The scale and variety of acts of religious intolerance evident in so many countries today are of enormous contemporary concern. This 2005 study attempts a thorough and systematic treatment of both Universal and European practice. The standards applicable to freedom of religion are subjected to a detailed critique, and their development and implementation within the UN is distinguished from that within Strasbourg, in order to discern trends and obstacles to their advancement and to highlight the rationale for any apparent departures (...) between the two systems. This dual focus also demonstrates the acute need for the European Court to heed the warnings from various patterns of violation throughout the world illustrated by the Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. (shrink)

Plato uses the myth of Er in the Republic in order to carve out space for political freedom and responsibility for human freedom in the ordinary polis. While much of the Republic concentrates on the development of an ideal city in speech, that city is fundamentally a mythos presented in order for Socrates and his friends to learn something about political and individual virtue. The city in which Socrates and his friends exist is an imperfect city and myth of Er (...) is intended for those audience members. Its emphasis on the necessity for personal responsibility in the midst of freedom can be understood as a political claim about the place of individual choice in a world that is constrained by both political and cosmic "necessity". Platón utiliza el mito de Er en la República con el fin de abrir un espacio para la libertad y la responsabilidad políticas en la polis común y corriente. Mientras que gran parte de la República se centra en el desarrollo de una ciudad ideal en el discurso, esa ciudad es fundamentalmente un mythos presentado para que Sócrates y sus amigos aprendan algo acerca de la virtud política e individual. La ciudad en la que viven Sócrates y sus amigos es una ciudad imperfecta y el mito de Er está dirigido a esos miembros del público. El énfasis que hace el mito en la necesidad de la responsabilidad personal en el ámbito de la libertad puede entenderse como una afirmación política acerca del lugar de la elección individual en un mundo constreñido tanto por la "necesidad" política como la cósmica. (shrink)

This article analyses the relationship between power and freedom. In the first part, two ideal types of freedom are distinguished: natural freedom and social freedom. These forms of freedom are theorized as in tension relative to levels of social integration, mutual dependence and power-to. Social freedom consists in the duality of structure, where constraints limit natural freedom, but simultaneously enables power-to. In the second half, the four dimensions of power are analysed, relative to these two forms of freedom. The first (...) dimension concerns decisional freedom; the second structural bias which actors are aware of; the third concerns epistemic reasons for accepting a disadvantageous trade-off of natural to social freedom; and in the fourth dimension, relations of un-freedom and freedom are explained relative to the construction of social ontology. The article argues that in complex modern society social freedom requires restraint upon natural freedom. (shrink)

Recognition and freedom function not only most prominently as a key concept in current social and political theory, notably in critical theory and in (post‐)structuralist debates as well as in pragmatic‐skeptical conceptions, but the concept also receives considerable treatment within the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition. Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, and Jean‐Paul Sartre have elaborated the concept of recognition in a significant way. However, there are seminal indications for a nuanced understanding of the intrinsic relation of recognition and (un)freedom in the (...) thinking of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, and Martin Heidegger. A positive understanding of recognition takes its departure from the assumption that the subject can only achieve a practical self‐relation if she experiences affirmation and acceptance from Others. The negative understanding starts with the observation that existing orders of recognition force the subject to adopt given identity attributions in conformity with the system and with an effective apparatus of power. (shrink)

I illustrate a formal similarity between the autonomy-heteronomy relation in Kant and the authenticity-inauthenticity relation in Heidegger, which then serves as an introduction to the affinity as well as the differences between Kant’s philosophy of self-consciousness and Heidegger’s investigation of the meaning of being. I sketch this in a two-fold manner: (1) for Kant and Heidegger, freedom is a form of energeia—a self-sustaining and (in some sense) complete or perfected activity. For each it may also be seen as constitutive of (...) our lived experience of time (or temporality, Zeitlichkeit) as the limit within which our everyday being occurs, allowing for fallenness or un-ownedness to manifest inside time; and (2) for both, the possibility of un-ownedness is to be understood through a form of self-deception. We will see that these two basic points are inextricably linked: freedom or spontaneity as a self-sustaining activity underlying philosophy as a whole, and which constitutes the possibility of activity in time, is the condition of the possibility and actuality of the phenomenon of losing one’s self-ownership to oneself within time. The inextricable link can be seen in the way that all activity which is properly described as taking place inside time always already presupposes a relation to the energeia constituting the whole of time. This distinction between being in time and being constitutive of time is registered in what I call the temporal difference. However, the striking disagreement between Kant and Heidegger may also be understood from this same vantage point. I suggest that this difference lies in the way that Kant conceives of the temporal difference, specifically by emphasizing the independence of self-consciousness from time. (shrink)

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is widely considered to be the most influential statement on religious freedom in human history. Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a groundbreaking account of its origins and developments, examining the background, key players, and outcomes of Article 18, and setting it within the broader discourse around international religious freedom in the 1940s. Taking issue with standard accounts that see the text of the Universal Declaration as humanity's (...) joint response to the atrocities of World War II, it shows instead how central features of Article 18 were intimately connected to the political projects and visions of particular actors involved in the start-up of the UN Human Rights program. This will be essential reading for anyone grappling with the historical and contemporary meaning of human rights and religious freedom. (shrink)

The idea of a ‘tobacco-free generation’ promises to make smoking a thing of the past by making cigarettes unavailable to birth cohorts in the future. If implemented, such a generational ban would lead to a society in which some individuals are allowed the freedom to smoke while others are not. This paper examines the ethical significance of this fact through the lens of ‘relational egalitarianism’, an approach to social justice that emphasises equal and respectful social relationships. It explores various dimensions (...) in which a society can fail to live up to the idea of equal status, such as the denial of moral agency, discrimination, stigmatisation, the unequal recognition of interests and violations of political equality. While acknowledging the complexity of practical and ethical challenges, the paper maintains that the generational ban need not violate egalitarian commitments. (shrink)

El siguiente texto es un fragmento del capítulo 4 del libro, en prensa, "Philosophical Diseases of Medicine and Their Cure" . Este pasaje seleccionado aborda la distinción analógica de los distintos tipos de fines y bienes que intervienen en el acto libre y que están íntimamente relacionados con el actuar médico.

