We were interested in exploring the associations and effects of experimental language (i.e., native – L1, or foreign – L2), dilemma type (i.e., personal – D1 or impersonal – D2), the digital device participants used (i.e., PC/laptop or smartphone), along with gender and age in sacrificial COVID-19 and non-COVID moral dilemmas. We performed two studies involving 522 participants aged 18 to 69 in April 2020. In Study 1, we found no significant associations between the dilemma type and the digital device. (...) However, most participants chose to sacrifice an older COVID-19 patient in a critical medical condition to prioritize rescuing similar, younger patients (i.e., 45-year-old males). Results also suggested that male and younger participants were more likely to choose the utilitarian option when the sacrificial dilemma was presented in French. In study 2 (i.e., non-COVID-19), participants made significantly more utilitarian choices in the personal dilemmas presented in French. Results are discussed concerning the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic context and its emotional impact on moral judgment. (shrink)

We develop a utilitarian framework to assess different decision rules for the European Council of Ministers. The proposals to be decided on are conceptualized as utility vectors and a probability distribution is assumed over the utilities. We first show what decision rules yield the highest expected utilities for different means of the probability distri- bution. For proposals with high mean utility, simple bench- mark rules (such as majority voting with proportional weights) tend to outperform rules that have been proposed (...) in the political arena. For proposals with low mean utility, it is the other way round. We then compare the expected utilities for smaller and larger countries and look for Pareto- dominance relations. Finally, we provide an extension of the model, discuss its restrictions, and compare our approach with assessments of decision rules that are based on the Penrose measure of voting power. (shrink)

This paper aims to present of the ethics of social consequences (a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism) as a theoretical basis for the examination of teacher ethics and a tool for dealing with practical moral problems of the teaching profession. Teachers’ duty is to help students, teach them to recognize the difference between good and evil, right and wrong, show them that they have moral responsibility for their actions and all this can be very well attained on the basis of (...) the ethics of social consequences. (shrink)

Noradrenergic pathways are involved in mediating the central and peripheral effects of physiological arousal. The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of noradrenergic transmission in moral decision-making. We studied the effects in healthy volunteers of propranolol (a noradrenergic beta-adrenoceptor antagonist) on moral judgement in a set of moral dilemmas pitting utilitarian outcomes (e.g., saving five lives) against highly aversive harmful actions (e.g., killing an innocent person) in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel group design. Propranolol (40 mg (...) orally) significantly reduced heart rate, but had no effect on self-reported mood. Importantly, propranolol made participants more likely to judge harmful actions as morally unacceptable, but only in dilemmas where harms were ‘up close and personal’. In addition, longer response times for such personal dilemmas were only found for the placebo group. Finally, judgments in personal dilemmas by the propranolol group were more decisive. These findings indicate that noradrenergic pathways play a role in responses to moral dilemmas, in line with recent work implicating emotion in moral decision-making. However, contrary to current theorising, these findings also suggest that aversion to harming is not driven by emotional arousal. Our findings are also of significant practical interest given that propranolol is a widely used drug in different settings, and is currently being considered as a potential treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder in military and rescue service personnel. (shrink)

Utilitarian ideas in nineteenth-centuryAmerica have been given short shrift inmodern historical and philosophicalscholarship. Collecting the relevant publishedwork together in one place is an essentialstarting point for any serious investigation of American utilitarians andtheir critics. James Crimmins and Mark Spencer have made an expertselection from scattered sources of around 60 important articles andessays. These include treatments of Bentham by his friend John Neal,editor of The Yankee, and commentaries on John Stuart Mill gatheredfrom rare American journals. There are also discussions of (...) utilitarianjurisprudence by the great American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, andpieces by many other writers. This collection, with its substantialeditorial introduction, will be vital reading for historians of ideas,scholars of philosophy and political thought, and any one elseinterested in the fate of utilitarianism in America. (shrink)

