse what I shall call the Common-Element Argument. According to this argument, there is something in common between judgment and other attitudes like assumption and imagination: they all regard their contents as true. Since this regarding-as-true feature is not distinctive of judgment - the argument goes - it can’t explain its truth-directedness. On this ground, theorists have been motivated to endorse an inflationary view that tries to capture truth-directedness by appealing to some further feature: intentions, second-order (...) representations, sub-personal mechanisms, or subjugation to norms are the most discussed candidates for fulfilling this role. In this paper I will argue that the Common-Element Argument is unsound. It rests on a false premise, namely that there is some common element such as a regarding-as-true component between judgment and other cognitive attitudes. I shall reject Velleman’s and Railton’s defenses of the Common-Element-Argument. Then I will discuss three influential inflationary accounts of truth-directedness: Railton’s account, Velleman’s teleological account, and Shah and Velleman’s conceptualist account. I shall argue that they all face a phenomenological and an explanatory challenge. Finally, I shall sketch a deflationary view of truth-directedness that evades these challenges. (shrink)

Compromises are arrived at when, in spite of the efforts of those participating to mediate and defend their position in a rationally acceptable manner, each remains with his judgment while, at the same time, a decision must be made without further delay. What this means is that the parties agree to an option about which they are not, in their heart of hearts, entirely convinced. This article examines the notion of moral compromise, concentrating thereby on the case of political praxis. (...) It asks whether, in view of the complexity and multiplicity of morally relevant decisions encountered in a pluralist society, it is at all realistic to expect much else from political institutions than what Rawls dismissively refers to as a modus vivendi and whether a conception of justice that is true or reasonable only given the reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is still a conception of justice, and not simply a compromise between the contending doctrines. (shrink)

Values and virtues play an important role in military organizations. In particular, armies can be understood as institutions that are guided by values and virtues, endeavoring to promote them. A common understanding within the military organization relating the relevant values and virtues is therefore essential. In many armed forces, there are lists of relevant values and virtues that have mostly grown historically. In the context of this volume, special emphasis has been devoted to the value and virtue culture and its (...) importance within a military organization. Specifically, the dimensional structure of values and virtues was analyzed. Through a systematic survey of the military target groups and a factor analytical assessment within the Swiss Armed Forces, the core values and virtues were categorized and defined. These values and virtues describe the current culture of the Swiss Armed Forces and contribute to a more binding support of the objectives of military education. (shrink)

This essay proposes that the only publication of the Accademia del Cimento, referred to as Saggi,Footnote11 Accademia del Cimento, Saggi di naturali esperienze fatte nell’ Accademia del Cimento sotto la protezione del serenissimo principe Leopoldo di Toscana e descritte dal segretario di essa Accademia (Firenze: Per Giuseppe Cocchini, 1667). had as one of its main goals the celebration of the House of Medici’s paternity of cutting-edge experiments and instruments during the reign of Grand Duke Ferdinando II. These included Ferdinando II’s (...) thermometers and hygrometers, Torricelli’s experiment and barometer, and Galileo’s pendulum as a clock-regulator. It seems that this agenda went unnoticed, not at the time of its initial circulation, but rather in modern historiography. Christiaan Huygens’s challenged invention of the pendulum clock provides a case study to explore the agenda of this publication and the problem of defining an invention in seventeenth-century Europe. This paper presents for the first time the document that attests to when the first specimen of Huygens’s clock arrived in Florence, disproving the previously believed date of September 1657. The paper argues that over the last two centuries, this error has made the Medici narratives of this dispute appear inconsistent and marginalized them. In light of this new find, they must be reconsidered. (shrink)

The importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific. In this paper, we present a case study concerning earthquake engineering. So far, the philosophical literature has considered various branches of engineering, but very rarely earthquake engineering. We claim that the assessment of seismic hazard models is (...) sensitive to both epistemic and non-epistemic values. In particular, we argue that the selection and evaluation of these models are justified by epistemic values, even if they may be contingently influenced by non-epistemic values. By contrast, the aggregation of different models into an ensemble is justified by non-epistemic values, even if epistemic values may play an instrumental role in the attainment of these non-epistemic values. A careful consideration of the different epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in the choice of seismic hazard models is thus practically important when alternative models are available and there is uncertainty in the scientific community about which model should be used. (shrink)