RESUMEN La importancia de Rousseau para el surgimiento del idealismo poskantiano ha sido poco investigada. Oculta en gran medida por la recepción kantiana, la obra del pensador ginebrino parece tener tan solo una importancia accesoria. A partir del análisis interpretativo de las fuentes y su comparación con las principales doctrinas de Rousseau, nuestro trabajo busca mostrar, valiéndonos de las obras de Hölderlin y Hegel de la época de Tubinga y de los años inmediatamente posteriores (1791-1795), que la influencia del pensador (...) ginebrino posee una importancia decisiva para concebir el programa artístico y religioso de los autores estudiados. El análisis nos permitirá comprender que el mencionado autor no representa la figura de un filósofo, menos la de un ilustrado, sino más bien la de un sabio, el portador de una doctrina práctica cuyo principio fundamental se encuentra en la suprema dignidad del hombre y en la idea de libertad entendida como autonomía. ABSTRACT Rousseau's importance for the postkantian idealism has been poorly researched. Hidden by the Kantian interpretation, the work of the Geneva thinker seems to have no relevant influence. Departing from an interpretative analysis of the literary sources and a comparison with the main doctrines, our paper aims to show, using Hölderlin and Hegel's Tubingen and the immediately subsequent works (1791-1795), that Rousseau's influence has a decisive importance to understand the artistic and religious program of our authors. This analysis will allow us to understand that Rousseau is not a philosopher, nor an enlightenment figure, but rather a wise man, the bringer of a practical doctrine whose main principle consisted in supreme human dignity and the idea of freedom interpreted as autonomy. (shrink)

L’admiration de Paul Ricoeur pour Merleau-Ponty est connue, lui qui entendait donner à la Phénoménologie de la perception sa « contrepartie pratique » avec le premier tome de la Philosophie de la volonté, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire. Il faut d’emblée s’étonner que celui-ci n’ait pas reconnu la teneur pratique de la philosophie de son aîné, dont les diverses analyses au Collège de France, et en particulier l’intérêt marqué de Merleau-Ponty pour la pensée marxiste comme philosophie de l’homme charnel, et le (...) motif naturaliste de l’être agissant et souffrant à partir de 1956, font état. Car c’est bien depuis ce motif que Ricoeur, en 2004, expose le parcours de la reconnaissance : de l’homme agissant et souffrant, à l’homme capable. L’enjeu, nous semble-t-il alors, de ces deux philosophies en leur dimension pratique se résume aisément par les exigences formulées par Paul Ricoeur dans l’ouvrage Soi-même comme un autre, en particulier lorsque celui-ci se donne pour but de « déterminer les traits nouveaux de l’ipséité correspondant à la pratique politique » – détermination du Soi agent qui se dessine, au dire même de l’auteur, à la croisée d’une phénoménologie de l’agir et d’une ontologie du Soi. En effet, comme le souligne Ricoeur, l’effacement paradoxal de la question de l’ipséité dans la philosophie morale kantienne, entre autres, s’explique par l’absence d’une telle théorie de l’action. En bref, le « Je veux » analysé en 1950 par Ricoeur s’ancre dans un « Je peux », qui ne se limite jamais au seul plan spatial chez Merleau-Ponty. Ainsi, à la figure phénoménologique de nos expériences de la passivité correspond la catégorie ontologique de l’altérité, mentionnée par l’expression du Visible et de l’invisible reprise en titre de cet article et dont l’attribution à Ricoeur ne choquerait pas.Paul Ricoeur’s admiration for Merleau-Ponty is well-known given that he presented his “practical counterpart” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the form of his Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. One is immediately surprised that this is not recognized as the practical content of his predecessor’s philosophy given the diverse analyses at the Collège de France of which, in particular, the marked interest Merleau-Ponty had in Marxist thought as the philosophy of the fleshly human being, as well as the naturalist motif of the active and suffering being beginning in 1956, are part. For, it is due to this motif that Ricoeur, in 2004, presents the trajectory of recognition: from the active and suffering human being to the capable human being. As we see them, the stakes in these two philosophies, as far as their practical dimensions are concerned, are easily summarized by the requirements Paul Ricoeur formulated in his work, Oneself as Another. This is particularly the case given that this text has for its aim, “determining the new traits of individual identity which correspond to practical politics” – the determination of Self as a self-designing agent, which, according to the author, lies at the intersection of a phenomenology of action and an ontology of the Self. In fact, as Ricoeur himself underlines, the paradoxical effacement of the question of ipseity in Kantian moral philosophy, among others, is explained by the absence of just such a theory of action. Briefly, the “I want” analysis by Ricoeur in 1950 is anchored in the “I can,” which is never limited to the single spatial outline we find in Merleau-Ponty. Thus, to the phenomenological figure of our experiences of passivity correspond the ontological category of alterity, as mentioned in the phrase from The Visible and the Invisible taken up in the title of this article and which it would not be shocking to attribute to Ricoeur.È ben nota l’ammirazione di Paul Ricoeur per Merleau-Ponty: col primo tomo della Philosophie de la volonté, intitolato Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Paul Ricoeur intendeva offrire alla Fenomenologia della percezione una vera e propria “contropartita pratica”. Ma è singolare il fatto che Ricoeur non abbia riconosciuto il risvolto pratico presente nella filosofia del suo predecessore, risvolto ampiamente attestato nei corsi merleau-pontyani al Collège de France e in particolare nelle lezioni che pongono al centro delle loro analisi il pensiero marxista come filosofia dell’uomo carnale e il motivo naturalistico dell’uomo agente e dell’uomo sofferente almeno a partire dal 1956. È proprio prendendo le mosse da questo motivo che Ricoeur nel 2004 espone quanto definisce come il percorso del riconoscimento: dall’uomo agente e dall’uomo sofferente all’uomo “capace”. La posta in gioco, ci sembra, di queste due filosofie, considerate nella loro dimensione pratica, si riassume facilmente nelle esigenze che Ricoeur formula nel suo libro Sé come un altro, in particolare quando si assegna il compito di “determinare i tratti peculiari dell’ipseità corrispondente alla pratica politica” – cioè di determinare i tratti di quel Sé agente che si delinea, a dire dell’autore stesso, al crocevia tra una fenomenologia dell’agire e un’ontologia del Sé. In effetti, come sottolinea Ricoeur, la paradossale cancellazione dell’ipseità operata dalla filosofia morale kantiana si spiega tra l’altro con l’assenza di una adeguata teoria dell’azione. In breve, l’“Io voglio” analizzato da Ricoeur nel 1950 si àncora in un “Io posso” che non si limita mai, in Merleau-Ponty, al solo piano spaziale. Così, alla figura fenomenologica delle nostre esperienze di passività, corrisponde la categoria ontologica dell’alterità, che proprio Il visibile e l’invisibile menziona con l’espressione che noi riprendiamo nel titolo di questo articolo e che ci si aspetterebbe essere anzitutto ricoeuriana. (shrink)

La philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre dans L'être et le néant et Critique de la raison dialectique garde toujours sa validité comme élucidation de notre liberté située. Néanmoins, il faut la critiquer – au double sens de limiter et corriger – sur deux thèmes : 1) l'interprétation sartrienne de la matière et de la science de la physique ressemble à celle des positivistes logiques , dont on sait la faiblesse ; 2) les relations sociales analysées par Sartre non seulement avec profondeur, (...) mais aussi avec brillance, mettent à coté ou ignorent une socialité plus fondamentale et anonyme, dont il faut aussi rendre compte. Les contributions néo-kantiennes de l'École de Marbourg, en particulier celles de Ernst Cassirer, peuvent suppléer ou rectifier la philosophie sartrienne, en en faisant un situationnisme critique. (shrink)

