Institutional guidelines for transgender children and adolescent minors fail to adequately address a critical juncture of care of this population: how to proceed if a minor and their parents have disagreements concerning their gender-affirming medical care. Through arguments based on ethical, paediatric, adolescent and transgender health research, we illustrate ethical dilemmas that may arise in treating transgender and gender diverse youth. We discuss three potential avenues for providing gender-affirming care over parental disagreement: legal carve-outs to parental consent, the mature minor (...) doctrine and state intervention for neglect. Our discussion approaches this parent–child disagreement in a manner that prioritises the developing autonomy of transgender youth in the decision-making process surrounding medically assisted gender affirmation. We base our arguments in the literature surrounding the risks and benefits of gender-affirming therapy in transgender children and the existing legal basis for recognising minors’ decision-making authority in certain medical situations. (shrink)

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments (...) cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable. (shrink)

While many take Newton's argument for absolute space to be an inference to the best explanation, some argue that Newton is primarily concerned with the proper definition of true motion, rather than with independent existence of spatial points. To an extent the latter interpretation is correct. However, all prior interpretations are mistaken in thinking that 'absolute motion' is defined as motion with respect to absolute space. Newton is also using this notion to refer to the quantity of motion (momentum). This (...) reading reveals a misunderstood argument for absolute space, according to which absolute space is necessary for a workable definition of momentum. (shrink)

This article examines Newton’s method of induction and its connection to methodological atomism. The article argues that Newton’s Rule III for the Study of Natural Philosophy is a criterion for isolating the primary qualities of the atomic parts; in other words, it interprets Rule III as a transductive inference. It is shown that both the standard inductive and invariance interpretations of Rule III can be subsumed under the transductive view, although the invariance criterion is reinterpreted; by qualities “that cannot be (...) intended or remitted,” Newton means qualities that are invariant under changes in the configuration of the atomic parts. (shrink)

We discuss the problem of finding forcing posets which introduce closed unbounded subsets to a given stationary set.

We address the following questions in this paper: (1) Which set or number existence axioms are needed to prove the theorems of ‘ordinary’ mathematics? (2) How should Frege’s theory of numbers be adapted so that it works in a modal setting, so that the fact that equivalence classes of equinumerous properties vary from world to world won’t give rise to different numbers at different worlds? (3) Can one reconstruct Frege’s theory of numbers in a non-modal setting without mathematical primitives such (...) as “the number of Fs” ( $$\#F$$ ) or mathematical axioms such as Hume’s Principle? Our answer to question (1) is ‘None’. Our answer to question (2) begins by defining ‘x numbers G’ as: x encodes all and only the properties F such that being-actually-F is equinumerous to G with respect to discernible objects. We answer (3) by showing that the mere existence of discernible objects allows one to reconstruct Frege’s derivation of the Dedekind-Peano axioms in a non-modal setting. (shrink)

Zionist national identity in Israel is today challenged by two mutuallyantagonistic alternatives: a liberal, secular, Post-Zionist civic identity, on the one hand, and ethnic, religious, Neo-Zionist nationalistic identity, on the other. The other, Zionist, hegemony contains an unsolvable tension between the national and the democratic facets of the state. The Post-Zionist trend seeks a relief of this tension by bracketing the nationalcharacter of the state, i.e., by separation of state and cultural community/ies; the Neo-Zionist trend seeks a relief of the (...) same tension by bracketing the democratic nature of the state, i.e., by consolidating the Jewish ethno-national character of the state. The focus of the study is upon two dimensions of this unfolding cultural-political strife: the conflicting perceptions of time and space, and the ways they affect the perceptions of the boundaries of the collectivity, either in an inclusionary manner (the ``post'') or in an exclusionary manner (the ``neo''). (shrink)

Traditionally, pleasure has been understood in three different ways: as a simple feeling or phenomenological quality, as a behavioral disposition, and as an evaluation. While versions of these accounts – and combinations of two of them – have been attributed to Kant, I argue that Kant successfully combines all three. Pleasure, on this view, is an evaluation of an object’s agreement with a particular subject’s ability or intention to act. Because it refers to a particular subject, it has a subjective (...) felt character, and because it is about agreement with an ability or intention to act, it disposes one to action. In addition to being philosophically compelling, this reading incorporates Kant’s disparate characterizations of pleasure. (shrink)

In the following pages we propose a theory on cognitive systems and the common strategies of perception, which are at the basis of their function. We demonstrate that these strategies are easily seen to be in place in known cognitive systems such as vision and language. Furthermore we show that taking these strategies into consideration implies a new outlook on immune function calling for a new appraisal of the immune system as a cognitive system.