Wenn eine Kultur etwas als Erfindung akzeptiert, dann hat dieses Etwas bereits den Status einer Tatsache erhalten, die vorhanden ist und auf ihren Nutzen oder auf ihre Funktion hin befragt werden kann. Was aber geschieht davor? Wie gewinnt das Erfundene Wirklichkeit? Wie in der Kunst, wie im Theater, wie in der Literatur und Musik, wie in der Wissenschaft? Und mit welchen Folgen? Die Beiträge in diesem Band beschäftigen sich alle mit einem Moment oder einem bestimmten Modell der Invention. Ausgehend von (...) den jeweils involvierten Medien wird der Versuch unternommen, diese Momente und Modelle zu rekonstruieren. Um etwas über die entsprechenden Inventionen in Erfahrung bringen zu können, werden diese als Ergebnisse oder Effekte von Improvisationsprozessen begriffen: Improvisationen in dem Sinne, dass von einem grundsätzlich offenen Zukunftsspielraum ausgegangen wird, gleichzeitig aber auch davon, dass es ein Umgebungs- und Verfahrenswissen gibt, das im Einzelfall beschrieben werden kann. (shrink)

Der Begriff ‚Kompromiss‘ hat seine Wurzeln im lateinischen Kompositum compromissum, compromittere („sich gegenseitig versprechen, eine Entscheidung dem Schiedsrichter zu überlassen“). Spätestens Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts ist der Kompromiss nicht mehr an den Schiedsspruch eines Dritten gebunden. An dessen Stelle tritt eine pragmatische Vereinbarung zwischen streitenden Parteien. Was die Merkmale des Kompromisses sind und welches sein Verhältnis zu ähnlichen Begriffen wie Schmutzige Hände oder Modus Vivendi ist, wird im Artikel geklärt.

A través de una comparación entre Vico y Hobbes se aborda la concepción de la política como un facere y el rol de las emociones, vinculadas a la biografía de los dos autores . El autor aplica el esquema de emociones rojas y blancas, basándose en la distinción de B. Williams y la utilización de A. Margalit. Esta herramienta la aplica a la clarificación de ciertas teorías políticas en Leviathan y en Scienza nuova.PALABRAS CLAVE: Vico, Scienza nuova, Hobbes, Leviathan, emociones, (...) miedo, vergüenza, filosofía política. By comparing Vico and Hobbes, the conception of politics as a facere is considered, as well as the role of emotions, which are here linked with the biographies of those two authors . The author applies B. Williams’ distinction between red and white emotions, following A. Margalit. This tool is used in order to clarify some political theories in Leviathan and in Scienza Nuova.KEYWORDS: Vico, New Science, Hobbes, Leviathan, emotions, fear, shame, political philosophy. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to review and critically discuss the philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Given that estimates of seismic hazard are typically riddled with uncertainty, diferent epistemic values (related to the pursuit of scientifc knowledge) compete in the selection of seismic hazard models, in a context infuenced by non-epistemic values (related to practical goals and aims) as well. We frst distinguish between the diferent types of uncertainty in PSHA. We claim that epistemic and nonepistemic (...) considerations are closely related in the selection of the appropriate estimate of seismic hazard by the experts. Finally, we argue that the division of scientifc responsibility among the experts can lead to responsibility gaps. This raises a problem for the ownership of the results (“no one’s model” problem) similar to the “problem of many hands” in the ethics of technology. We conclude with a plea for a close collaboration between philosophy and engineering. (shrink)

Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural way Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 109–136, 2010; Schwartzkopff in Grazer philosophische studien 82:353–373, 2011). However, some ground-theoretic abstraction principles entail that there are circles of partial ground :775–801, 2017). I call this problem auto-abstraction. In this paper I sketch a solution. Sections 1 and 2 are introductory. In Sect. 3 I start comparing different solutions to the problem. In Sect. 4 I contend that the (...) thesis that the right-hand side of an abstraction principle is prior to its left-hand side motivates an independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to predicative restrictions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction principles. In Sect. 5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In Sect. 6 I highlight several parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground. I finally compare my solution with the strategies listed in Sect. 3. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein's feeling of wonder stems from perceiving the existence of the world as an absolute miracle, that is, as a fact that is in principle beyond explanation. Based on this analysis, I will suggest that Wittgenstein's experience is akin to what has been described by other authors such as Coleridge, Pessoa, Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, and Hadot, (...) among many others. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein and Coleridge on the experience of existence, I shall highlight some core features of this experience, chief among them the use of the notion of nothingness in clarifying what is understood in the experience, the role of intuition, and the presence of a specific pathos. As a whole, this paper aims to provide a contribution to the project of a phenomenology of the experience of existence and intends to create a bridge for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition on the enigma of existence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can (...) be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education. (shrink)