In Axel Honneths Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien- und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer „besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit“ (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die „Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen“ innerhalb unzähliger „Vorstellung[en] vom Guten“ als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als (...) „Facette[n] der konstitutive[n] Idee der individuellen Autonomie“ (RF 35) verstanden werden müssen. -/- 454 -/- Wir argumentieren, dass Honneths Erörterung des Werts von Freundschaft in dreierlei Hinsicht sein Ziel verfehlt: Erstens zwingt sie Honneth zu einer radikalen Beschneidung des Freundschaftsbegriffs, indem er einen überzogenen Kontrast zwischen antiken und modernen Konzeptionen von Freundschaft zeichnet. Zweitens marginalisiert Honneth mit seiner Betrachtung andere Axiologien der Freundschaft, welche dieser gewichtige instrumentelle, konstitutive und finale Werte zuweisen. Drittens scheint selbst eine schwächer angelegte These, die den Wert, den Freundschaften für die individuelle Freiheit haben, auf die Stellung eines primus inter pares zurückstuft, immer noch den zentralen Wert, den Freundschaften für uns haben sollten, zu verfehlen. Dadurch wird Honneths Kernthese von der Exklusivität des Wertes der Freiheit für unsere Gesellschaft in Frage gestellt. (shrink)

Under this name, on November 19-20, 1998, an international scientific and practical conference devoted to the 50th anniversary of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights took place in Kyiv. The organizers of the conference are the International Academy of Religious Freedom, the International Commission on the Freedom of Conscience, the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies, the State Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs, the Department of Religious Studies at the Institute of Philosophy named after. G.S. Skovoroda, National Academy of (...) Sciences of Ukraine. (shrink)

Habermas claims that although modern thought “treats revelation and religion as something alien and extraneous,” religion is still present in today’s world. The memorable events of 9/11 confirmed that modernist secular society is not the end of history, and that the theme of religions and civilizations, and of potential conflicts between them, is still alive. There is now a growing conflict between fundamentalist religion and the secular state. While challenging Habermas' view on religion, I claim that in just one generation (...) the inhabitants of the West—who made their own deconstruction by becoming a people without God, without virtue, without manners, and often without families and without children—are at risk of losing their current leading economic, political, and cultural role in the world. They have created a void that is now to be filled by other, non-Western civilizations. The greatest loss of modern humanity, however, in both the West and the East, is the loss of the human soul. By forsaking God and virtue, and the awareness of the proper order of things, human beings lose themselves in superficial desires. They are not even aware of what has been lost. The solution is obviously not the politicized and often violent religiosity of fundamentalism. That only contributes further to human degradation. To save themselves, modern individuals must learn to know themselves again. By deep philosophical reflection and authentic religion, they must fill up the void that created postreligious and postmetaphysical thought. They must in the end rediscover their deeper selves. One cannot live by power or desire alone. Human beings are not one-dimensional, as Hobbes and his followers tried to make us believe, but in fact have many dimensions and many needs. The classical tradition reveals some of those. It speaks to us of community and friendship, virtue and corruption, self-interest and self-control, justice and order, freedom and law, happiness and sorrow, the purposes of life and the dangers of war. It is only through action that can be defined as a return to origins, namely, by creatively repeating and recalling the sources of Western civilization—the ideas contained in the classical tradition—that the declining civilization can be rebuilt. (shrink)

U ovome radu istražujem Polanyijeve glavne argumente za akademsku slobodu. Akademska i politička sloboda međusobno su blisko povezane: ako država preuzme kontrolu nad znanošću, to dovodi do kolapsa same slobode u cijelome društvu. Njegovi argumenti protiv totalitarizma oslanjaju se na njegovu anti-pozitivističku filozofiju znanosti. On definira totalitarizam kao poricanje akademske slobode koje se temelji na pragmatičkom poimanju znanosti i instrumentalističkim interpretacijama moralnih vrijednosti. Polanyijeva ideja znanosti je duhovni, idealistički opis zajednice slobodnih intelektualaca koji su strastveno posvećeni potrazi za istinom i (...) imaju autonomnu zajednicu s vlastitim pravilima i autonomnim upravljanjem. Potraga za istinom radi nje same je bitan cilj znanosti, koji se može postići jedino ako znanost ostane slobodna od političkih, ideoloških i ekonomskih utejcaja. Tvrdim da Polanyijevi uvidi mogu biti relevantni i danas, kada znanost može postati instrument profitno orijentiranih praktičnih potreba umjesto potrage za istinom samom i kada se humanistika često smatra nepotrebnom.In the present essay I investigate Polanyi’s main arguments for academic freedom. Academic and political freedom are closely related to each other: if state takes control over science, it will lead to the collapse of freedom itself in the whole society. His arguments against totalitarianism rely on his anti-positivist philosophy of science. He diagnoses totalitarianism as a denial of academic freedom which is based on a pragmatist view of science and instrumentalist interpretation of moral values. Polanyi’s idea of science is a spiritual, idealistic description of a community of free intellectuals who are passionately committed to seeking the truth and have an autonomous community with its own rules and autonomous direction. Seeking the truth for its own sake is the essential goal of science, which can be accomplished only if it remains free from political, ideological and economical influences. I will argue that Polanyi’s insights can still be relevant today, when science can become an instrument of profit-oriented practical needs instead of seeking the truth itself, and the humanities are often considered unnecessary.Dans cet essai, j’examine les principaux arguments de Polany pour la liberté académique. La liberté académique et politique sont étroitement liées : si l’Etat prend le contrôle de la science, cela conduira à l’effondrement de la liberté elle-même dans toute la société. Ses arguments contre le totalitarisme reposent sur sa philosophie anti-positiviste de la science. Il diagnostique le totalitarisme comme un refus de la liberté académique fondé sur une conception pragmatique de la science et une interprétation instrumentaliste des valeurs morales. L’idée de la science de Polany est une description spirituelle, idéaliste, d’une communauté d’intellectuels libres, passionnément dédiés à la recherche de la vérité, et qui ont une communauté avec ses propres règles et une direction autonome. La recherche de la vérité pour elle-même est l’objectif essentiel de la science, ce qui peut être accompli uniquement si elle demeure libre des influences politiques, idéologiques et économiques. J’affirme que les visions de Polany peuvent toujours être pertinentes aujourd’hui, alors que la science peut devenir un instrument des besoins pratiques orientés vers le profit au lieu de chercher la vérité elle-même, et alors que les sciences humaines sont souvent considérées comme inutiles.Im präsenten Artikel gehe ich Polanyis Hauptargumentation für akademische Freiheit auf den Grund. Die akademische und politische Freiheit sind miteinander nahe verwandt: Unterzieht der Staat die Wissenschaft seiner Kontrolle, endet dies im Kollaps der Freiheit selbst in der gesamten Gesellschaft. Polanyis Begründung gegen den Totalitarismus stützt sich auf dessen antipositivistische Philosophie der Wissenschaft. Er diagnostiziert den Totalitarismus als Versagung der akademischen Freiheit, die auf dem pragmatischen Blickpunkt der Wissenschaft als auch der instrumentalistischen Interpretation der Moralwerte basiert. Polanyis Wissenschaftsvorstellung ist eine spirituelle, idealistische Schilderung einer Gemeinschaft freier Intellektueller, die sich der Suche nach Wahrheit glutvoll gewogen zeigt und über eine autonome Community mit eigenen Regeln sowie autonomer Verwaltung verfügt. Die Erkundung der Wahrheit um ihrer selbst willen repräsentiert das essenzielle Vorhaben der Wissenschaft, welches sich allein unter Bewahrung ihrer Independenz von politischen, ideologischen bzw. wirtschaftlichen Einflüssen zuwege bringen lässt. Ich halte dafür, Polanyis Einblicke hätten auch heutzutage Relevanzpotenzial, zu der Zeit, wenn sich die Wissenschaft auf ein Werkzeug des profitorientierten praktischen Begehrens reduzieren könnte, anstatt nach der Wahrheit selbst zu fahnden, und die Geisteswissenschaften gehäuft als entbehrlich abgestempelt werden. (shrink)