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it (...) is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false. (shrink)

We build a new spectrum of recursive models (SRM(T)) of a strongly minimal theory. This theory is non-disintegrated, flat, model complete, and in a language with a finite structure.

This paper contends that Bacon’s inductive method depends crucially on his general account of matter. I argue that Bacon develops a dynamic form of corpuscularianism, according to which aggregates of corpuscles undergo patterns of change that derive from active inclinations and appetites. The paper claims that Bacon’s corpuscularianism provides him with a theory of material form that enables him to theorize bodily change and possible material transformations. The point of natural histories and experiments is then to find the processes of (...) corpuscular change that correlate with making present or making absent simple natures. (shrink)

This dissertation elucidates the notion of physical system which opens new conceptual pathways that connect the three realms of physical theory; spacetime, material bodies and their properties, and the laws of nature which govern their evolution. The notion of physical system includes two presuppositions regarding their structure. The first presupposition is a description of isolated systems and their evolution in time, which amounts to a Paradigm of Uniform Motion. The second presupposition describes how parts of a physical system are combined (...) into wholes. This presupposition amounts to a Rule of Composition. Once we make these presuppositions explicit we can derive the spacetime structures and the fundamental equations of motion. "Newtonian" and "relativistic" systems are shown to differ with respect to the paradigm of uniform motion, a difference that leads to the respective structures of Newtonian mechanics and the Special Theory of Relativity. ;The philosophical framework offered in this dissertation provides a new interpretation of the concept of mass, and a new elucidation of the relation between the conservations of mass and momentum. Previous analyses of the concept have claimed that "mass" cannot be defined and broken down to more primitive predicates. The framework offered here, on the other hand, enables the systematic reduction of the concept of mass to motions and the presuppositions we have regarding the nature of physical systems. The new interpretation of mass reveals a surprising connection between mass and inertial reference frames, as they are both shown to be derived, in a similar way, from our definition of physical systems. Mass is by necessity attributed to bodies in virtue of the frame we use to describe their motions. This account also enables us to understand the different conceptual roles of mass and their interconnections. In the context of Newtonian mechanics, the roles of mass as a Quantity of Matter, as the Inertial property of bodies, and as Gravitational mass are shown to be various aspects of a single role the concept has in the new framework offered here. In the context of the Special Theory of Relativity, rest mass and relativistic mass are similarly analyzed as consequences of our presuppositions regarding physical systems. (shrink)

We present a theoretical model and corresponding research design (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci 1994) that could yield stronger evidence for (or perhaps against) Howe et al.'s conclusions. The model assesses levels of heritability (h²) under different amounts of training and practice, thus providing estimates of the independent contribution of “innate talent” to the quality of development outcomes. The design can also reveal the extent to which this independent contribution varies systematically as a function of other influential factors identified by Howe et (...) al. (shrink)

Biological phenomena can be investigated at multiple levels, from the molecular to the cellular to the organismic to the ecological. In typical biology instruction, these levels have been segregated. Yet, it is by examining the connections between such levels that many phenomena in biology, and complex systems in general, are best explained. We describe a computation-based approach that enables students to investigate the connections between different biological levels. Using agent-based, embodied modeling tools, students model the microrules underlying a biological phenomenon (...) and observe the resultant aggregate dynamics. We describe 2 cases in which this approach was used. In both cases, students framed hypotheses, constructed multiagent models that incorporate these hypotheses, and tested these by running their models and observing the outcomes. Contrasting these cases against traditionally used, classical equation-based approaches, we argue that the embodied modeling approach connects more directly to students’ experience, enables extended investigations as well as deeper understanding, and enables “advanced” topics to be productively introduced into the high school curriculum. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the positivist–conventionalist interpretation of the Restricted Principle of Relativity is flawed, due to the positivists’ own understanding of conventions and their origins. I claim in the paper that, to understand the conventionalist thesis, one has to diambiguate between three types of convention; the linguistic conventions stemming from the fundamental role of mathematical axioms, the conventions stemming from the coordination betweeh theoretical statements and physical, observable facts or entities, and conventions that are made possible by (...) possible revisions to theory. I claim that it is not possible to interpret the Principle of Relativity as based on one of these three types of convention. This renders the conventionalist interpretation of the Principle of Relativity untenable. The paper is part of a larger project that aims to understand the philosophical significance of the Principle of Relativity. (shrink)

