The wager for values proposed by Henryk Elzenberg seems to be an interesting and important problem in axiological thinking. That is why one should take a close look at Elzenberg’s reasoning and at certain consequences of such point of view. We analyze this problem as a parallel to Pascal’s Wager for God. One should live and act as if God existed—it is an effect of Pascal’s Wager. One should live and behave as if perfect values existed—this is the essence of (...) Elzenberg’s wager. Paralel analysis of both standpoints lets us formulate numerous hypotheses and statements especially in axiology. (shrink)

Some of the contemporary ethical debates have put in value the rational feature of feelings because of the estimative intentionality that is implied in them. In this context, some claim that the intentionality of emotions is a kind of value perception, as Phenomenology stressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly Max Scheler, by analysing emotional Feeling [_Fühlen_] in the frame of emotional life. In order to extend the context of this philosophical debate, and after describing Scheler’s phenomenology of (...) feelings of the intentional and non-intentional emotional life, firstly, we defend _the_ _axiological_ _and_ _emotional_ _intentionality_ _as_ _double_ _intentionality_ that—in our understanding—Scheler analyses phenomenologically, while taking distance from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s intentional structure of estimative emotions. And, secondly, we propose a tentative interpretation of _the link_ between estimative and emotional double intentionality _as living_ _structure_ _of_ _ethical_ _life_, in the light of Martin Heidegger’s Hermeneutical Phenomenology. (shrink)

This dissertation is an ontological investigation of value. The thesis is this: Value is a moment founded on a real entity and, in this sense, value is real. I argue that this thesis is true for all objects in the domain of value by looking at three distinct categories of value: economic value, aesthetic value, and moral value. And I demonstrate by means of advancing definitions, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these three categories of value, that (...) this thesis is the essential glue that holds all values in the realm of social reality as part of the genus value. There are two restrictions to this thesis. One restriction is that the real existence of value is possible only if there is a relation of correspondence between a value judgment and its referent. A false value judgment, then, fails to correspond to its intentional target so there is no possible value. The other restriction is that the value entities are either concrete objects that have at least temporally come into being, or actual states of affairs with a spatial and temporal location. Both of these restrictions combined imply that no future states of affairs, or objects which either have not or cannot come into being, can be objects of value. This dissertation draws from sources in the Central European philosophical tradition. (shrink)

This book is a systematic defense of a nonnaturalist, intuitionist moral realism. It supplies an account of moral facts according to which moral value is supervenient, undefinable, and nonreducible. The author also argues that "we must accept without proof some claim to the effect that a given thing is intrinsically good or bad if we are to prove that anything at all is so". The project is explicitly in the tradition of philosophers such as Brentano, Moore, and Ross. The author (...) focuses on developing his views rather than engaging in current debates by explicit reference to other work in value theory. The account is responsive to what one might take to be the most significant objections to it, but there are few references to specific arguments of recent and contemporary philosophers. On the one hand, this helps maintain the tightly interwoven systematic character of the account; but on the other, those not already disposed to accept some of its main claims may not find the articulation and defense of them compelling. (shrink)

Human values seem to vary across time and space. What implications does this have for the future of human value? Will our human and (perhaps) post-human offspring have very different values from our own? Can we study the future of human values in an insightful and systematic way? This article makes three contributions to the debate about the future of human values. First, it argues that the systematic study of future values is both necessary in and of itself and an (...) important complement to other future-oriented inquiries. Second, it sets out a methodology and a set of methods for undertaking this study. Third, it gives a practical illustration of what this ‘axiological futurism’ might look like by developing a model of the axiological possibility space that humans are likely to navigate over the coming decades. (shrink)

Value change is a phenomenon that is gaining increasing attention in ethical analyses of technologies. However, a comprehensive study of how reprogenetic technologies and values coevolve is lacking. To remedy this gap, in this overview article, I address the relationship between reprogenetics and value change. This contribution thus argues for the importance of investigating the phenomenon of value change in relation to the technological controversies discussed in bioethics. To meet this goal, I begin by clarifying, first, how technologies shape reproductive (...) choice. I then clarify what “values” and “moral values” are, how reprogenetic technologies are value laden, and what values are often discussed in reprogenetics debates. Next, I show five types of value changes that have occurred in advance in reproductive and genetic technologies. Finally, I argue for the bioethical relevance of discussing future techno-value change, pointing out the descriptive and normative challenges of this philosophical endeavor. (shrink)