At the end of the 19 th century, in an effort to reform the economic and social organisation along socialist lines, the first Fabians had to reflect on morality and the place of the individual in society. They derived their ideals and theories from various political and intellectual traditions, among which popular and liberal radicalism, Darwinism and ethical positivism. As for the utilitarian influence on the first Fabians, it is controversial. Though the Fabians admired the reformist endeavour of Bentham (...) and his disciples, they openly rejected Utilitarianism. For them, it was a theory of the past that justified individualism. However, a study of the _ Fabian Essays in Socialism _ (1889) as well as other essays published by the seven essayists (Annie Besant, Hubert Bland, William Clarke, Sydney Olivier, George Bernard Shaw, Graham Wallas and Sidney Webb) shows that the Fabians reshaped some utilitarian principles to suit their objectives. They engaged with the utilitarian tradition, whi... (shrink)

Two distinct and perhaps mutually exclusive understandings of utilitarianism have emerged in the ethics literature. Utilitarianism is typically regarded as an approach to determine ethicality by focusing on whether or not actions produce the greater good, but has also been conceptualized as a set of traits to which individuals might be predisposed. This paper is designed to clarify the meaning and implications of such utilitarian traits as “results-oriented,” “innovative,” and “a winner.” Although the Janus-headed model of ethical theory from (...) which these traits emerged had been acknowledged by its developer as possibly misrepresenting typical views of utilitarianism, much research using these traits appears to have been conducted without clear recognition of this. If the conceptual foundation underpinning hypothesis development is disconnected from the measure used to test them, then little support for relevant predictions should emerge. A review of the literature which featured utilitarian traits generally confirmed this. This paper also explored the origins and emergence of these traits and suggested that existing evidence that these measure utilitarian ethical predispositions is not especially persuasive. Understanding what utilitarian traits do not assess is critical in order for knowledge about this potentially useful measure to advance. (shrink)

For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian point. Also, it is “between” the utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s IIA.

A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of (...) maturation, we asked a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today’s younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism, in one formu lation of each, are not extensionally equivalent, that is, they do not require of an agent precisely the same behavior as is shown by Gerald Barnes in "Utilitarianisms”, Ethics 82 (197I) 56-64. As a result each theory passes and sometimes fails different utilitarian tests: the comparative consequences of universal conformity by everyone (distributively) vs. universal conformity by everyone (collectively) Barnes argues that the latter is the appropriate test. I argue that the (...) test which AU passes is the appropriate one, since everyone, collectively, does not make moral choices. Moral choices are made by everyone individually. (shrink)

The ethical theory underlying much of our treatment of animals in agriculture and research is the moral agency view. It is assumed that only moral agents, or persons, are worthy of maximal moral significance, and that farm and laboratory animals are not moral agents. However, this view also excludes human non-persons from the moral community. Utilitarianism, which bids us maximize the amount of good in the world, is an alternative ethical theory. Although it has many merits, including impartiality and the (...) extension of moral concern to all sentient beings, it also appears to have many morally unacceptable implications. In particular, it appears to sanction the killing of innocents when utility would be maximized, including cases in which we would deliberately kill and replace a being, as we typically do to animals on farms and in laboratories. I consider a number of ingenious recent attempts by utilitarians to defeat the killing and replaceability arguments, including the attempt to make a place for genuine moral rights within a utilitarian framework. I conclude that utilitarians cannot escape the killing and replaceability objections. Those who reject the restrictive moral agency view and find they cannot accept utilitarianism's unsavory implications must look to a different ethical theory to guide their treatment of humans and non-humans. (shrink)

The contrast typically made between utilitarianism and virtue theory is overdrawn. Utilitarianism is a universal emulator: it implies that we should lie, cheat, steal, even appropriate Aristotle, when that is what brings about the best outcomes. In some cases and in some worlds it is best for us to focus as precisely as possible on individual acts. In other cases and worlds it is best for us to be concerned with character traits. Global environmental change leads to concerns about character (...) because the best results will be produced by generally uncoupling my behavior from that of others. Thus, in this case and in this world, utilitarians should be virtue theorists. (shrink)