We examine how degrees of computably enumerable equivalence relations under computable reduction break down into isomorphism classes. Two ceers are isomorphic if there is a computable permutation of ω which reduces one to the other. As a method of focusing on nontrivial differences in isomorphism classes, we give special attention to weakly precomplete ceers. For any degree, we consider the number of isomorphism types contained in the degree and the number of isomorphism types of weakly precomplete ceers contained in the (...) degree. We show that the number of isomorphism types must be 1 or ω, and it is 1 if and only if the ceer is self-full and has no computable classes. On the other hand, we show that the number of isomorphism types of weakly precomplete ceers contained in the degree can be any member of $[0,\omega ]$. In fact, for any $n \in [0,\omega ]$, there is a degree d and weakly precomplete ceers ${E_1}, \ldots,{E_n}$ in d so that any ceer R in d is isomorphic to ${E_i} \oplus D$ for some $i \le n$ and D a ceer with domain either finite or ω comprised of finitely many computable classes. Thus, up to a trivial equivalence, the degree d splits into exactly n classes.We conclude by answering some lingering open questions from the literature: Gao and Gerdes [11] define the collection of essentially FC ceers to be those which are reducible to a ceer all of whose classes are finite. They show that the index set of essentially FC ceers is ${\rm{\Pi }}_3^0$-hard, though the definition is ${\rm{\Sigma }}_4^0$. We close the gap by showing that the index set is ${\rm{\Sigma }}_4^0$-complete. They also use index sets to show that there is a ceer all of whose classes are computable, but which is not essentially FC, and they ask for an explicit construction, which we provide.Andrews and Sorbi [4] examined strong minimal covers of downwards-closed sets of degrees of ceers. We show that if $\left$ is a uniform c.e. sequence of non universal ceers, then $\left\{ {{ \oplus _{i \le j}}{E_i}|j \in \omega } \right\}$ has infinitely many incomparable strong minimal covers, which we use to answer some open questions from [4].Lastly, we show that there exists an infinite antichain of weakly precomplete ceers. (shrink)

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...) understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be free. We therefore asked leading philosophers and neuroscientists which questions related to free will they would most like the other field to answer. Those experts then voted on the 15 most important questions for each field to answer. This book is a collection of the answers to those questions along with follow-up questions from world experts in the neuroscience and philosophy of free will. These varied perspectives will fascinate, illuminate, and stimulate students from both fields along with anyone who wants to be brought up to date on these profound issues. (shrink)

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In (...) this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. (shrink)

Assuming the existence of a supercompact cardinal and a weakly compact cardinal above it, we provide a generic extension where there are no Aronszajn trees of height ω 2 or ω 3 . On the other hand we show that some large cardinal assumptions are necessary for such a consistency result.

This paper presents a reading of Bacon’s Novum Organum and the inductive method he offers therein. According to this reading, Bacon’s induction is the search for forms that are necessary and sufficient for making simple natures present. Simple natures are observable qualities. However, in the paper we argue that forms can best be understood via Bacon’s appetitive physics, according to which particles and bodies are endowed with appetites or inclinations that lead to bodily transformations. We argue that this conceptual elaboration (...) of the notion of form changes our understanding of Bacon’s inductive method. In fact, his inductive method is a reductive program designed to find, for each observable quality (or simple nature), the transformation or combination of transformations associated with its coming to being. The paper considers the textual evidence for this reading and argues for the benefits of this reading in relation to other, traditional interpretations. (shrink)

We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that (...) have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts. (shrink)