According to some Philosophy for Children theorists, the pedagogy of the Community of Inquiry hinges upon the acceptance of a pragmatist epistemology. The underlying idea is that it is possible to participate, and to justify participation, in a community of inquiry only if some pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is true and accepted by the participants engaged in dialogue. In this article we argue that this claim is false. In this way, we want to free the pedagogy of the (...) Community of Inquiry from some epistemological assumptions that we regard as unwarranted. To support our contention, we shall highlight two distinctions that are important in order to appreciate the connection between epistemology and education: first, the distinction between the disposition of intellectual humility and the belief in fallibilism; second, the belief in the existence of Cartesian certainties and the attitude of psychological certainty. Finally, we also argue that to vindicate dialogic inquiry it is neither necessary to adopt a pragmatist theory of truth, nor is it necessary to regard warranted judgement as the primary aim of inquiry. In contrast, we argue that truth is the aim of inquiry, and so is the aim of children when they participate in a dialogic inquiry. In this way we also suggest a justification of philosophy with children that does not instrumentalize it. (shrink)

The brief life of the Accademia del Cimento (1657–1667), the first known society with a purely experimental programme,1 is entangled with the most surprising advancements in the history of scientific instruments of that century, from the telescope to the microscope, the thermometer to the barometer, the hygrometer to the pendulum as a time-regulator, and more. The making of instruments at the Florentine court shows the interaction of princely, scholarly and artisanal actors. This paper explores this collaboration and shows how the (...) supposed “invisibility’ of artisans depended on their proximity to the academicians and princes, who mainly communicated verbally with them, directly or through middlemen. The visibility of artisans increases proportionally to their physical distance from the Court. In this essay I unveil the identity of the artisans of the Cimento and, finally, attempt to attribute five instruments (some lost and others still extant) to specific makers, shedding light also on relations between the artisan and his patron. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 30-37, March 2022.

ZwangDie BegriffeGewalt (s. a. Folter, Krieg, Vergewaltigung) ‚Gewalt‘, ‚Macht‘, ‚Herrschaft‘ oder ‚Zwang‘ sind semantisch sehr eng verknüpft. Der Artikel geht auf den Ursprung des Wortes „Gewalt“ und seine Ambivalenz zurück und fragt unter anderem nach der Beziehung, die Gewalt mit Zwang im rechts- und politisch-philosophischen Sinne unterhält. Individuelle, institutionelleNötigung und strukturelle Gewalt werden auseinandergehalten und ihr Unterschied erläutert. Den Schluss bildet die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung der Gewalt.

Der Ausdruck ‚Krieg‘ kennt keine allgemein anerkannte Definition. Der Krieg ist, mit Clausewitz zu sprechen, eine gesellschaftliche Aktivität zum Zwecke der Regelung politischer Probleme durch Gewaltanwendung. Je nach Gesellschaftsstadium nimmt von daher der Krieg entwicklungsgeschichtlich sehr unterschiedliche Formen an. Nach einer begrifflichen Klärung liefert der Artikel einen Einblick in die Geschichte der Theorie des gerechten Kriegs und in die Begründungen der humanitären Intervention. Er schließt mit einem kurzen Überblick über den Pazifismus ab.

Hume’s Principle states that the cardinal number of the concept F is identical with the cardinal number of G if and only if F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence. The Schwartzkopff-Rosen Principle is a modification of HP in terms of metaphysical grounding: it states that if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then this identity is grounded by the fact that F and G can be paired one-to-one, 353–373, 2011, 362). HP is (...) central to the neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics ; in this paper we submit that, even if the neo-logicists wish to venture into the metaphysics of grounding, they can avoid the SR Principle. In Section 1 we introduce neo-logicism. In Sections 2 and 3 we examine the SR Principle. We then formulate an account of arithmetical facts which does not rest on the SR Principle; we finally argue that the neo-logicists should avoid the SR Principle in favour of this alternative proposal. (shrink)

Epistemic uncertainties are included in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as second-order probabilities that represent the degrees of belief of the scientists that a model is correct. In this article, I propose an alternative approach that incorporates the scientist’s confidence in a probability set for a given quantity. First, I give some arguments against the use of precise probabilities to estimate scientific uncertainty in risk analysis. I then extend the “confidence approach” developed by Brian Hill and Richard Bradley to PRA. Finally, (...) I claim that this approach represents model uncertainty better than the standard (Bayesian) model does. (shrink)