'This volume provides major texts of the eighteenth-century religious exponents of utilitarianism, three of Bentham's important works on religion, and neglected essays by James Mill and by John Stuart Mill on utilitarianism and religion. No better guide and editor for these texts could be found than James Crimmins, the world's leading scholar on this subject. Since most of these writings are quite scarce, the collection is an indispensable resource for every student of the history of British moral, political, and religious (...) thought.' - J. B. Schneewind This publication represents the most complete collection ever of original writings on religion and utilitarianism. Illustrating both the sympathetic and antagonistic relationships between the principle of utility and religious beliefs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this is a work that no scholar of modern political thought should be without. Divided into two parts, religious and secular, the collection reprints the most important and salient contributions to the debate. It includes both the well-known writers and the lesser-known but equally important contributors, making this volume the best one-stop resource for undergraduates, graduates, scholars in the field, and all those interested in the relation of politics to religious belief. All materials are newly typeset. As well as two general introductions the collection features a biographical note on each author and detailed notes on each text. --all texts are reset and fully indexed --11 new introductions --features key writings and extracts long out of print. (shrink)

One problem for any utilitarian alternative to act utilitarianism, such as rule utilitarianism, is the feeling that act utilitarianism is the most natural form of utilitarianism. Other forms seem unmotivated, inconsistent, or irrational. This argument is found in Smart, Foot and Slote. It turns on the assumption that utilitarianism must be motivated by the "teleological motivation," the idea that one must derive one's entire moral theory from the notion of the good. I respond that act utilitarianism itself has a (...) problem from the point of view of the teleological motivation, a problem solved, surprisingly, by several utilitarian alternatives including rule utilitarianism. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is to develop a theory of value covering all kinds of values, based on my unified utilitarian theory. It is unique and is different from all traditional and existing theories of value. Like the views of most psychologists and decision-scientists, value is asserted to be subjective in nature because value exists only for a subject. Value and value judgment are considered statistical in nature in three dimensions, namely in the dimensions of subject, object, and (...) judge. This theory covers a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory as an integral part. The three conceptions of utility held by philosophers, economicsts, and decision-scientists are unified. The traditional and conventional classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental, which may lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and circularity, is not used. Instead, a classification based on the classification of good things in life according to the principle of exchangeability and replaceability is emphasized and used. A decision-theoretic approach is taken for the study of actions in life. All the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values pursued are related, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely, to a life plan. Thus, this utilitarian general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is also consequential, teleological, and utilitarian. (shrink)

In this paper I want to point out the multifaceted impact of utilitarianism as well as pragmatism, applied as the unified philosophy of environmental protection. Special attention is paid to the utilitarian aspect of Marxism, and a continuous, comprehensive case study from Poland – in the context of European economic realities – serves as an example of social receptionof the utilitarian paradigm in contemporary environmental protection policy.

Consideration of the objection from the personal point of view reveals the resources of utilitarianism. The utilitarian can offer a partial rebuttal by distinguishing between criteria of rightness and decision procedures and claiming that, because his theory is a criterion of rightness and not a decision procedure, he can justify agents' differential concern for their own welfare and the welfare of those close to them. The flexibility in utilitarianism's theory of value allows further rebuttal of this objection; objective versions (...) of utilitarianism can treat self-determination or autonomy as a dominant good which trumps even large magnitudes of lesser goods such as pleasure. After the resources of utilitarianism are exhausted, though, there remains a worry, generated by the personal point of view, about utilitarianism's impartiality. But this worry is correctly viewed, not as a moral worry about the merits of utilitarianism as a moral theory, but as a worry about morality concerning the rationality or supremacy of impartial moral demands. Whether or not this worry can be answered, the fact that it arises supports rather than undermines a utilitarian account of morality. (shrink)

Every tenable ethical theory must have an account of moral virtue and vice. Julia Driver has performed a great service for utilitarians by developing a utilitarian account of moral virtue that complements a broader act-based utilitarian ethical theory. In her view, a moral virtue is a psychological disposition that systematically produces good states of affairs in a particular possible world. My goal is to construct a more plausible version of Driver’s account that nevertheless maintains its basic integrity. I (...) aim to accomplish this goal by developing four problems concerning admiration and luck for Driver’s account. Subsequently, I modify the account in a way that partially or entirely mitigates each difficulty. Finally, I attempt to undermine Driver’s rationale for rejecting the modification and explore how well the modified account of moral virtue fits with utilitarian accounts of right action. (shrink)