This paper argues that values if they are sheering through collective discussion and communicative-pragmatic justification have been proved to be a capital of society which forms the foundation and horizon for its sustainable development. The concept of personal axiological competence as an ability to produce and interiorize share values on the basis of their critical reflection, critical selection and integration has been developed by taking into account the specifics of the world of values in the context of globalization. A role (...) of higher education and dialogic education in its formation has been characterized. (shrink)

Values, Valuations, and Axiological Norms in Richard Rorty's Neopragmatism sympathetically discusses Richard Rorty's neopragmatist philosophy. This book brings together a range of interpretations and possibilities on a variety of humanistic topics, including philosophy, literature, culture, film, economics, social issues, politics, and more. Skowroński involves the work of philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, Santayana, and Kołakowski as he delves into various philosophical problems using the lens of Rorty’s neopragmatist thought.

The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is (...) that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value. (shrink)

Horizons is a critical inventory of value-related thinking, demonstrating that the mind has the ability to profile a distinctive circumstance in diverse ways. Readers are first invited to a historical inquiry into typical configurations of values, their collisions, and the worldviews that drive them. They are then introduced to the epistemologies employed by the social sciences, so that they are better able to gauge the potential of these disciplines for coming to terms with values. Axiology is portrayed as a (...) field that has broken free from its neo-Kantian roots, benefiting from challenging new conceptual frames based in documents with global reach-mainly the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After scrutiny of what various sociological models claim about values and the way in which empirical surveys approach them, Horizons reaffirms the assumption that social life and its dynamics condition the fate of values. Yet, for the sake of more accurate accounts, research should consider to a greater extent social stratification, and pressing macrosocial problems such as environmental protection, sustainable development, and attainment of some form of global equity. Social sciences' limitations modulate their ability to serve as an unequivocal guide for value choices. These limitations are a problem because of the significance of the process of dialogue and deliberation in value-related fields. Rather than advancing the allegedly universal characteristics of any one culture, in a world consisting of many civilizations, the imperative is to acknowledge pluralism and discern what is held in common. (shrink)

The paper "Environmental Ethics and Cultural Values related to the Philosophical Approaches to Eco-Axiology" examines the complex interplay of ethical concerns about the environment, cultural viewpoints, and human values. This research explores eco-axiology, the philosophical study of values in connection to the natural world, observing at how moral precepts influence how people interact with the natural world. For measuring, the research study used SPSS software and generated results, including descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA test analysis, which also explains (...) the pair sample analysis between them. The contrast between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism is examined, emphasizing the range of moral viewpoints and the influence of cultural norms on environmental ethics. The usefulness of environmental ethics in solving urgent environmental issues like climate change and biodiversity loss is highlighted, along with its practical implications in policymaking, education, corporate practices, and individual behavior. The research found a positive and significant relationship between environmental ethics and cultural values. Ultimately, this discussion is a call to action, imploring people to practice moral stewardship and substitute a more peaceful coexistence with nature for the sake of both the current and the future generations. (shrink)

How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)—the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM (...) is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it’s true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty. (shrink)

This book expounds the basic principles of Axiology as a major field of philosophical inquiry. Those principles can be discovered and demonstrated by scientific method. In treating scientific inquiry the book throws light on what values are and how they are known. It explores questions of Good and Bad, Ends and Means, and Appearance and Reality as applied to values. Axiology, argues the author, provides the basis for ethics as the science of oughtness: the power that a greater (...) good has over a lesser good in compelling our choices. The book concludes with a survey of efforts to establish Axiology as a science. (shrink)

This book treats values as the basis for all of philosophy, an approach distinct from critiquing theories of value and far rarer. "First Philosophy," the effort to justify the foundations for a system of philosophy, is one of the main issues that divide philosophers today. McDonald's philosophy of values is a comprehensive attempt to replace philosophies of "existence," "being," "experience," the "subject," or "language," with a philosophy that locates value as most basic. This transformation is a radical move within Western (...) philosophy as a whole, since it has never been done in such a thoroughgoing way. Hugh P. McDonald makes a comprehensive case against first philosophy as metaphysical, by mounting a case against all metaphysical systems of philosophy. Radical Axiology: A First Philosophy of Values is a fresh start for a rebirth of philosophy. While other movements debate the "death of philosophy," this book radically re-evaluates the direction of philosophy by discovering values at the basis of all philosophy. This reorientation addresses the question of what the love of wisdom can mean for us today. (shrink)

Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality. (shrink)

Cardiology is characterized by its state-of-the-art biomedical technology and the predominance of Evidence-Based Medicine. This predominance makes it difficult for healthcare professionals to deal with the ethical dilemmas that emerge in this subspecialty. This paper is a first endeavor to empirically investigate the axiological foundations of the healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital. Our pilot study selected, as the target population, cardiology personnel not only because of their difficult ethical deliberations but also because of the stringent conditions in which they (...) have to make them. Therefore, there is an urgent need to reconsider clinical ethics and Value-Based Medicine. This study proposes a qualitative analysis of the values and the virtues of healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital in order to establish how the former impact upon the medical and ethical decisions made by the latter. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis and interpretation of axiology and ethics as seen by the writer and philosopher Ayn Rand. The author follows the assumption that, in a situation where indifference is observed with regard to values (cf. Simmel, Sloterdijk), a return of philosophical reasoning to the idea of objectivity of values could be worthwhile. Therefore, he examines a specific type of axiological objectivism that can be found in Rand’s work. In the present paper, the suggested comparison with Baden (...) neo-Kantism as well as phenomenological axiology serves to capture the specifics of Rand’s axiological approach. These lie in placing emphasis on such a relationship between facts and values in which values result from the facts of reality, as well as in the very understanding of the objectivity of values that Rand identifies with long-term life goals and identifies them as an objective necessity for an individual’s life. Following the analysis of Rand’s axiology, the author focuses on her understanding of ethics, which he places in contrast to Kant’s deontology, as well as morality, which he views through the prism of a business relationship based on the exchange of values. The aim of the paper is to, by means of an analysis and interpretation of Rand’s ideas, show that objective values can be understood as a necessary prerequisite for consequential ethics and an individual living a happy life without being anchored in transcendence or social consensus. (shrink)

This article explains that and how values and evaluations are unavoidably and conspicuously present within natural scientists and their sciences—and why they are definitely not “value-free”. It shows how such things can be rationally understood and assessed within the framework of formal axiology, the value theory developed by Robert S. Hartman and those who have been deeply influenced by his reflections. It explains Hartman’s highly plausible and applicable definitions of “good” and related value concepts. It identifies three basic kinds (...) of value objects and human evaluations of these, and it shows how these should be ranked or prioritized in comparative worth. Finally, throughout, it applies all of the above to what is really going on within natural scientists and their sciences. It shows how anyone, scientists included, should proceed in order to make sense of what and how they value. (shrink)

My thesis demonstrates that, despite a number of impossibility results, a satisfactory and coherent theory of population ethics is possible. It achieves this by exposing and undermining certain key assumptions that relate to the nature of welfare and personal identity. I analyse a range of arguments against the possibility of producing a satisfactory population axiology that have been proposed by Derek Parfit, Larry Temkin, Tyler Cowen and Gustaf Arrhenius. I conclude that these results pose a real and significant challenge. (...) However, in the absence of further evidence I reject the conclusion that they imply that the value of populations is either not precise or not transitive. Instead, I expose some fundamental assumptions behind these results. One key assumption is that something can only make a life better or worse if it makes that life better or worse for the person living it, i.e. it raises or lowers the ‘welfare level’ of that life. Although intuitively highly plausible, this assumption ignores the possibility that perspectives other than that of the person living a life may be relevant for evaluating the components of that life and that these should be incorporated into our all things considered judgements. I argue that episodes within a person’s life that are strongly psychologically connected may have a special normative significance, particularly if these episodes involve such things as the enjoyment of ‘the best things in life’ or the experience of great suffering. We have reason to assign an all things considered value to such strongly psychologically connected phases of a person’s life, where this value is not exhausted by the contributions these make to the welfare level of that person’s life as a whole. It follows that our all things considered evaluations of populations are often underdetermined by information about the welfare levels of the lives they contain. However, in certain cases, most notably in that of ‘the Repugnant Conclusion’, there is nevertheless sufficient information provided by the welfare levels of persons’ lives to allow us to infer facts about these components that make an all things considered difference to these evaluations. I argue that a failure to acknowledge these facts is the cause of the aforementioned impossibility results and that once they are taken into account it is possible to produce a satisfactory theory of population ethics. (shrink)