RésuméJe me penche sur un aspect de la philosophie sociale de Popper, à savoir les principes d'évaluation des interprétations historiques. Ma thèse globale est que suivant la perspective poppèrienne, notre choix parmi des interprétations historiques doit user d'au moins deux des critères qu'applique Popper au choix parmi diverses théories scientifiques : une interprétation devrait logiquement se prêter à une réfutation et elle devrait être consistante. Afin de montrer la pertinence et la fécondité de cette approche, je me concentre sur l'interprétation (...) historique des causes de la montée du nazisme que propose Erich Fromm, en particulier dansEscape from Freedom.Je montrerai que l'application de notions psychanalytiques dans le cadre de son interprétation historique a une valeur explicative faible, voire nulle. Son échec à expliquer certaines questions sociales tient à plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, l'auteur ne fournit pas, quoi qu'il en dise, d'explication causale convaincante. Ensuite, les concepts et les multiples hypotheèsesad hocauxquels il a recours tendent è rendre son interprétation irréfutable. Enfin, Fromm s'appuie sur des assomptions théoriques contradictoires. Mon analyse est basée sur la notion fondamentale de Popper voulant que la connaissance scientifique empirique exige au strict minimum une ouverture des interprétations historiques à la critique intersubjective. C'est cette exigence qui permet de les critiquer — c'est-à-dire les accepter, les réfuter et les corriger — sur une base rationnelle. (shrink)

J'entreprends de défendre la conception leibnizienne de la liberté de la volonté selon laquelle on peut être libre sans que l'on n'ait le pouvoir causal de choisir autrement que l'on ne fait. La liberté d'indifférence en revanche est irrecevable et sort d'une analyse erronée de ce que c'est un pouvoir de décider hic et nunc. Un tel pouvoir est indiscernable d'avec la décision même. Par conséquent un recours à la liberté d'indifférence préconisé entre autres par Duns Scotus est à la (...) fois superflu et aporétique. (shrink)

Presenta este trabajo un análisis del proceso de creación y de aplicación de la Ley de Libertad Religiosa de 1967 y de la limitación de sus resultados. Se destaca su importancia por ser el primer marco legal para las Confesiones no Católicas, promovido por el Gobierno español después del Concilio Vaticano II.

Locke and Leibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with determinism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how one is determined. However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the definitions and examples for freedom and necessity that Locke and (...) Leibniz present in sections 8-13 of chapter 21 of the Essay on Human Understanding and the Nouveaux essais respectively, and then conjecture how Locke and Leibniz would have continued the discussion, if they had had the opportunity to engage in an exchange of opinions. In this way, we believe, one will be in a position to understand why Leibniz thinks that Locke’s discussion of freedom “est un des plus prolixes et des plus subtils de son ouvrage.”. (shrink)

Quelle est la nature de la liberté réelle (réelle) dans notre société? Je présenterai ici une nouvelle théorie du libéralisme que j’appelle « libéralisme orienté vers la croissance ». D’abord, j’examine le concept de liberté positive et négative d’Isaiah Berlin et je pose la question fondamentale en matière de liberté, à savoir que la liberté est un idéal paradoxal. J’identifierai deux paradoxes : l’un porte sur la liberté ordinaire et les valeurs sophistiquées, l’autre sur la question de la libération et (...) de l’apathie des individus ou des populations. Comment pouvons-nous surmonter ces paradoxes? Pour répondre à cette question, j’examinerai l’argument de Charles Taylor sur la liberté positive (liberté) et en élargirai les implications. Le paradoxe est d’autant plus lorsqu’il s’agit de communautés, comme la société japonaise. Au-delà du mode de pensée communautaire de Taylor, par exemple, je construis une nouvelle théorie de la liberté en proposant de suivre trois principes : le principe de la vertu (estime de soi), le principe du changement générateur et le principe de la différenciation. Je soutiens que la pierre de touche d’une société libre dépend de la façon dont nous concevons notre gouvernance sociale sur la base de ces principes. JEL Codes : Z10, B25. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain (...) in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does. The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been . Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future. (shrink)