A theory of punishment should tell us not only when punishment is permissible but also when it is a duty. It is not clear whether McCloskey's retributivism is supposed to do this. His arguments against utilitarianism consist largely in examples of punishments unacceptable to the common moral consciousness but supposedly approved of by the consistent utilitarian. We remain unpersuaded to abandon our utilitarianism. The examples are often fanciful in character, a point which (pace McCloskey) does rob them of much (...) of their force. If there was no tension between utilitarian precepts and those which come naturally to plain men, utilitarianism could have no claim to provide a critique of moralities. The utilitarian's attitude to such tensions is somewhat complicated, but what is certain is that there is more room in his system for the sentiments to which McCloskey appeals against him than McCloskey realizes. We agree with McCloskey, however, on the absurdity of substituting rule?utilitarianism for act?utilitarianism as an answer to his attacks. The distinction itself may represent a conceptual confusion. In our view, indeed, unmodified act?utilitarianism provides the best moral basis for thought about punishment. (shrink)

RESUMEN Diversos estudios han concluido que los pacientes con daño en la Corteza Frontal -CF- o Corteza Prefrontal Ventromedial -CPV- muestran una disposición a herir directamente a otra persona con el fin de salvar varias vidas en sus respuestas a los "dilemas morales personales", revelando una posible carencia de empatía. No obstante, cuando evalúan conductas carentes de empatía sin justificación utilitarista, sus respuestas son normales. Defendemos aquí que los pacientes sufren una deficiencia cognitiva relacionada con la hipótesis de marcador somático (...) de Damasio y con juicios de valor. Criticamos la hipótesis del "paciente utilitarista", que se ha atrincherado en la neurociencia cognitiva. ABSTRACT In their answers to questions regarding "personal moral dilemmas", patients with lesions to the Frontal Cortex -FC- or Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex -vmPFC- display a disposition to directly injure another person in order to save lives, thus revealing a possible lack of empathy. However, their answers are normal when they evaluate behaviors lacking in empathy but without a utilitarian justification. We here defend that those patients suffer from a cognitive deficiency associated with Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis and with value judgments. The article critiques the "utilitarian patient" hypothesis that has become deeply rooted in cognitive neuroscience. RESUMO Diversos estudos têm concluído que os pacientes com danos no Córtex Frontal (CF) ou Córtex Pré-frontal Ventromedial (CPV) mostram uma disposição a ferir diretamente a outra pessoa com o objetivo de salvar várias vidas em suas respostas aos "dilemas morais pessoais", o que revela uma possível carência de empatia. Contudo, quando avaliam condutas carentes de empatia sem justificativa utilitarista, suas respostas são normais. Defendemos aqui que os pacientes sofrem uma deficiência cognitiva relacionada com a hipótese de marcador somático de Damásio e com juízos de valor. Criticamos a hipótese do "paciente utilitarista", que vem se refugiando na neurociência cognitiva. (shrink)

Unpleasant dreams occur much more frequently than many people realise. If one is a hedonistic utilitarian – or, at least, one thinks that dreams have positive or negative moral value in virtue of their experiential quality – then one has considerable reason to try to make such dreams more positive. Given it is possible to improve the quality of our dreams, we ought to be promoting and implementing currently available interventions that improve our dream experiences, and conducting research to (...) find new, more effective interventions. (shrink)

The article explains a rule-Utilitarian normative thesis about when actions are morally excused; that an act otherwise morally objectionable in some way is excused if a moral system, The acceptance of which in the agent's society would be utility-Maximizing, Would not condemn it. What is meant by a "moral system condemning" an action is explained. The parallel between this moral thesis and the benthamite theory of criminal justice is developed. It is argued that this rule-Utilitarian thesis implies that (...) an action is morally excused (not blameworthy) if it does not manifest a defective trait of character. (shrink)