Value is either additive or else it is subject to organic unity. In general we have organic unity where a complex whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Value exhibits organic unity if the value of a complex, whether a complex state or complex quality, is greater or less than the sum of the values of its components or parts. Whether or not value is additive might be thought to be of purely metaphysical interest, but it is also (...) connected with important aspects of evaluative reasoning. Additivity is closely connected with principles of bare difference and separability which are often tacitly assumed in value theory. The author spells out these principles and trace their connections with additivity and organic unity. The author then develops an unpleasant paradox of additivity. Additivity apparently entails nihilism: that nothing is more valuable than anything else. Additivity involves a kind of axiological atomism -- that complexes decompose into components or factors; that these factors possess value independently of their role in valuable complexes; and that the factors do not interact in their production of overall value. In order to avoid the paradox it seems as though the factors have to be akin to the metaphysically privileged states of logical atomism -- a doctrine that does not enjoy widespread support. The paradox poses a problem not only for the notions of organic unity and additivity, but also for the closely related bare-difference principles which lie at the heart of value theory and of its application. The author proposes a way of eliminating the paradox, and thereby saving additivity and separability, without presupposing an unpalatable variant of logical atomism. The author closes with the proposal to treat principles of additivity as regulative ideals in our search for intrinsic values. (shrink)

Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the (...) general conceptual framework for our thinking about values. This latter area can in turn be subdivided into two interrelated but relatively independent fields of research. In one, we find theories about the meaning, the evidential grounds and the truth status of value statements, along with analyses of the alleged motivational pull of value judgments. In the other research field, which may be called formal axiology, the focus is on the structural features of our value notions: on the logic of value, on the conceptual distinctions and connections between different value types, on the relationships between value concepts and normative notions, etc. While this volume concentrates on formal axiology, it also makes some forays into other fields of value research. The papers appearing in the collection are, for the most part, preliminary reports. Their final versions may later be published in regular journals or books. (shrink)

This study of axiology explores the axiocentricity of being human. Human beings dwell in the realm of value. Values are not simply what persons have; values in large part are what persons are. The mystique of values is analyzed here in terms of their cultural, phenomenological, and ontological status. The relationship between science and values is debated. Values should not be submitted to reductionism. Postmodernism raises new problems for the future of a philosophy of values. Yet, we may direct (...) our hopes toward happiness, universalism, and humanism as inseparable from value-life. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This paper focuses on Max Scheler`s idea of person and its meaning in terms of values organized according categories. The work of Scheler on ethics expands the solidarity of the person as cordis ordo by the construction (...) of a hierarchical system of values. Therefore, the recognition of the realm of universal values, a sector of which forms the ethos of a given age, has to be supplemented by that of the order of the time with its individual values and claims. There are many lectures of values in axiological philosophy, as we explain in this paper according to material-values ethics, and they are very important in the revelation of the Other. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe main question addressed in this paper is whether conflict is constitutive of the nature of value commitment, and hence necessarily implied by value pluralism. If this is the case, no resolution of value disagreements, whether on the global level or within modern multicultural societies, is possible via practical reasons, and the only solutions to inner or outer conflicts will be “political”, in the sense of a Realpolitik. Positive and negative answers to the main question are shown to express two (...) intellectual and moral attitudes opposing each other as Gorgias and Socrates, or Rhetoric and Philosophy did in the Ancient World. In post-Nietzschean Modernity, however, most philosophers seem to take sides with Gorgias, against Socrates, as is shown on the basis of Ronald Dworkin’s solitary campaign against the many faces of value scepticism. Drawing on phenomenological axiology, this paper takes sides with Socrates by reconciling value pluralism and universalism. (shrink)