In questo dialogo radiofonico del 1964 Bloch e Adorno discutono della nostalgia per ciò che non è ancora, per un qualcosa che manca, come af¬fermato nel Mahagonny di Bertolt Brecht. L’utopia, in Moro e Campa¬nella, era l’isola in cui vigeva uno stato di cose giusto, la optima res pu¬blica. L’utopia è quindi ricerca di realizzazione, di libertà, di giustizia. Nonostante oggi la parola ‘utopia’ sia caduta in discredito a causa del com¬piersi di un gran numero di cosiddetti sogni utopici, tutti (...) gli uomini si ren¬dono conto che qualcosa di meglio è davvero possibile. Bloch sostiene che l’utopia è una parte ineliminabile del pensiero, mentre Adorno argomenta che l’idea di utopia coincide con la trasformazione della totalità, con la ca¬pacità, da riconquistare, di immaginare la totalità come qualcosa che po¬trebbe essere completamente differente.In this 1964 radio talk, Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno debate about the desire for something that is not, for «Something’s missing», as stated by Bertolt Brecht’s Mahagonny. Utopia, by Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella, was the island of good social order, optima res publica: uto¬pia is then search for happiness, for freedom, for justice. Though nowa¬days ‘utopia’ has become discredited by the fulfilling of a large number of so-called utopian dreams, all men know that something better is really pos¬sible. Bloch argues that utopian thinking is a fundamental part of thought itself, while Adorno states that the idea of utopia coincide with the trans¬formation of totality: men must reconquest the capability to imagine the totality as something that could be completely different. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom by Eric S. NelsonJean-Yves Heurtebise (bio)Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom. Eric S. Nelson. London: Bloomsbury, 2024. Pp. viii + 256. Paper $103.50, ISBN 978-1-350411-90-6.On the Way: from Heidegger to Nagarjuna via Lao-ZhuangAfter having reviewed Eric S. Nelson’s 2017 Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought (for the Journal of Chinese Philosophy) and his 2020 Daoism and Environmental Philosophy (for (...) Monde Chinois Nouvelle Asie), reviewing now, for Philosophy East & West, Nelson’s 2024 Heidegger and Dao: Things, Nothingness, Freedom, which develops on the insights of his two previous opuses, is both a real pleasure and a true challenge. It’s a pleasure to read again Eric S. Nelson’s scholarly prose with its own specific conceptual style and distinctive philosophical rhythm. It’s a challenge to give a meaningful and fair overview of a conceptually complex, scholarly rich, and thought-provoking book.No one can speak better about the aim and goals of Nelson’s book than the author himself--following the wayist way of spontaneous ziranity, we will thus let the book speak for itself:Its primary thesis is that, entangled with Daoist and other intercultural sources, Heidegger’s path proceeds from the paradigmatic Occidental philosophy of available givenness and mere presence--which conceals the open spacing of things and seeks to logically exclude and dialectically subordinate negativity and the nothing--to nothingness, emptiness, and the clearing in their coming to presence and withdrawal in absence or, to accentuate its mutable verbal sense, presencing-absencing. […] Zhuangzi’s vision of free and easy wandering indicates ways of practicing philosophy as contesting and unraveling fixations. These practices allow rethinking Heidegger’s pathways and reimagining for ourselves things, nothingness, and world in the specificity of our existential condition.(p. 10)These lines can give already a good indication about what the reader will be provided with: a Heideggerian reading of Daoism nurturing and enriching a Daoist reading of Heidegger; a Daoist reinterpretation of the late Heidegger feeding and complexifying a Heideggerian Pre-Socratic reinterpretation of early Daoism; a continuous feedback loop leading to a process of mutual symbiosis and multiple conceptually creative hybridizations. Ziran and Dao are used to unlock the concealed potentialities of overdetermined Western concepts such as Nature and Ethos while the Heideggerian deconstruction of “Western metaphysics” is [End Page 1] used to de-Eurocentricize our understanding of Daoist and Buddhist thoughts about Thing and Nothingness.The book is divided in two parts: the first part deals with the concept of Thing, the second with the concept of Nothingness. Thing and Nothingness seem to be the perfect antithesis but the magic of Nelson’s reading of their tri-cultural Daoist, Buddhist and Heideggerian conceptualization is to dissipate the classical, ontological antinomy between Being and Non-Being to explore what’s both beyond and below: the natural source of life emergence, coming and returning to a Nothing that is Everything via a Thing that is never Anything (a ready-made and exchangeable object in the universal trading scheme of capitalist general equivalence) but always Something (this and that in particular, in their own specific rhythm of coming back and forth, from and to their source of un-nothingity).The first five chapters evoke the issue of the encounter of Heidegger and Daoist thinking in relation to the deconstruction of Thingness. In the first chapter, Nelson proposes a cross-cultural perspective about the Nature of the Thing linking Heidegger’s critique of the reduction of Things’ Presence to Functional Tools to the Daoist extended conception of Things in terms of Multitude (wanwu 萬物), in which objects, living beings, and spirits participate in the fabric of reality. Chapter 2 examines the connection between Heidegger’s and Daoism’s understanding of “nature” as manifesting a distinct yet similar attention to things’ autopoiesis: following the natural disclosing and unfolding of “things” entails a specific way to think and be in the world. In chapter 3, a comparison is established between Heidegger and Laozi with respect to the notion of void and emptiness: the fact that what powers the utility of a thing is what... (shrink)

L'offre de services de géolocalisation via un téléphone mobile implique de connaître la localisation et l'identifiant du téléphone, donc de collecter des données relatives à un utilisateur identifié ou identifiable. À ce titre, la loi Informatique et Libertés exige que l'utilisateur consente en toute transparence à bénéficier d'un service géolocalisant et que ses données de localisation soient détruites ou anonymisées une fois la prestation fournie. Si, dans certains cas, l'utilisateur aspire à être localisé, dans d'autres cas, la personne concernée ignore (...) que sa position géographique est connue de tiers. Cette traçabilité subie laisse entrevoir de redoutables perspectives de contrôle ou d'abus tant de la part des services répressifs que des entreprises. L'enjeu ne porte pas uniquement sur les risques d'atteinte à la liberté d'aller et venir, et au respect de la vie privée. De façon plus pernicieuse, l'autonomie informationnelle et décisionnelle du citoyen peut être remise en cause.Location Based Services are information services that can be accessed with mobile phones. They rely on the system s knowledge of the geographical position and the identifier of the phone being used, and therefore on collecting data on an identified or identifiable user. In this respect, the French data protection act stipulates that users agree to be supplied with an LBS service on a fully transparent basis and that their location data must be erased or made anonymous once the service has been provided. In some cases, locationbased services are provided on the user s own request, but in other cases, the individual concerned is unaware of the fact that third parties know where s/he is. This creates potentialfor surveillance and misuse on the part of both police and businesses. What is at stake here is not only the right of individuals to freedom of movement and to privacy but also, and more perniciously, citizens autonomy with regard to information and decision-making. (shrink)

Cet article, qui s’appuie sur les récits de vie de trois femmes arrivées à Berlin après avoir fui l’Afghanistan et la Syrie, conteste la validité des représentations des réfugiées comme des victimes de cultures patriarcales devant être sauvées et libérées. Il montre au contraire que ces femmes, luttaient déjà pour leur liberté dans leurs pays d’origine, et que l’expérience de l’exil a même été un moment d’empowerment pour certaines d’entre elles. À l’inverse, la situation de réfugiée en Allemagne peut présenter (...) des situations de disempowerment pour ces femmes. (shrink)

Bastiat belonged to the optimist French tradition of liberal economic thought. Following Jean-Baptiste Say, he argued that the market was immensely creative in the discovery of new opportunities for improving human well-being and creating social harmony. He also recognized the importance of the entrepreneur, who earned a profit in contrast to the capitalist who simply earned a return for his investment. Although he was no great theorist, Bastiat demonstrated with relentless informal logic the social value of freedom. This is best (...) exemplified in his demonstration of the virtues of free trade. Bastiat anticipated modern public choice theory with his argument that people tried to use the coercive power of the state to get what they would not achieve by market transactions. He was also concerned with the moral virtue of liberty and in his final work, The Law, he showed how the modern system of law had been perverted. Instead of protecting individual rights it had become an instrument of plunder. Socialism was most malevolent form of plunder.Bastiat appartenait à la tradition optimiste française de la pensée économique libérale. Dans la lignée de Jean-Baptiste Say, il considérait que l’économie de marché recelait une créativité significative ouvrant sur la découverte de nouvelles opportunités permettant d’améliorer le bien-être humain et donnant parallèlement lieu a une harmonie sociale. Bastiat avait aussi conscience de l’importance de l’entrepreneur, celui qui glane des profits contrairement au capitaliste qui perçoit simplement une rémunération pour ses investissements. Bien que n’étant pas un très grand théoricien, Bastiat démontre avec une logique informelle implacable la valeur sociale de la liberté. La meilleure illustration en est sa démonstration des vertus du libre-échange. Bastiat anticipe la théorie moderne des décisions publiques quand il argumente que les individus essayent d’utiliser le pouvoir coercitif de l’Etat pour obtenir ce qu’ils ne peuvent obtenir à travers les transactions marchandes. Bastiat était aussi préoccupé par la vertu morale de la liberté et dans son dernier ouvrage, La Loi, il montre de quelle manière le système juridique moderne a été perverti. Au lieu de protéger les droits individuels, ce système est devenu un instrument de pillage public et le socialisme est la forme la plus pernicieuse de ce pillage. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 2 Seiten: 162-182.