This paper introduces the model of Utilitarian Principlism as a framework for crisis healthcare ethics. In modern Western medicine, during non-crisis times, principlism provides the four guiding principles in biomedical ethics—autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice; autonomy typically emerges as the decisive principle. The physician–patient relationship is a deontological construct in which the physician’s primary duty is to the individual patient and the individual patient is paramount. For this reason, we term the non-crisis ethical framework that guides modern medicine Deontological (...) Principlism. During times of crisis, resources become scarce, standards of care become dynamic, and public health ethics move to the forefront. Healthcare providers are forced to work in non-ideal conditions, and interactions with individual patients must be considered in the context of the crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced healthcare to shift to a more utilitarian framework with a greater focus on promoting the health of communities and populations. This paper puts forth the notion of Utilitarian Principlism as a framework for crisis healthcare ethics. We discuss each of the four principles from a utilitarian perspective and use clinical vignettes, based on real cases from the COVID-19 pandemic, for illustrative purposes. We explore how Deontological Principlism and Utilitarian Principlism are two ends of a spectrum, and the implications to healthcare as we emerge from the pandemic. (shrink)

Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value (...) theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility. (shrink)

This chapter sets out an intertemporal addition theorem, the exact analog, across the dimension of time, of the interpersonal addition theorem. A premise of the new theorem is the 'principle of temporal good', the exact analog of the principle of personal good. It turns out that the principle of temporal good would, if true, give crucial support to the utilitarian principle. The chapter explains that the principle of temporal good is dubious, and describes how this principle might nevertheless be (...) defended. The defence is metaphysical. It is founded on a disuniting metaphysics of personhood. A complete argument was made out by deducing the principle of temporal good from a disuniting metaphysics. The chapter shows that the principle of temporal good, if true, lends very strong support to the utilitarian principle of distribution. So a chain of argument would have been completed, linking the disuniting metaphysics to the utilitarian principle. (shrink)

I examine the positive and negative features of homeopathy from an ethical perspective. I consider: (a) several potentially beneficial features of homeopathy, including non-invasiveness, cost-effectiveness, holism, placebo benefits and agent autonomy; and (b) several potentially negative features of homeopathy, including failure to seek effective healthcare, wastage of resources, promulgation of false beliefs and a weakening of commitment to scientific medicine. A utilitarian analysis of the utilities and disutilities leads to the conclusion that homeopathy is ethically unacceptable and ought to (...) be actively rejected by healthcare professionals. (shrink)

Tools are needed to benchmark carbon emissions and pledges against criteria of equity and fairness. However, standard economic approaches, which use a transparent optimization framework, ignore equity. Models that do include equity benchmarks exist, but often use opaque methodologies. Here we propose a utilitarian benchmark computed in a transparent optimization framework, which could usefully inform the equity benchmark debate. Implementing the utilitarian benchmark, which we see as ethically minimal and conceptually parsimonious, in two leading climate–economy models allows for (...) calculation of the optimal allocation of future emissions. We compare this optimum with historical emissions and initial nationally determined contributions. Compared with cost minimization, utilitarian optimization features better outcomes for human development, equity and the climate. Peak temperature is lower under utilitarianism because it reduces the human development cost of global mitigation. Utilitarianism therefore is a promising inclusion to a set of benchmarks for future explorations of climate equity. (shrink)

In folk psychology and some academic psychology, utilitarian thinking is associated with coldness and deontological thinking is associated with emotion. I suggest, mostly through personal examples, that these associations are far from perfect. Utilitarians experience emotions, which sometimes derive from, and sometimes cause or reinforce, their moral judgments.

This chapter compares the versions of utilitarianism to which Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore subscribed. Moore and Sidgwick offer considerations in favor of utilitarianism. Moore thinks they defeat all rivals. Sidgwick concedes that they do not show that utilitarianism is better justified than egoism. He does think they show that utilitarianism is superior to common‐sense morality, which, for Sidgwick, is, roughly speaking, a pluralist view with principles restricting what people are permitted to do in the pursuit desirable outcomes. Sidgwick and (...) Moore disagree most sharply over what has non‐instrumental value (disvalue). The chapter suggests that Sidgwick's case is more compelling, but that his general argumentative strategy is beset with problems. It compares Sidgwick's hedonism with Moore's pluralism. Moore raises compelling criticisms of Sidgwick's view and in addition Moore makes many compelling contributions to value theory. (shrink)

Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, much support for torture interrogation of terrorists has emerged in the public forum, largely based on the “ticking bomb” scenario. Although deontological and virtue ethics provide incisive arguments against torture, they do not speak directly to scientists and government officials responsible for national security in a utilitarian framework. Drawing from criminology, organizational theory, social psychology, the historical record, and my interviews with military professionals, I assess the potential of an (...) official U.S. program of torture interrogation from a practical perspective. The central element of program design is a sound causal model relating input to output. I explore three principal models of how torture interrogation leads to truth: the animal instinct model, the cognitive failure model, and the data processing model. These models show why torture interrogation fails overall as a counterterrorist tactic. They also expose the processes that lead from a precision torture interrogation program to breakdowns in key institutions—health care, biomedical research, police, judiciary, and military. The breakdowns evolve from institutional dynamics that are independent of the original moral rationale. The counterargument, of course, is that in a society destroyed by terrorism there will be nothing to repair. That is why the actual causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing terrorism must be elucidated by utilitarians rather than presumed. (shrink)

Self-interest voting is irrational when it has even a small cost, but it can be rational for those who care about others; its expected utility (EU) may exceed its cost. For cosmopolitan voters (those who care about outsiders), the EU of voting increases with the number of affected others. The EU of voting for the good of the world now and in the future can thus be large. In some cases, the EU of parochial voting (e.g., considering only one's nation) (...) may not cross the cost threshold, but cosmopolitan voting can cross it. I apply these principles to various kinds of voting. And I compare voting to charity. Voting has the advantage of enlisting the coercive power of the state, but charity can be more focused on effective policies. I discuss campaign contributions, and I conclude with a discussion of the existence of utilitarian voters. (shrink)

Henry Sidgwick taught G.E. Moore as an undergraduate at the University of Cambridge. Moore found Sidgwick’s personality less than attractive and his lectures “rather dull”. Still, philosophically speaking, Moore absorbed a great deal from Sidgwick. In the Preface to the Trinity College Prize Fellowship dissertation that he submitted in 1898, just two years after graduation, he wrote “For my ethical views it will be obvious how much I owe to Prof. Sidgwick.” Later, in Principia Ethica, Moore credited Sidgwick with having (...) “first clearly exposed the [naturalistic] fallacy” – a fallacy putatively committed when one defines naturalistically or super-naturalistically “good” – which was one of the book’s main ambitions (PE 39; also 17, 59). It is therefore unsurprising that Moore remarks in the intellectual autobiography he wrote years later that “From…[Sidgwick’s] published works…I have gained a good deal, and his clarity and his belief in Common Sense were very sympathetic to me.” This influence did not, however, prevent Moore from registering disagreements with Sidgwick, the sharpest of which concern the viability of egoism and the nature of the good. The disagreements between Sidgwick and Moore speak to many important moral theoretical issues arising both within and without the utilitarian tradition in ethical thinking. Because the two share much in common, a critical comparison of them on a range of moral philosophical questions proves instructive. It will tell us in particular something about the general direction of ethical thinking in the utilitarian tradition at the dawn of the twentieth century. This chapter has four parts. Part I compares the versions of utilitarianism to which Sidgwick and Moore subscribed. Part II examines the arguments each provides for the view. Part III discusses their conflicting theories of value. Part IV sums things up. (shrink)

The utilitarian fallacy, most egregiously committed by J. S. Mill but perpetuated ever since, consists of supposing that “pleasure”, being a noun, is, in every true statement in which it occurs, the name of a feeling, and that “pleasant”, in any such statement, means that whatever is so described is conducive to that feeling. In fact, “pleasant” is more commonly used as a positive term of appraisal, indicating that the thing so described is liked, and usually liked for its (...) own sake, and “pleasure” typically has a similar use. These terms thus resemble words like “awful”, “wonderful” and so on, which typically do not mean evocative of awe, wonder and so on. What follows from this is that the feeling of pleasure, while perhaps good for its own sake, is not uniquely so. Almost anything correctly described as pleasant is apt to be such. Similar observations apply to the term “happiness”. Therefore utilitarianism, according to which there is only one thing good as an end, or for its own sake - namely, pleasure or happiness - is false as a philosophical theory of ethics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.