Philosophers have gradually accepted axiology as one branch of philosophy. As a basic category belonging to axiology and philosophy, "value" is the general abstraction of concrete value formation in various fields including utility, ethics and appreciation of the beauty. The problem of value is essentially a problem of historical activities of practice in human society. The axiology based on the scientific practice view insists on the principle of unification between theory and practice, truth and value. In research (...) of axiology, the relation between subjectivity and objectivity of values is a problem that must be solved in the first place. The modern conversation of value philosophy is the academic and practical demands of the value philosophy research in China. Value evaluation is an important part of the axiology. In order to deepen the research of value philosophy and to promote the development of current value philosophy, we must have scientific mode of thinking suitable for the nature of value. It is the base of value relation, the origin of value needs, the process of value creation and actualization and the fundamental way to proving ones value as a human being. (shrink)

The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty – the question of how you should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory, extend them in various ways and (...) interpret them accordingly, and thus provide axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty. (shrink)

The overall synoptic view of fundamental issues in the theory of value are discussed in this work, which includes the following chapters: (1) By the Standards ...

Taking full measure of Rorty's influence and legacy demands encountering his reception outside North America. One such case, Eastern Europe, where Rorty spent considerable time and enjoys a committed following, is especially interesting, given the post-1989 resonance of his claims about the priority of democracy to philosophy.Polish philosopher Krzysztof Skowroński's attention to the underappreciated normative dimension of Rorty's pragmatism opens a window into this reception. This wide-ranging book advances a core – and, in my view, essential – insight: there is (...) a "profoundly axiological character" to Rorty's philosophy. Even though Rorty consciously eschewed a theory of values or a system of axiology, for... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss the notion of value presupposed by empirical value-surveys such as the World Values Survey (WVS) or the European Values Study (EVS), using some basic distinctions of philosophical value-theory. I intend to show that the framework of these surveys is grounded on definitions or implicit claims that are systematically problematic, having also a certain impact on the empirical realisation and some of the survey’s outcomes. First, it is shown that the assumption of values (...) as “that what is valued” is not consistent with a taxonomy of four value-groups. Whereas the former leads to an inflation of values, the latter is too narrow even for the conceptualisation of some values mentioned in the survey’s questionnaire. Referring to the philosophical distinction of values and (valuable) goods, it is also shown that the survey’s framework is not able to articulate cases in which we value the same good over time but because of different value-aspects. Second, it is shown that an understanding of the value-groups as fundamentally conflicting does not withstand a critical review: Whereas the conflict of materialist and post-materialist values should be understood as a mere difference of preferences regarding goods that are all evaluated positively, the assumed conflict of traditional and secular-rational values depends on a rigorous, intolerant articulation of value-based worldviews. (shrink)

IntroductionCardiology is characterized by its state-of-the-art biomedical technology and the predominance of Evidence-Based Medicine. This predominance makes it difficult for healthcare professionals to deal with the ethical dilemmas that emerge in this subspecialty. This paper is a first endeavor to empirically investigate the axiological foundations of the healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital. Our pilot study selected, as the target population, cardiology personnel not only because of their difficult ethical deliberations but also because of the stringent conditions in which they (...) have to make them. Therefore, there is an urgent need to reconsider clinical ethics and Value-Based Medicine. This study proposes a qualitative analysis of the values and the virtues of healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital in order to establish how the former impact upon the medical and ethical decisions made by the latter.ResultsWe point out the need for strengthening the roles of healthcare personnel as educators and guidance counselors in order to meet the ends of medicine, as well as the need for an ethical discernment that is compatible with our results, namely, that the ethical values developed by healthcare professionals stem from their life history as well as their professional education.ConclusionWe establish the kind of actions, communication skills and empathy that are required to build a stronger patient-healthcare professional relationship, which at the same time improves prognosis, treatment efficiency and therapeutic adhesion. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently wondered whether the value impact of the existence of God on the world would be positive, negative, or neutral. Thus far discussions have distinguished between the value God's impact would have overall, in certain respects, and/or for particular individuals. A commonality amongst the various positions that have been taken up is to focus on the goods and drawbacks associated with both theism and atheism. Goods associated with atheism include things like privacy, independence, and autonomy. I argue that (...) it is better overall and for everyone to prefer a hidden God to no God. This is because it is possible to experience many of the goods attributed to atheism if God is hidden even if they do not really obtain, while also gaining many of the additional goods connected to theism. This amounts to a new solution to the problem of divine hiddenness: God might hide in order to increase or maximize the axiological value of the world. (shrink)