RésuméDans cette introduction, je propose un survol de Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture d'Asha Bhandary, afin que les lecteurs puissent mieux situer les suggestions des contributeurs au symposium, Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg et Helga Varden. Bhandary développe et défend la théorie libérale de la prise en charge de la dépendance en réponse à l’échec des théories libérales passées à reconnaître que cette prise en charge de la dépendance, qui est essentielle à notre survie, relève de la justice. (...) En terminant, je tisse des liens avec la philosophie de Jean Hampton, afin de stimuler la discussion autour des travaux inédits de Bhandary, qui élargissent l'influence de la théorisation libérale féministe contemporaine. (shrink)

L'A. individua nell'opera di Enrico di Gand la fonte diretta della teoria del mutamento del XIV sec. Secondo questa teoria fisica i due termini contrari di un processo di mutamento , costituendo due segni di diversa natura, possono essere pensati entrambi come veri nell'istante temporale del mutamento, senza generare contraddizione. Sono studiati i passi in cui Enrico sarebbe giunto ad analoghe conlusioni. Nel Quodlibet XV, q. 13, affrontando la questione dell'Immacolata Concezione, Enrico avrebbe in un primo momento sostentuto la tesi (...) secondo la quale grazia e peccato, in quanto signa distinti, avrebbero potuto coesistere nell'istante temporale della concezione. Nei Quodlibeta X e XI Enrico fa un uso più deciso di tali argomentazioni, nel tentativo di conciliare due proposizioni apparentemente contraddittorie riguardanti alcune condizioni del rapporto tra intelletto e volontà nella scelta morale. (shrink)

Throughout Iran and various countries, the recent calls of the “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (in Persian), “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (in Kurdish), or “Woman, Life, Freedom” (in English) movement call for change to acknowledge the importance of women. While these feminist protests and demonstrations have been met with brutality, systematic oppression, and internet blackouts within Iran, they have captured significant social media attention and coverage outside the country, especially among the Iranian diaspora and various international organizations. This article, grounded in feminist urban (...) theories of the Global South, analyzes the digital feminist placemaking movement in Iran. As the first counter‐revolution led by women, the movement utilizes digital art, graffiti, and protest movements to embody women’s solidarity groups and sympathy rallies. Our analysis employs various digital research methods, including social media scrutiny and the study of protest illustrations. Analyzing the digital feminist placemaking in Iran will enable us to compare the commonalities, differences, challenges, and opportunities between the minorities and majorities in the world’s countries. The outcomes of this research can help international organizations such as Amnesty International and the United Nations Agency for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (UN Women), as well as policymakers, institutions, academics, and NGOs, to highlight the various ways in which broader public participation could be encouraged in the process of digital feminist insurgent placemaking. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza el reforzamiento de la libertad de expresión que se produce cuando ésta es ejercida en conexión con el derecho de defensa, y se centra en un concreto supuesto que ha sido recientemente examinado por el Tribunal Constitucional: el ejercicio del derecho de defensa en primera persona por un funcionario que es objeto de un expediente disciplinario. A la vez que estudiamos la solución dada por el TC al citado caso, reflexionamos sobre los efectos de la (...) misma más allá del caso específico que resuelve, planteando la posibilidad de su extrapolación a la generalidad de supuestos donde el ciudadano ejerce su derecho de defensa en primera persona y sin asistencia letrada. ABSTRACT: The present article analyzes the reinforcement of the freedom of expression that takes place when this one is exercised in connection by the right of defense, and centres on a concrete supposition that has been recently examined by the Constitutional Court: the exercise of the right of defense in the first person for a civil servant who is an object of a disciplinary process. Simultaneously that we study the solution given by the Constitutional Court to the mentioned case, we think about the effects of the same one beyond the specific case that resolves, raising the possibility of its extrapolation to the generality of suppositions where the citizen exercises his right of defense in the first person and without legal aid service.PALABRAS CLAVE: libertad de expresión, derecho de defensa, funcionario público, autotutela, expediente disciplinario.KEYWORDS: freedom of expression, right of defense, civil servant, autoguardianship, disciplinary process. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine la relation que Ronald Dworkin veut établir entre les idéaux libéraux d’égalité et de liberté dans le cadre de sa théorie dite de l’Égalité des ressources. Dworkin soutient que la spécification d’un système de libertés est essentielle à la définition même de l’égalité et que la théorie de l’Égalité des ressources unifie en profondeur ces deux idéaux par sa notion centrale de «vrais coûts de renonciation». Le présent article accepte avec Dworkin que la liberté et l’égalité (...) doivent être définies en interdépendance, mais nie que la théorie de l’Égalité des ressources y parvienne d’une manière cohérente. Cette théorie reste incomplète en tant que théorie de l’égalité et critiquable comme interprétation du libéralisme. Une autre voie serait de dériver le libéralisme d’un idéal libéral perfectionniste — celui de l’autonomie personnelle. On indique brièvement comment la chose pourrait être accomplie. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en dos cuestiones: por un lado, la presunción de libertad en el «período literario» (desde el s. VIII en adelante); y, por otro, la cuestión de la esclavización, venta o servidumbre ¿voluntaria o no¿ de personas libres en la «época preliteraria» (ss. VII y VIII). Asumiendo de partida la idea de que la práctica legal en la Antigüedad Tardía influyó en las discusiones de los primeros juristas musulmanes, trataré de reconstruir el discurso legal de los siglos (...) I/VII y II/VIII y de mostrar que ese discurso contenía interesantes opiniones legales en relación a la venta de niños, servidumbre por deudas y la situación legal de los huérfanos. En la literatura legal que emergió desde el s. II/VIII los juristas, al contrario de lo que se hubiese esperado, no trataron estas cuestiones intensamente. Tal y como se muestra, existe una cierta inconsistencia entre el discurso ameno y controvertido sobre el tema del «período preliterario», que se reconstruye en este artículo, y la marginalización del tema en la literatura legal posterior. (shrink)

RESUMEN: En el presente artículo se intentará demostrar que la libertad de conciencia y religiosa conforman un único derecho que tienen como fin proteger las creencias e ideologías de las personas, independientemente de su carácter religioso o secular. Por ende, se sostendrá que la fórmula adoptada por el sistema jurídico colombiano de promover el fenómeno religioso es contraria al principio de igualdad porque privilegia una visión del mundo teísta frente a otras visiones, también válidas en un Estado constitucional y pluralista (...) como el colombiano.ABSTRACT: In this article we will try to demonstrate that the freedom of conscience and religion constitute a single right that have as a purpose to protect the beliefs and ideologies of people, regardless of their religious or secular character. Therefore, it will be argued that the formula adopted by the Colombian legal system to promote the religious phenomenon is contrary to the principle of equality because it privileges a view of the theist world against other visions, also valid in a constitutional and pluralist state like Colombia.PALABRAS CLAVES: libertad de conciencia, libertad religiosa, estado laico, neutralidad religiosa, separación KEYWORDS: freedom of conscience, religious freedom, secular state, religious neutrality, separation. (shrink)

