Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss the notion of value presupposed by empirical value-surveys such as the World Values Survey (WVS) or the European Values Study (EVS), using some basic distinctions of philosophical value-theory. I intend to show that the framework of these surveys is grounded on definitions or implicit claims that are systematically problematic, having also a certain impact on the empirical realisation and some of the survey’s outcomes. First, it is shown that the assumption of values as “that what is valued” is not consistent with a taxonomy of four value-groups. Whereas the former leads to an inflation of values, the latter is too narrow even for the conceptualisation of some values mentioned in the survey’s questionnaire. Referring to the philosophical distinction of values and (valuable) goods, it is also shown that the survey’s framework is not able to articulate cases in which we value the same good over time but because of different value-aspects. Second, it is shown that an understanding of the value-groups as fundamentally conflicting does not withstand a critical review: Whereas the conflict of materialist and post-materialist values should be understood as a mere difference of preferences regarding goods that are all evaluated positively, the assumed conflict of traditional and secular-rational values depends on a rigorous, intolerant articulation of value-based worldviews.