This book explores the value impact that theist and other worldviews have on our world and its inhabitants. Providing an extended defense of anti-theism - the view that God’s existence would (or does) actually make the world worse in certain respects - Lougheed explores God’s impact on a broad range of concepts including privacy, understanding, dignity, and sacrifice. The second half of the book is dedicated to the expansion of the current debate beyond monotheism and naturalism, providing an analysis of (...) the axiological status of other worldviews such as pantheism, ultimism, and Buddhism. -/- A lucid exploration of contemporary and relevant questions about the value impact of God’s existence, this book is an invaluable resource for scholars interested in axiological questions in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Evaluativists hold that psychiatric disorders have a factual and evaluative dimension and recognize that psychiatric patients have an active role in shaping their symptoms, influencing the development of their disorders, and the outcome of psychiatric therapy. This is reflected in person-centered approaches that explicitly consider the role of values in psychiatric conceptualization, classification, and decision-making. In this respect, in light of the recent partnership between Fulford’s value-based practice (VBP), and Stanghellini’s phenomenological-hermeneutic-dynamical (P.H.D) psychotherapy method, this paper presents a comparative analysis (...) of two person-centered approaches to psychiatric care currently discussed within the literature. I claim that while these approaches share some core ideas, they also present important divergences concerning their axiological underpinnings, which could potentially compromise their partnership. In particular, by exploring their theoretical, practical, and ethical dimensions, I show that these models have different conceptions of what values are, which, in turn, affect their understanding of how values relate to the person and how clinicians can identify them. Finally, I argue that although Fulford’s and Stanghellini’s approaches are prima facie compatible and complementary, developing a “combined analytic-plus-phenomenological form of values-based practice” should address fundamental conceptual issues if it is to become a consistent and coherent method for psychiatric care. (shrink)

This book expands the current axiology of theism literature by assessing the axiological status of alternative conceptions of God and the divine. To date, most of the literature on the axiology of theism focuses almost exclusively on the axiological status of theism and atheism. Specifically, it focuses almost entirely on monotheism, typically Judeo-Christian conceptions of God, and atheism, usually construed as ontological naturalism. This volume features essays from prominent philosophers of religion, ethicists, and metaphysicians addressing the value impact (...) of alternative views such as ultimism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism, and idealism. Additionally, it reflects a wider trend in analytic philosophy of religion to broaden its scope beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition. Value Beyond Monotheism will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of religion, ethics, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Great thinkers have devoted to explaining morality and ethics in human beings. The major reflections have resulted in a well-known dichotomy, that of matters of fact and matters of value, or what is known as the theoretical world, which is objective, and the practical world, that of affections. With the birth of analytic philosophy, the emphasis is placed on language allowing to explain philosophical problems, such as validity. This study proposes the following thesis: it is possible to derive “ought” from (...) “is”, as it is evidenced in the Spanish verb “tocar” and several of its verbal periphrasis. To achieve this, a naturalization of morality is proposed from the postulates of two theories, namely, cognitive semantics (Talmy 2000) and the Modular Theory of Modalities (Gosselin 2010). The methodology applied consists of both a semantic and a cognitive analysis of “tocar”, for which a corpus was collected in literary texts and presidential speeches. The main result shows that “tocar” has a prototypical descriptive semantic value, alethic value, and new prescriptive semantic values. It is concluded that the new semantic values for this verb and its periphrasis are the deontic and the axiological ones, which demonstrates once again the evolutionary character of language and the need to provide empirical information on philosophical issues, such as morality. (shrink)

Although it is been more than a century since the appearance of Max Weber’s famous essay about the objective character of knowledge in the field of social and political sciences, it still continues to attract the interest of researchers in the various cultural sciences. There is a whole secondary literature dedicated to concepts that Weber has not defined clearly enough, such as Idealtypus [ideal type], historisches Individuum [historical individual], Wertbeziehung [value-relation] or Werturteilsfreiheit [the freedom from value- judgement] ( Oakes, 1990 (...) ). Our contribution falls into this category; since the phrase ‘axiological memory’ appears nowhere in Weber’s work, the concept itself is present, especially in his essays dedicated to methodology in the social and political sciences. As Guy Oakes noted, Weber did not always endeavour to argue his thesis rigorously, thus leaving ample room for the interpretation and development of his ideas. (shrink)