If one answers the question ‘What is G-ness?’ with a biconditional of the form ‘x is G iff x is F,’ one can ask whether x is G because it is F, or whether x is F because it is G. This question, known as The Euthyphro Question, invites one to choose between one of two options which are presented as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive: either x is G because it is F, or x is F because it is (...) G but not both. Each answer has its attractions and difficulties. The _Euthyphro Problem_ is the problem of choosing one rather than the other. This paper argues that holism in the theory of reasons — a view developed by Jonathan Dancy in a different context and for a different purpose — provides a novel and elegant solution to this age-old problem. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are (...) careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism. (shrink)

A forcing poset of size 221 which adds no new reals is described and shown to provide a Δ22 definable well-order of the reals . The encoding of this well-order is obtained by playing with products of Aronszajn trees: some products are special while other are Suslin trees. The paper also deals with the Magidor–Malitz logic: it is consistent that this logic is highly noncompact.

How far should our realism extend? For many years philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of ethics have worked independently to address the question of how best to understand the entities apparently referred to by mathematical and ethical talk. But the similarities between their endeavours are not often emphasised. This book provides that emphasis. In particular, it focuses on two types of argumentative strategies that have been deployed in both areas. The first—debunking arguments—aims to put pressure on realism by emphasising the (...) seeming redundancy of mathematical or moral entities when it comes to explaining our judgements. In the moral realm this challenge has been made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street; in the mathematical realm it is known as the 'Benacerraf-Field' problem. The second strategy—indispensability arguments—aims to provide support for realism by emphasising the seeming intellectual indispensability of mathematical or moral entities, for example when constructing good explanatory theories. This strategy is associated with Quine and Putnam in mathematics and with Nicholas Sturgeon and David Enoch in ethics. Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics addresses these issues through an explicitly comparative methodology which we call the 'companions in illumination' approach. By considering how argumentative strategies in the philosophy of mathematics might apply to the philosophy of ethics, and vice versa, the papers collected here break new ground in both areas. For good measure, two further companions for illumination are also broached: the philosophy of chance and the philosophy of religion. Collectively, these comparisons light up new questions, arguments, and problems of interest to scholars interested in realism in any area. (shrink)

This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume’s argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper’s second aim is (...) to show that Newtonian induction escapes Hume’s secret powers argument, given that it includes a transductive inference, from observable phenomena to the powers present in the ultimate parts of matter. Consequently Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction does not demonstrate the non-rational nature of Newtonian induction. (shrink)

We examine the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ of equivalence relations on $\omega $ under computable reducibility. We examine when pairs of degrees have a least upper bound. In particular, we show that sufficiently incomparable pairs of degrees do not have a least upper bound but that some incomparable degrees do, and we characterize the degrees which have a least upper bound with every finite equivalence relation. We show that the natural classes of finite, light, and dark degrees are (...) definable in $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$. We show that every equivalence relation has continuum many self-full strong minimal covers, and that $\mathbf {d}\oplus \mathbf {\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {Id}}}_1}$ needn’t be a strong minimal cover of a self-full degree $\mathbf {d}$. Finally, we show that the theory of the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ as well as the theories of the substructures of light degrees and of dark degrees are each computably isomorphic with second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each (...) of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this essay I offer a new particularist reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that the interpretation I present not only helps us to resolve some puzzles about Aristotle’s goals and methods, but it also gives rise to a novel account of morality—an account that is both interesting and plausible in its own right. The goal of this paper is, in part, exegetical—that is, to figure out how to best understand the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. But this paper (...) also aims to contribute to the current exciting and controversial debate over particularism. By taking the first steps towards a comprehensive particularist reading of Aristotle’s Ethics I hope to demonstrate that some of the mistrust of particularism is misplaces and that what is, perhaps, the most influential moral theory in the history of philosophy is, arguably, a particularist moral theory. (shrink)

A methodological problem may distort the implications derived from the metabolism scans of the brain, but Posner & Raichle may have found neural networks which underlie the analytical and synthetical hemispheric data processing mechanism. This methodological problem is that a large regional consumption of energy, detected by the PET technique, is not necessarily related to more data processing. It may be related to the inefficiency of the neural system at this region.

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 8 Heft: 2 Seiten: 210-226.