Lo Stato commerciale chiuso di J. G. Fichte fornisce un punto di vista sul rapporto tra economia e politica, agire interessato e agire etico, che consente di porre alcune distinzioni critiche all’interno della discussione attuale sulla ‘globalizzazione’. A partire dall’analisi della struttura stessa del sapere, emerge una nozione di libertà che vieta di intendere il problema nei termini di opposizione tra garanzia e controllo, libertà e limitazione. È proprio una tale idea che struttura gli ordinamenti politico-economici e giuridici e indica (...) le possibilità di ottenere l’equità economico-sociale e la pace internazionaleJ. G. Fichte's Closed Commercial State treats of the relation between economy and politics, and between self-interest and ethics, and thus may offer an important contribution to the current debate on globalisation. From Fichte's analysis of the structure of knowledge emerges a concept of freedom that disallows simple oppositions between guarantees and controls, or freedom and restriction. This analysis orders Fichte's account of political, legal and economic activity and evinces the possibility of social and economic justice, as well as international peace. (shrink)

Dans cet article, Tanabe reprend une question kantienne : quelle place la liberté, entendue comme « volonté auto-législatrice », peut-elle avoir dans un monde régi par les lois nécessaires de la causalité? Tanabe rappelle, avec Kant, que, comme noumène, ayant une cause spontanée, la liberté est « théoriquement possible », mais soutient que pour qu’elle soit concrètement réalisée, est nécessaire un dépassement de toutes les « limitations individuelles » à travers l’unification du sujet moral agissant avec la « valeur absolue (...) » qu’est. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar el debate filosófico entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en el periodo de entreguerras, a partir de su modo disímil de comprender la libertad del hombre como proceso de autoconfiguración del sujeto o Dasein. En primer lugar, se examinará la reinterpretación global de la filosofía kantiana por parte de ambos pensadores a la luz de sus proyectos filosóficos: en el caso de Cassirer, la filosofía de las formas simbólicas, en el de Heidegger, la (...) hermenéutica de la facticidad. En segundo lugar, se analizarán sus interpretaciones sobre el pensamiento estético de Friedrich Schiller, en el marco de sus reflexiones sobre la función del arte para la comprensión de la Selbstbildung. Ello permitirá iluminar un nuevo aspecto de esta disputa, así como determinar la distancia entre sus dos orientaciones filosóficas y políticas.This paper aims to analyze the philosophical debate between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger in the interwar period, starting from their dissimilar way of understanding human freedom as a process of selfconfiguration of the subject or Dasein. First, we will examine the global reinterpretation of Kantian philosophy by both thinkers in the light of their philosophical projects: in the case of Cassirer, the philosophy of symbolic forms, in the case of Heidegger, the hermeneutics of facticity. Second, their interpretations of the aesthetic thought of Friedrich Schiller will be analyzed, within the framework of their reflections on the function of art for the understanding of the Selbstbildung. This will illuminate a new aspect of this debate and determine the distance between their two philosophical and political orientations. (shrink)

: The present work analyses Content Moderation, focusing on ethical concerns and cognitive effects. Starting from a general description and history of the moderation process, it stresses some ethical problems: quality of moderation, transparency, and the working conditions of human moderators. Using some of Facebook leaked slides offering examples of moderation, we define some controversial rules and principles for Commercial Content Moderation. These examples highlight a general lack of coherency and transparency, which has the potential to affect users’ cognitive attitudes, (...) their perception of reality, and their freedom of speech. Such effects are studied in comparison to other well-known online cognitive phenomena and in relation to the most recent dedicated legislation in EU countries. The current Content Moderation scheme leaves users at risk of specific cognitive distortions, highlighting the urgent need for greater transparency throughout the moderation process and better working conditions for moderators. Keywords: Content Moderation; Freedom of Speech; Epistemic Bubble; Technology Ethics Commercial Content Moderation: un oscuro labirinto per la libertà d’espressione e le opinioni degli utenti Riassunto: Il presente lavoro offre un’analisi approfondita della moderazione di contenuti, concentrandosi sulle problematiche etiche e sugli effetti cognitivi. A partire da una introduzione ai concetti chiave e alla storia della moderazione di contenuti online, si concentra su alcuni problemi etici primari: la qualità della moderazione, la sua trasparenza e le condizioni di lavoro dei lavoratori. Utilizzando dei documenti formativi interni di Facebook, pubblicati da un quotidiano e dagli esempi in essi contenuti, definiremo le controverse regole e i principi della Commercial Content Moderation. Ne emerge una generale mancanza di coerenza organizzativa e di trasparenza nel processo, che mostra potenziali effetti dannosi sulle attitudini degli utenti, sulla loro percezione della realtà e la loro libertà di parola. Tali effetti saranno studiati in confronto con i più conosciuti effetti cognitivi del mondo dei social ed in relazione alle più recenti disposizioni di leggi europee in merito. Gli schemi attualmente in uso producono degli specifici effetti di distorsione cognitiva e conseguentemente mostrano l’importanza di una maggiore attenzione alla trasparenza del processo e alle condizioni di lavoro dei moderatori. Parole chiave: Moderazione di contenuti; Libertà di parola; Bolla epistemica; Etica della tecnologia. (shrink)

This critical notice was occasioned by reading M. Espinoza, "Freedom in a Causally Determined World," Actas de las XIII Jornadas sobre Filosofía y Metodología Actual de la Ciencia, Jornadas sobre Libertad y Determinismo: Ciencias Sociales y Ciencias de la Naturaleza, Universidad de A Coruña, March 2008.

Hastings reads the novel Comme dans un film des frères Coen by Bertrand Gervais as addressing both the midlife and the blank page crisis. Indeed, the main character of this novel is a writer in his fifties who still suffers from the failure of his last novel ignored by the critics. Disenchanted, he slowly enters a world of fantasy, and falls in love with the voice of his GPS he called Gwyneth “parle trop” therefore recalling the name of the actress (...) with the same name. He gradually loses contact with his wife and his son, a successful painter, and is transformed into “the man who was not there” another character from a movie by the Coen brothers entitled The Barber: the man who was not there. Hastings asks: How could one get lost with a GPS? After the main character had initially bought his GPS for a trip in Australia in order to find his way, it started to go beyond its role as a road guide and questioned where he was in his relationship with his wife, in his career as a writer, and in his skin as a mature man. Not only was the GPS not fulfilling its purpose but also it started to ruin a fragile relationship hoping to find its way back to love during a last minute trip in Australia. Even after destroying the annoying talkative GPS, it continued to disrupt the couple in the plane on the way back to Canada. As much as Gwyneth the GPS is synonymous with escape and freedom, it is also showing the main character the wrong way, the way out of his reality, out of his family and out of his life. His attempts to free himself from Gwyneth are worthless, her image is still there, haunting his thoughts like images from a movie. But the displacement happens at another level than just the diegetic one. The confrontation of the text with moving images has consequences on the shape of the text itself. The mapping of the text on the page is influenced by this amalgam. The white page becomes a space where words are rearranged in different ways, some of which suggest poetry, other cartoons or cinematic images. The displacement of literature in areas that were previously foreign to it is at the heart of creative activity, and determines its renewal. Hastings presents the consequences resulting from the confrontation with the GPS, both on the mapping of one’s identity as well as the mapping and the shaping of the text itself. (shrink)

Karl Popper postula que no puede haber una teoría científica del desarrollo histórico que sirva de base para la predicción. Para mejorar la sociedad es necesario recurrir a la ingeniería social gradual, que busca introducir cambios tentativos, en sí mismos valiosos, al margen de que exista o no un plan general. Si no se obtiene el resultado esperado, habrá oportunidad de rectificar. El progreso gradual, la necesidad de un equilibrio de fuerzas bajo el poder del Estado, y la proporción entre (...) Estado y sociedad son vitales para la conservación de la libertad. La base teórico-social se ilustra con el ejemplo de un país imaginado, en el cual luego de un comienzo promisorio, que parecía dirigido a la construcción de una sociedad más justa, se abandonó el gradualismo, surgieron las ilusiones utópicas y terminó por apartarse de toda planificación. Palabras clave: Estado; falsacionismo; gradualismo; historicismo; ingeniería social; libertad; marxismo; planificación; sociedad; utopía. Popper and freedom. Once upon a time there was a country that went off courseKarl Popper argues that there can be no scientific theory of historical development on which historical prediction might be grounded. In order to improve society it is necessary to resort to gradual social engineering, which seeks to bring about tentative changes, valuable in themselves, regardless of whether or not there exists a general plan. If one does not reach the expected result, there will be room for rectification. Gradual progress, the need for a balance of the forces under the State’s power, and the balance between State and society are vital for the preservation of freedom. The social-theoretical basis is illustrated with the example of an imaginary country, which after a promising start -seemingly aimed at building a more just society-, simply gave up gradualism, utopian illusions emerged, and finally all planning was abandoned. Keywords: State; falsationism; gradualism; historicism; social engineering; freedom; marxism; planning; society; utopia. (shrink)

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly seen as driving a paradigm shift in mental health law, particularly in relation to the understanding that it requires a shift from substituted to supported decisions. This article identifies two competing moral commitments implied by this shift, both of which appeal to the notion of autonomy. It is argued that because of these commitments the Convention is in tension with more general calls in the medical ethics literature for preserving (...) patient autonomy through support. The competing commitments within the Convention also present a particular challenge in putting the support it requires into practice. A discursive control account of freedom is used to develop some practical guidelines for navigating this new moral territory. (shrink)

Présentation:L’année 2015 marque le dixième anniversaire de la mort de Raymond Klibansky, philosophe et historien des idées canadien. La revueDialoguelui rend hommage en publiant le texte qui suit de Mme Ethel Groffier, veuve de Raymond Klibansky et chercheure émérite au Centre de recherche Paul-André Crépeau en droit privé et comparé de l’Université McGill. Dans cette intervention, Mme Groffier rappelle l’importance de l’engagement dans la vie et l’œuvre de ce remarquable philosophe.Né en France au mois d’octobre 1905 dans une famille allemande, (...) éduqué en Allemagne à partir de la Première guerre, exilé en Angleterre en 1933, Raymond Klibansky s’installa à Montréal dès 1946, à l’invitation de l’Université McGill. Sa carrière académique au Canada et à l’étranger fut admirable et reconnue par de nombreux hommages. Il laisse derrière lui une œuvre imposante, tant en philosophie qu’en histoire des idées modernes; parmi ces idées, il s’attacha particulièrement à la tolérance et à la liberté, qui inspirèrent toute sa vie.Luc LangloisPresentation:The year 2015 marked the 10thanniversary of Raymond Klibansky’s death. As a tribute to this prominent Canadian philosopher and historian of ideas,Dialogueis proud to publish the following intervention by Ethel Groffier, Raymond Klibansky’s widow and Emeritus scholar at McGill University’s Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law. Groffier reminds us of the importance of engagement—understood in the strong, philosophical sense—in this philosopher’s life and works.Born in France in October 1905 to a German family, raised in Germany from World War I to 1933, and then forced to move to the United Kingdom, Klibansky settled in Montreal in 1946 following an invitation from McGill University. His academic career in Canada and abroad is admirable and has been acclaimed on numerous occasions. He left behind an impressive body of work in philosophy and in the history of modern ideas; among these ideas, freedom and tolerance inspired his entire life.Luc Langlois. (shrink)

Involuntary memories raise worries for any notion of constitution of memorial experiences and of the relationship between subjectivity, the past, and intentionality. However, this does not mean they are wholly intractable for an intentional analysis of consciousness. To the contrary, if one avoids conflating the will with thetic or express intentional acts, the Sartrean notion of intentionality is well-placed to account for the most salient features of involuntary memories, without resorting to appeals to non-subjective memorial processes in which any sense (...) of implication or investment in the content of involuntary memory seems difficult to locate. To make this case, two steps are taken. The first is to map out a Sartrean phenomenology of memory, by taking into consideration how his notions of intentional consciousness, absence, and lack play out at the level of memory. The second is to examine how the Sartrean model of intentional consciousness appears to be well-adapted to the phenomenal traits most salient to involuntary memories. The upshot of such an examination is a provocative phenomenological position on the nature of the resistance of the past and on doing justice to the past, that is, in regard to how memorial intentionality ought be conceived when involuntary memories contribute to the rule rather than merely being an exception in the experience of the past. (shrink)

Consent can only be voluntary, freely given and uncoerced. Can this legal adult standard also apply to children? High-risk surgery is seldom a wanted choice, but compared with the dangers of the un...

Combatting chronic, lifestyle-related disease has become a healthcare priority in the developed world. The role personal responsibility should play in healthcare provision has growing pertinence given the growing significance of individual lifestyle choices for health. Media reporting focussing on the ‘bad behaviour’ of individuals suffering lifestyle-related disease, and policies aimed at encouraging ‘responsibilisation’ in healthcare highlight the importance of understanding the scope of responsibility ascriptions in this context. Research into the social determinants of health and psychological mechanisms of health behaviour (...) could undermine some commonly held and tacit assumptions about the moral responsibility of agents for the sorts of lifestyles they adopt. I use Philip Petit's conception of freedom as ‘fitness to be held responsible’ to consider the significance of some of this evidence for assessing the moral responsibility of agents. I propose that, in some cases, factors outside the agent's control may influence behaviour in such a way as to undermine her freedom along the three dimensions described by Pettit: freedom of action; a sense of identification with one's actions; and whether one's social position renders one vulnerable to pressure from more powerful others. (shrink)

Given the increasing complexity of living in a global village, countries and regions that are parts of larger political entities frequently have considered the option of separating or seceding an ideal solution to their problems with a larger center of power. Isolation, a form of “freedom from,” has the potential of offering them free rein or “freedom to” manage their affairs for their own sake. Francophone playwrights and filmmakers have found the dialectical interplay between “freedom from” and “freedom to” fertile (...) dramatic soil for plays and films. Some of them work in both of these and other genres. These works seem to ask the same question: Is it desirable or possible to achieve both, even in ideal isolation, without suffering cultural stagnation or repeating the abuse of power on the part of the political center that led to the separation? This article explores the answers to this question given in the plays of Aimée Césaire, Anne Hébert, and Wajdi Mouawad within the greater context for this issue found in J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians and Azouz Begag’s Un Mouton dans la baignoire and in francophone films by Raoul Peck, Bertrand Tavernier, Claire Denis, Rachid Bouchareb, Ousmane Sembène, Michael Haneke, and Mathieu Kasovitz. (shrink)

Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman (...) animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes. (shrink)